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Abstract 
Judgment recognition and enforcement (JRE) between US sister states, 
between EU member states, and between Mainland China, Hong Kong, and 
Macao, are in the category of “interregional JRE.” This Dissertation is a 
comparative study and focuses on what lessons China can draw from the US and 
the EU to develop a Multilateral JRE Arrangement between Mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and Macao.  
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Chapter I Introduction 
?
A. Introduction: Theme and Contribution of this Dissertation 
Generally speaking, states in a country or nation-states in a supranational system not only 
share an overarching constitutional framework but also enjoy a higher degree of economic, 
geographical, cultural, and historical proximity with one another than with outsiders.1 Therefore, 
a state is usually more willing to recognise and enforce a judgment2 issued by a court in a sister 
state than a court in a state outside the constitutional framework.3 For example in the US, the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and the related statute4 require full-faith-and-
credit recognition and enforcement of judgments between sister states, but they do not apply to 
judgments from foreign countries.5 Similarly in the EU, the 1968 Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter 
“Brussels Convention”)6 and the corresponding 2002 Regulation (hereinafter “Brussels I 
                                                        
1 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979) (indicating “as members of the same political family” and being bound by “the 
deep and vital interests,” sister states in the US should “presume a greater degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness towards 
one another, than…between foreign nations.”) See also Arthur T von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International 
Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 191, 194 (Spring 2001) (discussing the example of countries in Western Europe). 
See also Arthur T von Mehren, The Case for a Convention-mixte Approach to Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 61 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLĀNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
86, 90 (1997). 
2 Without special indications, “judgment” in this dissertation is used broadly to include all types of judicial awards. This 
dissertation focuses on judgments in civil and commercial cases; therefore, judgments in cases of divorce, maintenance, 
guardianship, or other family law cases are excluded. For the definition of "civil and commercial" in detail, see Chapter V. 
3 A T von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice 
in the European Economic Community and the United States, 81 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1044, 1045-50 (1981). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 1738.  
5 U.S. CONST IV, § 1 states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the…judicial proceedings of every other 
State.” The meaning of this provision is particularized by the Judiciary Act of 1790: “records and judicial proceedings of any 
court of any…State…” of the United States “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court…as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of such State… from which they are taken.” For explanations, see EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 1264-65, 1279-82 (4th ed. 2004). 
6 [1978] OJ L 304, 36. The 1968 text of the Brussels Convention has been amended four times because of the enlargement of the 
EU: the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom on October 9, 1978; the accession of Greece on October 25, 
1982; the accession of Spain and Portugal on May 26, 1989; and the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden on November 29, 
1996. The latest consolidated version of the Brussels Convention was reproduced at OJ C 27 (Jan. 26, 1998) and it is this version 
to which reference is made in this article. See Peter Kaye, Transitional Scope of the Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 7 
CIV. JUST. Q. 53 (1988). 
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Regulation)7 provide that judgments rendered in an EU member state are entitled to recognition 
without review of the merits and subject to only limited exceptions.8 But, neither the Brussels 
Convention nor the Brussels I Regulation applies to judgments from non-EU countries.9  
A comparable situation exists in China. Hong Kong and Macao are special administrative 
regions (hereinafter "SAR") in China.10 The policy of “One Country, Two Systems” provides a 
quasi-constitutional regime for the three regions.11 They also share economic, geographical, 
cultural, and historical proximity with one another. However, there is no multilateral judgment 
recognition and enforcement (hereinafter “JRE”) scheme among them, as there is in the US and 
the EU; and it is harder to recognize and enforce sister-region judgments in China than in the US 
and the EU.12 The most severe issue is that majority of judgments rendered by Mainland courts 
are practically unrecognizable and unenforceable in Hong Kong, and vice versa.13 Therefore, 
tremendous efforts need to be made to develop an effective and efficient JRE system among 
                                                        
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 12, 1-23. The Brussels Regulation came into effect on March 1, 2002. The Brussels 
Convention remains in force as regards the relations between Denmark and the other Member States. 
8 For exceptions, see art. 35 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
9 Art. 32 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
10 Art. 31 of the PRC Constitution [Xian Fa] (Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on Dec. 4, 
1982, and amended on Mar. 14, 2004). The preamble of the Hong Kong Basic Law (Adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh 
National People's Congress on Apr. 4, 1990, effective on July 1, 1997) and the Macao Basic Law (Adopted at the First Session of 
the Eighth National People's Congress on Mar. 31, 1993, effective as of  Dec. 20, 1999). For discussion of SAR in constitutional 
law, see Arnaldo Gonçalves, A Paradigm of Autonomy: The Hong Kong and Macau Sars, 18 CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA 36, 
36-60 (1996). For the status of SAR in international law, see Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Status of Hong Kong and Macao Under the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV 307, 314-17 (2004). SARs are 
different from ethnic autonomous regions in China, such as the Tibet Autonomous Region. For comments on ethnic autonomous 
regions, see Lok Wai Kin, The Relationship between Central and Local Governments Under the Unitary State System of China,  
in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER 
THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 527, 533-37 (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). Chunli Xia, Autonomous 
Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People's Republic of China: The Law and the Reality,  in ONE COUNTRY, 
TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 541, 541-63 (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Gardinal ed. 2009). For comparison between SARs and ethnic 
autonomous regions, see Dan Wei, Comments Local Autonomy in the Context of Chinese Political Modernization, 583, 586-590 
(Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). For more discussions, see fn 214. 
11 For discussion of the policy of “One Country, Two Systems,” see Guiguo Wang & Priscilla MF Leung, One Country, Two 
Systems: Theory into Practice, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 279, 279-321 (1998). 
12 For details, see infra the Part of Current JRE System in China in Section C of Chapter I. 
13 Although the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement has been implemented, because of its narrow scope, majority of judgments 
are left out. For details, see infra Chapter III.  
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Chinese regions.14 JRE regimes among the US sister states and among the EU member states can 
provide rich reference resources for Chinese regions to establish such a JRE system.15 Therefore 
this dissertation aims to draw useful lessons from the US and EU JRE laws to help achieve free 
circulation of judgments among Chinese regions.16  
This dissertation intends to propose a Multilateral JRE Arrangement to help alleviate the 
current JRE difficulties in China.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                
  
                               
  
  
                           
Figure 1: ? Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
 
This dissertation is significant because the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement can serve as a 
reference for the legislatures of the three regions to reform the current system. An ultimate 
solution to Chinese interregional JRE problems is to develop a Multilateral Arrangement, 
because it will create the interregional unification that bilateral and regional laws cannot offer.17 
This has been observed for Europe by Peter Kaye in his invaluable treatise:18 
 
[T]he real obstacle to easy and effective [judgment] enforcement was complexity and 
diversity of national law conditions therefore, and that consequently, what was required 
was facilitation, simplification and unification of such recognition and enforcement 
conditions and procedure; [] bilateral enforcement treaties … were divergent and 
                                                        
14 For need and feasibility of developing the existing JRE system between Chinese regions, see Section D of Chapter I. 
15 For reasons why the US and the EU laws can provide a rich resource for China, see Part i of Section C of Chapter I. 
16 For what lessons that China can draw from the US and the EU JRE laws, see Chapter IV and V.  
17 For details, see Chapter III. 
18 PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, 4 (1987). 
Mainland China 
Macao Hong Kong 
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incomplete.... (Emphasis added) 
 
By proposing a Multilateral JRE Arrangement, ultimately this dissertation aims to help 
realize free circulation of judgments in an effective and efficient way among Chinese regions. It 
can help achieve judicial economy by decreasing re-litigation19 and maintain certainty between 
parties regarding their rights and obligations.20 As the Supreme Court of the US noted,21 
 
[i]t is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should be a place 
to begin litigation. After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his 
evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision…merely retries the 
issue previously determined. There is no reason to expect that the second decision will be 
more satisfactory than the first.  
 
In addition, the importance of JRE is not limited to collecting debts. It is also directly related 
to social justice, since justice cannot be achieved unless a legally effective judgment is 
enforced.22 Therefore, my dissertation also intends to enhance the administration of justice 
among Chinese regions.   
 
This Chapter serves as an introduction to the whole dissertation. Besides Theme and 
Contribution of this Dissertation (Section One), it has four other sections. Section Two discusses 
                                                        
19 James D. Sumner, Jr. The Full-Faith-And-Credit Clause—Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224, 249 (1954-1955). 
(indicating the Res judicata is the policy underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause and it aims to avoid re-litigation, achieve 
economic use of judicial resources). See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Prefatory Note of the 
Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act. 
20 See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 
81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1601-04 (1968) (indicating five reasons attesting to the vital importance of recognizing foreign 
judgments: achieving efficiency, protecting successful party, avoiding forum shopping, granting authority to the more appropriate 
jurisdiction, fostering stability and unity in an international order). See also Stephen Kai-yi Wong, Comments Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Court Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Between Hong Kong SAR and the Mainland,  in ONE 
COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE 
RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA , 378 (Jorge Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal (eds) ed. 2009) (indicating "interests of the 
judgment creditors and debtors" is a factor to establish an interregional JRE arrangement). Sumner, supra note 19 at 249. Scoles 
et al., supra note_5_ at 1258. For cases, see Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348 (1942). 
21 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). 
22 See Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Rule and Reason in the Common Law of Foreign Judgments, 12 CAN. J. L & JURIS 193 (July 
1999). 
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the concept of interregional JRE. Section Three introduces the comparative perspectives of this 
dissertation. It first presents the comparative approach adopted by this dissertation, then it briefly 
compares the interregional JRE systems in the US, the EU, and China. It demonstrates that 
Chinese interregional JRE systems are far more ineffective and inefficient than that adopted by 
the US and the EU. It points out the major problem of the current Chinese JRE system is the 
absence of an overarching JRE scheme and insufficiency of substantive laws. Section Four 
analyzes the need for and feasibility of a multilateral JRE system in China. The last Section 
presents the structure of what follows. 
 
B. Concept of Interregional JRE  
 
“Interregional JRE” refers to recognizing and enforcing judgments between different regions 
(1) within a country, such as between states in the US and between Mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and Macao in China, or (2) within a supranational system, such as between member states in the 
EU. “Region” is used to denote a territorial unit that has its own system of private law, as 
opposed to “country,” which always implies sovereignty,23 or to “state,”24 which has never been 
used to describe the status of Hong Kong and Macao in Chinese law since Hong Kong and 
Macao are special administrative regions in China.25  
Some scholars suggest that interregional JRE should be restricted within one country.26 
                                                        
23 “Region” and “country” are not used interchangeably in this dissertation. “Country” is a territorial unit with sovereignty. But 
“region” may be a country, or a territorial subdivision of a country and this subdivision has no sovereignty.  
24 But see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS § 2 (1934), which provides “…the word state denotes a territorial unit in 
which the general body of law is separate and distinct from the law of any other territorial unit.” This definition makes no 
distinction between interregional and international JRE. 
25 Legislation and scholarship regarding Hong Kong and Macao always use “region,” rather than “state” to describe these two 
regions. Eg., See art. 31 of the PRC Constitution, art. 1 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, and art. 1 of the Macao Basic Law, Wang & 
Leung, supra note 11 at 284 and quoted in H Chiu, Legal Problems with Hong Kong Model for Unification of China and Their 
Implications for Taiwan, 2 J. CHINESE L. 83, 87 (1998).  
26 Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, “One Country, Two Systems,” Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: The 
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However, this suggestion has two problems. First, it improperly excludes the EU JRE system 
outside of the comparative parameters.27 Interregional JRE should include both JRE within one 
country and JRE within a supranational system. This has been supported by the fact that the JRE 
systems among US states and among EU member states are frequently compared to each other, 
despite structural differences.28 Moreover, the EU JRE law can offer valuable insights for 
improving interregional JRE in China.29 Therefore, in this dissertation the definition of 
interregional JRE includes the JRE system among EU members, among US states, and among 
Chinese regions. Second, it ignores the fact that interregional JRE can be discussed irrespective 
of sovereignty concerns. For example, both before and after Hong Kong reunited with Mainland 
China, it regards Taiwan as a non-recognized government.30 However, in Chen Li Hung v. Ting 
Lei Miao, the Hong Kong court ruled that the recognition and enforcement of Taiwan judgments 
did not violate Hong Kong public policy when31   
 
(1) the rights covered by those [judgments] are private rights; 
(2) giving effect to such [judgments] accords with the interests of justice, the dictates 
of common sense and the needs of law and order; and; 
(3) giving them effect would not be inimical to the sovereign’s interests or otherwise 
contrary to public policy. 
 
 
The Chen Li Hung court emphasized that recognizing and enforcing such judgments does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Emerging Inter-regional Conflicts of Law in China, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289, 292 (1994) (defining "inter-regional 
conflicts of law" as "conflicts of law among regions with different legal systems within one country"). 
27 For scholarships comparing the EU JRE system with Chinese interregional JRE systems, see Section C of Chapter II. 
28 Eg., Peter Hay, The Development of the Public Policy Barrier to Judgment Recognition Within the European Community,  THE 
EUROPEAN LEGAL FORUM 289, 289-290 (2007); Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the 
United States and Europe: How Can We Achieve a Comprehensive Treaty, REVIEW of LITIGATION 382, 382-432 (Spring 2004).  
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference, 57 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS 271, 274-76 (1994); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdiction Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL LAW 
REVIEW 89, 89-91, 115 (1999). For earlier contributions, see Peter Hay, the Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcements of Judgments, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1968), Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the 
Common Market, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 44 (1975).  
29 For scholarship discussing the lessons from the EU JRE law for China, see Section C of Chapter II. For what insights that the 
EU JRE law can offer for a Multilateral JRE Arrangement among Chinese regions, see Chapter IV and V.  
30 Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao [2000] 1 HKC 461, [2000] 1 HKLR 252, per Mr. Justice Bokhary PJ (indicating Taiwan is 
“under the de jure sovereignty of the PRC but is presently under the de facto albeit unlawful control of a usurper government.”) 
31 Id. 
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involve recognizing this non-recognized government and its courts in public international law.32 
Therefore, it is unnecessary to combine interregional JRE with the issue of sovereignty.  
Interregional JRE is distinct from international JRE, because for the former the participating 
regions are under a constitutional or quasi-constitutional regime, such as the US Constitution for 
American states, the Treaty on European Union for EU members,33 and the policy of “One 
Country, Two Systems” for Chinese regions. For the case of international JRE, no mutually 
accepted constitutional or quasi-constitutional system exists between signatories. For example, 
China and France concluded the Treaty of Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs,34 
but they have never shared any constitutional or quasi-constitutional regime. Thus, the JRE 
between China and France is international, not interregional, JRE.  
 
C. A Comparative Perspective 
 
This section presents the comparative perspective of this dissertation. It first introduce the 
comparative method. Then it compares the current interregional JRE systems in the US, the EU, 
and China. It demonstrates that the current Chinese interregional JRE system suffers from (1) no 
formal uniformity because an overarching multilateral JRE scheme is absent and (2) insufficient 
substantive law so it is harder to enforce sister-region judgments in China than in the US and the 
EU. 
 
i. Introduction to the Method: Comparative Studies 
                                                        
32 Id. 
33 The Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht on Feb 7, 1992 and entered into force on Nov 1, 1993. Its Art. 2 
provides that "This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe..." For 
the significance of this Treaty, see http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/maastricht.htm (last visited March 22, 2010). 
34 THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS ON MAY 4, 1987 BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND 
FRANCE, http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/10/10-4.htm (last visited Feb 4, 2010).  
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This dissertation is a comparative study of interregional JRE systems in China, the US, and 
the EU. It aims to draw useful lessons from the US and the EU to help design an effective and 
efficient Multilateral JRE Arrangement among three Chinese regions. Admittedly, in many 
aspects interregional legal conflicts in China are different from those between US sister states 
and between EU member states.35 However, these differences cannot deny the value of a 
comparative study for four reasons.  
First, interregional JRE systems in the US and the EU are more effective and efficient than 
the current system in China.36 Many scholars have devoted themselves to researching how to 
improve Chinese interregional JRE system by reference to those in the US and the EU.37 
However, those researches are insufficient38 and this dissertation will help fill this gap. 
Undeniably, China, the US, and the EU have different legal, economic, and political systems, 
which may play a role in shaping their JRE laws.39 Thus, when I transplant the US and EU JRE 
laws to China, I need to carefully assess how these differences may affect the feasibility of such 
transplant.  
Second, conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law in civil and commercial cases have 
greatly decreased between Mainland China and its sister regions. In civil and commercial cases, 
socialist law refers to laws of planned economy, as opposed to capitalist law that implies laws of 
market economy. Since Mainland China accessed to the WTO in 2001, in terms of civil and 
commercial law, it is in an ongoing process of reforming its laws to comply with the WTO 
                                                        
35 Eg., the four distinctive characteristics of Chinese interregional legal conflicts, see Depei Han, Lun Wo Guo De Qu Ji Fa Lv 
Chong Tu Wen Ti---Wo Guo Guo Ji Shi Fa Yan Jiu Zhong De Yi Ge Xin Ke Ti [An Analysis of Chinese Interregional Legal 
Conflicts: A New Subject in Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws], 6 ZHONG GUO FA XUE [CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 3, 5 (1998). 
36 See infra Part iv of Section C of Chapter I.  
37 See infra discussions of comparative scholarship in Chapter II. 
38 Id 
39 See Salvatore Mancuso, Legal Transplants and Economic Development: Civil Law Vs. Common Law?,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO 
SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 75, 87 (Jorge Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). 
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standards.40 Therefore, the conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law have significantly 
decreased in civil and commercial cases.41 Second, a survey of using the public policy exception 
in Chinese interregional conflicts demonstrate conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law 
have been becoming less an issue in civil and commercial cases in China.42 Therefore in many 
aspects China can draw from the US and the EU to enhance its interregional JRE system in civil 
and commercial cases, although their laws are not designed to address the conflicts between 
socialist law and capitalist law.43  
Third, China can use insights from the EU JRE laws on how to solve conflicts between civil 
law and common law. The EU is constituted by both civil- and common-law countries.44 The EU 
experience to coordinate the different JRE systems in these two types of countries will have 
special implications for China, because the civil-law tradition, especially that originating from 
Germany, has strongly influenced Mainland China and Macao, and the English common-law 
tradition has shaped Hong Kong’s legal system.45 Therefore, China may draw useful lessons 
from the US and the EU JRE laws to coordinate its multi-legal systems.  
Fourth, lack of mutual trust is a problem not only among the EU members46 but also among 
Chinese regions. Therefore, the EU efforts to enhancing mutual trust can shed a light on China.  
As a conclusion, many thorny interregional JRE problems that China faces may have 
already been solved by the US and the EU; therefore, the rich jurisprudence in the US and the 
                                                        
40 For Mainland China's efforts in revising laws of planned economy in order to fulfil its obligations under the WTO, see Part i of 
Section A of Chapter IV.  
41 See Xiao Yongpin, The Conflict of Laws Between Mainland China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: the 
Choice of Coordination Models, 4  in YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 163, 198 (2003). See also Henry S. Gao, 
Taming the Dragon: China's Experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, SSRN ELIBRARY, 369, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095803 (last visited Apr 6, 2010) (indicating China is halfway between a 
planned economy and a market economy). For detailed discussion, see Part i of Section A of Chapter IV. 
42 For details, see Part ii of Section A of Chapter IV. 
43 For details, see Chapter IV. 
44 For the crash between English common law and the European continental civil law, see Jonathan Harris, Understanding the 
English Response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law, 4 JOURNAL OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 347, 394-95 
(2008). 
45 See Mancuso, supra note_39_ at 87. 
46 See Harris, supra note_44_ at 370. 
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EU can provide insights for China to establish a multilateral JRE regime.  
 
ii. Free Circulation of Judgments in the US 
 
Free circulation of judgments among the US sister states is based on the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause47 and the Full Faith and Credit Statute.48 Free circulation of judgments is desirable 
for US sister states because it helps enhance interstate administration of justice and political 
unification of originally independent colonies. It is feasible because, as a constitutional 
requirement, the Full Faith and Credit Clause create an overarching JRE scheme binding for 
every American state.  
 
1. Historical Backgrounds 
 
The historical background of drafting the Full Faith and Credit Clause is related to the 
demand of interstate coordination in the administration of justice.49 Before the American 
Revolution, the courts of each colony regarded the judgments rendered in sister colonies as 
prima facie evidence so could review its substance in the JRE proceedings.50 Before 1776, Great 
Britain never enacted any law to require courts in its colonies to recognize and enforce 
judgments rendered in its territory or other colonies.51 Consequently, judgment debtors could 
                                                        
47 U.S. CONST, art. IV, § 1. 
48 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373, 134 L. Ed. 2d 6, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996); 
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485, 72 L. Ed. 2d 262, 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982). 
49 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (indicating that the "clear purpose" of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is to "establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to 
judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered").  
50  See Hilton v. Guyot 159 U.S. 180-81 (1895), Bissell v. Briggs 9 Mass. 462, 464, 465 (1813). See also Sumner, supra note 19 at 
226.  
51  Sumner, supra note 19 at 227.  
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easily escape from debts by simply moving to a neighboring colony.52 Since the middle of the 
seventeenth century, a handful of colonies began to abandon the concept of independence from 
each other.53 Four colonies passed statutes favoring JRE.54 In 1778, the Articles of Confederation 
provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts and 
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other States.”55 When the Articles of 
Confederation was replaced by the Constitution, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was broadened 
by including “public acts” and strengthened by authorizing the Congress to enact relevant laws.56 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the federal statute established an interstate JRE system that 
assures the administration of justice.57 In Justice Jackson’s words,58 
 
… [T]he full faith and credit clause is the foundation of any hope we may have for a truly 
national system of justice, based on the preservation but better integration of the local 
jurisdictions we have.  
 
Moreover, before the American Revolution, a requested colony usually imposed very 
stringent requirements in verifying judgments from a sister colony.59 For example, some courts 
required a judgment creditor to provide the original judgment, and in case of missing, to provide 
                                                        
52  Id. For the example of Massachusetts, see Willis L. M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to 
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1949). 
53  Sumner, supra note 19 at 227. See Hilton v. Guyot 159 U.S. 181 (1895). See also Note: The History of the Adoption of Section 
I of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of Federal 
Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 470, 470-71 (1904). 
54  Sumner, supra note 19 at 227. Colonies that passed JRE statutes are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and South 
Carolina. CONNECTICUT, ACTS AND LAWS, TITLE VERDICTS (1650); ACTS OF ASSEMBLY PASSED IN THE 
PROVINCE OF MARYLAND FROM 1692 TO 1715; 1 BREVARD, DIGEST OF PUBLIC STATUTORY LAW OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 316, title 74, sec. 6; and 14 GEO. 5 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 
323 (1774). 
55 Articles of Confederation Art. IV, last paragraph. For historical background, see McElmoyle v. Cohen (1839) 13 Pet. at P.325, 
Sumner, supra note 19 at 229-30. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—the Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. 
L. REV.1, 3-7 (1945). Note, supra note 53 at 471-72. 
56 For the differences between The Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, see Note, 
supra note 53 at 474. For the history of The Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Articles of Confederation, see Reese & Johnson, 
supra note 52 at 153-55. 
57 Sumner, supra note 19 at 243. Jackson, supra note 55 at 2.   
58 Jackson, supra note 55 at 34. 
59  Sumner, supra note 19 at 245.  
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witnesses to testify a copy of a judgment was authentic.60 Therefore, the JRE proceedings were 
“tedious, expensive, time-consuming, and at times impossible.”61 According to the authorization 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress enacted federal statutes62 and established an 
inexpensive and simplified method of proving sister-state judgments.63 In this sense, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause was designed to “unify the systems of justice.”64 
In addition, the Full Faith and Credit Clause also reflects the aspiration of uniting 
independent and sovereign American colonies into a political union.65 When the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention met, the new country was confronted with the problem that no unity 
existed among the states.66 As a scholar described67 
 
The states considered each other as foreign countries. Experience had shown that such an 
association of federated states as was created by the Articles of Confederation could not 
result in the establishment of a nation. Without unification, the progress of each state, as 
well as the development of the country, was handicapped. 
 
The framers of the Constitution clearly realized that each state needed to forego some degree of 
its sovereignty for the benefit of establishing a unified country.68 The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause was desirable because it was one of clauses incorporated into the Constitution to achieve 
this goal.69 The Clause accorded the citizens of different states equal privileges throughout of a 
                                                        
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62 Act of May 26, 1790, 1 STAT. 122 (the law declared that “records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall 
have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the US, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from 
whence the said records are or shall be taken”). Act of March 27, 1804, 2 STAT. 298 (supplementing the Act of May 26, 1790 and 
providing the authentication of records etc., not relating to a court.) 
63  Sumner, supra note 19 at 245-46. 
64  Paul D. Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 382-83 (1963). Sumner, supra note 19 
at 246. Gray J. in Atherton v. Atherton (1900) 181 U.S. at P. 160 (indicating The Full Faith and Credit Clause “was intended to 
give the same conclusive effect to the judgments of all the states so as to promote certainty and uniformity in the rule among 
them.”)  
65 Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1228 (2009). 
66 David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L. J. 1584, 1586 and 1610 (2009). 
67 Sumner, supra note 19 at 241.  
68 Id, at 242.  
69 Id. 
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unified country.70 As a result, it “basically altered the status of the States as independent 
sovereigns.”71 
 
2. The Full-Faith-and-Credit-JRE System 
 
A basic feature of the American interstate JRE system is that states need to obey the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Statute for interstate recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.72Art. IV, § 1 of the federal Constitution provides that “Full faith and 
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every 
other state. The Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records 
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”73 The Supreme Court of the US 
interpreted this clause as having three distinct objects:74 
 
1. To declare that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the records etc. in 
every other state. 2. The manner of authenticating such records, etc.; and, 3. Their effect 
when so authenticated. The first is declared and established by the constitution itself, and 
was to receive no aid, nor was it susceptible of any qualification by the legislature of the 
United States. The second and third objects of the section were expressly referred to the 
legislature of the union to be carried into effect in such manner as to that body might seem 
right. 
 
The Judiciary Act of 1790 expanded the Full Faith and Credit Clause as: “Such Acts, records 
                                                        
70 Id.  
71 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546, 92 L. Ed. 1561, 68 S. Ct. 1213 (1948). Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 
68 S. Ct. 1087 (1948) ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers 
for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation."). see Jackson, supra note 37 at 18. 
72 LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL III & ET AL, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 631 (LexisNexis 2004, 4th 
e.d.). ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 710 (2007).  C. SYMEONIDES & ET AL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERCIAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 710 (Thomason West 2003, 2nd e.d.). The Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution and the 
relevant statute also apply to public acts and records of the states. 
73 U.S. CONST. Art. IV, Sec. I.  
74 Washington J. in Green v. Sarmiento (1811) 3 Wash. (C.C.) 17 at P. 21. 
 19 
and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and 
credit in every court…as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State… from which 
they are taken.”75 Notably, the Full Faith and Credit Clause not only covers sister-state judicial 
proceedings, but also includes sister-state statutes,76 common law, and public records. Judicial 
proceedings are the focus of this dissertation.  
 The Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute generally require every 
requested state to give sister-state judgments at least the res judicata effect that the judgment 
would be accorded in the rendering state.77 Full faith and credit to sister-state judgments is also 
demonstrated in the Second Conflicts Restatement:78 
[T]he local law of the State where the judgment was rendered determines, subject to 
constitutional limitations, whether, and to what extent the judgment is conclusive as to the 
issues involved in a later suit between the parties or their privies, upon a different claim or 
cause of action. 
 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, taken alone, does not provide a systematic inter-state JRE 
scheme.79 Moreover, Congress has never exercised its power to enact a law to fill this gap. 
Therefore, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law made the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in 1948. Its 1964 revision establishes a speedy and 
economical JRE mechanism between sister-state courts, which is substantially similar to the JRE 
mechanism provided by Congress in 1948 for the inter-district enforcement of Federal District 
                                                        
75 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1964) (originally enacted in 1790). For full faith and credit clause in family cases, see Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, 28 
U.S.C.A. §1738B, and the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C. For explanation of The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
see Scoles, supra note 5 at 1279-82. 
76 See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155 (1932). 
77 See Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235, 4 L.Ed. 378. Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481, 484, 3 L.Ed. 411. Riley v. New 
York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 353 (1942). The Full Faith and Credit Clause also require federal courts to recognize and enforce 
state court judgments and vice versa, which is not a focus of this study. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. 
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 95, comment (g) (1971).  
79 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839).  
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Court judgments.80 Under the Act, if a sister-state judgment complies with the filing and notice 
requirements of a requested state, this state should enforce it in the same manner as its own 
judgment.81  
If a judgment is final,82 valid,83 and on the merits,84 it is entitled to Full Faith and Credit JRE 
in all sister states. No review of merits is allowed.85 Lack of jurisdiction,86 undue process,87 and 
fraud88 are widely accepted defenses Full Faith and Credit interstate JRE. Notably, these 
defenses are limited by the principle of res judicata: if the judgment debtor has alleged and fully 
litigated these defenses in the judgment-rendering court, the requested court is precluded from 
reviewing the same defenses again. Moreover, the public policy exception can never constitute a 
defense to interstate Full-Faith-and-Credit JRE.89 The Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a 
                                                        
80 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Act, 13 U.L.A. 155 (1964 revision of the original 1948 Act).  
81 § 2 and 3 of the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.  
82 A judgment subject to appeal or against which an appeal has been perfected is regarded as a final judgment. Bank of North 
America v Wheeler (1859) 28 Conn 433. Faber v Hovey (1875) 117 Mass 107. C.f. Re Forslund (1963) 123 Vt 341, 189 A2d 537, 
2 ALR3d 1379 (the Vermont court held that a California custody order was not final so not entitled to full faith and credit 
recognition because an appeal against it has not been finished in California). For details, see infra Part ii of Section B of Chapter 
IV. 
83 See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ET AL., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).   
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 93 (1971).  
85 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, (1908). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 106 (1971). 
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 97 (1971). Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 547-549 (1948) (in this case, a New York 
court awarded a permanent alimony to a wife. Later the husband moved to and resided in Nevada. He ceased paying the alimony 
after getting a divorce decree in a Nevada court by the constructive service upon the wife. The wife filed suit for alimony arrears. 
The husband argued that the Nevada decree should be recognized in New York. The Supreme Court held that Nevada could not 
adjudicate the rights of the wife under the New York judgment when she was not personally served and did not appeal in the 
divorce proceeding. Therefore, the Court divided the effects of the Nevada decree to accommodate the interests of both Nevada 
and New York: the full faith and credit recognition was given to the part of the Nevada decree that affecting marital status but not 
to the part of alimony). Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901), Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29 (1917), Hansberry v. 
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41.  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979), Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina 
Life & Accident & Health Insurance Guaranty Assn. ET AL., 455 U.S. 691 (1982). For details, see infra Part i of Section C of 
Chapter V. 
87 Russell v. Perry, 14 N.H. 152, 155 (1843). Undue process generally refers to that the defendant does not get reasonably notice 
and opportunity to be heard. See Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int’l, 231 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (F1’s mistake in not allowing amendment 
of pleadings does not violate due process, so its judgment is entitled to full faith and credit recognition in F2). For details, see 
infra Part ii of Section C of Chapter V. 
88 For leading cases regarding fraud in the US JRE law, see United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 and Allegheny 
Corporation v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For details, see infra Part iv of Section C of Chapter V. 
89 See Baker v. GM, 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 
438, 88 L. Ed. 149, 64 S. Ct. 208 (1943) (the Supreme Court is "aware of [no] considerations of local policy or law which could 
rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Act of Congress require to be 
given to [a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.") Differently, a forum can determine the applicable law by the 
consideration of public policy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-424, 59 L. Ed. 2d 416, 99 S. Ct. 1182 (1979).  
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requested state to determine how to enforce sister-state judgments.90 As a conclusion, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and consequent legislations create an effective and efficient JRE system 
among US sister states.  
 
iii. Free Circulation of Judgments in the EU 
 
Free circulation of judgments among the EU member states is created by the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. The Brussels regime provides an overarching JRE 
scheme and substantive laws for EU members. This regime is deemed necessary because the EU 
framers believed that free circulation of judgments could enhance market integration and legal 
certainty in the EU.  
 
1. Historical Backgrounds 
 
Before the adoption of the Brussels Convention, the domestic JRE laws in European states 
were restrictive in JRE and states adopted bilateral treaties to solve JRE difficulties. For example, 
the Netherlands would deny JRE in the absence of a JRE treaty.91 Both France and Luxembourg 
permitted révision au fond in some circumstances.92 Germany required reciprocity as a condition 
                                                        
90 Baker v. GM, 522 U.S. 222, 235 (Full faith and credit clause does not require a requested state must adopt the practices of the 
judgment-rendering state “regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments"). McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. 
Cohen, 13 Peters 312, 325 (1839). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 99 (1971) (indicating "[t]he local law of the 
forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced."). 
91 See DUTCH CODE CIV. PROC. (WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING), .art. 431(1) (1838, amended 
1946). 
92 Révision au foud implies that requested courts re-examine the merits of a foreign judgment. eg., Holker v. Parker, decision of 
Apr. 19, 1819, Cass. civ., 1819 S. Jur. I 288. But French courts abondoned révision au foud after Munzer v. Jacoby-Munzer, Cour 
de Cass., Ch. Civ. (1st Sect.), Jan. 7, 1964. For comments, see Kurt H Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-
Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 72 (1964) and Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 7 (1988). For Luxembourg law, see Pellus v. Detilloux, Cour 
Supérieure, April 20, 1964, 19 Pasicrisie Luxembourgeoise 371.  
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for JRE.93 Belgium courts were allowed to re-examine foreign judgments.94 Italy denied 
judgments by default had conclusive effects.95 Various bilateral treaties existed between these 
states except Luxembourg.96 
Against this background, the framers of the EU were concerned that business confidence 
would be harmed and economic integration would be discouraged if a uniform JRE interregional 
system was absent.97 Therefore, the development of the EU interregional JRE mechanism is 
designed to parallel with European economic integration.98 The significance of JRE to trade is 
best described by an invitation note sent by the European Economic Community’s Commission 
to the Community’s six member states on October 22, 1959 to invite them to negotiate the 
Brussels Convention. In this note, the Commission stated that99  
 
“The economic lift of the Community may be subject to disturbances and difficulties unless 
it is possible, where necessary by judicial means, to ensure the recognition and enforcement 
of the various rights arising from the existence of a multiplicity of legal relationships. As 
jurisdiction in both civil and commercial matters is derived from the sovereignty of Member 
States, and since the effect of judicial acts is confined to each territory, legal protection and, 
hence, legal certainty in the common market are essentially dependent on the adoption by 
the Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.”  
 
                                                        
93 § 328(1) GERMAN CODE CIV. PROC (ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO]), (1877). Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and 
Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 175, 186-7 (2005). 
94 See Law on Jurisdiction of March 25, 1876, art. 10, [1876] Pasinomie (Belgium) 121, 129; Projet de loi contenant le Code 
judiciaire art. 570, Belgian Senate Document no. 60, 1963/64 Sess. 
95 See ITALIAN CODE CIV. PROC. (CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE) art. 798 (1942). 
96 Kurt H Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper FORA in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997 (1967). 
97 John Fitzpatrick, The Lugano Convention and Western European Integration: a Comparative Analysis of Jurisdiction and 
Judgments in Europe and the US, CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 695, 699 (Spring, 1993). See the Preamble to the 
Brussels Convention and the Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1, 38. See also P.M. NORTH & J.J. 
FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (1987). 
98 Fitzpatrick, supra note 97 at 695-96. See Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of Judgments in the European Community: the 
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 559, 572-73 (1992-1993). 
99 von Mehren, supra note 72 at 70. Pippa Rogerson, Chapter 1 Scope,  in BRUSSELS I REGULATION , 47 (ULRICH 
MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007). 
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Because legal and economic integration often comes together, Article 63 of the Brussels 
Convention provided that any state becoming a member of the EC should accept the Brussels 
Convention.100 The Preamble of the Brussels I Regulation also emphasized the significance of 
free circulation of judgments for economic integration. It states that in order to progressively 
establish an area of freedom, security, and justice, ensure the free movement of persons, and 
maintain the sound operation of the internal market, the measures relating to JRE is necessary.101    
Besides facilitating economic integration, the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I 
Regulation also aim to ensure legal certainty regarding jurisdiction and JRE.102 They provide 
highly foreseeable rules and efficient procedures to achieve this goal.103 
  
2. The Brussels I Regulation 
 
The Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation realize free circulation of judgments 
among EU members.104 Different from the Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation is 
directly applicable to EU members.105 The Regulation was enacted by the European Commission 
after it gained competence to enact regulations in the field of police and administration of justice 
according to the Treaty of Amsterdam.106 However, regarding texts and substances, the 
                                                        
100 Art. 63 of the Brussels Convention. 
101 Preamble (1) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
102 Ulrich Magnus, Introduction,  in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 8-9 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski ed. 2007). 
103 Id.  
104 von Mehren, supra note 72 at 69. Burkhard Hess & Et. Al, The Brussels I-Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, 17 (Verlag C. H. 
Beck München 2008). Another significant regulation the EU adopted is the Regulation on the Creation of a European 
Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims in 2004. Council Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of 21 April, 2004 ([2004] OJ L 143, 
15-39). It came into forth on October 21, 2005. But this Regulation is distinct from the Brussels Regulations because the former 
gives a judgment debtor no recourse in the State of enforcement but the latter still retain a minimum of judicial control for the 
courts in the enforcement state. 
105 Art. 249 of the EC Treaty. For comments, see GEORGE A. BERMANN & ROGER J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW 78-79 (2nd ed. ed. 2002). 
106 The intergovernmental cooperation in matters of police and administration of justice was originally the third pillar. However, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam integrated it into the Treaty and made it a Community policy (first pillar). Magnus, supra note_102_ at 
15-16. Art. 61 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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differences between the Convention and Regulation are modest.107    ?
The Brussels Convention is considered as one of the most successful treaties ever concluded 
in private international law and one of the most successful pieces of EU legislation.108 The most 
recent study shows that the Brussels I Regulation is performing well in practice.109 The 
feasibility of the Brussels Convention and Regulation comes from four factors. First, the 
Convention and Regulation are double conventions.110 This was promoted by the insight that the 
"fair and reasonable jurisdiction" of the judgment-rendering court is the precondition for JRE.111 
Second, JRE can be denied only for explicitly specified grounds under the Convention and the 
Regulation, so the outcome of JRE is "highly predictable."112 Third, the European Court of 
Justice (hereinafter "ECJ") was authorized to interpret the Brussels Convention and Brussels I 
Regulation.113 It has endeavored to promote a more intensive integration between the member 
states by accepting preliminary references from national courts.114 In many cases, it interpreted 
terms and phrases in the Convention and Regulation by adopting an autonomous Community 
definition instead of one favored by a particular member state.115 Therefore, the ECJ is essential 
for the successful operation of the Brussels Convention and the Regulation.116 Fourth, the 
accompanying Report by Jenard117 serves as a useful instrument to understand the Brussels 
                                                        
107  Magnus, supra note_102_ at 9. 
108 von Mehren, supra note 72 at 69. Burkhard Hess & Et. Al, THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION (EC) No. 44/2001, 1, 17 (Verlag 
C. H. Beck München 2008). See the assessment of Goode, Kronke, McKendrick and Wool: “the most successful instrument on 
international civil procedure of all times” (Transnational Commercial Law, p 793).  
109 Hess, supra note 108 at 1. 
110 A double convention refers to a convention regulating direct jurisdiction and JRE. For details, see Chapter V. 
111 Magnus, supra note_102_ at 14.  
112 Id. 
113 Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Brussels Convention, done Jun 3, 1971, 1975 O.J. (l204) 28. Its 
official English version was published at 1978 O.J. (L304) 50. 
114 Bermann, supra note_105_ at 352-53. 
115 Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of Judgments in the European Community: the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Brussels 
Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 559, 566 (1992-1993). 
116 Arthur T. von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements: To What Extent Should the State of Origin's Interpretation of Convention 
Rules Control for Recognition AND Enforcement Purposes?, in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS A-29, 
A-34 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman ed. 2001). 
117 Jenard, P. Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters signed 
at Brussels, 27 September 1968. OJ of March 5, 1979 C 59/1. (hereinafter "Jenard Report"). 
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Convention and still a good reference for the Brussels I Regulation.118 
The Brussels I Regulation applies in civil and commercial cases whatever the nature of the 
court or tribunal.119 It regulates both jurisdiction and JRE. Establishing uniform jurisdictional 
rules aims to facilitate JRE “by removing personal jurisdiction as a litigable issue” in the JRE 
proceedings.120 In terms of jurisdiction rules, the Brussels I Regulation confers general 
jurisdiction on the courts of a member state where a defendant is domiciled regardless of the 
defendant’s nationality.121 It also provides specific jurisdiction rules where a court in a member 
state can exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant in cases such as contract.122 
Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation provides for exclusive jurisdiction for certain 
circumstances such as real property and Article 23 allows parties to derogate from the Regulation 
by a choice of court agreement.  
As for JRE, the Brussels I Regulation presumes that any judgment rendered by a court of a 
member state must be recognized by courts of another state regardless of the defendant’s 
domicile.123 The Regulation does not limit to judgments that "definitively terminate a dispute in 
whole or in part."124 Therefore, a judgment that is only provisionally enforceable can benefit 
from the Regulation.125 In other words, lack of finality is not a ground for refusing JRE.126 
However, the requested court may stay the JRE proceedings when the judgment is challenged in 
the state of origin.127 Under no circumstance can a requested court review the substance of a 
                                                        
118 See Magnus, supra note_102_ at 14.  
119 Art. 1 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
120 Bermann, supra note 105 at 1409. 
121 Art. 2.1 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
122 Section 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
123 Arts. 1 and 32 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
124 Patrick Wautelet, Chapter III Recognition and Enforcement Section 1 Recognition, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 540 
(ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007). Jenard Report, page 43. 
125 Id. 
126 Arts. 37 and 46 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
127 Id. 
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sister-region judgment.128 Refusal of JRE must be based on the four explicit grounds under 
Articles 34 and 35.129 The four grounds are (1) the effects of the recognition of a judgment are 
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the requested state,130 (2) the judgment-rendering 
proceeding violates due process,131 (3) irreconcilable judgments exist,132 (4) the judgment-
rendering court does not have jurisdiction over the case.133 But the fourth ground is restricted to 
cases where a judgment-rendering court exercised jurisdiction against certain jurisdiction rules, 
such as those relating to insurance and consumer contracts134 as well as exclusive jurisdiction 
rules135 under the Brussels I regulation. Therefore, a requested court should not deny JRE—even 
by invoking the public policy exception—when the judgment-rendering court exercised the 
exorbitant jurisdiction prohibited by Article 3 of the Brussels I Regulation.136 If none of the four 
grounds exists, the requested court shall recognize the sister-state judgment. Empirical studies 
have shown that the four grounds are generally appropriate.137  
Additionally, the Brussels I Regulation provides a uniform, autonomous, and speedy 
exequatur procedure138 for the enforcement of a sister-region judgment.139 The execution of 
foreign judgments is left to lex fori.140 It also simplifies formality requirements for JRE 
                                                        
128 Art. 35 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
129 They should be read in relation with art 61 and 71. Wautelet, supra note_124_ at 555.   
130 Article 34(1), BRUSSELS I REGULATION. For details, see infra Part v of Section C of Chapter V. 
131 Art. 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. For details, see infra Part ii of Section C of Chapter V. 
132 Article 34(3) and (4) of the Brussels I Regulation. For details, see infra Part iii of Section C of Chapter V. 
133 Art. 35 of the Brussels I Regulation. For details, see infra Part i of SectionC of Chapter V. 
134 Section 3 and 4 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
135 Art. 22 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
136 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, (Case C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935, para 34. 
137 Hess, supra note 108 at 138.   
138 Arts. 38-52 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
139 Here, judgments include provisional, including protective, measures under Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation.  See Italian 
Leather SpA v. WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., (Case 80/00) [2002] ECR I-4995. 
140 Art. 40.1 of the Brussels I Regulation. Eric Coursier v. Fortis Bank and Martine Coursier, née Bellami, (Case C-267/97) [1999] 
ECR I-2543, I-2571 para. 28 (holding that “the Brussels Convention merely regulates the procedure for obtaining an order for the 
enforcement of foreign enforceable instruments and does not deal with execution itself.”) See also Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsbank v. SA Brasserie du Pêcheur, (Case 148/84) [1985] ECR 1981, 1992 para. 18; confirmed by Horst Ludwig 
Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg, (Case 145/86) [1998] ECR 645, 665 para 27. 
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application documents.141 Over all, the Brussels I Regulation establishes a simple and rapid 
system for free circulation of judgment between EU member states.  
 
iv. Current Interregional JRE System in China 
 
No similar uniform instrument exists between Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao.142 
Instead, the current Chinese interregional JRE system is constituted by both bilateral regimes in 
form of interregional arrangements and unilateral regimes in form of regional laws. Two such 
arrangements exist: the Arrangement between the Mainland and Macao on the Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments (hereinafter “Mainland-
Macao Arrangement”),143 and the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of Hong Kong 
Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned (hereinafter “Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement”).144 They established the basic framework of interregional JRE laws 
in China. Judgments excluded by the two arrangements145 are recognised and enforced according 
to regional laws, such as the Mainland Civil Procedure Law (hereinafter “CPL”)146 and its 
                                                        
141 See art. 56 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
142 For the constitutional situation among Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao, see infra Part Constitutional Framework 
Overarching Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao of Section D of Chapter I. 
143 This arrangement was signed by Mainland China and Macao on February 28, 2008 and came into force on April 1, 2008. In 
Mainland China, see Interpretation No. 2 [2006] of the Supreme People’s Court Adopted at the 1378th meeting of the Judicial 
Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on February 13, 2006. In Macao, see The No. 12/2006 Announcement of the 
Executive Chief of Macao on March 14, 2006.  
144 This arrangement was signed by Mainland China and Hong Kong on July 14, 2006. A courtesy English translation is available 
at http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/topical/mainlandlaw.htm last visited January 1, 2009. For Mainland implementation legislation, see 
Interpretation No.9 [2008] of the Supreme People’s Court on July 3, 2008. For Hong Kong implementation legislation, see 
Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance and its (Commencement) Notice, Ord. No. 9 of 2008, L.S. No. 2 to 
Gazette No. 27/2008, L.N. 195 of 2008. Upon the unanimity of Mainland China and Hong Kong, this Arrangement came into 
force as of August 1, 2008.  
145 Such as non-monetary judgments or judgments for disputes in which parties failed to make a choice of court agreement.  
146 Min Shi Su Song Fa [Civil Procedure Law] (Adopted on April 9, 1991 at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People's 
Congress, effective Apr. 9, 1991, amended Oct. 28, 2007) translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com last visited May 3, 2010 
(P.R.C.). 
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? 
judicial interpretations,147 the Macao Civil Procedure Code,148 and Hong Kong common law.149 
The following figure demonstrates the current interregional JRE system in China.   
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Figure 2: the current Chinese interregional JRE system 
(Solid lines represent interregional laws and dotted lines represent regional laws) 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement (???
Mainland regional law (???
Mainland-Macao Arrangement (???
Hong Kong common law(???
Macao Civil Procedure Code (?? 
 
Between Mainland China and Hong Kong, judgments included by the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement (?? are recognised and enforced under this Arrangement. In theory, other 
judgments can be recognised and enforced under Mainland regional law (?? and Hong Kong 
common law(??, but in practice JRE is impossible. Between Mainland China and Macao, 
judgments are recognised and enforced under the Mainland-Macao Arrangement (??. Hong 
Kong recognises and enforces Macao judgments according to common law (??. Macao 
recognises and enforces Hong Kong judgments according to the Macao Civil Procedure Code 
(??. 
                                                        
147 The most important judicial interpretation is the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL (Promulgated by the Supreme 
People’s Court in July 14, 1992) translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com last visited December 16, 2009. Its art. 318-320 are 
about judicial assistance. 
148 Especially arts. 1199-1205 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
149 Both statute and common law govern recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Hong Kong. The statute mainly 
refers to Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) (hereinafter “FJREO”). But the FJREO was 
essentially an intra-Commonwealth scheme for reciprocal enforcement of judgments. So judgments rendered by courts in 
Mainland China and Macao are recognised and enforced in Hong Kong under common law. For details, see Part ii of Section A of 
Chapter III. 
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The major problems are no overarching multilateral JRE scheme and insufficient substantive 
laws.150 The most urgent issue is the JRE impasse for majority of judgments between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong.151 Consequently, the current system increases the possibilities of re-
litigation and risks of inconsistent judgments.152 In many circumstances, it even makes disputes 
between parties unresolved.153 
 
1. No Overarching Multilateral JRE Scheme and Insufficient Substantive Laws 
 
In the Figure 2, every arrow represents a law that a region uses to recognize and enforce 
judgments from another region. The five laws are distinct and they have different scopes, 
requirements for JRE, and grounds for refusing JRE.154 Suppose that a Mainland company sells 
certain products to a Hong Kong company. The sales contract includes a choice of court 
agreement favouring a Hong Kong court. Later disputes occur and the chosen court renders a 
judgment. The judgment debtor’s property in Hong Kong cannot fully satisfy the judgment but it 
has properties in other regions. Therefore, the judgment creditor has to apply for JRE in 
Mainland China and Macao. However, the requirements for JRE and grounds for denying JRE 
under ? and  ??are very?different. For example, under ? the recognition and enforcement of a 
judgment should be requested in two years since the judgment was rendered.155 As a contrast, the 
??does not impose time limit, but it authorizes Macao courts to review the substance of 
judgments in certain circumstances.156?This example demonstrates that, lack of an overarching 
                                                        
150 For a detailed discussion, see infra Chapter III. 
151 For the JRE impasse between Mainland China and Hong Kong, see infra Part i of Section A of Chapter III. 
152 Eg., see infra Chapter III. 
153 Id. 
154 See Id. 
155 Art. 215 of the Mainland CPL. 
156 Art. 1202.2 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. For details of the review on merits under the Macao regional JRE law, see 
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multilateral JRE scheme inevitably requires judgment creditors to invest tremendous amount of 
time and money to enforce judgments according to regional laws. Furthermore, some regional 
laws are influenced by local protectionism, such as review on the merits;157 therefore, JRE may 
be effectively impossible in some circumstances.  
 
2. JRE Impasse for Majority of Judgments between Mainland China and Hong Kong 
 
For three reasons, majority of judgments are unrecognizable and unenforceable between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong. First, the scope of ? is very narrow.158 Suppose that a 
Mainland creditor won a case in Shanghai against a wholly owned subsidiary of a Hong Kong 
company. When this creditor enforces the judgment, it finds that the properties of the Hong Kong 
company in Mainland China are insufficient, but the Hong Kong company has properties in 
Hong Kong and Macao. The creditor can enforce the judgment according to ? in Macao, but he 
or she cannot enforce the judgment in Hong Kong because ? does not apply to any judgment 
without a choice of court agreement.   
Second, Hong Kong refuses to recognize and enforce Mainland judgments beyond the scope 
of ??because its criteria for finality are fundamentally different from those in Mainland 
China.159 Chan Chow Yuen v Nangyang Commercial Bank Trustee Limited and et al. 
demonstrates Mainland judgments cannot be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong because of 
the two regions have different criteria on finality.160 In this case, the Court of First Instance in 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Part iii of Section A of Chapter III. 
157 Id. 
158 For a detailed discussion of the narrow scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, see infra Part i of Section B of 
Chapter III. 
159 For a detailed discussion of the finality disputes, see infra Part ii of Section B of Chapter IV. 
160 Chan Chow Yuen v Nangyang Commercial Bank Trustee Limited and et al., HACA 4/2002. 
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Hong Kong noticed that because Mainland judgments were not considered as final in Hong Kong 
so they were not recognizable and enforceable; consequently, the court suggested parties to re-
litigate the case in Hong Kong in order to resolve their disputes.161  
Third, Mainland courts would deny the recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong 
judgments, because they hold that no reciprocity exists between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong.162 Standard Chartered Asia Ltd v. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Huajian 
Company163 demonstrates this. It involves a guarantee contract among a Hong Kong creditor, a 
Hong Kong debtor, and a Mainland guarantor.164 The creditor won a Hong Kong judgment 
against the debtor and the guarantor. But he could not enforce it in Mainland China because of 
lack of an interregional JRE arrangement and the absence of reciprocity between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong.165 Consequently, the creditor had to sue the guarantor in Mainland China 
on the same cause of action.166  
As a conclusion, the US and EU interregional JRE systems have already realized free 
circulation of judgments by a unified overarching interregional JRE scheme. On the contrary, the 
current interregional JRE system in China is constituted by five different laws, and in many 
circumstances JRE is even impossible because of insufficient substantive laws.  
 
D. The Need for, and Feasibility of, a Multilateral JRE Arrangement  
 
The need for a Multilateral JRE Arrangement comes from economic integration among 
                                                        
161 Id., para 13. 
162 For a detailed discussion of the reciprocity requirements under the Mainland JRE law, see infra Part i of Section A of Chapter 
III 
163 Standard Charterred Asia Ltd v. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Huajian Company, Higher People’s Court of Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region, 1998. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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Mainland China, Macao, and Hong Kong. Its feasibility results from three factors: (i) the 
geographical, cultural, and historical proximities among the three Chinese regions, (ii) the 
constitutional framework of “One Country, Two Systems,” and (iii) contributions of the existing 
bilateral arrangements.  
 
i. Need: Economic Integration  
 
Interregional economic integration and JRE should accompany each other so that all 
participating regions can achieve the best comparative advantages.167 For example, the preamble 
of the Hague Choice of Court Convention indicates that the purpose of the Convention, inter alia, 
is to promote international trade and investment through uniform rules on jurisdiction and JRE in 
civil and commercial matters.168 Similarly, the development of the European common market 
also requires the establishment of a JRE system between its members.169 As a return, the Brussels 
Convention and corresponding Regulation help to develop the common market, because once 
merchants know the judgments rendered in their favor at home can be recognized and enforced 
in the other region with certainty and at a low cost, they would be more willing to “buy and sell, 
work and hire, render and purchase services, and invest across [regions]...”170  
The development of the EU single market requires free circulation of judgments, and 
similarly the necessities and possibilities of developing a multilateral JRE arrangement among 
                                                        
167 Ronald Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of Private International Law,  in 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES , 620-26 (J Bhandari and A Sykes ed. 
1997). Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44, 44-6 (2001). 
168 Preamble of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. For the history of the negotiations for this Convention, see Trevor C. 
Hartley, The Hague Choice of Court Convention, 31 E. L. REV. 414, 414-15 (2006), Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of 
Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 543-46 
(2005).  
169 Zhihong Yu, Lun Hong Kong He Nei Di Min Shan Shi Pan Jue Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xin Wen Ti Jie Jue de Guang Lian Chong 
Gou [On Reconstructing the Concept in Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments Between Hong Kong 
and Mainland], 127 JOURNAL OF JINAN UNIVERSITY [PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE] 77, 80 (2007). 
170 Bermann, supra note 105 at 1383-84. See Magnus, supra note_102_ at 7.  
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Chinese regions also come from their increasingly close economic integration.171 Since the new 
Millennium, the three regions have made joint efforts to realize free circulation of goods, 
services, capital, and people among them.172 A free trade area173 is emerging since Mainland 
China, Hong Kong and Macao, respectively, concluded two Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangements (hereinafter "CEPAs") in 2003.174 Since then the three regions have worked 
closely to introduce further economic liberalization measures by an annual supplement.175  The 
CEPAs comprise three pillars: zero-tariff for trade in goods,176 preferential treatment for trade in 
services,177 and trade and investment facilitation.178 The CEPAs quickly move the three regions 
in the direction of a single market.179 For example, since its establishment, the CEPA has 
significantly enhanced economic integration between Mainland China and Hong Kong.180 In 
2009, Mainland China is the most significant trading partner of Hong Kong,181 and as a major 
                                                        
171 Yu, supra note_169_ at 79-80.  
172 Weidong Zhu, The Relationships between China and Its Special Administrative Regions and Their Regulation, 4 J CAMBR. 
STUD. 111, 115-116 (2009), http://journal.acs-cam.org.uk/data/archive/2009/200902-article10.pdf (last visited March 30, 2010) 
173 Wei Wang, The legal status of the CEPA between the Mainland and Hong Kong of China, 4 FRONT. LAW CHINA 310, 312-13 
(2009) (indicating that the two CEPAs were notified to the WTO in the name of FTAs). 
174 The main text of the Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA was signed on June 29, 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The 
text is available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/cepa_legaltext.html last visited February 2, 2010. The Main text 
of the Mainland-Macao CEPA was signed on October 17, 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The text is available at 
http://www.cepa.gov.mo/cepaweb/front/eng/itemI_2.htm last visited February 5, 2010. 
175 http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/cepa_overview.html last visited April 22, 2009. The supplements to Mainland-Hong Kong 
CEPA are available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/cepa_legaltext.html, and the supplements to Mainland-Macao 
CEPA are available at http://www.cepa.gov.mo/cepaweb/front/eng/itemI_2.htm last visited April 22, 2010. 
176 From January 1, 2006, Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao grant tariff exemption to goods from each other as long as 
the goods meet CEPA origin rules. For comments, see Wang, supra note_173_ at 312. 
177 Hong Kong, Macao, and Mainland service suppliers enjoy preferential treatment in entering into one another’s market in 
various service areas. They also grant one another mutual recognition of professional qualifications. See 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/mutual/mutual.html and http://bo.io.gov.mo/edicoes/en/dse/cepa/ last visited April 22, 2010. 
178 A summary of mutual facilitation to improve the interregional business environment can be found at 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/facilitation/summary_invest.html and http://bo.io.gov.mo/edicoes/en/dse/cepa/ last visited 
April 22, 2010.  
179 Regarding the impact of CEPA on Hong Kong and Mainland economy, see CEPA Impact on the Hong Kong Economy at 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/statistics/statistics_research.html. LC Paper No. CB(1)1849/06-07(04). (This report indicates 
that for both trade in goods and trade in services, majority of responding companies considered CEPA beneficial to the Hong 
Kong economy and to the sectors that they specialized in. The Individual Visit Scheme under the CEPA boosted tourism in both 
Mainland China and Hong Kong. More new jobs were created for Hong Kong and Mainland residents. The CEPA also brought 
more investment in Mainland China. The more significant part of the CEPA to the Mainland lies with the intangible benefits, that 
is, the transfer of quality capital and management and professional skills to the Mainland for its long term economic 
development.) Regarding the impact of CEPA on Macao and Mainland economy, see statistics on 
http://www.cepa.gov.mo/cepaweb/front/eng/itemI_4.htm and 
http://yzs2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/workaffair/200801/20080105328980.html (last visited April 25, 2010). 
180 Zhu, supra note 172 at 114.  
181 Hong Kong Government Website, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). 
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service economy, Hong Kong has a particular strong link to Mainland China as well.182  
With the ever-increasing amount of trade, investment, and flow of people among Mainland 
China, Hong Kong, and Macao,183 there is a growing likelihood that more cases involving 
interregional factors will appear184 and consequently the demands for interregional JRE will 
increase.185 Moreover, although arbitration can solve many disputes and the awards can be 
enforced under the arrangement for recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards between 
Mainland and Hong Kong and Macro separately.186 However, not all contracts contain an 
arbitration clause. Even if a contract has an arbitration clause, this clause may be invalid for 
various reasons.187 Moreover, there are many claims, such as in the fields of intellectual 
properties, cannot not be solved by arbitration.188 Therefore, litigation will often become the only 
resort that parties can use to solve their disputes. As a conclusion, economic integration among 
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between Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR,  36 HONG KONG L. J. 553, 557-59 (2006). Shanshan Lu, Nei Di Yu Hong Kong 
Min Shan Shi Pan Jue Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing De Xiang Zhuang Yu Jian Yi [The Status Quo of and Suggestions to Interregional 
JRE between Mainland China and Hong Kong in Civil and Commercial Cases], 39 LI LUN GUANG CHA [THEORETIC 
OBSERVATION] 98, 100 (2006). 
186 See Arrangement concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitration award s between the Mainland and the Hong Kong 
concluded on June 18, 1999 and effective on Feb 1, 2000, at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf (last visited March 22, 2010). The Supreme People's 
Court promulgated this arrangement by issuing a judicial explanation (Judicial Explanation 3/2002) on January 24, 2000. In 
Hong Kong, the Arbitration Ordinance was amended accordingly. For comments, see Zhihui He, Dui Zhong Guo Qu Ji Si Fa Xie 
Zhu Mo Shi De Zai Ren Ke [Reconsideration of the Model for Interregional Judicial Assistance in China], 109 HE BEI FA XUE 
[HE BEI LAW SCIENCE] 79, 82-83 (2001). Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration award s 
between Mainland China and  Macao concluded on October 30, 2007 and effective on Jan 1, 2008 at www.lawinforchina.com 
(last visited March 22, 2010). 
187 Ie. see art 58, grounds to invalidate an arbitration award, of the Arbitration Law of the PRC (Adopted at the 8th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 8thNational People's Congress on August 31, 1994, effective Sep. 1, 1995) available at 
http://www.law-lib.com/LAW/law_view.asp?id=10684.  
188 See art 3 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC. For comments, see Taroh Inoue, Introduction to International Commercial 
Arbitration in China, 36 HKLJ 171, 190 (2006). 
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the three regions demands the establishment of an effective and efficient interregional JRE 
system.189 On the other hand, such system can facilitate interregional economy.190  
 
ii. Feasibility 
1. Geographical, Cultural, and Historical Proximities among the Three Regions 
 
Both Hong Kong and Macao share a close geographical proximity with Mainland China. 
Hong Kong191 is located at the south-eastern tip of China and is separated from the Mainland city 
Shenzhen by a twenty-meter wide river.192 Macao193 is about one-fortieth of the size of Hong 
Kong194 and is located on the southeast coast of China, facing Hong Kong to the east, the Pearl 
River Delta to the west, and the Guangdong Province of Mainland China to its north.195 It is 60 
km from Hong Kong and 145 km from the Mainland city Guangzhou.196 
These two regions also have strong cultural and historical ties with Mainland China.197 
Before they were ceded to the UK and Portugal, Hong Kong and Macao had been part of the 
territory of China since ancient198 times. The governance of the UK and Portugal significantly 
                                                        
189 See Wong, supra note_21_ at 378. 
190 Yu, supra note_169_ at 78. 
191 Hong Kong includes Hong Kong Island, Lantau Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, including 262 
outlying islands. See Hong Kong Government website, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). 
192 Hong Kong Government website, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). 
193 Macao includes the Macao Peninsula, Taipa Island, and Coloane Island. See Judith R. Krebs, Comment: One Country, Three 
Systems? Judicial Review in Macao After Ng Ka Ling, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 111, 113 (2000 December). For the history of 
Macau, see STEVE SHIPP, MACAU, CHINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONY'S TRANSITION TO 
CHINESE RULE (1997); GEOFFREY C. GUNN, ENCOUNTERING MACAU: A PORTUGUESE CITY-STATE ON THE PERIPHERY 
OF CHINA 1557-1999 (1996).  
194 Krebs, supra note 193 at 113.  
195 Macao government website, http://www.gcs.gov.mo/files/factsheet/geography.php?PageLang=E (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
196 Id. 
197 See Hong Kong Legislative Council Paper No. CB(2) 722/01-02(04) para 13 (acknowledging cultural similarities between 
Hong Kong and Mainland China). Yanzhi Cao, Macao yu Zhuguo Dalu Hunyin Falv Zhidu Zhi Bijiao [Comparison of Marriage 
Laws in Mainland China and Macao], 2 HE BEI FA XUE [HE BEI LAW SCIENCE] 52, 52 (2000). 
198 For the history of Hong Kong, see JOHN MARK CARROLL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 1 (2007); STEVE TSANG, A 
MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 1-39 (2007). For the history of Macau, see supra note 193. 
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changed the political and economic models in Hong Kong and Macao.199 But they did not 
fundamentally change the cultural and historical ties of these two regions with Mainland 
China.200 This is demonstrated by the facts that Chinese descents are the majority population and 
Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese) is the major language used in these two regions. The 
population of Hong Kong was approximately 6.98 million in 2008.201 95% is people of Chinese 
descents.202 Today only 3.1% of the population speaks English.203 A majority of the people speak 
a Chinese dialect—Cantonese, and 1.1 % speaks Mandarin.204 Regarding Macao, 89.6% of the 
current population were either born in Macao or emigrated from Mainland China.205 More than 
95% of the population speaks Chinese and only 5% speaks Portuguese, English or other 
languages.206  
 
2. Constitutional Framework Overarching Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao 
 
Hong Kong became an English colony after the Opium War in 1840.207 On December 19, 
1984, the Chinese and British Governments signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of 
Hong Kong, affirming that the the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “PRC”) Government 
                                                        
199 For how the UK established the political and economic models in Hong Kong, see Id. Tsang, at 161-206. For how the Portugal 
established the political and economic models in Macao, see QICHEN HUANG, MACAO TONG SHI [THE GENERAL HISTORY OF 
MACAO] 321-371, 391-454 (1999). 
200 Tsang, supra note_198_ at 1-39, and 47 (recognizing the great cultural differences between Chinese people and British people 
in Hong Kong). 
201 Hong Kong Government website, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id., 88.7% of population is Cantonese speakers.  
205 Macao government website, http://www.gcs.gov.mo/files/factsheet/geography.php?PageLang=E (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
206 “The Macanese are people of mixed Portuguese and Chinese descent.” See Krebs, supra note 193 at 113. The rest of 
population speaks English and other languages. 
207 The island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British Crown in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. Kowloon peninsula and 
Stonecutters Island were ceded to the British Crown in 1860 in the Treaty of Beijing. New Territories and a group of islands were 
rented to the British Crown for 99 years  from July 1, 1898. See A. D. Hughes, Hong Kong, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol XII 138 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1990). 
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would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong from July 1, 1997.208 Macao 
gradually became a Portuguese colony after the mid-16th century.209 On April 13, 1987, the 
Chinese and Portuguese Governments signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao 
and accordingly Mainland China and Macao were reunited on December 20, 1999.210   
The former Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, had originally formulated the policy of “One 
Country, Two Systems" for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.211 However, Hong 
Kong and Macao are the first cases where this policy has been put into practice. According to the 
two Declarations, after the PRC resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, they became 
special administrative regions under this policy.212 Accordingly, these three regions belong to one 
country, but Mainland socialism is not applied to special administrative regions and their 
previous capitalist system remains unchanged.213 Moreover, they enjoy legislative autonomy, 
independent judicial systems, and final adjudicative power.214 Importantly, the Mainland socialist 
                                                        
208 Arts 1 and 2 of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. The full name of the Declaration is Joint Declaration of 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China on the Question of Hong Kong, 23 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1366 para. 33 (1984). For the text of the 
Declaration, see http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm (last visited March 22, 2010). For the significance of the peaceful 
handover of Hong Kong from the UK to the PRC, see Tsang, supra note_198_ at 268-69. 
209 For the history of Macau, see fn 193. 
210 See art. 1 of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao. The full name of the Declaration is Joint declaration of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and The Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao. For 
its text, see http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/ (last visited March 22, 2010). 
211 Xiaoping Deng, Deng Xiaoping He Yang Liyu De Tang Hua [Deng Xiaoping’s Talk with Yang Liyu], in the DENG XIAOPING 
WENXUAN [COLLECTION OF DENG XIAOPING], (People Press, 1993), 230. 
212 Art. 3 of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and art. 2 of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao.  
213 Art. 3 of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and art. 2 of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao. Art. 
5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Macao Basic Law. For comments on this policy, see Yash Ghai, The Intersection of Chinese 
Law and the Common Law in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong: Question of Technique or Politics,  in ONE 
COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE 
RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA , 13-49 (Jorge Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal (eds) 2009) (The author's conclusion is that "the 
Chinese system has triumphed over the common law" but his paper concentrates on the right of abode, constitutional reform, the 
term of office of the chief executive and other constitutional and public law issues, instead of conflict of laws and commercial 
laws). 
214 Id, art. 2 provides that "the National People's Congress authorizes Hong Kong to exercise a high degree of autonomy and 
enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law." Besides, arts. 12-23 provide that Hong Kong shall be vested with autonomic rights in dealing with its 
own affairs except foreign affairs and defense. Therefore, as special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao enjoy a 
higher degree of autonomy than ethnic autonomous regions in China. For comments regarding the policy of “One Country, Two 
Systems,” see L H Ambrose, The Basic Law and the Success of “One Country, Two Systems,” China L. 76, 76-77 (July, 1997); P 
Raghubir & G V Johar, Hong Kong 1997 in Context,  63 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 543 (Winter 1999). See also Albert H.Y. 
Chen, The Theory, Constitution and Practice of Autonomy: The Case of Hong Kong,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE 
LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY 
 38 
system and policies will not be practiced in Hong Kong and Macao for 50 years even after they 
have reunited with Mainland China.215 The meaning of "remaining unchanged for 50 years" rule 
under Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Macao Basic Law should mean remaining 
unchanged for at least 50 years.216 Therefore, the coexistence of the three legal regions with 
independent legislative and judicial powers will probably last for more than 50 years.217 
The constitutional framework created by the policy of "One Country, Two Systems" brings 
both necessities and possibilities to the development of an interregional JRE arrangement in 
China. The necessities come from the fact that Hong Kong and Macao enjoy high judicial and 
legislative autonomy.218 Therefore, although they are only local authorities under the direct 
leadership of the central government in Mainland China,219 the latter cannot require them to 
recognise and enforce its judgments. However, Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and 
Article 93 of the Macao Basic Law authorize these two regions to render judicial assistance to 
each other, which are constitutional justifications for a multilateral JRE arrangement.220 These 
two provisions serve as a constitutional base, making the establishment of an interregional JRE 
arrangement legitimate and possible.221  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
CHINA 751, 751-766 (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). For the legislative power of the SARs, see eg. Fong Man Chong, 
The Ranking of the International Law in the Framework of "The Basic Law of the Macao SAR of the People's Republic of China" 
and the Introspection on the Perplexities of Fundamental Rights,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- 
PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 593, 593-604 
(Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). For the judicial power of the SARs, see eg. Jorge Menezes, Interpretation of the 
Basic Law by the Courts of the Macao SAR,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF 
EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 631, 631-53 (Jorge Oliveira & 
Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). 
215 Jin Huang, Interaction and Integration Between the Legal Systems of Hong Kong, Macao and Mainland China 50 Years After 
Their Return to China,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON 
MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 769, 769-771 (Jorge Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal ed. 1999). 
216 Id. at 770-71. Art. 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law indicate that "the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the 
Hong Kong SAR, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years." 
217 Id. at 770. 
218 See fn supra 214. 
219 Id. art. 12 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that "Hong Kong shall be a local administrative region of the PRC, which 
shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government."  
220 For detailed discussion, see Section A of Chapter VI. 
221 Id. 
 39 
3. Contributions of the Existing Bilateral Arrangements 
 
Although no multilateral judicial cooperation exists, bilateral judicial cooperation in China 
first started with the “seven-point” agreement concluded between the Guangdong Higher 
People's Court and the Hong Kong High Court in 1988.222 This agreement mainly concerned 
mutual service of documents.223 It was applicable to Hong Kong and Guangdong Province, 
instead of the whole Mainland China.224 However, it laid down a foundation for further 
interregional judicial cooperation, especially service of documents.225 For example, there are 
many similarities between it and the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement.226  
Thus far, six bilateral arrangements have been established between Mainland China, Hong 
Kong and Macao, respectively, in the areas of service of judicial documents,227 investigation and 
collection of evidence,228 and recognition and enforcement of judgments229 and arbitration award 
s.230 The word, “Anpai, ??” or “arrangement” in English is less formal than words such as 
treaty, agreement or convention, in the legal context.231 But it is used in the title of the three legal 
                                                        
222 The Higher People's Court of Guangdong Province, Circular on the Service of Civil and Economic Judicial Documents 
between the Higher People's Court of Guangdong Province and the High Court of Hong Kong (July 8, 1988). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Zhu, supra note_184_ at 643 and 668-69.. 
226 Id. at 669. 
227 Arrangement for Mutual Service of Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Proceedings between the Mainland and 
Hong Kong Courts was concluded on January 14, 1999 and effective on March 20, 1999 (hereinafter "the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Service Arrangement"). The Supreme People's Court promulgated a judicial interpretation (Judicial Interpretation 9/1999) to 
implement this arrangement on March 29, 1999. The Hong Kong High Court Rules Committee promulgated the Rules of the 
High Court (Amendment) Rules 1999 to amend the relevant provisions (including Orders 11 and 69) in the Rules of the High 
Court to implement this arrangement. See Wong, supra note_21_ at 378-79. For comments, see He, supra note_186_ at 81. 
Arrangement on the Mutual Service of Judicial Documents and Obtaining Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters between 
the Mainland and Macao was concluded in 2001 (hereinafter "the Mainland-Macao Service and Evidence Arrangement"). The 
Supreme People's Court promulgated a judicial interpretation (Judicial Interpretation 26/2001) to implement this arrangement on 
August 7, 2001 and effective on Sep.15, 2001. 
228 The Mainland-Macao Service and Evidence Arrangement. 
229 See supra fns 143 and 144. 
230 See supra fn 186. For comments on the existing arrangements, see Renshan Liu, Recent Judicial Cooperation in Civil and 
Commercial Matters Between Mainland China and Taiwan, The Hong Kong S.A.R. and the Macao S.A.R., 11 YEARBOOK OF 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 235-53 (2009). 
231 The typical meaning of “Arrangement” is “putting in order, plan, or preparation.” It does have a meaning of “agreement or 
settlement,” but which is seldom ranked as its top interpretations. See A S Hornby, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S ENGLISH-
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documents concerning service, investigation and collection of evidence, and recognition and 
enforcement of arbitration awards and judgments between Mainland China and Hong Kong, and 
those between Mainland China and Macao. This term is also found in legal documents 
concerning interregional economic issues.232  Probably, future legal documents concerning 
interregional issues in China will continue to use this term. The selection of this term is 
deliberate. Compared with other more widely used terminologies, such as “agreement,” “treaty,” 
and “convention,” “arrangement” in Chinese has a stronger connotation of family and of 
reaching a consensus harmoniously, peacefully, jointly, and amicably. This is consistent with 
Confucianism, which emphasizes solving disputes by a peaceful way in a family or a society. Put 
in legal terms, “arrangement” suggests that the three Chinese regions are equal and they 
voluntarily agree to make joint efforts to solve legal conflicts among them for mutual benefits. 
From the historical perspective, the co-existence of Chinese regions results from foreign 
invasions.233 In response, the PRC has repeated that solving interregional conflicts is its internal 
affair and resists any foreign intervention. In a political sense, “arrangement” symbolizes that it 
is made between local authorities to address their common affairs.234 Thus, “arrangement” 
perfectly suits the legal, social, historical, and political context of interregional conflicts in China. 
The existing bilateral arrangements enhance the feasibility of a Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement from four aspects. First, they demonstrate that Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic 
Law and Article 93 of the Macao Basic Law can serve as the constitutional basis for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
CHINESE DICTIONARY 65-6 (the Commercial Press and Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 1997). See also 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50012277?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=Arrangement&first=1&max_to_show=1
0 (last visited Dec 21, 2009); and http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Arrangement last visited May 1, 2009.  
232 For discussion of the meaning of "Arrangements" in the Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA and Mainland-Macao CEPA, see Wang, 
supra note_173_ at 311. 
233 “China's long history is full of glories and glooms. [However, from 1842 to 1949,] China suffered humiliation by foreign 
powers through a series of ‘unequal treaties’ which undermined its sovereignty.” During this period, China was demoted to a 
semi-colony of Western countries. See Wang & Leung, supra n 11, 280-81. For a detailed discussion on unequal treaties, see 
Priscilla Mei-fun Leung, THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: HYBRID OF COMMON LAW AND CHINESE LAW 17 (LexisNexis, 
2007).  
234 Wang, supra note_173_ at 311 (indicating that the word "arrangement" implies that signatories are members within one 
country). 
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proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement.235 The reason is that all the existing arrangements are 
established under these two articles.236 Second, the smooth functioning of these arrangements 
help safeguard the smooth transition of the sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao to the PRC, 
and promote economic integration and judicial cooperation among three regions.237 The success 
of these arrangements fosters a pro-cooperation environment among regions238 and enhances 
mutual understanding of the operation of each other's judicial system.239 Third, service, 
investigation and collection of evidence are related to JRE because unfair procedure in a 
judgment-rendering court constitutes a defense to JRE.240 So arrangements on these subjects and 
the two bilateral JRE arrangements provide an infrastructural support241 for developing the 
proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement.242 Last but not least, the existing arrangements 
demonstrate that regions have accepted the legal form of arrangements plus separate regional 
legislation for solving interregional legal conflicts.243  
 
E.  Structure of What Follows 
 
Besides this introduction chapter, this dissertation has another seven chapters. The Second 
Chapter is a literature review, focusing on scholarly achievements on Chinese interregional 
conflict of laws. The Third Chapter analyzes the status quo of the interregional JRE in China. It 
                                                        
235 For discussion of the constitutional basis for the proposed Multilateral Arrangement, see Section A of Chapter VI. 
236 See Wong, supra note_21_ at 378-81. 
237 Zhu, supra note 172 at 117. 
238 For comments of the achievements of the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement, see Zhu, supra note_184_ at 668-69. 
239 Zhang and Smart, supra note_185_ at 568. 
240 For details of unfair procedure defenses regarding service and investigation and collection of evidence, see Chapter III. 
241 Zhang and Smart, supra note_185_ at 561. 
242 Id, at 568-69 (indicating "the conclusion of the agreements between the Mainland and Hong Kong on service of judicial 
documents and on mutual enforcement of arbitration award s apparently laid a solid foundation of mutual understanding and trust 
for both sides' further cooperation"). 
243 See CAMILLE CAMERON & ELSA KELLY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN HONG KONG 430 (2 ed. 2008). The 
proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should adopt the legal form of arrangement plus separate regional legislation. See 
Chapter VI.  
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demonstrates the bilateral arrangements are first steps beyond the unsatisfactory pure regional 
laws. It argues that the next stage should be to establish a Multilateral JRE Arrangement. The 
Fourth Chapter discusses how to solve the three major challenges confronting Chinese 
interregional JRE: conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law; conflicts between civil law 
and common law; and weak mutual trust. These challenges are the most serious issues on the 
macro level for designing the Multilateral JRE Arrangement. They should be addressed first 
before proposing selected rules for the Arrangement. The Fifth Chapter discusses selected rules 
of the proposed Arrangement. It proposes its scope, requirements for JRE, and defences for JRE. 
The Sixth Chapter explores how to implement this Arrangement. It argues that the best method 
of implementation is the model of interregional arrangement plus separate regional legislations. 
The seventh chapter is a conclusion.  
In this dissertation, a judgment-rendering court or forum (F1) refers to the court that 
rendered a judgment; a requested court or forum (F2) means the court that is requested to 
recognise or enforce a judgment. 
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Chapter II  Scholarly Achievements on Chinese 
Interregional Conflict of Laws 
 
Juristic writings on Chinese interregional conflict of laws demonstrate the needs and 
possibilities of a Multilateral JRE Arrangement. The study of Chinese interregional 
conflict of laws began in late 1980s and is still in its infancy.1 The relevant literature can 
be divided into four categories: studies on the general theory of Chinese interregional 
conflict of laws, studies on interregional JRE, and comparative studies. 
 
A. General Theory of Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws 
 
Some scholars argue that since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, it has become a 
country with two legal regions, because Taiwan is a de facto independent region with a 
distinct legal system compared with that of Mainland China.2 But theoretical discussions 
of Chinese interregional conflict of laws first appeared in the early 1980s3 and prospered 
                                                        
1 Interregional conflict of laws in China is still in its infancy. See Chi Chung, Conflict of Law Rules Between China and 
Taiwan and Their Significance, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 559, 559 (2008). Veronika Hradilová, The 
Selected Topics of Private International Law in China, in EUROPEANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL LAW, THE LISBON 
TREATY AND SOME OTHER LEGAL ISSUES, 33-41 (Brno : Masarykova univerzita, 2008). Jin Huang & Andrew 
Xuefeng Qian, “One Country, Two Systems,” Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-
regional Conflicts of Law in China, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289, 289-328 (1994). For major academic writings in 
Chinese, see WEI DING, GUOJI SIFA XUE [THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW], 628-633 (Shanghai 
People Press, 2004); SHANGJIN ZHANG, GUOJI SIFA [INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW], 446-461 (Zhongguo Renmin 
Daxue Press, 2000); and JUAN SHEN, ZHONGGUO QUJI FALV CHONGTU [CHINA INTERREGINOAL CONFLICT OF 
LAWS], (Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxu Press, 1999). See also Qingjiang Kong and Minfei Hu, The Chinese Practice of 
Private International Law, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3.2, 414 (Oct 2002).  
2 Xianyu Yu, Zhongguo Quji Falv Chongtu Jiejue De Jinzhan He Qianzhan [The Progresses and Prospects of Inter-
Regional Conflict of Laws in China] (a paper presented at the Annual Conference of Chinese Society of Private 
International Law in the year of 2006). Before the return of Hong Kong and Macao, the JRE between Mainland China 
and these two regions were international JRE because they were British and Portuguese colonies.  
3 Hradilová, supra note 1 at 41.  
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with the return of Hong Kong and Macao to Mainland China.4 Legal writings of the 
general theory of Chinese interregional conflict of laws discuss the general issues of 
Chinese interregional legal conflicts, such as the reasons and status quo of interregional 
conflicts, as well as possible general solutions. The survey of scholastic achievements in 
this Section follows a chronic order and focuses on the works of Depei Han, Jin Huang, 
and Yongpin Xiao. Han is the first person laying down the theoretical postulate of 
Chinese interregional conflict of laws. Huang and Xiao are his most representative 
followers. The Parts i and ii present the works published before the reunification of 
Chinese regions, which bring the attention of Chinese legal academia, practitioners, 
judiciary, legislatures, and governments to the emergence of interregional legal conflicts. 
Part iii discusses the representative contemporary works after the reunification. Part iv 
assesses scholarship on general theory of Chinese interregional conflict of laws. 
 
i. The First Efforts 
 
The development of Chinese interregional conflict of laws cannot be explored 
without paying tribute to late Mainland Professor Depei Han. He is the forefather of 
Chinese interregional conflict of laws and his writings published in 1980s are still highly 
acclaimed today. Early in 1983, he pointed out that more attention should be paid to 
resolving the interregional legal conflicts in China after the return of Hong Kong and 
Macao.5 His articles published in 1989 and 1990 explain the reasons, characteristics, and 
                                                        
4 Id.,at 35. 
5 Depei Han & Suanyuan Li, Yin Gai Zhong Shi Dui Chong Tu Fa de Yan Jiu [Attention should be Paid on the Study of 
Conflict of Laws], 6 Wu Han Da Xue Xue Bao (She Hui Ke Xue Ban) [Wu Han University Journal (Social Science 
Edition)] 59 (1983). 
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solutions for Chinese interregional legal conflicts. He observes that the policy of “One 
Country, Two Systems” will be reflected not only in social and economic fields but also 
in legal systems.6 Therefore, after Hong Kong and Macao reunite with Mainland China, 
there will be multiple different legal regions in China and consequently legal conflicts 
between them are unavoidable.7 This is the theoretic postulate Han advances for the 
development of Chinese interregional conflict of laws. 
Han identifies four distinctive characteristics of Chinese interregional legal 
conflicts,8 which his follower, Professor Jin Huang, echoed.9  
First are the divergences of social systems between Chinese regions, because Hong 
Kong and Macao establish capitalism but Mainland China is built on socialism.10 The 
differences between the two systems significantly increase the difficulty of solving 
interregional legal conflicts.11  
Second are the conflicts between civil law and common law, because the civil-law 
tradition has strongly influenced Macao and Mainland China, but the English common-
law tradition has shaped Hong Kong’s legal system.12  
Third, under the two Joint Declarations, the Hong Kong Basic Law, and the Macao 
Basic Law, and international treaties in effect in Hong Kong and Macao before their 
reunification with Mainland China will continue to be effective after the handover; and 
moreover, Hong Kong and Macao can conclude treaties on numerous matters with other                                                         6 Depei Han, Lun Wo Guo De Qu Ji Fa Lv Chong Tu Wen Ti---Wo Guo Guo Ji Shi Fa Yan Jiu Zhong De Yi Ge Xin Ke 
Ti [An Analysis of Chinese Interregional Legal Conflicts: A New Subject in Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws], 6 
ZHONG GUO FA XUE [CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 3, 3-4 (1998). Depei Han & Jin Huang, Zhong Guo Qu Ji Fa Lv Chong 
Tu Wen Ti Yan Jiu [Analysis of Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws], 1 ZHONG GUO SHE HUI KE XUE [CHINA 
SOCIAL SCIENCE] 117, 118 (1989).   7 Han supra note 6 at 4. Han & Huang supra note 6 at 118. 8 Han supra note 6, at 5. 
9 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 304-06. 10 Han supra note 6, at 5. Han and Huang supra note 6, at 122. Huang and Qian, supra note 1 at 304-05.  
11 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 304-06.  12 Han and Huang supra note 6, at 122. 
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countries or international organizations under the name of “Hong Kong, China” or 
“Macao, China.”13 Therefore, some international treaties may be applicable to one region 
but not to others. Consequently, Chinese interregional conflicts include not only conflicts 
of regional laws but also conflicts of international laws.14 
The last distinctive characteristic is that Chinese interregional legal conflicts are 
unique conflicts within a unitary country, but they also share commonness with 
international conflicts. 15 The first reason is that each region has legislative autonomy.16 
Hong Kong and Macao laws are at the equal status as Mainland laws, but they are only 
effective in their own jurisdiction.17 The second reason is that each region has final 
adjudicative power.18 No court of final review that can hear cases from all regions exists 
in China19 to coordinate and to develop interregional conflict of laws.20 In this context, 
Chinese interregional legal conflicts are like international conflicts.21   
Han also points out three general principles for resolving interregional legal conflicts 
in China.22 The principle of national unity is the most important.23 He emphasized that 
Hong Kong and Macao are inseparable parts of the PRC, so when solving interregional 
legal conflicts, each region should give priority to national unity and should not harm the 
interests of other regions for its own benefits.24 The second principle is “One Country,                                                         
13 See Fong Man Chong, The Ranking of the International Law in the Framework of "The Basic Law of the Macao SAR 
of the People's Republic of China" and the Introspection on the Perplexities of Fundamental Rights, in ONE COUNTRY, 
TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE 
RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 593, 593-604 (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal ed. 2009). 14 Han supra note 6 at 5. Han & Huang supra note 6 at 122. 15 Han supra note 6 at 5-6. Han & Huang supra note 6 at 122.   
16 Han supra note 6 at 6. 
17 Id. For few Mainland laws that are effective in Hong Kong and Macao, see Part ii of Section A of Chapter VI. 
18 Id. 
19 Han supra note 6 at 6. Huang and Qian, supra note 1 at 304-06.  
20 Id. at 304-06. 
21 Han supra note 6 at 6. 22 Id 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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Two Systems” and peaceful coexistence.25 This is the guiding principle for solving 
interregional legal conflicts.26 Because of the policy of "One Country, Two Systems," the 
different legal system in each region will maintain for at least fifty years.27 So Han 
believes it is inappropriate to use national substantive laws to unify regional laws.28 
Instead, conflict of laws is the best approach to coordinate different regional legal 
systems.29 The last principle is equality and mutual benefits.30 Han emphasizes the 
equality between Mainland China and special administrative regions in terms of civil and 
commercial laws.31 He encourages each region to refrain from parochial territorialism 
and to treat its residents and parties from other regions indiscriminatingly.32 
Then, he proposes a three-step process for solving interregional conflicts in China.33 
First, each region may apply its own regional conflict of laws to solve interregional 
conflicts.34 The second step is to enact a national interregional conflict of laws applicable 
to all regions.35 Han argues that the national interregional conflict of laws represents 
national unity and does not fall into the autonomous affairs of Hong Kong.36 So he 
believes the National People's Congress (hereinafter "NPC") and its standing committee 
can enact such law according to Articles 17.3 and 17.4 of the Draft of Hong Kong Basic 
Law.37 As the third step, uniform national substantive laws, in areas such as trade,                                                         
25 Id. at 7. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id., at 7-8. 
30 Id., at 7. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 33 Han supra note 6 at 7. Han & Huang supra note 6, at 125. Han and Huang proposed the three steps for legal 
conflicts between Mainland China and Hong Kong, but they are also applicable for solving legal conflicts concerning 
Macao. 
34 Han supra note 6 at 7.  
35 Id., at 8-9. 
36 Id., at 9. 
37 Id., at 9. Han’s article was published in 1988 but the Hong Kong Basic Law was published in 1990; therefore Han 
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transportation, and finance, will replace relevant regional substantive laws.38 As an 
alternative, each region may also enact identical or similar substantive laws to avoid 
interregional conflicts.39 Han predicts that steps two and three may overlap but they 
cannot replace each other. He believes that ultimately solving interregional conflicts in 
China will take at least fifty years after 1997.40  
 
ii. Pioneering Works 
 
Professor Depei Han's theoretical research on Chinese interregional conflict of laws 
was continued by Professor Jin Huang. The latter published a Chinese treatise in 1992.41 
In this treatise, he extensively discussed the meanings of “legal regions” and 
“interregional conflict of laws,” as well as general characteristics and solutions for 
Chinese interregional conflicts. In 1995, he published an English article in the Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law,42 which summarized his Chinese treatise 
and brought the issue of Chinese interregional conflict of laws to the attention of the 
English-speaking legal academia.  
Huang defines “legal region [Fa Yu]” as a specific scope in which a distinct legal 
system applies.43  A legal region has two features. The first is that it has a distinct legal                                                                                                                                                                      
referred to a draft of Basic Law. Article 17.3 indicates “The PRC State Council can require the Hong Kong SAR 
government to implement laws enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee, regarding defense, foreign affairs, and 
others issues related to national unity and territorial integrity, as well as any issues outside of the high autonomy of 
Hong Kong according to the Basic Law, in case that these laws are applicable in Hong Kong." Article 17.4 states that 
“except emergency, before issuing requirements, the State Council shall consult the Hong Kong SAR Basic Law 
Committee and the Hong Kong SAR government.” Notably these two provisions were deleted in the final version of 
the Basic Law. For criticism of Han's three step approach, see Section A of Chapter VI. 
38 Id., at 10. 
39 Id. 
40 DEPEI HAN, HAN DEPEI XUAN JI [SELECTED ESSAYS OF HAN DEPEI] 247-48 (Wuhan University Press1996). 
41 JIN HUANG, QU JI CHONG TU FA YAN JIU [RESEARCH ON THE INTERREGIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS] (1991). 
42 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 289. 
43 Huang, supra note 41 at 1. In Huang’s treatise, he preferred the term “legal unit” as the English equivalent of “Fa 
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system.44 Second, it covers a specific scope, which can be spatial, temporal, or with 
respect to its members.45 He applies the concept of “legal region” to China and argues 
that after Hong Kong and Macao reunite with Mainland China, China will become a 
country with three legal regions because Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao will 
maintain their own distinct legal system that covers a specific geographical area.46 He 
also observes that Mainland China is in the socialist-law family, Hong Kong belongs to 
the common-law family, and Macao is in the civil-law family.47 Consequently, Huang 
concludes that in China exist "one country, two systems, three law families, and four 
legal regions."48  
Moreover, Huang defines “interregional conflict of laws” as “conflict of laws among 
regions with different legal systems within one country (emphasis added).”49 He argues 
that interregional conflict of laws has three basic characteristics: “(1) the conflict is 
basically involved with domestic laws; (2) the conflict is applicable as a choice of law in 
civil and commercial matters; and (3) the conflict differs from private international 
law.”50 Scholars in Mainland China highly acclaim Huang’s definition.51  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Yu.” However, three years ago, his English articles chose the concept “legal region” and abandon the “legal unit.” 
Huang does not provide an explanation in his English article.   
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 2. 
46 Id. at 12-13. 
47 Id. at 13. 
48 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 289. The four legal regions refer to Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan. 
49 Id. at 289-92. See Renshan Liu & Zaisheng Xiang, Current Situation, Problems and Proposals for Interregional Civil 
and Commercial Judicial Assistance in China (on file with the author) (indicating that “interregional civil and 
commercial judicial assistance usually refers to relationships within a country with multiple legal systems). See also 
Renshan Liu & Meirong Zhang, Pi Xi Zhong Guo Qu Ji Min Shang Shi Pan Jue Xiang Fu Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing Wen 
Ti de Li Fa Yu Si Fa Xian Zhuang [Analysis of Current Legislation and Judicial Practice of Chinese Interregional 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters], a paper presented in 2008 Annual 
Chinese Association of Private International Law in Beijing. See Shawei Gao, Mainland China and the HKSAR Have 
Rules to Follow in Mutual Enforcement of Arbitration awards, 4 CHINA LAW 68 (1999). But see the definition of 
interregional conflict of laws in this dissertation in Section B of Chapter I. 
50 Huang and Qian, supra note 1 at 289.  
51 See Liu and Xiang, supra note 49 (indicating that “interregional civil and commercial judicial assistance usually 
refers to relationships within a country with multiple legal systems). See also Liu and Zhang, supra note 49.  
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 Huang elaborates Han's equality argument. He points out that in terms of conflict of 
laws all the regions in China—Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao—are equal:52 
 
From the conflict of laws perspective, the Mainland’s socialist legal system will not 
be superior to any of the other legal systems. The PRC Constitution, the HK B[asic] 
L[aw] and M[acao] B[asic] L[aw], and statutes governing national issues such as 
defense and diplomacy shall constitute the “supreme law of the land” over the Hong 
Kong and Macao SARs. Nevertheless, in the private law context, China’s socialist 
laws will be on par with the laws of the SARs, because the Mainland, Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan will all be equal, independent legal regions.  
 
Many scholars accepted Han and Huang’s equality argument. Some of them step further 
and argue that the legitimacy of the principle of equality between legal regions comes 
from Article 2 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Article 2 of the Macao Basic Law.53 
The reason is that these two provisions authorize Hong Kong and Macao to exercise a 
high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative, and independent judicial 
power.54  
Huang also proposes solutions for Chinese interregional legal conflicts. He believes 
that unifying substantive laws in the three regions is possible only when the socio-
economic situation in every region is similar to each other.55 Therefore, at the current 
stage, adopting conflicts rules is likely to be more effective and feasible.56 He argues that 
the best approach to unifying conflicts rules in Chinese regions is to enact nationally 
uniform conflict rules.57 This method would eliminate forum shopping, avoid renvoi, and 
                                                        
52 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 289-303. See Liu and Zhang, supra note 49 (acclaiming the principle of “equality 
between legal regions [Fa Yu Pin Deng]” ). 
53 See Liu and Zhang, supra note 49.  
54 Id. 
55 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 309. 
56 Id. at 310. 
57 Id. at 311. 
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bring many other benefits.58 He proposes a framework for unifying regional conflict of 
laws. He discusses rules in the fields of characterization,59 renvoi,60 ascertaining the law 
of a foreign region,61 public policy exceptions,62 evasion of law,63 personal law,64 laws 
applicable to contracts,65 and laws applicable to property.66  
 
iii. The Contemporary Scene 
 
Compiled before Hong Kong and Macao reunited with Mainland China, Han and 
Huang's early works emphasize the harmonization of legal conflicts. The contemporary 
legal writings on the general theory of Chinese interregional conflict of laws thrive on the 
theoretic postulate established by Depei Han. They acknowledge and accept the concepts 
and characteristics of Chinese interregional conflict of laws proposed by Han.67 
However, contemporary legal writings focus more on coordination among regions. The 
reason is that, after reunion of the three regions, "coordination" among regions is more 
urgent than "harmonization" in practice, because the latter require a long process in 
time.68 Yongpin Xiao's works on interregional coordination is the best representative.  
                                                         
58 Id. at 309 and 311. Xiao Yongpin, The Conflict of Laws Between Mainland China and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region: the Choice of Coordination Models, 4  in YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 163, 192 
(2003). 
59 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 316. 
60 Id, at 317. 
61 Id. 
62 Huang and Qian, supra note_1_ at 319. 
63 Id. at 321. 
64 Id. at 321. 
65 Id. at 322. 
66 Id. at 325. 67 Yongpin, supra note_58_ at 164-81. 
68 For the long existence of Chinese interregional conflicts, see Jin Huang, Interaction and Integration Between the 
Legal Systems of Hong Kong, Macao and Mainland China 50 Years After Their Return to China,  in ONE COUNTRY, 
TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE 
RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 769, 770-72 (Jorge Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal ed. 1999). 
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Yongpin Xiao 
 
Mainland Professor Yongpin Xiao explored the models of legislative coordination in 
the fields of substantive laws and conflict of laws between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong.69 He analyzes four methods to unify substantive laws.70 The first is direct 
application of national laws in Hong Kong.71 He argues that this method should be 
restricted to national laws cited in Annex III of the Basic Law.72 The second method is 
the application of international treaties.73 Xiao believes that using international treaties to 
resolve legal conflicts between Mainland China and Hong Kong does not threaten 
national unity and territorial integrity.74 China's accession to the WTO provides a good 
opportunity and a legal basis for resolving interregional conflicts.75 Xiao predicts that the 
two regions will probably become more similar in the fields of commercial laws after 
they revise their laws according to the requirements of WTO.76 The third method is the 
application of interregional agreements.77 Interregional agreements aim to achieve 
unification in a particular area of law.78 He argues that the conclusion of interregional 
agreements complies with the Basic Law and "nearly all Chinese scholars consider this to 
be a viable method."79 Moreover, this method has been the dominant coordinating model 
from 1997 to the composition of Xiao's paper in 2002.80 The last method is the enactment 
                                                        
69 Yongpin, supra note_58_ at 182. 
70 Id. 
71 Yongpin, supra note_58_ at 182-83. 
72 Id. at 182. For discussion of the Annex III, see Section A of Chapter IV. 
73 Id. at 186. 
74 Id. 
75 Yongpin, supra note___ at 198. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 189. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 197. 
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of common legislation.81 "When Mainland China and Hong Kong cannot reach an 
agreement, the respective legislative bodies may enact the same or similar rules by direct 
consultation or by adopting model laws drafted by certain research institution or 
academic society."82 
Xiao argues that the four methods can also be used to unify conflict of laws. He 
agrees with Jin Huang that the best approach is to enact uniform conflict-of-laws rules at 
the national level.83 He suggests that the Model Law of Mainland International Conflict 
of Laws can serve as the basic test for the uniform interregional conflict-of-laws rules.84 
Xiao also compares unifying conflict-of-laws rules and unifying substantive and 
procedural rules.85 He concludes that the former could be achieved more easily than, and 
provide a foundation for, the latter.86  
Xiao also provides four coordinating principles for solving interregional conflicts 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong.87 First, the two regions should cooperate 
under a common goal of promoting national unity.88 Each side should not treat their 
relationship as that between sovereign states.89 Second, both regions should observe the 
principle of equality and mutual benefit when dealing with conflict-of-law issues.90 
Third, judicial circles in the two regions should adopt an attitude of mutual respect and 
equal treatment.91 The forth principle is to promote communication and gradual 
                                                        
81 Id. at 190. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 192. 
84 Id. at 193. 
85 Id. at 192. 
86 Id.  
87 Id., at 180-181. 
88 Id., at 180. 
89 See Shawei Gao, Mainland China and the HKSAR Have Rules to Follow in Mutual Enforcement of Arbitration 
awards, 4 CHINA LAW 68 (1999). 
90 Yongpin, supra note_58_ at 180-81.  
91 Id., at 181. 
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unification.92 Because many fundamental differences exist between the legal systems in 
the two regions, it is inappropriate to resolve interregional legal conflicts by enacting 
unified substantive laws in a short period.93 Legal unification will be realized gradually 
in a very long process.94 Communication and coordination in common problems and for 
mutual benefits are necessary.95  
 
Others 
 
Chinese interregional conflict of laws also raises the attention outside of Mainland 
China.96 Notably, few studies regarding interregional conflict of laws have been 
undertaken in Hong Kong and Macao. Until 2002, Hong Kong scholar, Guobing Zhu, 
publishes the first important survey of scholarship on interregional conflict of laws. He 
regretfully acknowledges Chinese interregional conflict of laws does not attract much 
attention in Hong Kong thus far.97 Therefore, his survey mainly concentrates on 
Mainland scholarship, especially those of Depei Han and Jin Huang. He agrees the 
reasons for,98 the characteristics of,99 and principles for solving,100 Chinese interregional 
legal conflicts proposed by Huang. Especially, Zhu revisits debates on this subject in 
                                                        
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Eg., Hradilová, supra note 1 at 33-41. The author observes that interregional conflict of laws is a new conception in 
China. She agrees with Jin Huang regarding the concept, reasons and characteristics of Chinese interregional conflict of 
laws. Id, at 34-35. 
97 Guobin Zhu, Inter-regional Conflict of Laws under “One Country, Two Systems”: Revisiting Chinese Legal Theories 
and Chinese and Hong Kong Law, with Special Reference to Judicial Assistance, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 615, 637 (2002).  
98 Id. at 618. 
99 Id. at 625-26. 
100 Id. at 628-29.  
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Mainland China101 and concludes that it is valuable to maintain a public policy exception 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong:102 
 
Based on this general study of the existing literature in China, it can be predicted that 
the adoption and application of the public order / public policy doctrine in inter-
regional conflict of laws will vary from one case to another. But it would be better to 
largely implement this doctrine in all conflicts of laws. Between the two SARs, 
which both maintain capitalist systems; the application of it would be less frequent 
and narrower in scope.  
 
Zhu believes that both regions should make sincere efforts to solve interregional 
conflicts and that applying widely accepted international norms can help achieve this 
goal.103 He argues that incrementalism, namely a step-by-step approach, should be the 
guiding principle for solving interregional legal conflicts between Mainland China and 
Hong Kong.104 Besides the general theory of interregional conflict of laws, Zhu also 
conducts research regarding jurisdiction105 and choice of law106 in interregional cases. 
 
iv. Assessment 
 
Legal writings on the general theory of Chinese interregional conflict of laws 
contribute to building the theoretic postulate, provide terminologies, and identifying 
distinctive characteristics of Chinese interregional legal conflicts. They explored the 
consequences of "One Country, Two Systems" in regional legal systems, created the 
concept of “legal region,” and consequently established the discipline of interregional                                                         
101 Id. at 629-37. 
102 Id. at 637. 
103 Id. at 642. 
104 Id. at 643. 
105 Id. at 643-48. 
106 Id. at 649-61. 
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conflict of laws in China. Different from Han and Huang, much other scholarship relating 
to Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao were restricted by the central-local 
relationship between them.107 Namely, Hong Kong and Macao are special administrative 
regions under the direct leadership of the Beijing government.108 However, by defining 
them as legal regions, Han and Huang elevated Hong Kong and Macao to an equal status 
as Mainland China in terms of conflict of laws. This becomes the theoretic postulate to 
develop interregional conflict of laws. More importantly, they also established that 
developing interregional conflict of laws complies with the policy of “One Country, Two 
Systems.” Han and Huang's arguments are significant because they justify the 
constitutional basis for the development of interregional JRE.  
Moreover, Han, Huang, Xiao and many other scholars109 reach a consensus that at 
the current stage designing interregional conflict-of-law rules, instead of substantive-law 
rules, is the best method to legitimately solve interregional legal conflicts in China. They 
also agree that interregional legislations are a better approach than regional legislations 
for solving interregional conflicts. However, they fail to provide a feasible and clear way 
to develop interregional conflict-of-law rules, including JRE rules. For example, Xiao 
surveyed the four models of legislative coordination among Chinese regions; however he 
ended with an ambiguous conclusion: a combination of several models will be the best 
                                                        
107 Eg., see Weidong Zhu, The Relationships between China and Its Special Administrative Regions and Their 
Regulation, 4 J CAMBR. STUD. 111, 112 (2009), http://journal.acs-cam.org.uk/data/archive/2009/200902-article10.pdf. 
See also Wang Qiansheng and Huang Shengchun, Zhongguo Neidi yu Aomen Sifa Xiezhu de Xingzhi ji Moshi [The 
Characteristics and Model of the Judicial Assistance between Mainland China and Macao], in Shan Changzong (ed), 
ZHONGGUO NEIDI YU AOMEN SIFA XIEZHU ZONGHENGTAN [JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN MAINLAND 
CHINA AND MACAO SAR] 110 (Beijing: People's Court Publishing House, 1999) (indicating the unequal status of the 
cross-border judicial assistance can safeguard the national unity and judicial sovereignty of the PRC). 
108 Id. See also Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws, arts 12-23.  
109 Zhu, supra note_97_ at 629 (indicating [a]ll Mainland scholars who have participated in this debate agree that a 
body of laws regulating inter-regional conflict of laws must be created and implemented, whatever the form of law. It 
could be statute law, case law or some kind of rules or practice). 
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method to develop interregional conflict of laws.110 This conclusion provides readers 
without a clear guidance. For example, it is unclear, when developing interregional 
conflict of laws, whether the four models are equally important, which one or ones are 
the starting points, and whether the four models will coexist from the beginning to the 
end.  
Additionally, interregional conflict of laws includes jurisdiction, choice of laws, and 
JRE.111 Depei Han and Jin Huang's works on interregional choice of laws112 are so 
influential that many later studies follow.113 Consequently, a large volume of studies on 
interregional choice of law appear.114 However, interregional JRE, which is urgently 
needed in practice, has been improperly ignored.  
 
B. Interregional Judgment Recognition and Enforcement 
 
By the end of 1990s, the conditions for comprehensive theoretical discussion of 
interregional JRE became mature. Legal writing on the general theory of Chinese 
interregional conflict of laws, developed since the late 1980s, provides theoretical 
postulates for research on JRE. In practice, Hong Kong and Macao reunited with 
Mainland China and the interregional legal conflicts, especially the difficulties of 
interregional JRE, become a real thorny issue. Legislative, judicial, and executive 
branches in each region began to make joint efforts to solve these conflicts; negotiations 
on bilateral arrangements regarding service, evidence investigation, the recognition and                                                         
110 Zhu, supra note_97_ at 639. 
111 Yongpin, supra note_58_ at 197. Zhu, supra note_97_ at 622. 112 Jin Huang, Constitutional Law and Inter-regional Choice of Law: A comparative Survey. Presented at 2005 U.S.-
China Private International Roundtable, Temple University Beasley School of Law. 
113 Eg., Hradilová, supra note 1 at 38-40.  
114 Id.  
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enforcement of arbitration awards, as well as JRE were held between Mainland China, 
Hong Kong and Macao, respectively.115 Among these subjects, JRE is particularly 
contentious, so it stimulates academic interests in three regions. Scholarship in this field 
can be divided into three sections chronically. The first-effort section is scholarship 
published before 1999 when the first interregional arrangement was concluded (Part i).116 
The pioneering-work section surveys scholarship published after the conclusion of the 
first arrangement but before the conclusion of the first JRE arrangement (1999-2006) 
(Part ii). The contemporary section presents the most recent scholarship regarding 
interregional JRE (after 2006) (Part iii).  
 
i. The First Efforts 
 
In 1999, the second major treatise on Chinese interregional conflict of laws,117 after 
the one published by Jin Huang in 1992, appeared. Its author is Mainland Professor Juan 
Shen. The book mainly discusses interregional choice of law; additionally it provides 
insightful arguments on the necessity and ways to develop interregional JRE.118 Shen 
argues that, for one region, denying interregional JRE seems to help protect its 
interests.119 However, one should not ignore that when one region denies the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments from other regions, other regions would probably do the 
                                                        
115 Bilateral arrangements regarding service, evidence investigation, the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
awards, as well as JRE are concluded between 1999 and 2006. See supra Part Contributions of the Existing Bilateral 
Arrangements of Section D of Chapter I.  
116 The first interregional arrangement is the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement. See Id. 
117 See Juan Shen, ZHONG GUO QU JI CONG TU FA YAN JIU [ANALYSIS OF CHINESE INTERREGIONAL CONFLICT 
OF LAWS] (Beijing, China Political and Law University Press, 1999). 
118 Id. 
119 Id, at 134 
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same to this region.120 Therefore, the region that refuses JRE actually shoots its own 
foot.121 Moreover, the spread of such refusal will prevent many interregional conflicts 
from being effectively and efficiently solved.122 Notably, in practice some courts tried to 
avoid JRE issues by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over a case where the resulting 
judgment may require interregional JRE.123 Shen argued that this approach was 
pessimistic because the court wrongly gave up the power of jurisdiction.124 Denying 
either JRE or jurisdiction sacrifices the interests of parties, which contradicts the ultimate 
goal of private laws—protecting parties’ interests.125 Such denial would also hinder the 
development of interregional relations in China.126  
Shen also proposed four valuable ways to improve interregional JRE. First is to 
harmonize the jurisdiction rules.127 Only when courts in the four regions agree on the 
jurisdiction rules, they will reach consensus for JRE.128 Second is to protect the lawful 
rights and interests of parties.129 This factor should become the ultimate goal of 
interregional JRE. Third, public policy exception should be allowed but should be 
restrictively restrained.130 Under the policy of “One Country, Two Systems,” public 
policy exception is necessary because each region’s fundamental interests are 
different.131 Nevertheless, public policy exception should be restricted: JRE should not 
be denied simply because the law of a judgment-rendering region is different from that of 
                                                        
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id., at 134-35. 
126 Id., at 135. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id., at 135-36. 
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a requested region.132 Fourth, regions should adopt the same res judicata rule.133 When a 
court with jurisdiction in a region has rendered a judgment, courts in other regions should 
respect this judgment and be willing to recognize and enforce it.134 It is against judicial 
economy to require parties to litigate the case in merits in the requested region.135 Re-
litigation may also cause inconsistent judgments so harm parties’ interests.136 Shen also 
argues that a multilateral JRE arrangement is necessary for Chinese regions.137 She 
proposes that, before reunification with Taiwan, Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Macao, respectively, can make a bilateral JRE arrangement with Taiwan.138 After the 
reunification, the four regions should consider to make a uniform JRE arrangement.139  
 
ii. Pioneering Works 
 
The first interregional arrangement on judicial assistance140 was concluded between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong on mutual service in 1999.141 Since then, much 
literature is published to discuss regional JRE laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong, 
as well as the possibilities of establishing interregional JRE cooperation.142 Some 
literature concerning Macao conflict of laws is published143 but very little is related to 
                                                        
132 Id. 
133 Id., at 136. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 In China, judicial assistance includes JRE. For detailed discussion, see infra fn 158 and accompanying texts. 
141 See supra Contributions of the Existing Bilateral Arrangements of Section D of Chapter I. 
142 Shaocong Su, Lun Hong Kong Yu Nei Di Fa Yuan Jian Dui Pan Jue de Xian Fu Cheng Ren Ji Zhi Xing [Recognition 
and Enforcement of Civil Judgment Between the Mainland and Hong Kong SAR], 23 HEBEI LAW SCIENCE 94, 94-99 
(2005). 
143 Eg., Jin Huang & Huacheng Guo, Zailun Guoji Sifa Zhong de Gonggong Zhixu Wenti: Jian Tan Macao Guoji Sifa 
de Youguan Lilun yu Shijian, 2 HEBEI LAW SCIENCE 15, 15-20 (1998). 
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JRE.144 This is because, compared with Hong Kong, Macao is relatively less significant 
in interregional economy and its territory is much smaller; therefore, fewer JRE concerns 
Macao. Moreover, the language barrier is another factor restricting the survey of 
literature on Macao law. 145 
In Mainland China, many scholars compare the regional JRE laws in Mainland 
China and Hong Kong.146 These studies enhance the mutual understandings of each 
other's JRE system so pave the way for interregional JRE cooperation. Scholars also 
argue that international conventions that Chinese regions ratify should not be applied to 
solve interregional judicial assistance; instead, the best model is bilateral interregional 
arrangements.147 Essentially, this model requires regions to reach mutual agreements 
through negotiation and then to implement the agreements by separate legislations in 
each region.148 This approach complies with the Basic Law of the SAR and it can adapt 
to the specific situation in each region.149 Some scholars also propose general principles 
to make a bilateral JRE arrangement.150 For example, the arrangement should help 
                                                        
144 Eg., Gujie Yuan, Nei Di Yu Gang Ao Xian Fu Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing Ming Shan Shi Pan Jue De Fa Zhang Qu Shi 
[The Trend of Development between Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao Respectively on Mutural Recognition 
and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments], 2 FA XUE JIA [JOURIST], 147-53 (2005). 
145 Before the return of Macao, Portuguese is the only official language in Macao. After its return, both Chinese and 
Portuguese are official languages. Majority of Macao jurisprudence and scholarship published before 1999 are in 
Portuguese. Because of the language barrier, the survey of scholarship concerning Macao JRE law focuses on 
publications in English and Chinese. 
146 Gu Song & Liu Pin, Zhong Guo Qu Ji Pan Jue Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing Zhi Du Tan Jiu---Yi Nei Di He Hong Kong 
Wei Li [An Analysis of Chinese Interregional JRE System: the Examples of Mainland China and Hong Kong], 20 
JOURNAL OF WEINAN TEACHERS COLLEGE 26, 26-27 (2005). 
147 Zhihui He, Dui Zhong Guo Qu Ji Si Fa Xie Zhu Mo Shi De Zai Ren Ke [Reconsideration of the Model for 
Interregional Judicial Assistance in China], 109 HE BEI FA XUE [HE BEI LAW SCIENCE] 79, 83 (2001). Song and Pin, 
supra note_146_ at 27-28. Some scholars, although recognizing the model of arrangements has become a precedent, 
suggest to explore other models because this model is not only available one. Jie Chen, Qu Ji Fa Lv Chong Tu Zhong 
Pan Jue De Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xin Wen Ti Yan Jiu [Study on the recognition and Implementation of Judgments 
Concerning Interregional Conflict of Laws], 10 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL PROCURATORS COLLEGE 13, 19 (2002). Yuan, 
supra note_144  at 150. Shanshan Lu, Nei Di Yu Hong Kong Min Shan Shi Pan Jue Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing De Xiang 
Zhuang Yu Jian Yi [The Status Quo of and Suggestions to Interregional JRE between Mainland China and Hong Kong 
in Civil and Commercial Cases], 39 LI LUN GUANG CHA [THEORETIC OBSERVATION] 98, 99 (2006). 
148 Chen, supra note_147 at 19. 
149 Id. at 19. 
150 Song and Pin, supra note_146_ at 27-28. Weidong Cheng, Qu Ji Fa Yuan Pan Jue Cheng Ren yu Zhi Xing de Fa Lv 
Yi Ju [The Legal Basis for Interregional JRE], 1 NANJING SOCIAL SCIENCE 56, 59-60 (2000). 
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maintain national sovereignty and integrity, comply with the principle of "One Country, 
Two Systems", observe the independence of each region, promote mutual benefits and 
cooperation, as well as protect parties' interests.151 Moreover, some scholars believe this 
arrangement should be convenient, transparent, fair, and efficient.152 Some also propose 
to make efforts in following aspects so as to facilitate interregional JRE: harmonize 
jurisdiction disputes, use public policy exception restrictively, and adopt an interregional 
res judicata rule.153 
Notably, interregional legal conflicts also raise the attention of scholars in Hong 
Kong. Professor Guobin Zhu's 2002 paper focuses on the frame of judicial assistance 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong before and after the 1997 handover. He 
observes legal principles and theories, as well as legal practices, differ significantly 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong.154 Therefore, it is urgently necessary to 
establish a workable system of co-ordination and co-operation between these two 
regions.155 He encourages his Hong Kong colleagues to give up pessimistic views 
towards Mainland China:156  
 
We should not underestimate the genuine intent of the Chinese legislative and 
judicial authorities towards a satisfactory solution of the conflict of laws between 
Hong Kong and the Mainland. The fact is that in dealing with all “Hong Kong-
related cases”, the mainland courts apply the laws and procedures applicable to 
foreign-related cases in line with the subsisting provisions and widely accepted 
international rules and practices. 
                                                         
151 Song and Pin, supra note_146_ at 28. Cheng, supra note_150_ at 59-60. Chen, supra note_147_ at 16-17. 
152 Song and Pin, supra note_146_ at 28. 
153 Chen, supra note_147_ at 17-18. 
154 Guobin Zhu, Inter-regional Conflict of Laws under “One Country, Two Systems”: Revisiting Chinese Legal 
Theories and Chinese and HongKong Law, with Special Reference to Judicial Assistance, 32 HONG KONG L. J. 615, 
616-17 (2002). 
155 Id. For discussion of Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, see Section A of Chapter VI.  
156 Id. at 617. 
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He emphasizes that Article 95 of the Basic Law is the guidance for interregional judicial 
assistance.157 He states that Hong Kong's traditional understanding of the phrase "judicial 
assistance" is narrower than Mainland China.158 Namely, for the former, JRE does not 
fall into the field of judicial assistance but for the latter, the answer is yes. However, the 
Hong Kong legal authorities agree with Mainland China that JRE is part of judicial 
assistance.159 He reviews many bilateral JRE treaties that Mainland China concluded 
with other countries and indicates that160  
 
It is ironic that under the doctrine of “one country, two systems”, the Mainland 
and the HKSAR are not able to reach a comparable [JRE] agreement with each 
other. There may be a difference of approaches or doctrines. Indeed, both parties 
need to understand each other's positions to negotiate a solution. 
 
Zhu observes that Hong Kong legislative authorities prefer the "separate legislative 
approach," which implies "categorically excluding a centralized legislation approach."161 
In other words, each region should enact regional laws to solve interregional conflicts.162 
This reflects Hong Kong people's concern regarding the quality of the Mainland judicial 
system.163 However, he raises a valuable question that "[a]re these differences [between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong] more substantial than those that exist between 
[Mainland] China and other countries with which [Mainland] China has already reached 
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agreements?"164 In other words, Zhu implies that the differences between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong are not insurmountable.  
Importantly, regarding JRE, Zhu uses case studies to demonstrate the absence of 
mutual JRE system left us with an "embarrassing situation."165 He points out numerous 
final judgments cannot be executed in the other region so some Hong Kong parties take 
advantage of this gap to escape legal liabilities.166 He strongly advocates that the two 
regions should jointly make efforts to solve the JRE impasse.167 However, he does not 
propose a clear approach for the two regions. He simply concludes his article with "a 
workable solution/approach is preferable...further theoretical study is needed."168 
 
iii. The Contemporary Scene 
 
 The Mainland-Macao Arrangement and Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement were 
concluded in 2006. The contemporary scholarship concentrates on their achievements 
and insufficiencies, as well as their implementations and future developments.169  
 
Scholars in Mainland China 
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169 For Mainland publications, i.e. Renshang Liu & Meirong Zhang, Lun Nei Di Yu Xiang Gan Min Shang Shi Pan Jue 
Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing Zhi Du Ji Qi Wan Shan [The Judgment Recognition and Enforcement System Between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong: Present and future], ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHI FA YU BI JIAO FA NIAN KAN [THE 
ANNUAL JOURNAL OF CHINESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW] (2009). For 
publications outside of Mainland China, i.e. MIN YUAN, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN 
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN THE PRC, HONG KONG, MACAO AND TAIWAN 1-88, 111-22 (2006). 
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In May 2007, an important conference regarding interregional conflict of laws was 
held in Guangdong Province.170 Eighty attendants of the conference were mainly from 
Mainland China, and some from Hong Kong or Macao.171 A report was released after 
this conference, where scholars compared the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement with 
the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.172  
According to this report, the negotiation of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement is 
faster than that of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the scope of the former is 
broader than the latter; this is partly because Mainland China and Macao both had strong 
desires to establish judicial assistance but Hong Kong has big concerns regarding 
Mainland judicial system.173 Moreover, Macao and Mainland China both belong to the 
civil law system so shared relatively similar views on many basic issues.174 Importantly, 
Macao is much smaller than Hong Kong in areas, so there are less interregional JRE 
issues involving Macao than Hong Kong.175  
Mainland China and Macao only had disputes in three aspects.176 First is whether the 
arrangement should apply to debt instruments certified by notary publics.177 Such 
instruments are enforceable under the Macao Civil Procedure Code.178 However, 
Mainland China hesitates to include such instruments into the Arrangement because they 
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PIN LUN [LAW REVIEW] 156, 156 (2008). 
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are not enforceable like court judgments in Mainland China.179 Nevertheless, Mainland 
China agrees to consider including such documents when expanding the scope of the 
Arrangement.180 The second dispute is whether the Arrangement should apply to 
judgments of return of properties involved in criminal cases.181 Such judgments are 
essentially civil and commercial in Macao so Macao delegates hope to include them into 
the Arrangement.182 However, the return of properties in criminal cases is regarded as 
criminal judgments in Mainland China.183 Therefore, Mainland delegates suggested 
including such judgments in judicial assistance arrangements on criminal issues.184 The 
third dispute is whether judgments can be automatically recognized by the other region, 
namely whether the exequatur procedure for recognition should be abolished.185 Macao 
prefers abolish such procedure.186 However, Mainland China believes that this is a good 
suggestion but in practice, recognition without enforcement is rare.187 Generally, a 
judgment creditor will request recognition and enforcement together.188 Even if the 
creditor only request for recognition, the debtor may raise defenses.189 So if the 
exequatur procedure for recognition was abolished, many disputes would occur in 
practice.190 
Both Mainland China and Hong Kong agree that international treaties cannot be 
applied to solve interregional legal conflicts, otherwise the policy of "One Country, Two 
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Systems" and Hong Kong Basic Law would be endangered.191 However, Mainland China 
and Hong Kong had different opinions in five areas when formulating the 
arrangement.192 The first is the scope of the Arrangement.193 Mainland China prefers the 
Arrangement to cover all civil and commercial judgments. However, Hong Kong insists 
on contractual disputes with choice of court agreements.194 The second dispute is the 
finality of Mainland judgments.195 Third, whether only judgments rendered by Mainland 
intermediate courts or courts at higher level can be recognized and enforced in Hong 
Kong.196 The Hong Kong delegates insist on restricting Mainland judgments to those 
rendered by Mainland intermediate courts or courts at higher level.197 However, 
Mainland China refused.198 The concession is that not all judgments rendered by 
Mainland district courts can benefit from the Arrangement: only judgments rendered by 
district courts with centralized jurisdiction over interregional cases, and judgments 
rendered by Mainland intermediate courts or courts at higher level are included in the 
Arrangement.199 The fourth dispute is whether natural justice should be a defense to 
JRE.200 During negotiation, Hong Kong delegates gave up this defense, and Mainland 
China accepted.201 The fifth dispute is the statute of limitation for interregional JRE.202 
Hong Kong law provides six year for JRE. However, under Mainland law, if the 
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judgment creditor is a legal person, the statute of limitation for JRE is only 6 month.203 It 
will be extended to one year, if the creditor is a natural person.204 Ultimately, the two 
regions agree to accept the short period under Mainland law.205   
This report also comments on the pros and cons of the two Arrangements.206 As for 
the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, the report praises the broad scope of the 
Arrangement. Among the cons, it argues that a requested court should apply the law of 
the judgment-rendering region to determine the latter's jurisdiction.207 It also suggests 
that the two regions should exercise the public policy exception restrictively. 208 
Regarding the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the report praises the definition 
of finality because it constitutes a breakthrough to the finality dispute brought by the 
Mainland procedure for trial supervision.209 However, it argues that the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement is only a "semi-manufactured product" rather than a "finished 
product" in a matured environment.210 In particular, it criticizes the scope of the 
Arrangement is too narrow to fully facilitate people's lives in the two regions.211 
Moreover, Hong Kong wished to include "natural justice" as a defense to JRE in the 
Arrangement.212 But ultimately, the Arrangement does not cover this defense, because 
this common-law principle has no equivalent and clear definition in the Mainland legal 
system.213 Mainland scholars concern that, since this defense is a long established 
principle in Hong Kong, whether the current defenses to JRE under the Arrangement can  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cover the defense of natural justice in Hong Kong law, and in case that the answer is 
negative, whether the Arrangement fails to satisfy the human right protections required 
by the Hong Kong Basic Law.214 Overall, the majority of Mainland scholars argue that 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is inadequate to solve interregional JRE 
difficulties and to facilitate economic exchanges.215  
After the conclusion of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, scholarship on Macao 
regional JRE law and this Arrangement appears. For example, Doctor Yuan Min in his 
dissertation discusses Macao regional JRE law, which helps fill the gap that very little 
scholarship in English or Chinese exists on this subject.216 Most scholarship concentrates 
on the Mainland-Macao Arrangement and discusses its achievements and 
shortcomings.217  
 
Hong Kong Scholar: Xianchu Zhan 
 
In Hong Kong, the first representative work is co-authored by Xianchu Zhang and 
Philip Smart.218 They review the history and development of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement, analyze its contents, and identify concerns and problems regarding the 
implementation of the Arrangement.219  
Zhang and Smart observes that because of the absence of an interregional 
arrangement, Mainland judgments have to be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong  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according to the cumbersome and expensive common-law procedures.220 On the 
Mainland side, recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong judgments were impossible 
because no JRE arrangement or reciprocity exists between two regions.221 The JRE 
impasse also brought political embarrassment to Hong Kong,222 because Hong Kong lags 
behind compared with Macao and Taiwan, who has established JRE mechanisms with 
Mainland China.223 In the words of the then Secretary for Justice, Elisie Leung, "it would 
be ridiculous if after the handover Mainland judgments could be enforced in foreign 
countries, but not in Hong Kong."224 Moreover, Zhang and Smart point out the absence 
of an interregional JRE arrangement harms the dynamic economic integration of the two 
regions.225 In this background, Mainland China and Hong Kong started the first round of 
negotiation on mutual JRE issues in July 2002.226 Totally seven rounds of consultation 
were carried out and twenty-six revisions of the text were made until the conclusion of 
the Arrangement in July 2006.227 Zhang and Smart identify four difficulties in 
negotiations: the vagueness of the Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law,228 the 
diversities between the legal systems in Mainland China and Hong Kong,229 the dispute 
regarding the finality of Mainland judgments,230 and the scope of the mutual enforcement 
regime.231 
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Moreover, Zhang and Smart analyze the contents of the arrangement from the 
aspects of enforceable final judgments, procedures, and defenses.232 They praise that 
"this Arrangement should certainly be welcome as the first step towards establishing a 
broader cross-border judicial cooperative regime on substantive matters."233 They also 
praise the approach adopted by the Arrangement to solve the finality dispute,234 but they 
also point out insufficiencies of the Arrangement. For example, compared with the 
Mainland-Macao Arrangement, the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is 
much narrow.235 The authors explain that this is because the Hong Kong's common-law 
system is more different from the Mainland civil-law system and, more importantly, 
because a deep concern of the quality of Mainland judgments exist in Hong Kong.236 
However, the authors worry that, even in most typical cross-border commercial settings, 
such limited scope will make the Arrangement rarely used.237 Another problem of the 
Arrangement is the lack of conflict-of-law rules on jurisdiction issues, which the authors 
predict, will limit the usefulness of the Arrangement.238 The authors also concern about 
problems such as whether Mainland courts would honor and enforce parties' choice of 
court agreements,239 how many judgments can be actually executed in Mainland 
China,240 no sufficient rules for recognition exists in the Arrangement.241 
As a conclusion, Zhang and Smart emphasize that the Arrangement is a "developing 
product with tough compromises[;]" however, it will "help to promote the development  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of cross-border economic and trade relations, but may also pave the way for further 
development towards a more comprehensive system."242 
Zhang's most recent work is the second representative scholarship in Hong Kong on 
interregional JRE.243  He concentrates on the Hong Kong implementing legislation of the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, discusses its insufficiencies, and also analyzes 
issues beyond the Mainland Judgments Ordinance.244  
The Hong Kong implementing legislation is the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Ordinance of Hong Kong (hereinafter "Mainland Judgments 
Ordinance”).245 Zhang highly praised the official implementation of the Arrangement as 
a historical breakthrough.246 He discusses the contents of the Ordinance247 and praises 
that it remedies many gaps in the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.248 For example, it 
provides rules to recognize Mainland judgments in Hong Kong.249 He emphasizes the 
regime of interregional JRE should be further developed and this Ordinance "lay[s] a 
solid foundation" for this endeavor.250  
He also indicates his concerns regarding the Mainland Judgments Ordinance. First, it 
is unclear how to certify a Hong Kong judgment in the Mainland JRE proceedings.251 
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Second is how to determine the jurisdiction and validity of choice of court agreements.252 
Third is the finality of Mainland judgments.253 He urges Hong Kong legislatures or 
courts to clarify whether the "final judgment with enforceability" in the Arrangement is 
the same as the "final, conclusive, and enforceable judgment" in the Ordinance.254 The 
fourth concern is the service of process.255 Zhang noticed that the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Service Arrangement has been rarely used by two regions and Mainland China made 
unilateral laws on interregional service.256 He believes the best approach is to improve 
the Service Arrangement by joint efforts instead of unilateral laws.257 Zhang's last 
concern is judicial fraud in Mainland China.258 He encourages the two regions to enhance 
communications.259 
Moreover, he discusses issues beyond the Mainland Judgments Ordinance. 
Considering the limited scope of the Ordinance, Zhang predicts that the common law in 
Hong Kong will still be the mainstream JRE laws for Mainland judgments in the near 
future.260 As such, two issues deserve special attention.261 They are jurisdictional 
conflicts in interregional cases and the finality of the Mainland judgments to be enforced 
outside the Ordinance.262 He argues that conflicts in direct jurisdiction "are becoming 
prominent concerns" in academic discussion and in practice.263 The focal point is 
whether Mainland courts would apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases  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where both sides claim jurisdiction.264 As for finality, Zhang is not sure how the 
Mainland Judgments Ordinance, which explicitly recognizes the finality of Mainland 
judgments falling under its scope, would influence the common law scheme.265 He urges 
the Court of the Final Appeal to clarify this issue soon.266  
Zhang concludes with his concerns about the current dual track JRE system, where 
some Mainland judgments are recognized and enforced according to the Ordinance, but 
the rest are governed by the common law.267 He encourages the two regions to make 
further cooperation and improvement.268 
 
iv. Assessment 
 
The above survey demonstrates that both Mainland and Hong Kong scholars have 
reached a consensus regarding the necessity of an effective and efficient interregional 
JRE system. Scholars are unsatisfied with the narrow scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement and concerned about the differences between the two JRE arrangements, 
and between the three regional JRE laws. A majority of scholars agree that the 
"arrangement" model is the best way for solving interregional JRE difficulties. However, 
the studies are restricted to the current bilateral format. Few scholars look beyond the 
current format and consider the possibility of a multilateral JRE arrangement among 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao. Although Juan Shen discussed the possibility 
of a uniform multilateral JRE arrangement, she unnecessarily linked its establishment  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with the reunification of Taiwan with Mainland China. In other words, the possibility of a 
multilateral JRE arrangement among Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao has not 
been sufficiently studied. Additionally, although many comparative studies have been 
carried out regarding the regional JRE laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong, little 
research has been done on regional JRE law in Macao.  
Notably, scholarships regarding interregional jurisdiction conflicts, the public policy 
exception, res judicata rules, the achievements and insufficiencies of the current two 
Arrangements, as well as regional JRE laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong can 
largely help to design the contents of a multilateral JRE arrangement. The research, 
which justifies the constitutional basis of the current Arrangements by Article 95 of the 
Hong Kong Basic Law and Macao Basic Law, provides a foundation for the legitimacy 
of a multilateral JRE arrangement.  
 
C. Comparative Studies 
 
The third category of scholarship is academic works that looks to foreign 
interregional JRE mechanisms for lessons to solve Chinese interregional JRE 
difficulties.269 The number of comparative works is much less than scholarship in the 
above two categories. Although they have made outstanding achievements, most of 
comparative works stay in general comparisons without digging into the details of the 
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interregional laws in China and abroad. Even less scholarship especially focuses on JRE 
issues.  
 
i. The First Efforts 
 
The value of comparative studies to the development of Chinese interregional 
conflict of laws was recognized by Professors Depei Han and Jin Huang early in 1989.270 
They argue that Chinese jurists should objectively understand the situation of Chinese 
interregional conflicts, and refer to foreign valuable lessons so as to find a solution 
suitable for China.271 Any solution drawn by comparative studies needs to adapt to 
China’s unique situation.272 When identifying the characteristics of Chinese interregional 
conflicts, Han compares Chinese situations with foreign ones.273 He points out four major 
differences between Chinese and foreign interregional conflicts. First, interregional 
conflicts in all foreign countries with multiple legal regions are conflicts in the same 
social system.274 For example, the interregional conflicts in the US, the UK, Canada, or 
Australia are in the capitalist social system.275 Similarly, the interregional conflicts in the 
Soviet Union and Poland are in the socialist social system.276 Only in China, the 
interregional conflicts are between socialist and capitalist social systems.277 Second, only 
few foreign countries, like China, have interregional conflicts between different legal  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systems.278 Examples include Québec in Canada and Louisiana in the US.279 These two 
regions are in the civil-law system but their sister regions are in the common-law 
system.280 Third, generally regions in foreign countries have no right to conclude 
international treaties.281 Therefore, interregional conflicts in foreign countries do not 
contain conflicts between treaties adopted by different regions.282 However, conflicts 
between treaties may exist in China, because Hong Kong and Macao can ratify treaties on 
certain subjects under their own names.283 Fourth, the autonomy that Chinese regions 
enjoy is much higher than that of states in the US.284 One reason is that in the US, federal 
laws, even contradictory with state laws, shall be binding in state courts.285 The second 
reason is the Supreme Court of the US enjoys the final adjudicative power, so it can hear 
cases from all states.286 On the contrary, laws enacted by Hong Kong and Macao are in 
the equal status with Mainland laws as long as they are not against the two Basic 
Laws.287 No court of final appeals exists in China to hear cases from all regions.288 The 
final adjudicative power belongs to the Supreme Court in each region.289   
When arguing how to use interregional conflict of laws to resolve interregional legal 
conflicts, Han also employed comparative studies.290 He surveys how other countries 
solve interregional legal conflicts and identifies two major models.291 The first is that the 
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highest legislature in the country enacts a national interregional conflict of laws.292 This 
approach is adopted by Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Former Soviet Union.293 The second 
approach is to use international conflict of laws to solve interregional legal conflicts.294 
The UK, the US, Canada, and Australia use this approach.295 Han argues that China can 
adopt the first approach because the NPC can enact national interregional conflict of laws 
which should be applicable in Hong Kong and Macao.296 
Jin Huang further divides the two models analyzed by Han into four:297 
 
1. Advocating a national uniform law of inter-regional conflict of laws. A good 
example is the Regulations on the Conflict of Laws and Jurisdiction over Civil 
Status, Family Relations and Succession enacted by the former Yugoslavian 
Federation in 1979. 
2. Different legal districts adopting their respective inter-regional conflict laws to 
solve the conflicts between their own districts and the others. This once occurred in 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
3. Applying by analogy private international law rules to solve inter-regional conflict 
of laws. This was, for example, stipulated in the 1888 Spanish Civil Code. 
4. Not distinguishing inter-regional / interstate conflict of laws from international 
conflict of laws and directly applying these commonly accepted rules to international 
and inter-regional / interstate conflict of laws. This is often the case in common law 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Huang's conclusion is the same as Han: a national uniform conflict of laws is the best 
solution for China.298 The most important reason is that this law can avoid conflicts of 
regional laws and help unify national legal systems in the long run.299 However, different 
from Han, Huang favors the model-law approach to enact this national uniform law.300  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Huang also uses comparative studies to demonstrate the necessities of maintaining a 
public policy exception in resolving Chinese interregional conflicts. He admits that in 
terms of choice of law public policy exception is rarely used in solving interregional 
conflicts in many foreign countries, because301  
 
In general, natural bonds are stronger between regions than between sovereign 
countries, and differences between regions are not as substantial as those separating 
sovereign countries. 
 
However he distinguishes Chinese interregional conflicts with those in foreign 
countries.302 He observes the special Chinese characteristics that are not found in foreign 
countries.303 He indicates that "the clash between fundamentally antagonistic socialist 
law and capitalist law precepts is particularly problematic."304 Moreover, Hong Kong and 
Macao enjoy much broader legislative autonomy than regions in many foreign 
countries.305 Consequently, the differences between the civil and commercial laws of 
these regions are like those existing between many sovereign countries.306 Therefore, he 
concludes that, allowing the public policy exception in terms of choice of law is 
"consistent with the policy of 'one country, two systems' in promoting the co-existence of 
separate legal regions for a considerable period of time."307 
 
ii. Contemporary Scene 
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The contemporary scholarship compares the interregional JRE law in Mainland 
China, with those in the US and the EU, and also with international JRE laws. In 
Mainland China, Professor Yongping Xiao's Chinese treatise, The Legal Conflicts and 
Coordination between Mainland China and Hong Kong, is the most comprehensive 
contemporary study regarding interregional conflict of laws in China and abroad.308 
Although focusing on lessons for Mainland China and Hong Kong,309 this treatise is still 
insightful for solving interregional legal conflicts involving Macao. It analyzes the 
models to solve interregional legal conflicts in the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, 
Germany, Spain, Switzerland, France, and Italy.310 It has six conclusions. First, 
interregional legal conflicts cannot be solved overnight, which has been demonstrated by 
all countries with interregional conflicts.311 Therefore, China should observe the policy 
of "One Country, Two Systems” and seek interregional coordination while maintaining 
the independent legal system of each region.312 Second, federal countries and unitary 
countries, common-law countries and civil-law countries, generally all adopt multiple 
models to solve interregional legal conflicts.313 The first step is to refer to international 
conflict-of-law rules to solve interregional conflicts.314 In the latter stage, China may 
consider enact national conflict of laws applicable to all regions.315 Only when the three 
regions are fully integrated in politics and economy, China may apply national 
substantive laws to all regions.316 Third, enacting interregional conflict of laws should  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comply with the PRC Constitution, Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws.317 Fourth, 
differences in political systems are an important factor influencing the resolution of 
interregional legal conflicts.318 In China, "One Country, Two Systems" is the basic 
political system, so interregional legal conflicts are unavoidable.319 This policy also 
serves as the basic principle and premise for solving Chinese interregional legal 
conflicts.320 Fifth, courts play a crucial role in solving interregional legal conflicts.321 
Because the absence of a court of final appeals in China, we need to consider how to 
enhance the coordination systems among courts in the three regions from now on.322 
Sixth, legal culture and tradition are basic psychological factors influencing interregional 
legal conflicts.323 In order to ultimately solve interregional legal conflicts, the foremost 
solution is to enhance legal cultural communication among regions.324 In this aspect, 
non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and scholars should play 
important roles.325  
Many other comparative studies focus on the US and Chinese interregional JRE 
laws. Like Han and Huang, many contemporary scholars also observe the differences 
between Chinese interregional conflicts with those within a federal system.326 They 
indicate that Hong Kong and Macao enjoy higher degree of autonomy than the states in 
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the US.327 They argue that greater regional autonomy will slow down the process of 
unifying national laws and perhaps will ultimately make this endeavour impossible.328 
However, some other works, although recognizing huge differences existing between 
interregional conflicts in China and those in federal countries, argue that China can still 
draw beneficial lessons from countries like the US.329 Scholars point out that the US 
adopts two methods to solving interregional conflicts: federal legislation and non-
governmental organizations' model laws.330 Some Mainland scholars propose that the 
ideal approach to solve interregional JRE in China is to make uniform laws applicable to 
all regions like the US.331 Some scholars disagree and advocate that the model law 
approach is the best because the Chinese central government's authority in enacting laws 
applicable to Hong Kong and Macao is limited.332 They also argue that the PRC 
Constitution should be amended and add provisions embracing principles such as full 
faith and credit, equality and mutual benefits, promoting interregional civil and 
commercial exchanges.333 These provisions can serve as a foundation for solving 
interregional conflicts.334 A Hong Kong scholar also argues that the US inter-state 
conflict of laws is of significance to China. He believes "the rules under §6 'Choice of 
Law Principles' and §10 'Interstate and International Conflict of Laws' in the Restatement 
are basically applicable to the Chinese situation."335 However, he warns that the US is a  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federal state but China is a unitary state.336 Furthermore, rules of conflict of laws, 
especially rules of choice of law, cannot be developed on the basis of common law in 
Chinese civil-law tradition.337 
Moreover, many comparative studies have also been conducted between Chinese and 
EU interregional JRE systems. Some Mainland scholars refer to the Brussels Convention 
and Brussels I Regulation338 and argue that the future JRE arrangement should be a 
double arrangement regulating jurisdiction and JRE.339 They make several proposals: the 
arrangement should provide exclusive jurisdiction rules,340 it should use defendant's 
domicile or habitual residence as the general jurisdiction rule,341 and the courts located in 
the place of performance or place of tort should have jurisdiction over relevant 
disputes.342 Other scholars also argue that China may draw useful lessons from the 
Brussels Convention.343 For example, they point out that the current arrangement 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong should be expanded to include judgments 
without choice-of-court agreements, and to include judgments involving consumers, the 
status and legal capacity of nature person, and civil compensations in criminal 
proceedings.344 Some Hong Kong scholars suggest that the laws to solve conflicts 
between EU law and UK law, such as the European Communities Act of 1972, may be a 
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338 Min Yuan, supra note_144_ at 141-51. 
339 Yuan, supra note_144_ at 151. Lu, supra note_147_ at 99-100. 
340 Id.  
341 Id.  
342 Id.  
343 G Li & H Wang, WOGUO QUJI FAYUAN PANJUE CHENGREN YU ZHIXING ZHI BIJIAO [A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF INTERREGIONAL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT IN OUR COUNTRY], a paper 
presented in the 2008 Annual Conference of the Chinese Association of Private International Law (on file with the 
author). 
344 Id. 
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valuable reference for Mainland China and Hong Kong to solve their legal conflicts.345 In 
this Act, the UK Parliament adopted a principle: the EU law prevails over the UK law. 
Putting in Chinese context, if a multilateral JRE arrangement comes into reality, it should 
prevail over any conflicting regional laws.  
 Notably, at the starting stage of negotiating the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, 
Hong Kong Legislative Council referred to the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention, 
the Brussels Convention, and the Lugano Convention for guidance.346 The Legislative 
Council analyzed the choice of court provision in the Draft Hague Choice of Court 
Convention.347 The Council acknowledged that under the Convention, if parties have 
agreed that a court should have exclusive jurisdiction over their disputes, the judgment 
rendered by this court should be recognized and enforced in all members of the 
Convention.348 The Council also noticed that this rule had been accepted by the Brussels 
Convention and the Lugano Convention.349 Although the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention will not be applied between Mainland China and Hong Kong because "the 
Convention, as an international agreement, will not apply as between two places in the 
same country", the Council emphasized that, JRE based on a choice of court agreement 
"may serve as a useful guide and model in any future arrangement to be made between 
the Hong Kong SAR and the mainland on reciprocal enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters."350 
                                                        
345 P K Y Kwong, Hong Kong Businessmen’s Development in the Mainland: Legal Conflicts Need to Be Dealt With, 
XIAO BAO CAI JING YUE KAN [HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTHLY] 23, 26 (June 2005).  346 Hong Kong Legislative Council Paper No. CB(2) 722/01-02(04) para 13, December 20, 2001. 
347 Id, at para 13-16. 
348 Id, at para 16. 
349 Id, at para 17. 
350 Id, at para 18. 
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In the legal academia, many scholars also analyze the similarities between the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention.351 
In terms of negotiation strategies, they praise that the former learned from the latter the 
approach of "start small."352 Namely, JRE is a very complex issue, so Chinese regions 
should follow the "order from easy to difficult matters" and advance cooperation step by 
step.353 As for the contents, the limited scope of the Arrangement is similar to that of the 
Convention.354 Many Mainland scholars believe this scope may be appropriate for 
international JRE but is too narrow for the interregional context.355 But Hong Kong 
scholars point out, by referring to the Hague Choice of Court Convention; the Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement will be confronted by fewer obstacles in the legislation process 
in Hong Kong.356 Mainland China can also gain valuable lessons from implementing this 
Arrangement so be prepared for the ratification of the Hague Convention.357  
 
iii. Assessment 
 
Comparative studies between the interregional JRE systems in China, the US, and 
the EU, as well as international JRE laws demonstrate that many scholars have realized 
the value of reference to foreign and international experience to solve Chinese 
interregional conflicts. These studies are very valuable. However, they do not 
systematically compare interregional JRE laws in China, the US, and the EU and dig into                                                         
351 Zhang and Smart, supra note_218_ at 569-70. Yu, supra note_170_ at 158. 
352 Zhang and Smart, supra note_218_ at 569-70. 
353 Id. at 568. 
354 Id. at 569-70.570. Yu, supra note_170_ at 158. 
355 Yu, supra note_173_ at 12. 
356 Xianchu Zhang, Dui "Neidi Hong Kong Xianfu Renke he Zhixing Danshiren Xieyi Guanxia de Minshanshi Anjian 
Panjue de Anpai" de Chubu Pinjia [Preliminary Comments on the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutural Recognition and 
Enforcement Judgment Arrangement], 8 FAZHI LUNTAN [LEGAL SYSTEM FORUM] 51, 62 (2006). 
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their details. They also fail to provide what particular lessons that China can draw from 
the US and the EU and how to implement these lessons in China. 
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Chapter III The Existing JRE System 
Between Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao 
 
The current interregional JRE system between Mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and Macao is constituted by both the unilateral regime in form of regional laws and 
the bilateral regime in form of interregional Arrangements. The unilateral regime is 
constituted by the Mainland Civil Procedure Law (hereinafter “CPL”)1 and its judicial 
interpretations,2 the Macao Civil Procedure Code,3 and Hong Kong common law4. It 
regulates JRE not covered by the two Arrangements.5 The bilateral regime includes 
the two Arrangements: the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the Mainland-
Macao Arrangement. These two Arrangements have been implemented by separate 
legislations in each region.6 
This chapter presents and analyzes the existing JRE system. It demonstrates that 
the bilateral Arrangements are first steps beyond the unsatisfactory pure regional 
laws. It argues that, more importantly, the next stage should be to establish a 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement. It can be divided into three sections. First, it explores 
regional JRE laws in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao. Here regional JRE 
                                                        
1 Min Shi Su Song Fa [Civil Procedure Law] (Adopted on April 9, 1991 at the Fourth Session of the Seventh 
National People's Congress, effective Apr. 9, 1991, amended Oct. 28, 2007) translated in 
http://www.lawinfochina.com accessed on May 3, 2009 (P.R.C.). 
2 The most important one is the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL (Promulgated by the Supreme 
People’s Court on July 14, 1992) translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com accessed on December 16, 2009. Its 
art. 318-320 are about judicial assistance. 
3 Especially arts. 1199-1205 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
4 Both statute and common law govern recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Hong Kong. The 
statute mainly refers to Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) (hereinafter “FJREO”). 
5 Such as non-monetary judgments or judgments for disputes in which parties failed to make a choice of court 
agreement.  
6 Regarding the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement: for Mainland implementing legislation, see Interpretation 
No.9 [2008] of the Supreme People’s Court on July 3, 2008; for Hong Kong implementing legislation, see 
Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance and its (Commencement) Notice, Ord. No. 9 of 2008, 
L.S. No. 2 to Gazette No. 27/2008, L.N. 195 of 2008. Upon the unanimity of Mainland China and Hong Kong, this 
Arrangement came into force as of August 1, 2008. Regarding the Mainland-Macao Arrangement: for Mainland 
implementing legislation, see Interpretation No. 2 [2006] of the Supreme People’s Court Adopted at the 1378th 
meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on February 13, 2006; for Macao implementing 
legislation, see The No. 12/2006 Announcement of the Executive Chief of Macao on March 14, 2006.  
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laws refer to those other than the implementing legislations of the Arrangements. 
These laws predate the existing bilateral Arrangements, so they must be discussed 
before analyzing the Arrangements. Moreover, they are applied to recognize and 
enforce judgments outside of the Arrangements. The first section concludes that 
interregional JRE is difficult under regional laws. The second section discusses the 
two Arrangements. It compares the two Arrangements with regional laws discussed in 
the first section. It argues that the Arrangements are laudable successes but cannot 
effectively remedy interregional JRE problems. The third section focuses on why a 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement can best solve JRE problems in the three regions.  
 
A. Regional JRE Laws 
i. Mainland Regional JRE Law 
 
In Mainland China, Articles 264-266 of the CPL  and its judicial interpretation, 
namely Articles 318-320 of the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL, govern 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial cases. A 
judgment creditor can request a Mainland court to recognize and enforce a foreign 
judgment according to the JRE treaty ratified by Mainland China or according to the 
principle of reciprocity.7 Treaties or reciprocity are the legal bases for JRE in 
Mainland China (Part One of this Section). The meaning of reciprocity is unclear in 
Mainland law, and it has rarely been used in litigation. Therefore, the requirements for 
JRE (Part Two) and grounds for refusing JRE (Part Three) are based on treaties 
ratified by Mainland China. This Section will focus on recognition and enforcement 
of judgments uncovered by the Arrangements, especially the JRE impasse between 
                                                        
7 Art. 265 of the Mainland CPL. 
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Mainland China and Hong Kong. This is because the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement and the Mainland-Macao Arrangement will be discussed in the Section 
of Interregional JRE Laws. The conclusion is that merely relying on Mainland 
regional legislation cannot solve the JRE impasse between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong.  
 
1. Legal Bases for JRE 
 
A foreign or sister-region judgment can be recognized and enforced according 
to a treaty/arrangement or the principle of reciprocity.8  
 
a. Treaty/Arrangement: JRE Impasse for Judgments Outside of the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
 
The JRE treaties between Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, respectively, 
refer to the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement. The Arrangements will be discussed in the Section of Interregional 
Laws, so this Section concentrates on how to recognize and enforce judgments 
excluded by the Arrangements. Compared with the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement excludes many judgments from its scope.9 
This Part demonstrates judgments beyond the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement are practically unrecognizable and unenforceable. It concludes that 
regional JRE laws cannot solve the JRE impasse between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong. 
                                                        
8 Arts 264-266 of the CPL and arts. 318-320 of the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL. 
9 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
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As for the recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong judgments in civil and 
commercial cases beyond the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, 
Mainland courts split into three opinions regarding whether such judgments are 
recognizable and enforceable. Although these opinions are summarized based on 
Mainland courts’ adjudication of cases before the conclusion of the Arrangement, 
they are still valid and can serve as guidance for recognizing and enforcing judgments 
outside the scope of the Arrangement.  
The first opinion advocates that Hong Kong judgments can be recognized and 
enforced by reference to the Provisions on Recognition of Civil Judgments of Taiwan 
Courts.10 For example, in 1999, Changsha Intermediate People’s Court of Hunan 
Province recognized and enforced a judgment of Hong Kong High Court by analogy 
[“canzhao,” ??] to the Provisions.11 When no law is enacted to address an issue, 
solving it by analogy to a law that was not enacted to address this issue is not an 
unusual practice in Mainland courts.12 Because of the absence of JRE laws for Hong 
Kong and Macao judgments, courts in Mainland China need to make a choice 
between two analogy candidates—the JRE law applicable to foreign judgments or the 
JRE law for Taiwanese judgments. Applying the former will lead to refuse the JRE, 
but the latter may permit the JRE. A JRE-friendly court would prefer the latter so as to 
recognize and enforce judgments from Hong Kong and Macao.  
The second opinion treats Hong Kong judgments as foreign judgments and 
believes that they are not recognizable and enforceable in Mainland China based on 
                                                        
10 The Provisions on Recognition of Civil Judgments of Taiwan Courts, issued by the Supreme People’s Court on 
May 22 1998. 
11 Xianchu Zhang & Philip Smart, Development of Regional Conflict of Laws: On the Arrangement of Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong SAR,  36 HONG KONG L. J. 553, 555 (2006).  
12 Jie Huang, Direct Application of International Commercial Law in Chinese Courts: Intellectual Property, Trade, 
and International Transportation, 5 MANCHESTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 105, 122 (2008). 
For other examples that courts adopt the reference approach, Chongqing Zhengtong Pharmaceutical Co. and the 
Trademark Review and Adjudication Board of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce v. Sichuan 
Huashu Veterinary Pharmaceutical Co. LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Jan. 6, 2008) (P.R.C.) (Sup. People’s Ct., 
Aug 31, 2007). 
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Article 266 of the CPL (Article 268 of the 1991 CPL). Because no reciprocity exists 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong, Hong Kong judgments, beyond the scope 
of the Arrangement, cannot be recognized and enforced in Mainland China. For 
example, in 2001 the Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court of Fujian Province 
refused to recognize and enforce a judgment of Hong Kong High Court for lack of 
JRE agreement and reciprocity between Mainland China and Hong Kong based on 
Article 266.13  
The third opinion holds that, because Hong Kong has become part of China, it 
is improper to treat its judgments as foreign judgments. According to this opinion, the 
fact that a judgment is excluded by the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
demonstrates the legislative intention in the two regions that recognition and 
enforcement of such judgment is inappropriate. For example, in a JRE case, the 
requested Xiameng court held that under Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law,14 
interregional JRE should be carried out after the competent authorities in the two 
regions reached a mutual agreement.15 Since no such agreement existed, the Court 
                                                        
13 Yuanqiao tou zi you xian gong si shen qing cheng ren xiang gang fa yuan min shi shu song pan jue an [the case 
of Investment Co of Hong Kong to recognize a Hong Kong civil judgment], Quanzhou Intermediate People’s 
Court on November 26, 2001. In this case, a Hong Kong company borrowed money from the other company and 
mortgaged a real estate located in the jurisdiction of the Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court. The debtor failed 
to pay the loan back to the creditor on time. Therefore, the creditor sued this debtor in Hong Kong High Court and 
got a favourable judgment in 1999. (No. 1801 Judgment of Hong Kong High Court on June 29, 1999.) Later, the 
creditor applied to the Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court to enforce the Hong Kong judgment on the collateral 
and the debtor’s other properties located in Mainland China. However, Quanzhou Court turned down this 
application for lack of JRE agreement and reciprocity between Mainland China and Hong Kong based on Article 
266.  
14 Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, 
through consultations and in accordance with law, maintain juridical relations with the judicial organs of other 
parts of the country, and they may render assistance to each other.” For analysis of this Article, see Section A of 
Chapter VI. 
15 Li Deng Li Fa Zhan You Xian Gong Si, Fu Fua Qi Ye Gong Si Shen Qing Min Shi Zhi Xing An [the case of 
enforcing the judgment of Li Deng Li Development Co. and Fu Fua Enterprise] (Xiameng Inter. People’s Ct., 
February 23, 2000) www. Lawyee.net (last visited January 15, 2009) (P.R.C.). In 1998 in a contractual dispute, 
Hong Kong High Court rendered a judgment for Li Deng Li and Fu Fua, requiring Yao Sheng to pay compensation 
to them. Yao Sheng’s properties in Hong Kong were not enough to pay the amount stipulated in the judgment, but 
it had properties in Xiameng City in Mainland China. Therefore, in 2000 Li Deng Li and Fu Fua applied to the 
Xiameng Intermediate People’s Court to enforce the outstanding balance of the Hong Kong judgment according to 
Article 267 and Article 268 of the 1991 CPL. The Xiameng Court found that all the parties in this case were Hong 
Kong companies, the dispute took place in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong law was the applicable law in the Hong 
Kong proceedings. Moreover, because the Hong Kong judicial organ is independent from its Mainland counterpart, 
it operates within its own judicial systems. The Court held that Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law authorizes 
Hong Kong to establish judicial assistance with sister regions. Since no such assistance exists, the Court dismissed 
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dismissed the suit and suggested the judgment creditors to bring an action of 
contractual dispute (not an enforcement proceeding) against the debtor.  
Substantially, the second and the third opinions lead to the same result: Hong 
Kong judgments are not recognizable and enforceable so parties have to re-litigate the 
merits of their disputes in Mainland China. This is time- and money-consuming and 
may also lead to inconsistent judgments. The first opinion can avoid these problems. 
However, very few courts support the first opinion. Two factors may explain why the 
majority of Mainland courts prefer the second and the third opinions and hesitate to 
recognize and enforce Hong Kong judgments. The first possible reason is that 
Mainland courts do not have broad discretion. Especially, the Mainland courts that 
hear JRE cases are intermediate courts—subordinate to the Supreme People’s Court 
and higher People’s Courts—so they are likely to prefer conservative approaches (the 
second and the third approaches) until they get new instructions from higher courts. 
The second reason is lack of reciprocity between Mainland China and Hong Kong. 
Mainland courts probably hesitate to take the initiative to recognize and enforce Hong 
Kong judgments by analogy to the JRE law for Taiwanese judgments. With the topic 
of reciprocity, here I turn to.  
 
b. Reciprocity 
 
Besides the existence of a treaty, Mainland courts can recognize and enforce 
foreign/sister-region judgments based on reciprocity.16 However, apart from divorce 
                                                                                                                                                               
the JRE action. 
16 Art. 265 of the Mainland CPL. For comments, see Patricia J. Blazey & Peter S. Gillies, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China, SSRN ELIBRARY, 6-8 (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103364 (last visited Jun 10, 2010).  
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decrees without enforceable contents,17 Mainland courts have never recognized and 
enforced foreign or sister-region judgments under the principle of reciprocity.18 
Theoretically the principle of reciprocity may be used to recognize and enforce 
judgments outside of the existing Arrangements. However, Mainland courts hesitate 
to take an initiative when other regions do not recognize and enforce Mainland 
judgments under this principle.19 The unclear definition of reciprocity in Mainland 
law also discourages Mainland courts. Especially, the Mainland courts that hear JRE 
cases are intermediate courts and they probably prefer higher courts to specify the 
principle of reciprocity ex ant before they can become active. 
 
2. Requirements for JRE 
 
According to JRE treaties that Mainland China ratified or the principle of 
reciprocity, requested judgments should have been effective or enforceable under the 
law of the judgment-rendering country.20 Some treaties require that the judgments 
should be final and enforceable according to the law of the judgment-rendering 
                                                        
17 Divorce decrees that have no enforceable contents refer to those only change the status of a person and do not 
have enforceable contents such as partition of common properties, maintenance, and expenses of bringing up 
children. Art. 2 of the Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ 
Handling Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, 64 THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S 
COURT GAZETTE 61 (2000). 
18 See Gujie Yuan, Lei Di Yu Gan Ao Xian Fu Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing Min Shang Shi Pan Jue de Fa Zhang Qu Shi 
[The Development Trend of Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong and Macao], FA XUE JIA [LEGAL EXPERT] 147, 149 (Issue 2, 2005). For 
cases that Mainland China uses lack of reciprocity to refuse JRE, see eg., Riben Gongmin Wuweifan Shengqing 
Zhongguo Fayuan Chengren he Zhixi Riben Fayuan Panjue An [Japanese Citizen Wuweifan Applied for Chinese 
Courts to Recognize and Enforce a Japanese Judgment], THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT GAZETTE 1 (1999).  
19 Jiwen Wang, Woguo Pizhun Haiya "Xuanzhe Fayuan Xieyi Gongyue" de Biyaoxing Fenxi [The Necessity that 
China Ratifies the Hague Choice of Court Convention], 16 ANHUI DAXUE FALV PINGLUN [ANHUI UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW] 153, 159-61 (2009). 
20 Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System, 25 
BOSTON COLL. INT’L & COMP. L. REV 59, 88 (2002). Eg., art. 22.3 of THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL 
AFFAIRS ON MAY 2, 1992 BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND SPAIN, 
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/10/10-4.htm (last visited Feb 2, 2010); and art. 21.2 of THE 
THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TREAY IN CIVIL CASES ON JANUARY 1, 1995 BETWEEN THE PRC AND ITALY.; art. 17.1 of 
THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TREAY IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES ON DECEMBER 25, 1999 BETWEEN THE PRC AND 
VIETNAM.; art. 21.1 of THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TREATY IN CIVIL, BUSINESS, AND CRIMINAL CASES ON MAY 31, 
1995 BETWEEN THE PRC AND EGYPT.  
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country.21 
 
3. Grounds for Refusing JRE 
 
A Mainland court does not review the merits of requested judgments.22 Refusal 
is generally based on the following four grounds, widely recognized by scholarship or 
bilateral JRE treaties ratified by Mainland China.23 For example, in 1997, the Foshan 
People's Court recognized an Italian bankruptcy judgment after holding none of the 
following grounds of refusal existed according to the Mainland-Italy JRE Treaty.24 
 
a. Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction 
 
Mainland courts can deny JRE if the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering 
court infringes the exclusive jurisdiction of Mainland courts25 or the judgment-
                                                        
21 Eg., art. 25.1.1 of THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TREATY IN CIVIL, BUSINESS, AND CRIMINAL CASES ON JANUARY 11, 
1996 BETWEEN THE PRC AND CYPRUS.; art. 21.1 of THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TREATY IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
CASES ON APRIL 12, 2005 BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. 
22 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88. Some scholars argue that Mainland courts review on the merits, see Qingjiang 
Kong & Hu Minfei, The Chinese Practice of Private International Law, 3 MELB. J. INT’L L. 414, 432 (2002).  
23 Zhang, supra note 20  at 88. For comments of bilateral JRE treaties that Mainland China ratified, see Wang, 
supra note_19_ at 162-63.(arguing that the number of bilateral JRE treaties that Mainland China ratified is small 
and cannot satisfy the potential needs of JRE brought by international trade. For examples of bilateral JRE treaties 
that Mainland China ratified, see eg., art. 19.2 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Cases on 
December 25, 1999 between the PRC and Vietnam, supra note_20_.; ie art. 22 of THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL 
ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS ON MAY 4, 1987 BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND FRANCE, 
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/10/10-4.htm (last visited Feb 4, 2010) (hereinafter 
"Mainland-France Treaty"). Besides the four grounds, the Mainland-France treaty also states that the JRE can be 
denied when, in terms of a natural person’s status and civil capacities, the judgment-rendering court does not apply 
the choice of law of the requested court, unless the law applied by the judgment-rendering court led to the same 
result as the choice of law of the requested court.  
24 B&T Case. The Foshan Court recognized the No. 62673 Bankruptcy Judgment rendered by Milano Court (Italy) 
on October 24, 1997 and the Adjudication Order on the Transfer of Confiscated Assets rendered by Civil and Penal 
Court in Milano (Italy) on September 30, 1999 according to The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil Cases on 
January 1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_. For more information of this case, see Recent 
Developments in Chinese Cross-Border Insolvencies, page 2-5 at 
http://law.hku.hk/aiifl/research/April%202002/recent%20developments%20in%20chinese%20cross-
border%20insolvencies.PDF (last visited May 10, 2010).  
25 Eg., art. 26.2 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal Cases on January 11, 1996 
between the PRC and Cyprus, supra note_21_.; art. 22 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil Cases on January 
1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_.; art. 21 of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs 
on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra note_20_.; art. 18 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in 
Civil and Criminal Cases on December 25, 1999 between the PRC and Vietnam, supra note_20_.; art. 22.2 of The 
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rendering court has no indirect jurisdiction26 according to treaties. The grounds of 
indirect jurisdiction in the treaties concluded by Mainland China are highly similar.27 
They are: a judgment-rendering court should have indirect jurisdiction when (1) the 
defendant has his or her domicile or habitual residence in the region where the court is 
located, (2) the defendant has a representative office in the region where the court is 
located and the action is related to the activities of the office, (3) the defendant 
accepted the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court by writing, (4) the defendant 
defended the substance of the case in the judgment-rendering court without 
questioning its jurisdiction, (5) in contractual disputes, the contract was signed, or has 
been or will be performed in the region where the court is located, or the subject 
matter is located in that region, (6) in cases of tort, the conducts or results of the tort 
took place in the region where the court is located, (7) in cases of personal status, one 
party has his or her domicile or habitual residence in the region where the court is 
located, (8) in cases of maintenance, the judgment creditor has his or her domicile or 
habitual residence in the region where the court is located, (9) in cases of inheritance, 
when he or she died, the inherited was domiciled or his or her main inheritance was 
located in the region where the court is located, or (10) the subject matter is a real 
                                                                                                                                                               
Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal Cases on May 31, 1995 Between the PRC and Egypt, 
supra note_20_.; and arts. 9 and 10 of the Regulation of the Supreme People’s Court for Recognizing Civil 
Judgments Rendered by the Courts in Taiwan Region (hereinafter “Mainland Regulation for Recognizing Taiwan 
Judgments”) issued on May 26, 1998. 
26 For the distinction between direct and indirect jurisdiction, see Part i of Section A of Chapter V. 
27 Since 1949, the PRC ratified twenty-five bilateral JRE treaties in civil cases. Six of these treaties provide 
indirect jurisdiction grounds. Indirect jurisdiction grounds in the five of the six treaties are almost identical, except 
very minor and insignificant differences. For details of these five treaties, see fn 27. The indirect jurisdiction 
grounds under the rest one treaty are in line with these five treaties, although less comprehensive than them. This  
treaty is The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Cases on April 12, 2005 between the PRC and the 
United Arab Emirates, supra note_21_. Its art. 19 states that a judgment-rendering court has jurisdiction in cases 
not involving real estate (1) when at the time of commencement of the judgment-rendering action, the defendant 
had domicile or habitual residence in the region where the court is located, (2) when at the time of commencement 
of the judgment-rendering action the defendant had a business establishment or a representative office in the 
region where the court is located and the action is related to the activities of this establishment or office, (3) the 
disputed contractual obligation should or has been performed in the region where the court is located according to 
the explicit or inexplicit agreement between parties, (4) in case of non-contractual obligation, the action of tort is 
conducted in the region where the court is located, (5) the defendant has explicitly or inexplicitly accepted the 
jurisdiction of the court, or (6) if the judgment-rendering court has jurisdiction over the main dispute according to 
this treaty, this court shall have jurisdiction over the application for provisional methods.  
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estate in the region where the court is located.28 The requested court shall be bound by 
the fact-findings of the judgment-rendering court, except that the judgment is 
rendered by default.29  
 
b. Unfair Procedure 
 
Mainland courts will deny JRE, if a defendant was not given adequate notice for 
the proceedings or was not properly represented by a guardian if lacking legal 
capacity.30  
 
c. Res Judicata 
 
Mainland courts can deny JRE if an effective judgment has been rendered by a 
people's court for the same cause of action between the same parties, the people's 
court has recognized and enforced a third-country judgment on the same cause of 
action between the same parties, or the case was in the middle of trial in a people's 
court31 and the trial had begun before the proceedings in the foreign court started.32  
                                                        
28 Eg., art. 26.1 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal Cases on January 11, 1996 
between the PRC and Cyprus, supra note_21_.; art. 22 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil Cases on January 
1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_.; art. 21 of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs 
on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra note_20_; art. 18 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in 
Civil and Criminal Cases on December 25, 1999 between the PRC and Vietnam, supra note_20_.; art. 22.1 of The 
Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal Cases on May 31, 1995 Between the PRC and Egypt, 
supra note_20_. 
29 Eg., art. 20 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Cases on April 12, 2005 between the PRC 
and the United Arab Emirates, supra note_21_. 
30 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88. ie, art. 25.1.3 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal 
Cases on January 11, 1996 between the PRC and Cyprus, supra note_21_; art.21. 3 of The Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in Civil Cases on January 1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_.; arts. 22.4 and 22.5 of the 
Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra 
note_20_.; art. 17.3 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Cases on December 25, 1999 between 
the PRC and Vietnam, supra note_20_.; art. 21.3 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal 
Cases on May 31, 1995 Between the PRC and Egypt, supra note_20_.; arts. 21.4 and 21.5 of The Judicial 
Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Cases on April 12, 2005 between the PRC and the United Arab 
Emirates, supra note_21_. The same ground for refusal can be found in arts. 9 and 10 of the Mainland Regulation 
for Recognizing Taiwan Judgments.  
31 Eg., art. 17.4 of the Vietnam Treaty The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Cases on December 25, 
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Article 306 of the Opinions on the Mainland CPL also involves res judicata. 
The first part of this Article is a lis alibi pendens rule: if both a people’s court and a 
foreign court have jurisdiction over a case, and a party sues in the foreign court first 
and then the other party brings an action in the people’s court, the people’s court can 
accept the case at its discretion. The second part deals with res judicata: if the foreign 
court renders a judgment earlier than the people’s court and the two judgments are 
inconsistent, the people’s court shall refuse to recognize and enforce the foreign 
judgment. Article 306 exemplifies the doctrine of “Mainland judgments always 
prevail.” Therefore, the res judicata rule in the treaties show more respects to foreign 
judgments. 
 
d. Public Policy Exception 
 
Mainland courts can deny JRE if recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment would cause harm to Chinese sovereignty, security, and public order.33 
Mainland legislators have long adopted an affirmative attitude towards the application 
of public policy exception.34 But they seldom use the term, “public policy,” in their 
                                                                                                                                                               
1999 between the PRC and Vietnam, supra note_20_.; art. 21.4 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, 
Business, and Criminal Cases on May 31, 1995 Between the PRC and Egypt, supra note_20_.; and arts. 9 and 10 
of the Mainland Regulation for Recognizing Taiwan Judgments. 
32 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88, eg., art. 25.1.5 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal 
Cases on January 11, 1996 between the PRC and Cyprus, supra note_21_; art. 21.5 of The Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in Civil Cases on January 1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_; art. 22.6 of The Treaty for 
Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra note_20_.; art. 21.6 
of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Cases on April 12, 2005 between the PRC and the 
United Arab Emirates, supra note_21_. 
33 Eg, art. 25.1.6, 25.1.7, and 25.1.9 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal Cases on 
January 11, 1996 between the PRC and Cyprus, supra note_21_; art. 21.6 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in 
Civil Cases on January 1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_.; art. 21.5 of The Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal Cases on May 31, 1995 Between the PRC and Egypt, supra note_20_.; art. 
21.3 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Cases on April 12, 2005 between the PRC and the 
United Arab Emirates, supra note_21_.; arts. 9 and 10 of the Mainland Regulation for Recognizing Taiwan 
Judgments. 
34 “Opinions on the Matrimonial Issues between Chinese Citizens and Foreign Residents as well as Those between 
Foreign Residents” issued by the Legislative Committee of the Central People’s Government in 1950 is generally 
regarded as the first legislation invoking the doctrine of public policy exception in the history of China. This 
Opinions stipulated that “Lex patriae should be applied only to the extent that they are not incompatible with the 
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legislation. Instead, they tend to use a cluster of terms together to refer to “public 
policy,” such as “public interests,”35 “state sovereignty,”36 “security,”37 “socio-
economic order,”38 and “social and public interests of the country,”39  and etc.  
Thus, in contemporary Mainland China, “public policy” includes at least the 
meanings of “state sovereignty, security, socio-economic order, and social and public 
interests of the country.” The focus of sovereignty and security in Mainland law 
results from a history of foreign invasions40 and the status quo of a rebellious Taiwan. 
Since the establishment of the PRC, the communist party has highly emphasized 
sovereignty and security in all of its lawmaking. The emphasis of economic orders 
lies in the fact that developing economy is a predominant issue for Mainland China 
currently. Moreover, Chinese courts would also invoke the public policy exception to 
refuse recognition and enforcement of judgments tainted by fraud or involving 
enforcement of a foreign penal or taxation law.41 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The JRE system in Mainland China has two problems. One is insufficient 
substantive JRE law. For example, the meaning of reciprocity is unclear, so except 
                                                                                                                                                               
ordre public, public interests, and the current basic policies of the State.” Yongping Xiao & Zhengxin Huo, Order 
Public in China's Private International Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 655 (2005). 
35 Eg., art. 150 of the General Principles of the Civil Law: “The application of foreign laws or international custom 
and usage in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall not violate the public interest of the People's 
Republic of China.” Art. 260.2 of the CPL: “The people's court shall not render the assistance requested by a 
foreign court, if it impairs the sovereignty, security or social and public interest of the People's Republic of China.” 
See also art. 266 of the CPL, and art. 276 of the Maritime Act and art. 190 of the Civil Aviation Act. 
36 Arts 260.2 and 266 of the CPL. 
37 Id. 
38 Eg., art. 7 of the General Principles of the Civil Law: “Civil activities shall have respect for social ethics and 
shall not harm the public interest, undermine state economic plans or disrupt social economic order.” 
39 Eg., art. 206.2 of the CPL states: “If the people's court determines that the enforcement of the award goes 
against the social and public interest of the country, the people's court shall make a written order not to allow the 
enforcement of the arbitration award.”  
40 Eg., Hong Kong and Macao have been parts of the territory of China since ancient times. However, Hong Kong 
was occupied by Britain after the Opium War in 1840 and Macao by Portugal in the mid 16th century.  
41 Blazey and Gillies, supra note_16_ at 7. 
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divorce decrees without enforceable contents, Mainland China has neither recognized 
nor enforced any foreign or sister-region judgments in civil and commercial matters 
beyond the bilateral treaties or arrangements it concluded.42 Second is the absence of 
an overarching multilateral JRE mechanism. It is necessary to develop a multilateral 
JRE arrangement to break through the JRE impasse between Mainland China and 
Hong Kong.  
 
ii. Hong Kong Regional JRE Law 
 
This section presents the most important contents of Hong Kong regional JRE 
law: legal bases for JRE (Part One), requirements for JRE (Part Two), and grounds for 
refusing JRE (Part Three). It reveals Hong Kong regional JRE law is insufficient for 
improving interregional JRE (Part Four).  
 
1. Legal Bases for JRE 
 
Both statute and common law govern recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in Hong Kong. Among them, English law still plays a prominent role. This 
is because after Hong Kong became a part of China, the laws previously enforceable 
in Hong Kong, such as English common law and rules of equity, are maintained, 
except insofar as they contravene with the Hong Kong Basic Law or are amended by 
the legislature of Hong Kong.43 The Hong Kong implementing statute of the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement will be discussed in the Section of the Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement.  
                                                        
42 Yuan, supra note 18 at 149. 
43 Art. 8 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
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a. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance 
 
The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) 
(hereinafter “FJREO”) constitute a legal basis for JRE.44 Under the FJREO, a 
judgment creditor may apply to the Court of First Instance to register a foreign 
judgment in Hong Kong.45 A registered foreign judgment has the same force and 
effect as a judgment issued by the registering court.46 So after registration this foreign 
judgment can be enforced as a Hong Kong judgment. Originally, the FJREO closely 
followed the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (UK). And it 
was essentially an intra-Commonwealth scheme for reciprocal enforcement of 
judgments between Australia, Bermuda, Brunei, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Sri Lanka.47 The non-Commonwealth countries that the FJREO also 
applied to are those that the UK had JRE treaties with, including Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, and Israel.48 Even if these countries fail to 
give reciprocity to Hong Kong, their judgments can still benefit from the FJREO.49 
                                                        
44 The Hong Kong Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Cap 319. 
http://www.legislation.gov.Hong Kong (accessed Dec 12, 2009).  
45 The other statute of registration is the Judgments (Facilities for Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 9, LHK), but it 
only applies to UK judgments.  
46 GARY HEILBRONN, CHRISTINE BOOTH, AND HELEN MCCOOK, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN HONG 
KONG 327 (Butterworths 1998). 
47 Cap 319A, Sch 1. Philip Smart, Enforcing Foreign Judgments After 1997, 4 Hong Kong Lawyer 54 (2002). 
Available at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2002-4/Apr02-litigation.htm. (Accessed on Jan. 6, 2010). Chapter 9 of 
GRAEME JOHNSTON, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN HONG KONG (2005). 
48 Cap 319A, Sch 2.  
49 Koninljike Philips Electronics NV v Utran Technology Development Ltd [2001] HKCFI 1068. The issue of this 
case is whether a monetary judgment made by a District Court of The Hague, Netherlands can be enforced in 
Hong Kong under the FJREO. The judge held that before July 1997 the JRE treaty between the UK and the 
Netherlands had extended to Hong Kong, but the treaty had no effect on Hong Kong after it became a SAR of 
China. The judge also indicated that no JRE agreement has been established between Hong Kong and the 
Netherlands thus far. The judge also found that the government of the Netherlands had clearly indicated that 
Netherlands court would not recognize or enforce judgments rendered by courts in the HKSAR because of the 
absence of a JRE treaty. However, the judge ruled that the FJREO continues to apply to judgments from the 
Netherlands by virtue of Article 8 of the Basic Law, which maintain all legislation before July 1997 that do not 
contradict with the Basic Law. Further, he held that Article 96 merely intends to empower Hong Kong to conclude 
new JRE treaties with other countries without striking down the FJREO. As a conclusion, the FJREO does not 
contravene any part of the Basic Law, therefore, judgments rendered by a court in the Netherlands should be 
enforced in Hong Kong under the FJREO even that the Netherlands has refused to provide reciprocity to enforce 
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b. Common Law 
 
Because the FJREO only listed approximately 30 jurisdictions, judgments 
rendered by all other jurisdictions, including those from Mainland China and Macao, 
are recognized and enforced in Hong Kong under common law. Therefore, common 
law plays a more important role in interregional JRE practice than the FJREO.50 
Moreover, the two JRE schemes are mutually exclusive, which means that if a 
judgment is enforceable under the FJREO, it should not be enforced under common 
law, and vice versa.51 
The registration procedure under the FJREO is more convenient for judgment 
creditors than that under common law for two reasons.52 First, the former is simpler 
than the latter.53 Second, under the FJREO, a foreign judgment is assumed to be 
recognizable and enforceable in Hong Kong, so a debtor needs to prove it is 
unrecognizable and unenforceable. However, in the common law, such presumption 
does not exist so a judgment creditor needs to prove that the judgment is recognizable 
and enforceable.54 Nevertheless, the underlying substantive rules and principles in the 
FJREO and common law are largely similar, except that recognition and enforcement 
under common law do not have reciprocity requirement55 and some differences of 
                                                                                                                                                               
Hong Kong judgments. For criticism of this judgment, see Smart, supra note 47.  
50 Philip Smart, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,  in ENFORCING JUDGMENTS IN HONG KONG 255, 256 (Christine 
N Booth ed. 2004).Johnston, supra note 47 at  545. It also indicates that “common law governs (i) the recognition 
of judgments from any court anywhere in the world, (ii) the enforcement of judgments of all courts in most 
countries, (iii) the enforcement of judgments of certain (not 'superior') courts in the remaining handful of 
countries.” Common law does not distinguish sister-region judgments and foreign judgments. 
51 Smart, supra note 50 at 257.  
52 Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), Bills Committee on Mainland Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Bill Background Brief, appendix I para 3. Yuan, supra note 18 at 148.  
53 Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), Bills Committee on Mainland Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Bill Background Brief, appendix I para 3. Yuan, supra note 18 at 148. 
54 See Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), Bills Committee on Mainland 
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Bill Background Brief, appendix I para 3. Yuan, supra note 18 at 148. 
55 Smart, supra note_50_ at 256. 
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details.56 Therefore, although the FJREO does not apply to judgments from Mainland 
China and Macao, it will be discussed when it can serve as an illustration to common 
law. More importantly, the FJREO is more systematic than common law. So it will be 
analyzed when it can help serve as a model and formulate proper rules for the 
proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement. This is especially true for grounds of 
refusing JRE. Additionally, the common law does not distinguish foreign and sister-
region judgments.  
 
2. Requirements for JRE 
 
Both common law and statutory regimes require finality57 as a condition to JRE 
in Hong Kong.58 The finality of a sister-region judgment is decided according to Hong 
Kong law.59 The law of the judgment-rendering region is only an important reference 
for Hong Kong to decide the finality issue. So the fact—the judgment-rendering court 
holds that its judgment is final—does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Hong 
Kong courts will also hold that this judgment is final.  
Under Hong Kong law, a foreign judgment can be final even if it is subject to 
appeal or has been appealed.60 Here “appeal” includes any proceedings by way of 
discharging or setting aside a judgment or an application for a new trial or a stay of 
                                                        
56 The differences between enforcement regimes stipulated by common law and statute are marginal, but two 
factors make common law actually more favourable to judgment creditors. First is the time limit. Common law 
provides twelve years limitation for recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment, but the statute indicates a 
six year limitation. Second is jurisdiction. Common law only requires the defendant presence in the foreign 
jurisdiction, whereas the statute requires the defendant’s residence. See Johnston, supra note_47_ at 547 and 555.  
57 In this dissertation, finality and conclusiveness are synonymous.  
58 FJREO cap 319, sec 3(2)(a) 
59 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 588. 
60 Id, at 589. The Hong Kong FJREO, § 3(2)(a) and 3(3). See Beatty v Beatty [1924] 1 KB 807, 815-16 (holding a 
judgment is no less “final” just because an appeal is possible or pending unless a stay of execution has been 
granted in the foreign court). In other circumstance, Hong Kong courts may stay the proceedings, see Colt 
Industries Inc v. Sarlie (No. 2) [1966] 3 All ER 85, 88; [1966] 1 WLR 1287, 1293. 
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execution.61 Notably, Hong Kong's criterion for finality is largely different from that 
of Mainland China, which hampers JRE between these two regions if relevant 
judgments are beyond the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.62 This 
issue is deeply-contentious and is a typical example of conflicts between civil law and 
common law; it will be discussed in Part ii of Section B of Chapter VI.  
 
3. Grounds for Refusing JRE 
 
The grounds for refusing JRE in Hong Kong laws include incompetent indirect 
jurisdiction, unfair procedures, fraud, Res judicata, and the public policy exception. In 
the JRE proceedings, Hong Kong courts will not review the facts and applicable laws 
of foreign judgments.63 For example, in a case involving the recognition and 
enforcement of a Mainland judgment, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal indicated that 
“the court is not re-trying the case. The question is not whether the decision of the 
[Mainland] court was correct.”64 Even if the judgment-rendering court applies Hong 
Kong laws erroneously, Hong Kong courts cannot refuse JRE solely on this ground.65  
Different opinions exist regarding whether a Hong Kong court can review the 
merits of a foreign judgment in the JRE proceedings if new evidence appears after the 
procedures to set off this judgment are not available any more in the judgment-
rendering court. One opinion is that the doctrine of no review of merits still applies.66 
The judgment debtor needs to seek remedies in the judgment-rendering court. The 
                                                        
61 Id., § 2(1). 
62 For detailed discussion on this issue, see Chapter V. 
63 See Owens Bank Ltd v. Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, Lord Bridge of Harwich indicated that “the defendant will not 
be permitted to reopen issues of either fact or law which have been decided against him by the foreign court.” See 
also Godard v. Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139. 
64 WFM Motors Pty Ltd v. Malcolm Maydwell, per Ching JA, [1995] HKLY 1047 CA. 
65 Henderson v. Henderson (1844) 6 QB 288, Bank of Australasia v. Harding (1850) 9 CB 661 Con Lorang v. 
Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] AC 641, Merker v. Merker [1963] P 283, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 
230 (1908). 
66 See De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone (1861) 6 H&N 301. See also Johnston, supra note 47 at 550. 
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opposing opinion believes that in this scenario Hong Kong courts can review the 
merits of a foreign judgment.67  
 
a. Lack of Jurisdiction 
Common Law Regime 
 
In a JRE proceeding, Hong Kong courts test hypothetically whether a judgment-
rendering court had jurisdiction under Hong Kong law.68 This comes from English 
precedent, such as Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, where a UK court denied JRE 
because the US judgment-rendering court had no jurisdiction over English defendants 
according to the UK law.69 Cape also shows that under UK law, a foreign court has 
competent jurisdiction on a party only in two circumstances: the party voluntarily70 
presents himself in its jurisdiction at the time of commencement71 of proceedings or 
the party submits to its jurisdiction.  
In terms of presence, Hong Kong courts require a nexus existing between the 
                                                        
67 See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, para 14-114, 14th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 
(arguing “[s]ince an English judgment can be set aside, even in the absence of fraud, if the unsuccessful party 
discovers new and material evidence after the trial, there seems no reason why a foreign judgment should be in a 
different position”.). 
68 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 573. 
69 Adams and Others v. Cape Industries Plc. and Another, [1990] Ch. 433, 462-63. Cape was an English company 
owning asbestos mining subsidiaries in South Africa and marketing subsidiaries in the US and the UK. The US 
subsidiary was incorporated in Illinois. A factory in Texas used the asbestos from the South African mines. In 1974, 
some employees or ex-employees at this factory brought an action in the United States Federal District Court at 
Tyler, Texas, for damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos dust (“the 
Tyler 1 actions”). The defendants included Cape and its subsidiaries in South Africa, the UK, and the US. Cape 
and its UK subsidiary protested the jurisdiction but failed. However, the Tyler 1 actions were settled and a consent 
order was made in 1978. The Tyler 2 actions were brought by other plaintiffs in the same court against the same 
defendants. Cape and its UK subsidiary ignored the Tyler 2 actions. The US court rendered a default judgment 
against Cape and its UK subsidiary. The plaintiffs sought to enforce this judgment in the UK. Cape argued that the 
US court had no jurisdiction according to the UK law. The UK court agreed with Cape and denied the JRE. The 
court held that the US court had no jurisdiction in the Tyler 2 actions for three reasons. First, the facts that Cape 
and its subsidiaries had submitted to the jurisdiction in the Tyler 1 actions did not constituted a submission to the 
jurisdiction in the Tyler 2 actions. The two actions were separate and distinct. Second, it is against English 
principles of natural justice that the US court exercised jurisdiction over Cape and its UK subsidiaries based on the 
presence of Cape’s Illinois subsidiary. 
70 Id, at 518-19 (indicating "voluntary" means not “induced by compulsion, fraud or duress.”) 
71 Generally, the commencement of proceedings refers to the date of service. See Emanuel v. Symon (1908) 1 KB 
302 at 309 per Buckley LJ; Adams and Others v. Cape Industries Plc. and Another, [1990] Ch. 433. See also 
Johnston, supra note_47_ at 574.  
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defendant and the judgment-rendering court.72 This nexus can be that the defendant 
resides in the judgment-rendering court’s jurisdiction,73 carry on business at a 
reasonably permanent place within the jurisdiction.74 The nexus will also be 
established if the defendant defenses the substance of the case, receives the service, or 
chooses the court in a choice of court agreement.75 If the defendant is a shareholder or 
a member of a company whose charter chooses the court as the forum to resolve 
disputes, Hong Kong courts will also deem that the chosen court has jurisdiction.76 
However, courts in Mainland China and Macao can exercise jurisdiction without such 
nexus. For example, both Mainland and Macao courts can exercise general 
jurisdiction when the defendant has distrainable property or has its representative 
offices in its jurisdiction,77 Therefore, Hong Kong courts will not recognize and 
enforce Mainland and Macao judgments issued on these jurisdictional grounds.  
Besides presence, a foreign party’s submission to the court also represents its 
consent to the court’s jurisdiction.78 This includes cases that a party commences an 
action or brings a counter-claim,79 makes a voluntary appearance without protesting 
the court’s jurisdiction,80 or explicitly agrees to submit to the court’s jurisdiction.81 If 
an act does not be regarded as a submission under the foreign law, it generally will not 
amount to a submission under Hong Kong laws in the JRE proceedings.82 Moreover, 
under Hong Kong law, submission to a court in a region is equal to submission to all 
                                                        
72 Heilbronn and et al, see supra note 46 at 311.   
73 Emanuel v Symon [1908] 1 KB 302, 309. Some authorities show that mere presence within the jurisdiction may 
be enough, Carrick v Hancock [1895] 12 TLR 59. But other scholar disagrees and argues there mere presence is 
not enough, see Smart, supra note_50_ at 272. The person’s residence can have no relation to the dispute, see 
Johnston, supra note_47_ at 574 and 576. 
74 Vogel v R and I Kohnstamm Ltd [1973] 1 QB 133, 142; [1971] 2 ALL ER 1428, 1436.  
75 Smart, supra note_50_ at 272. 
76 See Copin v Adamson (1874) LR 9 Exch 345; affmd (1875) 1 Ex D 17 CA. see also Bank of Australia v Harding 
(1850) 9 CB 661.  
77 Art. 241 of the Mainland CPL and art. 17 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
78 Adams, [1990] Ch. 433, 458. 
79 In principle, “a plaintiff who brings a claim only submits to counter-claims in respect of the same subject matter 
or related issues.” Johnston, supra note_47_ at 577. 
80 Adams, [1990] Ch. 433, 458. 
81 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 580. See Blohn v. Desser [1962] 2 QB 116, [1961] 3 All ER 1. 
82 Id. at 574. 
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courts in this region as long as courts in this region adopt “substantially the same 
substantive and procedural laws and practices.”83  
 
Statutory Regime 
 
The statutory regime divides whether a judgment is given by a court with 
competent jurisdiction into two categories: a judgment in rem and a judgment in 
personam. In the case of a judgment given in an action in rem, a judgment-rendering 
court can exercise jurisdiction when the property in question was in the judgment-
rendering region at the time of the proceedings.84  
In the case of a judgment given in an action in personam, the judgment-
rendering court has jurisdiction when a judgment debtor submits to its jurisdiction in 
three circumstances:85 
 
(i)  If the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, 
submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the 
proceedings; or  
(ii) If the judgment debtor was plaintiff in, or counterclaimed in, the 
proceedings in the original court; or 
(iii) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had 
before the commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject 
matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of the 
courts of the country of that court. 
 
But the judgment debtor shall not be treated as having submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court, if he or she appears in the proceedings 
only (1) to contest the jurisdiction of the court, (2) to ask the court to dismiss or stay 
the proceedings on the ground that the dispute in question should be submitted to 
                                                        
83 Id, at 579. 
84 FJREO cap 319, sec. 6(2)b. 
85 Id, sec. 6(2)a. 
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arbitration or to the determination of the courts of another country, or (3) to protect, or 
obtain the release of, property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings.86  
If parties conclude a valid exclusive choice of court agreement,87 Hong Kong 
courts do not recognize and enforce a sister-region judgment given by a court other 
than the chosen court when the judgment debtor does not submit to the jurisdiction of 
the judgment-rendering court.88 Hong Kong courts will not be bound by a sister-
region court’s decisions regarding whether a choice of court agreement is valid and 
whether a judgment debtor submits to its jurisdiction.89   
The judgment-rendering court will also be deemed as having jurisdiction in an 
in personam action as long as the defendant is present in its jurisdiction.90 Presence 
refers to two circumstances. The defendant, at the time when the judgment-rendering 
proceedings were instituted, resided in, or being a body corporate had its principal 
place of business in, the judgment-rendering region.91 Or, the defendant had an office 
or place of business in the judgment-rendering region and the judgment-rendering 
proceedings were about a transaction effected through or at that office or place.92 
However, regardless action in rem or in personam, a judgment-rendering court 
has no jurisdiction if a subject matter of the proceedings is immovable property 
outside the judgment-rendering region.93 The FJREO also contains a “sweeping up” 
provision,94 which indicates that if the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court is 
recognized by Hong Kong laws, its judgments can be recognized and enforced in 
                                                        
86 Foreign Judgments (Restriction on Recognition and Enforcement) Ordinance, Cap 46, section 4.  
87 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 582. (stating “[t]he agreement relied upon must expressly or implicitly prohibit the 
resolution of the dispute in the court in question.”) 
88 Foreign Judgments (Restriction on Recognition and Enforcement) Ordinance, Cap 46, section 3(1) and (2).  
89 Id, section 3(3).  
90 FJREO cap 319, sec. 6(2)a. 
91 Id, sec. 6(2)a(iv). 
92 Id, sec. 6(2)a(v). 
93 Id, sec. 6(3). 
94 Heilbronn and et al, supra note 56 at 315.  
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Hong Kong.95  
 
b. Unfair Procedures 
Common Law Regime 
 
The question, whether a sister-region judgment is rendered through unfair 
procedures, is decided based on Hong Kong views of substantial justice.96 In other 
words, Hong Kong laws, rather than the law of the judgment-rendering region, will be 
applied to decide whether the judgment-rendering proceedings are fair. For example, 
in the US if a defendant defaults, the court can accept the damages that the plaintiff 
claimed without an independent judicial assessment. However, Hong Kong courts will 
not recognize and enforce the subsequent judgment, because it breached substantial 
justice under Hong Kong law.97 However, if a party participates in the judgment-
rendering proceedings and loses, the judgment-rendering court does not breach the 
Hong Kong views of substantial justice because it erroneously accepts the other 
party’s assessment of damages.98 Mei Yu Lau v. Shiu Ki Lau illustrates this.99 This case 
involves the enforceability of a New Jersey judgment in Hong Kong. The judgment 
debtor argued that the New Jersey procedure was defective because the judge blindly 
accepted the submissions made by the other party; therefore, the judgment violated 
the Hong Kong courts’ view of substantial justice. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal 
ruled that the judgment debtor defended the case in the New Jersey, and the fact that 
the court accepted the creditor’s claim did not constitute a violation of substantial 
justice. The only remedy for the judgment debtor was to appeal to the appropriate 
                                                        
95 S 6(2)(c) of Cap 36.  
96 Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781 (especially per Lindley MR at 790). 
97 Adams, [1990] Ch. 433, 493.  
98 See Nintendo of America Inc v. Bund Enterprises Ltd, HCA 1189/2000. 
99 Mei Yu Lau v. Shiu Ki Lau, CACV 197 of 1995. 
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appellate court in New Jersey. Therefore, the New Jersey judgment was recognized in 
Hong Kong. 
The heart of substantial justice is reasonable notice to a defendant and 
opportunities to be heard.100 The fact that a party cannot fully participate in the 
litigation because of financial constraints does not imply that it has no opportunity to 
be heard. For example, in Nintendo of America Inc v. Bund Enterprises Ltd,101 the 
judgment debtor argued that the judgment-rendering court had ordered it to pay a 
large sum of money before it would be allowed to continue to defend the action and 
the amount was tantamount to exhaust its financial ability to continue the action. So 
he had to default in the judgment-rendering proceeding; therefore, he had no fair 
opportunity to present its case on the merits. The requested Hong Kong court held that 
even though personal finance might constraint a party to participate in the litigation, it 
did not mean that this party did not have the opportunity to present its case. In the 
view of Hong Kong courts, the party has the opportunity but for its own reason it 
cannot take advantage of the opportunity. 
Because the Hong Kong legal community does not trust the competence of 
Mainland judicial system and judges, unfair procedures will probably become a 
frequently raised ground for refusing Mainland judgments102 after Mainland China 
and Hong Kong solve the dispute of finality.103 For example, in New Link Consultants 
Ltd v Air China, a case about forum non conveniens, the plaintiff argued the risk of 
bias in Beijing courts: 104  
 
                                                        
100 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 546.  
101 Nintendo of America Inc v. Bund Enterprises Ltd, HCA 1189/2000. 
102 Id, at 603. 
103 For the dispute of finality between Mainland China and Hong Kong, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter IV. 104 New Link Consultants Ltd v. Air China, [2004] H.K.C. 169 (C.F.I.), para 98. available at 
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/judgment.jsp. 
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 (1) State-owned enterprises are economically important to the state and 
hence the Chinese Communist Party/Government authorities would intervene in 
the judicial process. (2) Because of its dependence on the Government, the 
judiciary is likely to be influenced by the Chinese Communist Party. (3) Even in 
the absence of any intervention from the Government, because of its dependence 
upon the Government’s financial well-being, the Chinese judiciary is prone to 
side with local/governmental economic interests. 
 
However, the Hong Kong court indicated that these arguments were general 
because they had no support of “concrete figures and examples”105 and failed to focus 
on the Beijing courts.106 The defendant also argued that Mainland judgments might 
lack sufficient experience in handling sophisticated cases.107 However, the Hong 
Kong court ruled that this argument was impermissible.108 Therefore, the defendant 
did not make out a prima facie case of forum non conveniens.109 This ruling suggests 
that in order to persuade Hong Kong courts to refuse recognition and enforcement of 
a Mainland judgment on the ground of unfair procedure, the debtor needs to prove 
unfair procedure occurred in the judgment-rendering proceeding rather than a general 
charge of incompetent Mainland judicial system. 
 
Statutory Regime 
 
The common-law scope of unfair procedure is much broader than that of the 
FJREO, because the latter limits unfair procedure to one circumstance, namely110  
 
that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings in the 
original court, did not (notwithstanding that process may have been duly served 
on him in accordance with the law of the country of the original court) receive 
notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the 
                                                        
105 Id, para 102.  
106 Id. 
107 Id, para 103. 
108 Id. 
109 Id, para 104. 
110 FJREO Section 6(1)(a)(iii).  
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proceedings and did not appear… 
 
Other instances of unfair procedures may fall into the public policy exception 
provision in the FJREO.111 Whether the defendant has been given sufficient time to 
defend its case is a matter of fact and will be decided by a test of reasonableness.112  
 
c. Fraud ?
Common law Regime 
 
Fraud “includes acts, omissions or concealment by which an undue or 
unconscientiously advantage is taken of another.”113 It can be committed by the party 
seeking JRE or judges who rendered the judgment.114 For example, it could be that 
false evidence provided by a party is accepted by the judgment-rendering court, or 
that judges of such court take bribes even if the party relying on its judgment is not 
involved in the corruption. Fraud can be committed unintentionally.115 However, 
judgment-rendering courts and Hong Kong requested courts may adopt different civil 
proceedings or legal standards. A mere difference does not mean that judgments from 
the former are made through fraudulent acts.116 Unlike the US, Hong Kong law does 
not distinguish extrinsic and intrinsic fraud and does not limit the defence to JRE to 
extrinsic fraud. 
In order to succeed in invoking fraud in Hong Kong JRE proceedings, a 
judgment debtor must “particularize the fraud with precision”117 by using plausible 
                                                        
111 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 563. 
112 Id. 
113 Dinardo v. Lark Int’l Ltd, 14565 C.F.I. 1998. 
114 William Henry Cowie v. The Attorney General, 336 C.F.A. 1947. Johnston, supra note_47_ at 564. 
115 Dinardo v. Lark Int’l Ltd, 14565 C.F.I. 1998. 
116 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 565.  
117 WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Malcolm Maydwell (unrep, C.A.C.V. 148 of 1995), Court of Appeal, per Ching JA 
([1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 236 Court of Appeal). 
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evidence to establish a prima facie, arguable, or credible case.118 The evidence is 
limited to those that was not available to the losing party in the judgment-rendering 
court and could not be discovered by him or her with reasonable diligence before 
judgment has been delivered.119 Applying these rules to interregional JRE between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong, a mere argument on the general organic deficiency 
of the Mainland judicial system does not constitute fraud in the Hong Kong JRE 
proceedings.120  
Whether the sister-region court’s determination of fraud has res judicata effect 
in the Hong Kong JRE proceedings is a complicated issue. The majority of authorities 
hold that the defence of fraud can be raised in Hong Kong even though the same 
defence was pleaded and rejected by the judgment-rendering court. WFM Motors Pty 
Ltd illustrates this:121 
 
[W]here fraud is alleged it is permissible in an appropriate case to 
examine the evidence to consider whether or not the evidence given at the trial 
was fraudulent…this can be done even when the very points that are put 
forward have already been considered and dismissed by the foreign court. 
 
Obviously, this rule contradicted with the res judicata doctrine122 and has been 
criticized for causing inconsistent judgments and wasting judicial resources.123 The 
new trend is to limit this rule in at least two circumstances. First, if the losing party 
litigated the question--whether the judgment was obtained by fraud--in the judgment-
rendering region in a separate and second action, she will be estopped from alleging 
                                                        
118 Syal v Heyward (1948) 2 KB 443; Owens Bank Ltd v Etoile Commerciale SA [1995] 1 WLR 44, Privy Council; 
Ever Chance Development Ltd v Ching Kai Chiu (unrep, C.A.C.V. 8 of 1997). 
119 Owens Bank Ltd v. Etoile Commerciale SA [1992] 2 A.C. 443, 444 and 459. 
120 Eg., the New Link Consultants Ltd v Air China, H.C.A. 515 of 2001, 
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/judgment.jsp (accessed on Dec 12, 2009). 
121 WFM Motors Pty Ltd v. Maydwell [1996] 1 HKC 444 (HKCA), appeal dismissed, [1997] HKLRD 739 (PC). 
See Abouloff v. Oppenheimer & Co. (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 295; Vadala v. Lawes (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 310; and Jet 
Holdings Inc. v. Patel [1990] 1 Q.B. 335. See Smart, supra note_50_ at 270. cf. Hong Pian Tee v. Les Placement 
Germain Gauthier Inc, [2000] 2 SLR 81 (Singapore, CA) and Beals v. Saldanha, (2003) 234 DLR (4th) 1.  
122 See Owens Bank Ltd v. Etoile Commerciale SA [1992] 2 A.C. 443, 462. 
123 See Id, at 463. 
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the same defence in the JRE proceedings in Hong Kong.124 Second, the doctrine of 
abuse of process has been used to prevent a party, who challenged judgments based 
on fraud in the judgment-rendering court, from re-litigating fraud in the JRE 
proceedings.125 Whether re-litigating fraud in the JRE proceedings will lead to an 
“abuse of process” is decided by a combination of factors such as “the fairness of the 
foreign procedure,” “the merits of the fraud allegation,” and “reasonable opportunities 
to raise the allegation of fraud in the judgment-rendering court.”126 For example, in 
Wang Hsiao Yu v Wu Cho Ching,127 a judgment debtor had alleged the same fraud 
against a Taiwanese judgment by six rounds of appeal in Taiwanese courts but all 
failed. In the Hong Kong JRE proceeding, the debtor alleged the same fraud again 
without submitting any new evidence, the Hong Kong court ruled that it was an abuse 
of process to allow a defendant to re-litigate the issue of fraud in Hong Kong after 
Taiwanese court had examined extensively and thoroughly and decided this issue. The 
court reconciled its decision with WFM Motors Pty Ltd by indicating that the latter 
court did not consider the issue of abuse of process. 
 
Statutory Regime  
 
Like common law, FJREO also states that a foreign judgment obtained by fraud 
shall not be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong. The statute indicates that: “On an 
application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment 
                                                        
124 House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite and Others, [1991] 1 Q.B. 241, 241-42. In this case, an Irish court issued 
a judgment against three defendants. Two of the defendants brought an action in Ireland to set aside the judgment 
by allegation of fraud. The action was dismissed. In the JRE proceedings, an English court held that all three 
defendants were estopped from alleging the fraud without submitting new evidence. The court held that the third 
defendant was estopped as the other two defendants because he was privy to them and was well aware of the 
proceedings brought by them to set aside the previous judgment. 
125 House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite and Others, [1991] 1 Q.B. 241, 242, 251 and 255. Owens Bank Ltd v. 
Etoile Commerciale SA [1995] 1 WLR 44, Privy Council. 
126 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 569-70.  
127 Wang Hsiao Yu v Wu Cho Ching, HCA 1690/1997. 
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may be enforced, the registration of the judgment…shall be set aside if the registering 
court is satisfied…that the judgment was obtained by fraud.”128  
 
d. Res judicata 
 
Res judicata is a ground to refuse JRE. As the FJREO states:129  
 
on an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a 
registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment…may be 
set aside if the registering court is satisfied that the matter in dispute in the 
proceedings in the original court had previously to the date of the judgment in 
the original court been the subject of a final and conclusive judgment by a court 
having jurisdiction in the matter.  
 
“A final and conclusive judgment” should “between the same parties on the 
same issues.”130 Clearly the same parties include privies.131 Therefore, a foreign 
judgment inconsistent with a Hong Kong early-in-time decision between the same 
parties or their privies on the same cause of action, will not be recognized and 
enforced in Hong Kong. However, whether the requirements of the same parties and 
the same issues can be relaxed in other circumstances is still unexplored in Hong 
Kong conflict of laws.132 
 
e. Public Policy Exception 
 
The public policy exception is a defence to JRE under both common law and 
                                                        
128 FJREO Cap319, § 6(1)(a)(iv). 
129 Id, § 6(1)(b).  
130 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 548. 
131 See Owens Bank, [1995] 1 WLR 44, Privy Council. 
132 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 556-58. 
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FJREO.133 Hong Kong courts restrict the use of the public policy exception to 
instances where JRE would be “contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality 
and justice” of Hong Kong.134 For example, if a foreign judgment is based on an 
agreement made on undue influence, its enforcement is contrary to public policy.135 
The public policy exception can be used to refuse the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments involving revenue and penal character.136 Accordingly, a Mainland or 
Macao judgment involving penal or revenue law is unrecognizable and unenforceable 
in Hong Kong.137  
Moreover, Hong Kong courts do not hold that the recognition and enforcement 
of a judgment from a region controlled by a non-recognized government violate Hong 
Kong public policy as long as the judgment concerns private rights only.138 Hong 
Kong courts also considered whether the recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
rendered in a region controlled by a non-recognized government would violate 
Mainland public policy, because Hong Kong was part of the PRC. For example, in 
Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao, the Hong Kong court permitted JRE because the 
interests protected by the Taiwanese judgment were “those of the creditors in the 
bankruptcy, not those of the Taiwan government.”139 Therefore, the recognition and 
enforcement of such judgments did not violate both Hong Kong and Mainland public 
policy.  
Hong Kong scholars generally uphold the maintaining of public policy 
                                                        
133 See FJREO, Section 6(1)(a)(v). 
134 Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering (1999) 2 HKCFAR 111, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ observed 
at p.139 E to G. See Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359, Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, and Enderby 
Town Football Club v. Football Association [1971] Ch 591. See Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_ at 578.  
135 Israel Discount Bank of New York v. Hadji Pateras [1983] 3 All ER 129 (CA). 
136 See Attorney-General for New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] AC 1(a case about a foreign Attorney General sued to 
recover an unpaid fine). But civil damages awarded in criminal proceedings may be enforced in Hong Kong. See 
Raulin v. Fischer [1911] 2 KB 93. 
137 Smart, supra note_50_ at 270.  
138 Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao [2000] 1 HKC 461, [2000] 1 HKLR 252, per Mr. Justice Bokhary PJ. For 
details of this case, see Section B of Chapter I.  
139 Id, per Lord Cooke of Thorndon NPJ. 
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exception in Chinese interregional conflict of laws because Hong Kong and Mainland 
China represent two completely different legal systems.140 In a recent case, the Hong 
Kong Court of First Instance invoked the public policy exception to deny JRE of a 
Mainland divorce decree,141 but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.142 This 
case involves parallel proceedings in Hong Kong and in Shenzhen, Mainland China. 
The parties are Mainland citizens and married in Shenzhen. They acquired the right of 
abode in Hong Kong and maintained matrimonial homes in both Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen. The husband spent most of his time working in Shenzhen while his wife 
and kids lived in Hong Kong. Majority of their matrimonial assets were located in 
Mainland China and a relatively small portion in Hong Kong. In May 2006, the wife 
filed a divorce petition in Hong Kong. The husband never challenged the jurisdiction 
of the Hong Kong court. A decree nisi of divorce was issued in November 2006. 
However, in October 2006, the husband brought an action in Shenzhen for divorce 
and division of the matrimonial assets in Mainland China. The Mainland court 
rejected the wife’s application to stay the Mainland proceedings. In November 2007, 
a Mainland judgment was rendered. Then the husband requested the Hong Kong court 
to permanently stay and strike out the wife’s claim for ancillary relief and for 
rescission of the decree nisi. In his opinion, since the marriage had been dissolved by 
the Mainland judgment, the Hong Kong court no longer had jurisdiction to grant any 
decree absolute and relevant ancillary relief in this case.  
The Hong Kong Court of First Instance noted that the Mainland court had 
substantial connections to the cases. It also indicated that the pursuit of concurrent 
parallel proceedings in the absence of any anti-suit injunction cannot be regarded as 
                                                        
140 Guobin Zhu, Inter-regional Conflict of Laws under “One Country, Two Systems”: Revisiting Chinese Legal 
Theories and Chinese and Hong Kong Law, with Special Reference to Judicial Assistance, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 615, 
634 (2002). 
141 ML v. YJ, HCMC 13/2006.  
142 ML v. YJ, CACV 89/2008, per Peter Cheung J. 
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violating the public policy of Hong Kong.143 However, the Court emphasized that if 
the parallel proceeding outside of Hong Kong was conducted by “forensic tactics” 144, 
recognizing the consequent judgment in Hong Kong was “against [Hong Kong] 
fundamental notion of justice.”145 The court ruled that the recognition of the judgment 
should be denied on the grounds of the public policy exception,146 because of the 
husband’s “latest tactical maneuver [to use the Mainland judgment] to terminate the 
wife’s ancillary relief application against him in Hong Kong.”147 The reason is that the 
recognition would frustrate the parties’ common intention that there would be an 
ancillary relief hearing in Hong Kong to distribute properties that had not been 
litigated in Shenzhen.148 However, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that 
recognizing the Mainland judgment would not infringe Hong Kong public policy 
because the husband had legitimate reasons to litigate in Shenzhen and the wife would 
not be deprived of substantial legal rights if the Shenzhen judgment is recognized.149 
The Court also held that there was no common intention of the parties to adjudicate 
different assets in different jurisdiction.150  
This case is significant because parallel litigations due to jurisdictional conflicts 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong have been rampant.151 It demonstrates 
whether to invoke the public policy exception to deny recognition and enforcement of 
a judgment resulting from parallel litigations is a fact-intensive decision. The court 
needs to consider whether a party has a legitimate reason to pursue the second action 
                                                        
143 ML v. YJ, HCMC 13/2006, paras 65 and 80.  
144 Id, para 67.  
145 Id.  
146 Sec. 61 (2) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap 179 states that recognition of a foreign divorce 
decree should be refused if that “would manifestly be contrary to public policy.” 
147 ML v. YJ, HCMC 13/2006, para 74. 
148 Id, at para 69. 
149 Id, at para 139. 
150 Id, at para 146. 
151 For discussion of parallel litigations due to jurisdictional conflicts, see Xianchu Zhang, A New Stage of 
Regional Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters: Implementation of the Mainland Judgments 
Ordinance and Certain Issues Beyond,  39 HONG KONG L. J. 3, 24-33 (2009).   
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after the commencement of the Hong Kong action. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Discussions in this Section demonstrate that the existing Hong Kong JRE law is 
insufficient to enhance interregional JRE. For example, in the JRE proceedings Hong 
Kong courts apply lex fori to determine the finality, jurisdiction, fraud, and unfair 
procedures of a sister-region judgment. Due to the divergences between regions, a 
judgment that is final in one region can be regarded as not final in the other; a court 
has jurisdiction according to the law of the judgment-rendering region can be 
regarded as lacking jurisdiction under the law of the requested region. Therefore, 
merely relying on unilateral regional legislation is difficult to improve interregional 
JRE. 
 
iii. Macao Regional JRE Law 
 
This Section will analyze legal bases for JRE in Macao (Part One), 
requirements for JRE (Part Two), and grounds for denying JRE (Part Three) in Macao 
regional JRE law. This Section concludes that merely relying on Macao unilateral 
regional legislation cannot solve interregional JRE difficulties.  
 
1. Legal Bases for JRE 
 
As Hong Kong law is shaped by the English law, Macao law has been 
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significantly influenced by Portuguese law.152 Like Portugal, Macao is in the civil law 
family so statutes play the most important role in regulating JRE. Chapter 14 of the 
Macau Civil Procedure Code regulates recognition and enforcement of judgments 
rendered by courts outside of Macao. Chapter 14 applies equally to the recognition 
and enforcement of sister-region and foreign judgments.  
 
2. Requirements for JRE 
 
Macao law requires that judgments should be definite according to the law of 
the judgment-rendering region.153 Macao Civil Procedure Code does not use the term 
“final.” However, a final judgment is definite.154 For example, a judgment becomes 
definite when it is not subject to modification or reversal by an appellate procedure.155 
An interlocutory judgment, such as instructions and orders issued by judges to 
facilitate proceedings, is definite too.156  
 
3.  Grounds for Refusing JRE 
 
Macao courts can review the merits of a sister-region judgment when new 
critical evidence appears, or when a Macao substantive law that leads to a more 
favourable judgment to a Macao resident should have been applied in the judgment-
                                                        
152 All laws, decrees, administrative regulations and other normative acts made by Portuguese governors and 
previously in force in Macao should remain in force after Macao returned to China, if they are not against the 
Basic Law and not revised by the legislature and relevant organs of Macao SAR. See art. 8 of the Macao Basic 
Law.  
153 Art. 1200(b) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
154 MIN YUAN, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN THE PRC, HONG KONG, MACAO AND TAIWAN 82 (2006). 
155 Id . 
156 Zhu Jian, MACAO MIN SHI SU SONG GUANG XIA YU QUE REN WAI DI CAI PAN DE ZHI DU [MACAO SYSTEMS FOR 
JURISDICTION AND JRE IN CIVIL LITIGATION], http://www.court.gov.mo/pdf/ConfirmC.pdf (last visited Feb 2, 2010). 
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rendering proceeding.157   
First, new critical evidence refers to one that was unknown to parties or has not 
been used in the judgment-rendering proceeding but can change the existing judgment 
into one more favourable to the losing party.158 It does not require this evidence alone 
should be able to overturn the judgment.159 It means that by adding this evidence into 
the evidence pool, the judgment must be overturned.160 Both parties and non-parties 
can bring the attention of a requested Macao court to such document. This ground 
involves review of the merits of a sister-region judgment. But it has rarely been used 
according to Macao jurisprudence.161 This is possibly because a judgment debtor has 
to respond to a JRE application within fifteen days,162 so he or she may not have 
sufficient time to find critical new evidence. This ground of review may be proper for 
international JRE163 but should be regarded as exorbitant in the interregional context. 
The reason is that it will harm mutual trust between regions, therefore the proper 
approach for Macao courts is to require the losing party to challenge the judgment in 
the judgment-rendering region. Only when there is no reasonable opportunities for 
this party to do so in the judgment-rendering region, a Macao requested court may 
consider reopen the merits of the case.  
Second, Macao courts would deny JRE, if (1) a sister-region judgment is 
against a Macao resident, (2) according to Macao conflict of laws, Macao substantive 
law should have been applied to solve the dispute, and (3) the application of Macao 
substantive law leads to a judgment more favourable to the Macao resident compared 
                                                        
157 Id. art. 1202. 
158 Arts. 1202 and Art. 653(c) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. Yuan, supra note_154_ at 86.  
159Id. 
160Id. 
161Id. 
162 Art. 1201(1) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. Parties have only ten days to respond to a procurator’s 
questions. See art. 1203(2) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
163 See a similar approach in Canada, where in the context of fraud, JRE can be denied when proof of new and 
material facts that was previously not discoverable appear and challenge the evidence accepted by the judgment-
rendering court, Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 para 43-51 (Can.). 
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to the sister-region judgment.164 This ground of refusal reflects Macao's protectionism 
towards its residents.165 The underlying policy is that, the Macao resident, who is the 
losing party, should receive the same treatment in the judgment-rendering court as he 
or she would receive in the Macao court if the action took place in Macao.166 
Obviously a Macao court is not able to influence what happens in the judgment-
rendering court. What the Macao court can is to review whether the judgment-
rendering court granted the Macao losing party the same treatment as he or she would 
receive in the Macao court. If the losing party received less favourable treatment, the 
Macao court will deny JRE. The Macao court will not review the facts finding of the 
judgment-rendering court. However, it will apply its own law to analyze these facts.167 
A Macao court cannot sua sponte review the merits of a sister-region judgment on this 
ground.168 This is because whether to invoke Macao law and whether to get more 
favourable treatments is one of parties’ disposable rights;169 if parties do not initiate 
this ground of refusal, parties waive it.170  
Besides substantive grounds, Macao courts can also deny JRE for non-
substantive reasons, such as lack of indirect jurisdiction, unfair procedure, res 
judicata, and public policy exception.171  
 
a. Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction 
 
                                                        
164 Id. art. 1202. The second section of Chapter 3 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code provides detailed conflict-of-
law rules. It contains seven divisions: Scope and Ascertainment of Personal Law, Law Applicable for Actions, Law 
Applicable for Obligations, Law Applicable for in Rem, Law Applicable for Legal Relations between Relatives, 
Law Applicable for Marriage De Facto, and Law Applicable for Succession. 
165 Jian, supra note_156_. 
166 Rambas Marketing Co., LLC v. Chou Kam Fai David, Court of Second Instance of Macao, Macao judgment 
29/2003 issued on June 10, 2004, page 28-9. (A curtsey English translation provided by Sérgio Silva Gaspar of the 
University of Macao is in file with the author). 
167 Id, at 29. 
168 Jian, supra note_156_. 
169 Id. 
170 Rambas Marketing, page 29. 
171 Art. 1200(c)(d) and (e), art. 1202 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
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Lack of indirect jurisdiction includes two circumstances.172  First, the 
jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court was tainted by fraud.173 For example, the 
defendant was fraudulently induced into the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering 
court. The second circumstance of lack of jurisdiction is that the case falls in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Macao courts.174 Macao courts claim exclusive jurisdiction 
when lawsuits related to a property right in real estate located in Macao and the 
bankruptcy or insolvency of a Macao legal person.175  
Macao courts distinguish the in rem and in personam effects of a sister-region 
judgment that involves real estate located in Macao. This is illustrated by a JRE case 
where a Mainland divorce judgment split a couple's properties and one real estate was 
located in Macao.176 The majority of Macao judges held that the judgment essentially 
concerned an obligation not a property right, although it was related to a real estate in 
Macao.177 Therefore, the judgment-rendering court did not violate the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the requested court where the real estate was located. So this judgment 
should be recognized and enforced in Macao.  
 
b. Unfair Procedure 
 
The second ground for refusing JRE is unfair procedure in the judgment-
                                                        
172 Id. art. 1200(c). Macao has only concluded two bilateral judicial assistance treaties: THE TREATY OF JUDICIAL 
ASSISTANCE BETWEEN MACAO SAR AND EAST TIMOR ON DECEMBER 5, 2008, and THE TREATY OF JUDICIAL 
ASSISTANCE BETWEEN MACAO SAR AND PORTUGAL ON FEBURARY 2, 2001. See 
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between Macao and East Timor, and art. 3 of the Treaty between Macao and Portugal.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. art. 20.  
176 Macao judgment 188/2003, issued on Nov. 13, 2003. Cited in Yuan, supra note_154_ at 83.  
177 The dissenting judges ruled that the judgment involved both an obligation and a transfer of property right. 
Because the title to a real estate located in Macao needed to be transferred, the case should belong to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Macao. In other words, the dissenter held that the Mainland court infringed the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Macao and its judgment should not be recognized and enforced in Macao. 
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rendering court. This includes two circumstances. First, a defendant was not properly 
summoned according to the law of the judgment-rendering region.178 Macao courts 
may also apply Macao law to determine whether a defendant has been properly 
summoned.179 Second, the judgment-rendering proceeding violates the principles of 
the right to argue and equality between parties.180 Fair procedure does not mean both 
parties should actually fully present the case.181 Therefore, a default judgment, where 
the defendant has been duly served and the trial is conducted impartially, is entitled to 
JRE in Macao.182 According to Macao case law, Macao courts have acknowledged 
that the civil procedures of Mainland China, Hong Kong, Canada, Portugal, and the 
Philippine Republic comply with the fair procedure requirements in the Macao JRE 
law.183 Additionally, JRE will be refused, if the judgment results from one or multiple 
judges’ dereliction of duty, or acceptance of illegal interests or bribery.184  
 
c. Res judicata  
 
Res judicata is the third ground to refuse JRE.185 The Macao Civil Code 
provides two res judicata rules. First, a sister-region judgment is unrecognizable and 
unenforceable in Macao, if this judgment is inconsistent with an existing judgment.186 
The existing judgment can be a Macao judgment or a third-region judgment that has 
been recognized in Macao. Judgments involve different parties or different causes of 
action may be regarded inconsistent as long as they are irreconcilable. For example, 
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29/2003 issued on June 10, 2004, para 112. (A curtsey English translation provided by Sérgio Silva Gaspar of the 
University of Macao is in file with the author). 
180 Art. 1200(f) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. Yuan, supra note_154_ at 84.   
181 Id. at 83.5. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Arts. 1202 and 653(a) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code.  
185 Id. art. 1200(d). 
186 Id. arts. 1202(d) and 653(g). 
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suppose that marriage is a precondition for a man to pay maintenance to a woman. If 
one judgment requires a husband pays maintenance to a wife and the other is a 
divorce judgment, these two judgments do not involve the same cause of action but 
they are inconsistent.  
Second, a sister-region judgment can be recognised, "[only if the debtor of the... 
judgment] cannot make a proper objection based on lis pendens and the reason that 
there is already a local judgment for the same case because the case is being heard in 
a Macau court. However, if a non-local court took the case earlier than the Macau 
court, it is possible that the judgment rendered by that court could be recognisable."187 
 
d. Public Policy Exception 
 
JRE will be denied if its result will manifestly violate Macao public policies.188 
The Macao Civil Procedure Code does not define the meaning of public policies. 
Macao judges interpreted the public policies as “[a] set of absolutely imperative 
norms and juridical principles that form the fundamental frameworks of the system, 
for they are, as such, unsusceptible of derogation by the will of the individuals.”189 
The meaning of public policies should be determined and developed in practice, and 
judges should decide whether to invoke the public policy exception according to the 
facts of each case.190 Generally, the recognition and enforcement of monetary 
judgments do not manifestly violate Macao public policies.191 
The test for “public policies” may involve review of a sister-region judgment on 
                                                        
187 Id., art. 1200 (d). The English translation is cited from E-mail from Guangjian Tu, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Macao Faculty of Law, to Jie Huang ( Jun 1, 2010, 11:50 PM CST) (on file with author). 
188 Art. 1200(e) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. Art. 1200(e) is in line with the essence of art. 20 of the Code. 
189 Rambas, Macao judgment 29/2003. 
190 Jin Huang & Huacheng Guo, Zai Lun Guo Ji Shi Fa Zhong De Gong Gong Zhi Xu Wen Ti [Re-analyze the Issue 
of Public Policy in Private International Law: The Theory and Practice in Macao Private International Law], HE 
BEI FA XUE 15, 20 (Issue 2, 1998). 
191 Judgement 228/2003 issued on Aug. 29, 2005. Cited in Yuan, supra note_154_ at 85.  
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the merits.192 Some authority suggests that the public polices review is to examine 
whether the same judgment would be issued under Macao law and procedure.193 The 
example is a JRE case where a Portuguese citizen residing in Macao requested a 
Macao court to recognize a Hong Kong default divorce judgment.194 The Macao 
requested court sua sponte reviewed whether the judgment contradicted Macao public 
policies.195 The court ruled that in terms of substantive law, similar to Hong Kong, 
Macao recognized divorce by consent and divorce by court.196 Therefore, the Hong 
Kong substantive law was not against Macao public policies. As for procedure law, 
the Hong Kong court accepted the plaintiff’s claim completely when the defendant 
defaulted in this case.197 The Macao court ruled that this procedure did not contradict 
with Macao public policies because it did not contain strong cultural, moral, or social 
value elements.198 Therefore, Macao courts would issue the same judgment under 
Macao’s own substantive and procedural law. Consequently, the Macao court 
recognized this Hong Kong judgment.199    
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Since the return of Macao, the JRE cases in Macao have been increasing every 
year, and the majority of judgments are from Mainland China and Hong Kong.200 
Most of these judgments are divorce decrees.201 Others are judgments concerning 
                                                        
192 Jian, supra note_156_ at 11. 
193 Issued on Nov. 7, 2002. Cited in Yuan, supra note_154_ at 85.  
194 Jin Huang & Huacheng Guo, supra note 190  at 19.  
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Gujie Yuan, Lei Di Yu Gan Ao Xian Fu Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing Min Shang Shi Pan Jue de Fa Zhang Qu Shi 
[The Development Trend of Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong and Macao], 2 FA XUE JIA [LEGAL EXPERT] 147, 149 (2005). 
201 Id. 
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inheritance, adoption, and business contractual disputes.202 Most JRE applications in 
Macao are successful and only few cases are rejected because of procedural issues.203 
However, substantive reviews under Macao law represent strong regional 
protectionism and hampers interregional JRE.  
 
iv. Problems of Regional JRE Laws 
 
The major problem of regional JRE laws is insufficient substantive law and the 
absence of an overarching JRE scheme. For example, Mainland China denies JRE 
when no JRE arrangement exists. It has never invoked the principle of reciprocity to 
recognize and enforce sister-region judgments, other than divorce decrees without 
enforceable contents. Moreover, Hong Kong courts apply their own law, rather than 
the law of the judgment-rendering region, to determine whether a sister-region 
judgment is final, whether the judgment-rendering court has jurisdiction, and whether 
the judgment-rendering proceeding is fair. Because regional laws are divergent, a final 
judgment in the judgment-rendering region may be considered as non-final in Hong 
Kong,204 and a court that has jurisdiction under its own law may be considered as no 
jurisdiction in Hong Kong.205 In addition, Macao courts can review the merits of 
sister-region judgments in the JRE proceedings. This devastates current fragile 
interregional mutual trust.206 As a conclusion, each region cannot solve interregional 
JRE difficulties unilaterally. Establishing an overarching JRE scheme can help 
address this problem.  
 
                                                        
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 For detailed discussion of finality, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter IV. 
205 For detailed discussion of conflicts between direct and indirect jurisdiction, see Part i of Section C of Chapter V. 
206 For detailed discussion of mutual trust, see Section C of Chapter IV. 
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B. Interregional JRE Law 
 
The current interregional JRE system between Mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and Macao is constituted by two bilateral Arrangements and a multilateral convention 
regarding oil pollution. The former includes: the Mainland-Macao Arrangement and 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. The later refers to the 1992 Protocol of the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (hereinafter 
“Convention on Oil Pollution”), which applies to the three regions.207 This section 
analyzes the three interregional laws. In order to achieve a better comparison, it starts 
from the more restrictive Arrangement between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 
then proceeds to the more JRE-friendly Arrangement between Mainland China and 
Macao, and at the end, it discusses the multilateral Convention on Oil Pollution. 
 
i. Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
 
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement was concluded in 2006 and came into 
effect after the Supreme People’s Court of Mainland China promulgated a judicial 
interpretation208 and Hong Kong completed the relevant legislation in 2008.209 This 
                                                        
207 The 1992 Protocol of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
http://www.imo.org/conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=660&topic_id=256 (last visited Feb 9, 2010). For status of 
convention by countries, see http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248.  
208 For Mainland implementation legislation, see Interpretation No.9 [2008] of the Supreme People’s Court on July 
3, 2008. For the circumstances and procedures that the Supreme People’s Court can issue judicial interpretation, 
see Provisions on the Judicial Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court dated March 23, 2007. See also Art. 
33 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [the Organic law of the People's Courts] 
(promulgated by the National People's Congress on July 1, 1979), translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com 
(accessed on Dec 12, 2009), provides that: "The Supreme People's Court gives interpretation on questions 
concerning specific application of laws and decrees in judicial proceeding." In the Mainland the interpretation of 
law rests with the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress according to art. 67 of Constitution of 
the PRC. 
209 For Hong Kong implementation legislation, see Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance and 
its (Commencement) Notice, Ord. No. 9 of 2008, L.S. No. 2 to Gazette No. 27/2008, L.N. 195 of 2008, Cap 597. 
Upon the agreement of Mainland China and Hong Kong, this Arrangement came into force as of August 1, 2008. 
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Arrangement is a milestone in the interregional JRE for Mainland China and Hong 
Kong.210 It will also provide valuable guidance for future judicial assistance in civil or 
commercial cases between the Mainland and other common law countries such as the 
US and the UK.211 This Arrangement will facilitate commerce between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong.212 It may also help Hong Kong to develop into a dispute 
resolution center for cases involving Mainland parties, because Hong Kong courts are 
deemed to be of a higher quality than their Mainland counterparts.213 So foreign 
parties may prefer to litigate in Hong Kong and, if they win, they can use the 
Arrangement to enforce their judgment in Mainland China.214 However, the scope of 
this Arrangement is very narrow, which restricts its practical significance. 
 
1. Scope of the Arrangement  
 
The scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is narrow.215 It applies 
only to an enforceable final judicial award requiring payment of money in a civil or 
commercial case pursuant to a choice of court agreement in writing, rendered by a 
                                                                                                                                                               
For a discussion of the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, see Zhang, supra note_151_. 
210 See Michelle Tsang, A New Chapter in Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments between the Mainland and Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong Lawyer 59-64 (July 2008). See also Zhang, supra note 151 at 5. 
211 Zhang, supra note 151 at 5. Iain Seow, Arrangements for Reciprocal Enforcement of Commercial Judgments 
Between Mainland China and Hong Kong, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING (Sept 1, 2006): NA (indicating “when 
the Arrangement is implemented, Hong Kong will be the first common law jurisdiction in the world whose court 
judgments are recognized on the Mainland and vice versa”). It should be noted that although the Mainland signed 
an agreement on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters with Singapore (a common-law country) in 
1999, but the recognition and enforcement of judgments are excluded from this agreement. 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=7108&pdmc=rdgb (accessed on Jan 16, 2009).  
212 Stephen Kai-yi Wong, Comments Reciprocal Enforcement of Court Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters Between Hong Kong SAR and the Mainland,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- 
PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA , 
378 (Jorge Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal eds. 2009). 
213 See speech made by the Secretary for Justice Mr. Wong Yan Lung SC at the signing ceremony of the 
Arrangement on July 14, 2006, available at http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/topical/mainlandlaw.htm (accessed on Jan 
28, 2009). See also James Illman, HK Courts Accord to Open China Market, LEGAL WEEK (May 11, 2006) 
(indicating that the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement makes it possible for Hong Kong lawyers to win a bigger 
slice of China’s potentially huge dispute resolution market and moreover because of the common-law tradition in 
Hong Kong, US and UK companies may like to resolve their disputes in Hong Kong and then enforce the 
judgments in Mainland China under the Arrangement). 
214 Id. 
215 Wong, supra note_212_ at 376. 
129 
people’s court of Mainland China or a court of Hong Kong.216 It excludes judgments 
in non-commercial or non-contractual disputes and judgments without choice of court 
agreements. This is because conflicts between Mainland and Hong Kong laws are 
very complex. So the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement was concluded after a 
difficult, four-year negotiation217 and its implementation took another two years. This 
Arrangement is a successful example of the approach of “following in order from 
easy to difficult matters and advanc[ing] step by step.”218 This is drawn from the 
approach of "start small" form the Hague Choice of Court Convention.219 
 
a. Judgments in Civil and Commercial Cases 
 
The Arrangement is limited to judgments in civil and commercial contractual 
disputes, excluding any employment contracts and contracts to which a natural person 
acting for personal consumption, family, or other non-commercial purposes.220 The 
record of the Hong Kong Legislative Council shows that this exclusion is inspired by 
the Hague Choice of Court Convention.221 However, the narrow scope and strict 
requirement of the Hague Convention are appropriate for the international scenario 
but are over-restrictive for the interregional context.222 Considering the close cultural, 
economic, and historical ties between Mainland China and Hong Kong,223 recognition 
                                                        
216 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
217 See the Paper on Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments in Commercial Matters between the HKSAR and the 
Mainland, CB (2)1431/01-02(01) march 2002. The negotiation between Mainland China and Hong Kong officially 
started in July 2002. See Zhang and Smart, supra note___ at 558. 
218 The Speech of the then Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court, Justice Songyou Huang made at the 
signing ceremony of the Arrangement on July 14, 2006, quoted from Xianchu Zhang & Philip Smart, supra note 
11 at 568. 
219 See Report: Recent International Agreement—Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, Concluded June 30, 
2005, 119 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 935 (2006) (indicating the approval of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 
demonstrates that “start small” is a good approach to complicated conflict-of-law issues). Hong Kong LC Paper 
No. CB(2)722/01-02(04), para 18. 
220 Id. art. 3. 
221 Hong Kong LC Paper No. CB(2)722/01-02(04), para 18. Art. 2 (1) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. 
222 See Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_ at 564. 
223 See Section D of Chapter I. 
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and enforcement of judgments in non-commercial and non-contractual issues can 
facilitate people’s life in these two regions. Moreover, the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement has a much broader scope and less restrictive requirements.224 Extending 
the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement would promote the growth of 
economic and familial bonds between the two regions.  
 
b. Monetary Judgments 
 
The judgments covered by the Arrangement must require payment of money. 
This comes from the approach of "start small," since the enforcement of monetary 
judgments is less controversial than enforcement of orders of injunction or specific 
performance. Moreover, because the Arrangement improperly omits recognition rules, 
judgment does not require any payment or further enforcement cannot be recognized. 
This creates uncertainty between parties. For example, supposing that a party wins a 
judgment that shows he or she has no liability to pay in one region, because this 
judgment cannot be recognized under the Arrangement, this party will need to re-
litigate the merits of her case in order to safeguard her rights in the other region.225 S 
16 (1) of the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal) Ordinance enacted by Hong Kong is 
designed to fill this gap.226 It states that Mainland judgments that do not require any 
payment or further enforcement and comply with the Ordinance can be used as a 
defense or counterclaim in Hong Kong litigations.227 Advisably, Mainland China 
should adopt a similar recognition rule in its implementing legislation of the 
Arrangement.  
                                                        
224 See art. 1 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
225 Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_ at 558. 
226 § 16 (1) of the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Ordinance). For comments, see Zhang, supra note_151_ at 10.  
227 § 16 (1) of the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Ordinance). 
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c. Types of Judicial Awards 
 
“Judicial awards” include judgments, rulings, conciliation statements, and 
orders for payment in Mainland China, or judgments, orders and legal cost appraisal 
certificates in Hong Kong.228 When discussing the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, 
without specialization, the term, “judgment,” is used broadly as an equivalent to 
“judicial awards.”  
In Mainland China, a judgment [pan jue] is used to decide the substance of a 
case and rulings [cai jue] is used to determine procedural issues.229 An order for 
payment [zhi fu lin] is issued when the following conditions are met: (1) a creditor 
requests a debtor to repay a certain amount of money or specific negotiable 
instruments; (2) the creditor has no obligations for reciprocal payment against 
delivery; and (3) the order for payment can be served on the debtor.230 Besides 
litigation, courts may also host mediation [tiao jie] between parties.231 In the 
mediation, parties can make agreements in front of a judge.232 This agreement is the so 
called judicial mediation agreements.233  Including such agreements into the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement should be praised, because judicial mediation 
agreements can be enforced as judgments in Mainland China and there is no reason to 
distinguish them from judgments in interregional JRE. 234  
In Hong Kong, a judgment is used to decide the substance of a case. An order 
                                                        
228 Art. 2.b of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
229 Art. 140 of the Mainland CPL. 
230 Art. 191 of the Mainland CPL and art. 215 of the Opinions of the CPL. 
231 Chapter 8 of the Mainland CPL. 
232 Mainly see arts. 9 and 16 and Art. 85-91 of the Mainland CPL, and arts. 91-97 of the Opinions of the CPL.  
233 Id.  
234 When a settlement is reached through mediation, the people’s court will draw up a mediation agreement. This 
agreement is signed by the judge and the court clerk, sealed by the people’s court, and served on both parties. 
Once it is received by the two parties concerned, the mediation agreement will become legally effective. See 
Chapter 8 of the Mainland CPL. 
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generally addresses procedural issues. It could be a cost order, an interlocutory order 
(e.g. to serve something within a certain period of time or injunction), or an order to 
execute a judgment. An allocatur is an official court document that specifies how 
much a party has to pay pursuant to a cost order. It includes both lawyers’ fees and 
litigation costs.  
 
d. Levels of Courts 
 
Not every judgment rendered by courts in Hong Kong or Mainland China can 
benefit from this Arrangement.235 It covers (1) Hong Kong judgments rendered by the 
Court of Final Appeal, the Court of Appeal of the High Court, the Court of First 
Instance, or the District Court, and (2) Mainland judgments issued by intermediate or 
higher People’s Courts, as well as district people’s courts with jurisdiction over cases 
related to Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and foreign factors.236 In Mainland China, not 
every district court can hear cases related to Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and foreign 
factors.237 Therefore, the Arrangement excludes judgments issued by these district 
courts. 
This is also because Hong Kong worries that there are more Mainland courts 
than Hong Kong courts, therefore the number of Mainland judgments is far higher 
than that of Hong Kong judgments.238 The huge flow of requested judgments from 
Mainland China may overwhelm Hong Kong courts.239 Moreover, Hong Kong 
                                                        
235 Zhang, supra note_151_ at 10. 
236 Art. 2.a and Annex 2 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
237 See arts. 1 and 5 of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction 
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China and Hong Kong and Macao---with Special Reference to the Practices of Hong Kong], 113 FAXUE LUNTAN 
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concerns about Mainland judicial integrity, the competence of courts, and difficulty in 
executing judgments.240 Therefore, Hong Kong strongly prefers to restrict the levels of 
Mainland courts so as to reduce the number of requested judgments and ensure their 
quality.241 In the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, Mainland China yielded to 
Hong Kong and agreed that the Arrangement covered judgments given by designated 
Basic Level People's Courts as well as courts at the Intermediate People's Court level 
or above.242  
 
e. Choice of Court Agreements 
 
A severe limitation exists insofar as the Arrangement is confined to judgments 
rendered on the basis of a choice of court agreement. This does not mean that the 
parties to the judgment must be identical to those of the choice of court agreement: 
the laws of subrogation, alter ego, and so forth in the judgment-rendering region apply. 
This choice of court agreement must be in a written form, expressly designating a 
Mainland court or a Hong Kong court as the one having exclusive jurisdiction.243 
Additionally, unless otherwise provided in the contract, a choice of court clause in a 
contract exists independently and its validity will not be affected by the modification, 
discharge, termination or nullification of the contract. 
 
f. Interregional  
 
                                                        
240 For the issue of weak mutual trust between Mainland China and Hong Kong, see Section C of Chapter IV. 
241 Jiang, supra note_238_ at 72. 
242 Art. 2 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.   
243 For relevant Mainland law, see art. 3 of the Mainland CPL. For relevant Hong Kong law, see para 3 of 
Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Ord. No. 9 of 2008. For a discussion of the Mainland 
law, see also J Huang & DH Huanfang, Private International Law in Chinese Courts, 1 FRONT. LAW CHINA 14, 
14-33 (2006). For a discussion of Hong Kong law, see Johnston, supra note_47_ at 579-580.   
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The Arrangement does not restrict its coverage to judgments involving 
interregional elements.244 For example, it does not require that one party of the 
judgment should come from Mainland China and the other should from Hong Kong; 
it also does not require that the dispute, on which the judgment is based, should 
involve transactions that take place across regions. Therefore, suppose that two 
Mainland companies sign a sales contract and carry it out completely within Mainland 
China. This contract contains a choice-of-court clause favoring a Hong Kong court. 
Later, the court renders a judgment to resolve contractual disputes between the parties. 
Then, the winning party applies to enforce this judgment in Mainland China 
according to the Arrangement. Mainland courts may refuse JRE if parties choose 
Hong Kong courts only to avoid the application of Mainland mandatory laws. 
However, in all the other circumstances, Mainland courts should recognize and 
enforce such judgment. 
Furthermore, this Arrangement, in theory, can also be applied to a judgment that 
solves a dispute taking place entirely outside of Mainland China and Hong Kong and 
between two foreign parties, as long as they make a choice of court agreement 
favoring a court in Hong Kong or Mainland China.245 Mainland courts may not accept 
cases having no actual connections with Mainland China,246  but Hong Kong courts 
may accept cases that have no connections with Hong Kong.247 Therefore, this 
Arrangement may be used by strategic international litigators who have disputes with 
a party having properties in either Hong Kong or Mainland China. 
 
                                                        
244 See Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_ at 581.  
245 Id. at 582.   
246 Art. 242 of the Mainland CPL. 
247 Johnston, supra note_47_ at 119-120. 
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2. Requirements for JRE 
 
Judgments entitled to JRE under the Arrangement shall be enforceable and 
final.248 “Enforceable and final” is an autonomous terminology. It refers to any 
enforceable judgments rendered by qualified courts according to the above levels of 
courts clause. Because the Mainland procedure for trial supervision permits a court to 
reopen its own judgments, but under Hong Kong common law a judgment will never 
become final if a court retains power to do this.249 Therefore, the Arrangement states 
that when an application to enforce a Mainland judgment has been made in Hong 
Kong and the procedure for trial supervision calls for a retrial in Mainland China, the 
case shall be retried by a court at the next higher level of the judgment-rendering 
court.250  
The Arrangement does not have the "on the merits" requirement because it 
covers rulings and orders, which address procedural, rather than substantive, issues. 
 
3. Grounds for Refusing JRE  
 
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement provides seven mandatory grounds 
where JRE shall be denied. Although the Arrangement does not indicate whether the 
list of seven grounds is exhaustive,251 it should be read as an exhaustive list for the 
purpose of legal certainty and predictability. The following interpretations serve to 
clarify the implications of the seven grounds.  
                                                        
248 Art. 2.a of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. Another translation is "final judgment with enforceability". 
Wong, supra note_212_ at 376-77.  
249 For detailed discussion of the finality dispute between Mainland China and Hong Kong, see Part ii of Section B 
of Chapter IV. 
250 Art. 2 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. See Wong, supra note_212_ at 377. For detailed discussion of 
the Hong Kong common law requirements of finality, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter IV. 
251 The same problem exists in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.  
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a. Invalid Choice of Court Agreement 
 
The first ground is that “the choice of court agreement is invalid under the law 
of the place of the court chosen by the parties where the original trial was conducted, 
unless the chosen court has determined that the choice of court agreement is valid.”252 
A critical issue is which law should be applied to determine the validity of the 
agreement.253 The Arrangement provides two possibilities. The first is the law of the 
place of the chosen court.254 If a chosen court has decided that a choice of court 
agreement is valid under its law, its decision should have preclusive effect and bind 
any requested court. The reason is that the chosen court has the greatest expertise in 
its own law and its decision of the validity of the agreement under this law should be 
respected. However, a chosen court may issue a judgment without determining the 
validity of the choice of court agreement. For example, it may exert jurisdiction over 
the case on other jurisdictional grounds. In this scenario, the requested court must 
consider whether the agreement is valid under the law of the region where the chosen 
court is located. 
The second possibility the Arrangement provides is that although the choice of 
court agreement is invalid under the law of the region where the chosen court is 
situated, the chosen court applies another law to decide the validity of the agreement. 
Under this law, the choice of court agreement is valid. This law can be the law of the 
region where the agreement is made or any other law.255 For example, two parties 
                                                        
252 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
253 For a discussion of the importance of choice of law issues for a choice of court agreement in the US and the 
EU contexts, see Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law Consideration in the Validity & Enforcement of International 
Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 43, 43 (2004).  
254 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
255 See Yackee, supra note_253_ at 63 (providing a list of laws that may apply to determine the validity of a choice 
of court clause).  
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concluded a choice of court agreement in Hong Kong but they choose a court in 
Mainland China to resolve their disputes. The choice of court agreement may be valid 
under Hong Kong law but invalid under Mainland law.256 Suppose that the Mainland 
court determines the agreement is valid by invoking Hong Kong law, will this 
judgment be subject to the first ground for refusing JRE? The answer should be 
negative. Favor validitatis should be applied here: if the Hong Kong law should be 
the applicable law according to Mainland conflict of laws, the chosen court should 
uphold the validity of the choice of court agreement. This suggestion is based on the 
purpose of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, which is to enhance JRE between 
the two regions. Given this purpose, F1’s decision regarding the validity of a choice 
of court agreement should have preclusive effect in F2.  
 
b. Wholly Satisfied Judgment 
 
The second ground for refusal is that JRE will be denied if a judgment has been 
wholly satisfied.257 This is based on a common view that a creditor should not be 
doubly compensated.  
 
c. Exclusive Jurisdiction 
 
The third ground for refusal is the requested court has exclusive jurisdiction 
over the case according to its law.258 If a case involves real estate located in Hong 
Kong or an intellectual property right granted by Hong Kong, Hong Kong courts have 
                                                        
256 For example, unlike Hong Kong, in Mainland China parties can choose non-Mainland courts only when the 
dispute involves foreign or sister-region elements. See art. 242 of the Mainland CPL.  
257 If a judgment has been partially satisfied in one region, only the unsatisfied part of the judgment can be 
enforced in the other region. See art. 5 and art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. See also para 10 of 
Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance. 
258 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
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exclusive jurisdiction over the case.259 Comparatively, Mainland law grants its courts 
a much broader scope of exclusive jurisdiction. For example, a People’s Court should 
have exclusive jurisdiction over cases where a lawsuit brought on a dispute over real 
estate, harbour operations, succession provided that a decedent’s domicile or major 
estate is located in the Mainland, or cooperative exploration and development of 
natural resources in the Mainland.260 These grounds for exclusive jurisdiction are 
reasonable. However, Mainland law also requires that lawsuits brought on disputes 
arising from the performance of contracts for Chinese-foreign (including Mainland-
Hong Kong or Mainland-Macao) equity or contractual joint ventures in Mainland 
China shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of People’s Courts.261 This provision 
aims to provide a forum for Chinese parties who establish joint ventures with 
foreigners. It should not be applicable to parties from Hong Kong or Macao after 
these two regions have become parts of China. Excessive use of exclusive jurisdiction 
will severely undermine choice of court agreements and thus interregional 
transactions. It is a shortcoming of the Arrangement that this ground of exclusive 
jurisdiction is not excluded.  
Sometimes, in order to avoid the far-reaching exclusive jurisdiction of Mainland 
courts, parties tend to sue in Hong Kong courts. However, judgments rendered by 
Hong Kong courts that infringes Mainland exclusive jurisdiction cannot be 
recognized or enforced in Mainland China under the Arrangement. Therefore, special 
attention should be paid to exclusive jurisdiction of each region, when parties want a 
court to recognize or enforce a sister-region judgment. 
 
                                                        
259 For a detailed discussion of lex situs rule in Hong Kong, see Johnston, supra n , 297-318. 
260 Art. 34 and art. 246 of the Mainland CPL. Notably, if parties agree to arbitrate their dispute, art. 34 and art. 246 
do not apply according to Art. 305 of Opinions of Application of the CPL. 
261 Art. 246 of the Mainland CPL. A choice of court agreement is invalid if it is inconsistent with exclusive 
jurisdiction of Mainland courts, see Art. 305 of Opinions of the Mainland CPL.  
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d. Unfair Procedure 
 
The fourth ground for refusal concerns procedural fairness.262 It includes cases 
where the party who receives an unfavourable default judgment, had not been 
summoned according to the law of the judgment-rendering region, or the party had 
been summoned according to the law but had not been given the time to defend the 
proceedings as specified by the law.263 Compared with the relevant Hong Kong law,264 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement shows more respect to the law of the 
judgment-rendering region. Other than Hong Kong FJREO and common law, the 
Arrangement requires the requested court to apply the law of the judgment-rendering 
region to determine this issue. This new rule can spur reciprocity of co-operation and 
improve mutual trust between Mainland China and Hong Kong. Additionally, this 
"Arrangement permits the People's Court of the mainland to effect service by way of 
public notice [announcement] in accordance with the law and relevant provisions of 
mainland China and exempts such service practice from the grounds to deny 
recognition and enforcement of the judgments rendered on that basis."265  
Compared with relevant Hong Kong law, this provision is more comprehensive. 
Hong Kong FJREO only indicates one circumstance of procedural deficiency: a party 
has been summoned but not been given a reasonable time to defend a case. The 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement adds a second circumstance: a party has not been 
summoned in the original trial. This addition is necessary because procedural 
deficiencies are not limited to insufficient time to defend a case. 
                                                        
262 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
263 Id. 
264 Hong Kong law decides whether the judgment-rendering proceedings are fair according to Hong Kong views of 
substantial justice, see supra ft 96 and accompanying texts. 
265 Art. 9.4 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. Zhang, supra note___ at 18. Xianchu Zhang, Dui "Neidi 
Hong Kong Xianfu Renke he Zhixing Danshiren Xieyi Guanxia de Minshanshi Anjian Panjue de Anpai" de Chubu 
Pinjia [Preliminary Comments on the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutural Recognition and Enforcement Judgment 
Arrangement], 8 FAZHI LUNTAN [LEGAL SYSTEM FORUM] 51, 70 (2006). 
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Moreover, a practical issue related to this ground of refusal is the due process in 
the service of judicial documents. Interregional service between Mainland China and 
Hong Kong can be conducted either under regional law or according to interregional 
law. The latter refers to the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement.266 Two 
factors explain why the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement requires a requested court 
to examine due service according to the law of the judgment-rendering region, instead 
of the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement. First, the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Service Arrangement is restricted by its narrow scope.267 For example, it does not 
include statements of counter claim, defense, or orders of payment. Its 
implementation is also unsatisfactory.268 Second, the Service Arrangement states that 
it is only an optional channel for service.269 The two regions can still conduct service 
according to their regional laws. However, conducting service according to the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement is a good way to avoid the losing party 
denying JRE on grounds of undue service. Arguably, the two regions should expand 
the scope of the Service Arrangement and make it a priority channel for service.270 
Only when a judicial document failing to be served under the Service Arrangement, 
can it be served under regional law. 
Additionally, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement especially states that 
service by public announcement according to the law of the judgment-rendering 
                                                        
266 The Arrangement for Mutual Service of Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Proceedings between the 
Mainland and Hong Kong Courts (hereinafter “Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement”) was concluded in 
1998. For a brief comment of this Arrangement, see Weidong Zhu, The Relationships between China and Its 
Special Administrative Regions and Their Regulation, 4 J CAMBR. STUD. 111, 117 (2009). 
267 Renshan Liu, Recent Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters Between Mainland China and 
Taiwan, The Hong Kong S.A.R. and the Macao S.A.R., 11 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 250 
(2009). 
268 Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_. 
269 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement provides that the courts of the two sides may entrust 
each other to provide service of civil and commercial matters (emphasis added). See art. 6 of the Several 
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issues concerning the Service of Judicial Documents of Hong 
Kong- and Macao-related Civil and Commercial Cases, adopted at the 1463rd meeting of the Judicial Committee 
of the Supreme People’s Court on February 16, 2009, effective on March 16, 2009. Art. 84 of the Mainland CPL. 
Art. 88 of the Opinions of the Mainland CPL. 
270 Zhang, supra note_151_ at 19. 
141 
region does not violate the requirement of fair procedure under the Arrangement.271 
Thus, the requested court cannot use the public policy exception to reject JRE merely 
because the losing party was served by public announcement.272 This provision 
especially addressed Mainland interests, because public announcement is a way of 
service under its law in three strict conditions. First, the recipient does not domicile or 
reside in Mainland China or his or her whereabouts are unknown.273 Second, courts 
can use public announcement only when all other means of service fail.274 Third, the 
public announcement shall appear in publicly available press both in Mainland China 
and the region where the recipient is domiciled. This is to avoid cases like Zhu 
Yanmin v Wenwei Publishing Co where the public announcement was made in 
Mainland China but the defendant was domiciled in Hong Kong.275 As a conclusion, 
Mainland courts can use public announcement to serve a defendant only in very 
restrictive circumstances. Therefore, public announcement is not more far-reaching 
than most other cases of service as it appears. This may explain why Hong Kong 
accepts this way of service in the Arrangement. Moreover, Hong Kong's acceptance 
may be a trade-off for Mainland's agreement to restrict people's courts from reopening 
their own judgments. 
Improperly conducted public announcement will infringe a party’s right to due 
process. Advisably, Mainland courts should strictly observe the three conditions in 
practice. Moreover, Mainland law should be more precise about how to conduct 
                                                        
271 Art. 9.4 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
272 Zhang, supra note_151_ at 18. 
273 Art. 1 of the Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issues concerning the Service of Judicial 
Documents of Hong Kong- and Macao-related Civil and Commercial Cases. Art. 84 of the Mainland CPL. Art. 88 
of the Opinions of the Mainland CPL.   
274 Art. 9 of the Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issues concerning the Service of Judicial 
Documents of Hong Kong- and Macao-related Civil and Commercial Cases. 
275 Zhu Yanmin v Wenwei Publishing Co was reported in Tao Kaiyuan (ed), Guangdong Zhishi Chanquan Anli 
Jingxuan (Selected Cases of Intellectual Property Cases in Guangdong), Vol 2 (Beijing: Law Press China, 2004), 
pp 57-63. Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_ at 574. In this case, in mid-November 2000, the first-instance 
Mainland court served the complaint to the defendant who was domiciled in Hong Kong by express mail first and 
then a public announcement published in Mainland China. In December, the court conducted hearings and 
rendered a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant appealed. The appellate court noted that it was 
improper to publish a public notice in Mainland China as a way to serving a defendant domiciled in Hong Kong. 
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public announcement involving recipients domiciling in Hong Kong, such as how 
many times that the announcement should be made and which Hong Kong media 
should be chosen. The two regions should exchange information in this regard in the 
future negotiation.  
 
e. Fraud 
 
If a judgment was obtained by fraud, JRE will be denied under the Arrangement. 
276 Since the return of Hong Kong, the issue of finality has remained as the primary 
barrier to recognize or enforce a Mainland judgment in Hong Kong. Hong Kong 
courts rule that before settling the issue of finality it is unnecessary to decide whether 
Mainland judgments are tainted by fraud.277 So, thus far judgment creditors seldom 
invoke fraud to defend JRE of Mainland judgments in Hong Kong. However, after the 
conclusion of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, if a Mainland judgment is 
covered by the Arrangement, the issue of finality will not interfere with its recognition 
and enforcement in Hong Kong. In the Hong Kong business community, there are 
deep worries about exposing Hong Kong businessmen to judgments obtained through 
fraudulent means in Mainland China.278 Therefore, “fraud” will possibly become most 
frequently used ground to deny JRE under the Arrangement.  
Fraud is not an independent heading in Mainland JRE laws.279 Making fraud an 
                                                        
276 It should be noted that there is no fraud exception in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
277 Wuhan Zhong Shuo Hong Real Estate Company Limited, HCA 14325/1998. Yeung J indicated that “On the 
present pleadings, even if the issues relating to the conclusiveness and finality or otherwise of the judgment in 
question were to be decided in favour of the Plaintiff, the court still have to resolve the further issues of whether 
the judgment was obtained by fraud and whether the granting of the judgment was against natural justice and/or 
contrary to public policy.”  
278 Zhang and Smart, supra note_11_ at 578. But other scholarship points out that Mainland government pays more 
and more attention to rule of law, and encourages Hong Kong businessmen to change their negative stereotypes 
about Mainland legal system. See Phyllis K. Y. Kwong, Hong Kong Businessmen’s Development in the Mainland: 
Legal Conflicts Need to Be Dealt With, XIAO BAO CAI JING YUE KAN [HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL 
MONTHLY] 23, 23 (June 2005). 
279 See Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88. Kong & Hu, supra note 22 at 432. 
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independent ground for refusing JRE in the Arrangement shows Mainland deference 
to Hong Kong law. The Mainland Contract Law280 and the General Principle of Civil 
Law281 define “fraud,” but do these definitions apply to JRE? The answer is “no,” 
because these two laws and the JRE law are in different contexts. The former is 
substantive laws and the latter is conflict of laws. Moreover, their definitions of fraud 
do not cover fraudulent acts by the court so it is much narrower than the definition of 
fraud in Hong Kong law. Therefore, the understandings of fraud in Mainland China 
and Hong Kong282 may be different. 
Arguably, the two regions should design a mutually agreed autonomous 
definition of fraud; otherwise, the general mistrust in the Mainland judiciary and 
different definitions of fraud possibly will subject JRE to uncertainty. 
 
f. Res judicata 
 
The sixth ground for denying JRE is res judicata. JRE will be refused if a 
judgment on the same cause of action has been rendered and enforced in the requested 
region, or a court of this region has already recognized or enforced a judgment or an 
arbitration award on the same cause of action rendered by a court of a foreign country 
or an arbitration tribunal.283  
The res judicata rule under the Arrangement creates an exception to Article 306 
of the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL. According to this Article, in 
case that parallel litigations occur in Mainland China and Hong Kong, if the Hong 
Kong court renders a judgment earlier than the people’s court and the two judgments 
                                                        
280 Art. 68 of Opinions on Application of the General Principle of Civil Law of the PRC promulgated by the 
Supreme People's Court in 1988.  
281 Id, “fraudulent act” is defined as “a party purposely conveys any false information to the other party, or 
purposely disguises any fact so as to induce the other party into making any false declaration of will.”  
282 For Hong Kong understanding of fraud, see supra fn 115 and accompanying text. 
283 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
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are inconsistent, the people’s court shall refuse to recognize and enforce the Hong 
Kong judgment. The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement prevails in case that it 
conflicts with the Opinions.284 Thus in the above case, if the Hong Kong judgment is 
covered by the Arrangement, and if the Mainland judgment has not been executed 
before the application for recognition and enforcement of the Hong Kong judgment is 
submitted to a people’s court, the people’s court should recognize and enforce the 
Hong Kong judgment instead of the Mainland judgment. 
Notably, the res judicata rule in the Hong Kong implementing ordinance reads 
differently from the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. The difference concentrates 
on whether a requested court can deny JRE because a prior judgment has been 
rendered in the requested region. Under the Arrangement, a requested court can deny 
JRE because a prior judgment has been rendered and enforced in the requested region. 
However, the Hong Kong implementing ordinance states that a requested court can 
deny JRE because a prior judgment has been rendered in the requested region.285 
Arguably, the rule adopted by the Hong Kong implementing ordinance is more 
consistent with judicial practices in reality: a requested court generally will not 
recognize and enforce a sister-region judgment when it has rendered an inconsistent 
judgment between the same parties, although it has not enforced its own judgment.  
The res judicata rule in the Arrangement expands the res judicata rule under the 
Hong Kong FJREO.286 The requirement of “to the date of the judgment in the original 
court” under the Hong Kong FJREO will be waived in the case involving the 
recognition and enforcement of a Mainland judgment under the Arrangement. 
However, comparatively speaking the court that recognizes or enforces a judgment 
                                                        
284 See the third sentence of art. 306, which states that an international treaty ratified by Mainland China shall 
prevail if it conflicts with this Article.  
285 Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Ord. No. 9 of 2008, para 18 (1)(h) and (i) state that 
“a judgment on the same cause of action between the parties to the judgment has been given by a court in Hong 
Kong...” (emphasis added) 
286 For the res judicata rule in the Hong Kong FJREO, see supra Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
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has less discretion under the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement than under the Hong 
Kong Ordinance.287   
 
g. Public Policy Exception 
 
The last ground for refusal is the public policy exception.288 JRE shall be 
refused if the people’s court of Mainland China considers that the enforcement of a 
Hong Kong judgment is contrary to Mainland’s social and public interests, or if the 
court of Hong Kong considers that the enforcement of a Mainland judgment is 
contrary to Hong Kong public policies.289  
Regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, Article 266 of the 
Mainland CPL provides that if a foreign judgment is against sovereignty, security or 
social and public interests, it should not be recognised and enforced.290 Both 
Arrangements indicates that if a sister-region judgment is against Mainland social and 
public interests, JRE should be refused.291 Notably, this wording departs from Article 
266.292 The reason is that since the three regions are within one country, they should 
not have any disputes over sovereignty and security.293 Therefore, “sovereignty and 
security” are properly out.  
The “social and public interests” in the Mainland law is equivalent to the 
                                                        
287 If the requirements of the Hong Kong FJREO, § 6(1)(b) are satisfied, “the registration of the judgment…may be 
set aside.” However, the preamble of the Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement stipulates that “if a 
debtor under the original judgment adduces evidence to show any of the following situations, the court dealing 
with the application shall, upon having examined such evidence and found any of the said situations proved, refuse 
to recognize and enforce the judgment.” That is to say if requirements of Art 9.6 of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement are met, the registration of the judgment must be set aside.  
288 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
289 Id.  
290 Art. 266 of the Mainland CPL. For detailed discussion, see supra Part i of Section A of Chapter III. 
291 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and art. 10 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
292 But the wording of the Arrangement is consistent with art. 258 of the CPL, which provides that recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitration awards should be refused if this award is against social and public interests. 
293 The defense of Hong Kong and Macao is Mainland's responsibility. These two regions take charge of their own 
local security issues. For details, see Part ii of Section D of Chapter I.   
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“public policy” in Hong Kong law,294 although their contents may be different. In the 
JRE context, judgments involving punitive damages deserve special attention. 
Mainland courts award damages generally for compensatory purposes.295 Punitive 
damages are permitted in cases that business operators defraud consumers or 
knowingly manufacture or sell defective products to consumers.296 Some authorities 
suggest that Mainland judgments on punitive damages would possibly be refused in 
Hong Kong on the grounds of the public policy exception.297 
 
4. Assessment and Conclusion 
 
The most significant contribution of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is 
that: it solves the finality dispute between the two regions, it requires the requested 
court to determine the jurisdiction and procedure of a sister-region judgment 
according to the law of the judgment-rendering region, and it eliminates the 
requirement of reciprocity. However, the narrow scope is the serious shortcoming of 
the Arrangement. It improperly excludes non-commercial or non-contractual disputes 
and judgments without choice of court agreements. Judgments uncovered by the 
                                                        
294 Nansheng Sun, Lun Yiguo Lianzhi Xia Quji Shifa Zhong de Gonggong Zhixu Baoliu [An Analysis of Public 
Policy Exception in Interregional Conflict of Laws under the Policy of "One Country, Two Systems", 41 HUADONG 
ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF EAST CHINA POLITICAL AND LAW INSTITUTE] 73, 73 (2005). 
295 See art. 113 of the Mainland Contract Law.  
296 Art. 47 of the Mainland Tort Law (adopted at the 12th session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh 
National People’s Congress on Dec 26, 2009 and effective on July 1, 2010) (indicating that where a manufacturer 
or seller knowing any defect of a product continues to manufacture or sell the product and the defect causes a 
death or any serious damage to the health of another person, the victim shall be entitled to require the 
corresponding punitive compensation.) Art. 49 of Mainland Law on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 
(Adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on Oct. 31, 
1993 and effective on Jan. 1, 1994) (indicating that business operators engaged in fraudulent activities in supplying 
commodities or services shall, on the demand of the consumers, increase the compensations for victims’ losses; the 
increased amount of the compensations shall be two times the costs that the consumers paid for the commodities 
purchased or services received.)  
297 See Nanus Asia Company Incorporated v Standard Chartered Bank [1990] 1 HKLR 396, Huntington v. Attrill 
[1893] AC 150 (PC). See also Lewis v. Eliades, (2003) EWHC 368 (QB), (2003) 1 All ER (Comm) 850, on appeal 
(2003) EWCA Civ 1758, (2004) 1 All ER 1196. Recognition and enforcement of Mainland judgments of punitive 
damages may also be rejected by Hong Kong courts based on the Hong Kong Protection of Trading Interests 
Ordinance (Cap 417,  §7(3) and 8), which forbids multiple damages. 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/78F350B74A272F51482575
EF000AFEB7?OpenDocument&bt=0 (last accessed Feb 10, 2010). 
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Arrangement still cannot be recognized and enforced. Moreover, many aspects of the 
Arrangement need to be clarified. It is unclear how to define fraud and how to address 
procedure deficiencies uncovered by the fair procedure defense. As a conclusion, the 
Arrangement is a significant achievement but it cannot completely solve all the 
interregional JRE difficulties. 
 
ii. The Mainland-Macao Arrangement 
 
The Mainland-Macao Arrangement was concluded on February 28th, 2006 and 
became effective on April 1st in the same year.298 It regulates JRE in civil and 
commercial cases between Mainland China and Macao. This section will discuss the 
scope of the Arrangement (Part One), requirements for JRE (Part Two), and grounds 
for refusing JRE (Part Three). In each part, it will extensively compare the Mainland-
Macao Arrangement with the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, as well as regional 
laws and international JRE treaties ratified by Mainland China.  
 
1. Scope of the Arrangement 
a. Judgments in Civil and Commercial Cases 
 
This Arrangement has a very broad scope. It covers judgments rendered without 
a choice of court agreement. It includes not only the decisions of civil or commercial 
contractual disputes covered by the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, but also 
decisions rendered in civil labour disputes and civil compensations in criminal 
                                                        
298 For Mainland implementing legislation, see Interpretation No. 2 [2006] of the Supreme People’s Court Adopted 
at the 1378th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on February 13, 2006. For Macao 
implementing legislation, see The No. 12/2006 Announcement of the Executive Chief of Macao on March 14, 
2006. 
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proceedings.299 This broad scope is more JRE-friendly than international treaties that 
Mainland China concluded. For example, although those treaties generally apply to 
civil and commercial cases including civil compensations collateral to criminal 
proceedings,300 regarding labour disputes, some treaties explicitly include it301 but 
some are silent.302 Therefore, as a contrast, the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement is too narrow even compared with JRE treaties ratified by Mainland 
China. 
There are three reasons for why the negotiation of the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement went faster than that of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the 
scope of the former is broader than the latter.303 First, Mainland China and Macao 
both have strong desires to establish judicial assistance, but as a contrary, Hong Kong 
has serious concerns regarding Mainland judicial system so hesitates to conclude a 
broad scope Arrangement.304 Moreover, Macao and Mainland China both belong to 
the civil law family so share relatively similar views on many basic issues.305 
Additionally, Macao is much smaller than Hong Kong in geography and less 
significantly involved in interregional commerce than Hong Kong. Therefore, 
compared with Hong Kong, fewer cases require JRE in Macao.306 Consequently, 
Macao has fewer stakes in JRE issues so more easily to reach a broad scope JRE 
                                                        
299 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. This Arrangement does not apply to judgments obtained in 
administrative cases. 
300 Eg. art. 19 the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs on May 4, 1987 between 
Mainland China and France, supra note_23_. (hereinafter “Mainland-France Treaty”).  
301 Eg. art. 1 THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL AFFAIRS ON JUNE 2, 1993 BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA 
AND BULGARIA, http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/10/10-4.htm (last visited Feb 4, 2010). 
(hereinafter “Mainland-Bulgaria Treaty”). 
302 Eg. art. 19 of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs on May 4, 1987 between 
Mainland China and France, supra note_23_.  
303 Zhihong Yu, Di Er Ji Nei Di, Hong Kong, Macao Qu Ji Fa Lv Wen Ti Yan Tao Hui Zong Su [Report of The 
Second Conference Regarding Interregional Conflict of Laws among Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao], 
147 FA XU PIN LUN [LAW REVIEW] 156, 156 (2008). 
304 Id. at 157. Zhihong Yu, Nei Di Yu Macao, Hong Kong Xian Fu Ren Ke he Zhi Xing Min Shang Shi Pan Jue An 
Pai de Bi Jiao ji Ping Xi [Comparison and Analysis of Mainland China, Macao, and Hong Kong Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments], 5 TAI PING YAN XUE BAO [PACIFIC JOURNAL] 6, 
11 (2009).  
305 Yu, supra note 303 at 157. 
306 Yu, supra note 304 at 11. 
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arrangement with Mainland China. 
 
b. Monetary and Non-monetary Judgments 
 
Unlike the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement covers both monetary and non-monetary judgments.307 The Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement does not cover the recognition procedure.308 By contrast, the 
Mainland-Macao Arrangement provides recognition rules for sister-region non-
monetary judgments or monetary judgments that no enforcement is requested.309 After 
recognition, a sister-region judgment has the same legal effect as a judgment issued 
by the requested court and can be enforced according to the law of the requested 
region.310 Similarly, in Mainland law, many international JRE treaties that Mainland 
concluded also apply to the enforcement and recognition of monetary and non-
monetary judgments.311 Therefore, again, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is 
too narrow.  
 
c. Types of Judicial Awards 
 
The term, “judicial awards” in this Arrangement include judgments, rulings, 
decisions, mediation agreements and orders for payment in Mainland China; decrees, 
judgments, mediation agreements, decisions or instructions of judges in Macao.312 
                                                        
307 Art. 3 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
308 Yu, supra note_6_ at 10. 
309 Id. 
310 Art. 13 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
311 Art. 19 of the Mainland-France Treaty. See art. 17 of the Treaty of Judicial Assistance in Civil and Criminal 
Affairs between People’s Republic of China and Mongolia, art. 10 of the Treaty of Judicial Assistance in Civil and 
Commercial Affairs between People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Morocco, and art. 21 of the Treaty 
of Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs between People’s Republic of China and Romania.  
312 Art. 2 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
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When discussing the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, without special indication, the 
term, “judgment,” is used broadly as an equivalent to “judicial awards.” Compared 
with JRE treaties concluded between Mainland China and a foreign country, the 
definition of “judicial awards” in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement is more precise.  
This is because most of the JRE treaties Mainland China concluded use “judicial 
award [Cai jue]” without definition.313  
Moreover, unlike the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement covers Mainland decisions. Decisions are made for specific issues 
during a proceeding in order to remove the obstacles to the proceeding and ensure its 
normal progress. For example, courts issue decisions to determine a party’s recusal 
application against a judge or a court clerk,314 to impose fines and detentions as 
compulsory measures against obstruction of civil actions,315 to grant or decline 
extension of a time limit upon a party’s application,316 and to decide whether to 
postpone, reduce, or wave the court costs for a party.317   
The Mainland-Macao Arrangement also covers all the judicial awards that a 
Macao judge may render in a civil case. Macao judges can render decrees, judgments, 
mediation rulings, decisions, or instructions. A court will render a decree of facts after 
deciding the facts of a case.318 After deciding legal issues,319 the court will render a 
judgment in the first-instance trial320 and a decree if the trial is at the second 
instance.321 Both decrees and judgments are for the substance of a case. Judges can 
mediate a dispute before trial if both parties agree to.322 Instructions can be issued for 
                                                        
313 Eg. art. 19 of the Mainland-France Treaty.  
314 Art. 47 of the Mainland CPL. 
315 Id. art. 105. 
316 Id. art. 76. 
317 Id. art. 107. 
318 Art. 556 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
319 Id. arts. 560 and 561. 
320 Id. art. 562. 
321 Id. art. 631. 
322 Id. art. 428.  
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either procedure or substantive issues.323 For example, a judge can issue an instruction 
to dismiss a party’s motion for suspending a trial or to start to hear substantive 
issues.324 A judge also can use an instruction to accept an appeal325 and to impose a 
fine or a money guarantee.326 Decisions are made for procedural issues such as 
requiring appraisement of certain subject matter,327 deciding the number of 
witnesses,328 and appointing experts.329    
 
d. Levels of Courts  
 
Unlike the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement covers judgments rendered by all levels of courts in Mainland China 
and Macao. 
 
2. Requirements for JRE 
 
Different from the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement does not use the term “finality.” Instead, it indicates any effective 
judgment in the judgment-rendering court is entitled to JRE under the Arrangement.330 
In other words, JRE shall be refused, if the judgment has not become effective or is 
ruled not to come into force due to a retrial according to the law of the judgment-
rendering region.331 Using the term "effective" is also in line with some treaties 
                                                        
323 Id. art. 574.2. 
324 Id. art. 429. 
325 Id. art. 592. 
326 See id. art. 607. 
327 Id. arts. 499, 500, and 501. 
328 Id. art. 529. 
329 Id. art. 552. 
330 Id, art. 11.5. 
331 Id. 
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concluded between Mainland China and a foreign country.332 Some scholars point out 
that the use of "effective" instead of "final" or "definite" in the Arrangement is 
deliberate.333 The reason is that compared with "effective," "final" and "definite" are 
ambiguous.334 Any civil and commercial judgments are enforceable as long as it is 
legally effective.335 For example, before a retrial against a judgment is commenced 
under the Mainland procedure for trial supervision, this judgment is still legally 
effective and so should be recognized and enforced in the other region.336 Therefore, 
the term "effective" can facilitate Macao courts to recognize and enforce Mainland 
judgments.337  
Moreover, the significance of the Arrangement is that it requires the requested 
court to apply the law of the judgment-rendering region to define "effective." This 
approach, like the autonomous terminology of "final" adopted by the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement, can help avoid controversies regarding what judgments can 
benefit from the Arrangements.  
Like the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement does not have the "on the merits" requirement because it covers rulings, 
decisions, and judge's instructions on procedural issues.    
 
3. Grounds for Refusing JRE 
 
Under the Arrangement, a judgment debtor may raise any of the following four 
                                                        
332 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88. Kong & Hu, supra note 22 at 432. For examples, see art. 22.3 of the Treaty for 
Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra note_20_.; art. 21 
of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs on June 2, 1993 between Mainland China and Bulgaria, supra 
note_301_. (these treaties require that judgments shall be legally effective according to the law of the judgment-
rendering country). 
333 Yu, supra note_303_ at 158. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
337 Id. 
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grounds for refusing JRE: exclusive jurisdiction of the requested court, res judicata, 
unfair procedure, and the public policy exception.338 Arguably, this list should be 
treated exclusive. If a requested court has denied the JRE on the first, third, and fourth 
grounds, a judgment creditor cannot request JRE again, and instead she can re-litigate 
the substance of the case in the requested court as long as it has jurisdiction.339 
However, if a requested court accepts a JRE application or has recognized and 
enforced the judgment, it shall not accept a lawsuit on the substance of the same 
case.340 On the contrary, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement improperly remains 
silent regarding the question whether a judgment creditor can request JRE again after 
his or her application has been rejected or whether he or she can litigate the substance 
of the case in the requested court. 
 
a. Exclusive Jurisdiction 
 
Like the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the Macao Civil Procedure 
Code,341 the Mainland-Macao Arrangement indicates that if a judgment-rendering 
court infringes the exclusive jurisdiction of a requested court, JRE must be denied.342 
A requested court should be allowed to raise the defence of exclusive jurisdiction on 
its own motion.  
However, refusal of JRE of judgments rendered without jurisdiction is not 
regulated explicitly in the Arrangement. Unlike the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, 
JRE treaties that Mainland China concluded generally states that JRE must be denied 
when the judgment-rendering court is lack of jurisdiction according to relevant 
                                                        
338 Art. 11 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
339 Id. art. 17.  
340 Id. art. 16. 
341 See art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and art. 1200 (c) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
342 Id. art. 11 (1). 
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provisions of international treaties or the law of the requested court.343 The benefit of 
this treaty provision is its clarity because it includes both no jurisdiction and violating 
exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, the Arrangement should also explicitly regulate 
judgments rendered without jurisdiction.  
 
b. Res judicata 
 
The second ground for refusal is res judicata. The Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement provides two res judicata rules. First, JRE should be refused, if before 
brought in the judgment-rendering court; the same case had been brought in the 
requested court that had proper jurisdiction.344 Although this rule seems like a lis alibi 
pendens rule, essentially it functions as a res judicata rule. The reason is that, 
different from typical lis alibi pendens rules that regulate direct jurisdiction,345 this 
rule uses denying JRE to discourage parallel litigation. In other words, it does not 
impact on the regional direct jurisdiction rules. This approach corresponds to regional 
laws in Mainland China and Macao, and also reconciles the rapid Mainland civil 
procedure and its comparatively slow Macao counterpart. 
Both Mainland and Macao have long recognized that concluding an 
interregional or international arrangement on direct jurisdiction is hard,346 if not 
impossible, therefore, the field of JRE is a more feasible place to address multiple 
judgments from parallel litigations. For example, many bilateral JRE treaties that 
                                                        
343 Zhang, supra note 20_at 88. Qingjiang Kong & Minfei Hu, The Chinese Practice of Private International Law, 
3 MELB. J. INT’L L. 414, 432 (2002). For examples, see Art. 21.1 of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil 
Affairs on June 2, 1993 between Mainland China and Bulgaria, supra note_301_; art. 22.1 of the Treaty for 
Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs on May 4, 1987 between Mainland China and France, supra 
note_23_; Art. 21 of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China 
and Spain, supra note_22_ . 
344 Id, art. 11.2. 
345 Eg., arts. 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
346 Zhang, supra note_151_ at 33. 
155 
Mainland China ratified state that Mainland courts can deny JRE if the same case was 
in the middle of trial in a people's court347 and the trial had begun before the 
proceedings in the foreign court started.348 Macao Civil Procedure Code also states 
that if a non-local court took the case earlier than the Macau court on the same cause 
of action, it is possible that the judgment rendered by that court could be 
recognisable.349 Similarly, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement indicates that the 
judgment rendered in the action brought first prevails. 
 This rule also helps to reconcile the rapid Mainland civil procedure and its 
comparatively slow Macao counterpart. It can avoid an action, which is commenced 
late in time but leads to a judgment earlier, to create preclusive effects in the 
requested court. The Mainland civil procedure is well known for its rapidity:350 
generally a first-instance court will issue a judgment within six months after it accepts 
a case,351 and an appellate court will render a judgment within three months after the 
appeal commences.352 Under the first res judicata rule, suppose that after a Macao 
court seizes a case, one of the parties conducts a forum shopping and brings a suit on 
the same cause of action in Mainland China. Under this res judicata rule, although the 
Mainland court makes a judgment earlier than the Macao court, the Mainland 
                                                        
347 Eg., art. 17.4 of the Vietnam Treaty The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Cases on December 25, 
1999 between the PRC and Vietnam, supra note_20_.; art. 21.4 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, 
Business, and Criminal Cases on May 31, 1995 Between the PRC and Egypt, supra note_20_.; and arts. 9 and 10 
of the Mainland Regulation for Recognizing Taiwan Judgments. 
348 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88, eg., art. 25.1.5 of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Business, and Criminal 
Cases on January 11, 1996 between the PRC and Cyprus, supra note_21_; art. 21.5 of The Judicial Assistance 
Treaty in Civil Cases on January 1, 1995 between the PRC and Italy, supra note_20_; art. 22.6 of The Treaty for 
Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra note_20_.; art. 21.6 
of The Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Cases on April 12, 2005 between the PRC and the 
United Arab Emirates, supra note_21_. 
349 Id., Art. 1200 (d). The English translation is cited from E-mail from Guangjian Tu, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Macao Faculty of Law, to Jie Huang ( Jun 1, 2010, 11:50 PM CST) (on file with author). For details, 
see supra Part iii of Section A of Chapter III. 
350 Johnston supra n 47 at 123 (stating that “Mainland legal system, which is well known for its rapidity compared 
to that of Hong Kong and other common law systems.) 
351 Art. 135 of the Mainland CPL. 
352 Id, art. 159. Judgments of 96.06% cases accepted by peoples' courts in Mainland China are rendered within the 
time limits under art. 135 and art. 159 of the Mainland CPL in 2008. This number is 98.41% in 2009. See 2008 
Nian Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [2008 Supreme People's Court Working Report] and 2009 Nian 
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [2009 Supreme People's Court Working Report]available at 
http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_926191.htm (last accessed April 15, 2010). 
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judgment is unrecognisable and unenforceable in Macao. However, the downside of 
this res judicata rule is that parties have to race to the court. Notably, the res judicata 
rule in the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is different, which provides that JRE 
should be refused if a court of the region where JRE is sought has rendered a 
judgment on the same cause of action.353 Therefore, in the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement Mainland China compromises the rapidity of its civil procedure. It is 
Mainland deference to Macao and help foster mutual trust and understanding.  
The first res judicata rule also provides an exception to Article 306 of the 
Opinions on the Mainland CPL.354 In case of parallel litigation in Mainland China and 
Macao, if a judgment creditor applies to enforce the consequent Macao judgment in 
Mainland China, Mainland courts cannot refuse JRE either under Article 306 or the 
first res judicata rule in the Arrangement. One reason is that the Arrangement trumps 
the Article 306, so the latter is inapplicable. Second, the Mainland court accepted the 
action after the Macao judgment-rendering court had accepted the action so the first 
res judicata rule is also inapplicable. Therefore, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement 
creates an exception to Article 306 of the Opinions on the CPL. Compared with 
Article 306; the Arrangement adopts a more even-handed approach, so in this light it 
should be applauded. 
Nevertheless, this rule is problematic because it uses when the case is brought, 
rather than when a court is seized as the point in time relevant to determine which 
resulting judgment should be respected.355 The reason is that a court may refuse to 
seize a case after a party brings an action. It would be more precise to indicate that 
“JRE should be refused, if a court of the region where JRE is sought has jurisdiction 
over the same cause of action and had been seized the action before the judgment-
                                                        
353 Art. 9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. See supra n 53 and accompanying text. 
354 For discussion of art. 306 of the Opinions on the Mainland CPL, see fn 30 and accompanying text. 
355 Yu, supra note_303_ at 157-58. 
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rendering court seized the action.”356 
The second res judicata rule is that JRE will be refused if the requested court 
has already recognized or enforced a judgment or an arbitration award on the same 
cause of action rendered by a court of a foreign country or by an arbitration 
tribunal.357 This is the same as the res judicata rule adopted in the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement and the Macao Civil Procedure Code.358 
 
c. Unfair Procedure 
 
The third ground for refusal is unfair procedure in the judgment-rendering court. 
The Mainland-Macao Arrangement provides two instances: the judgment debtor has 
not been lawfully summoned, or the party with diminished capacity is not provided 
with any attorney or guardian.359 The laws of the judgment-rendering region shall be 
applied to determine the existence of unfair procedure. These two circumstances can 
be found in many JRE treaties concluded by Mainland China.360 The first 
circumstance also exists in the Macao Civil Procedure Code361 and the Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement.362 The second circumstance substantiates the relatively 
abstract principles of adversarial hearing and equality between parties under the 
Code.363 Therefore, the Arrangement makes the results of JRE more predictable so it 
is more JRE-friendly. In addition, the biggest difference between the two 
Arrangements is that the Mainland-Macao Arrangement allows any losing party to 
                                                        
356 See the res judicata rule in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement in Chapter VI. 
357 Art. 11.3 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
358 See supra Part iii of Section A and Part I of Section B of Chapter III. 
359 Id, art. 11.4. 
360 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 88. For examples, see art. 22.4 and 5 of the Treaty for Judicial Assistance in Civil 
Affairs on May 2, 1992 between Mainland China and Spain, supra note_20_.Kong and Hu, supra note_22_ at 432. 
361 Art. 1200(e) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
362 Art.9 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
363 Art. 1203(f) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. Yuan, supra note_154_ at 84.  
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raise the defence of unfair procedure but the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
restricts that to default losing parties. This is probably because the second 
circumstance listed by the Mainland-Macao Arrangement does not address default 
parties.  
Nevertheless, neither of the two Arrangements lists all instances of possible 
unfair procedure in the original trial.364 For example, supposing that a judge who 
should recuse himself according to the law of the region where the original trial was 
conducted did not do so, or that the hearing judge accepted bribery, do such 
procedural deficiencies fall under the heading of unfair procedure of the two 
Arrangements? Courts may interpret the aforementioned two instances of unfair 
procedure broadly so as to include other procedural deficiencies, or they may use the 
public policy exception to deny JRE.  
Due service is an important part of fair procedure. Mainland China and Macao 
has concluded a Mainland-Macao Service and Evidence Investigation Arrangement.365 
Like the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement, the Mainland-Macao Service 
and Evidence Investigation Arrangement is not compulsory. So parties in Mainland 
China and Macao can conduct service according to regional laws. Therefore, in order 
to decrease disputes about service in the JRE proceedings, advisably the two regions 
should make the service Arrangement a priority channel of service. Only when a 
document cannot be served under the Arrangement, the two regions can consider 
conduct service according to regional laws.  
 
d. Public Policy Exception 
 
                                                        
364 For the unfair procedure provision under the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, see supra fn 262 and 
accompanying texts. 
365 For details of this Arrangement, see Part i of Section D of Chapter I. 
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The fourth ground for refusing JRE is the public policy exception. The 
Arrangement provides that Mainland courts can deny JRE if it would be contrary to 
Mainland basic principles of the laws or social public interests, and that Macao courts 
can deny JRE if it would violate the basic principles of the laws or public order of 
Macao. For example, Macao is famous for its casino industry but casino is illegal in 
Mainland China. Suppose a party wins a judgment in Macao based on a gambling 
debt and seeks JRE in Mainland China, should JRE be denied according to the public 
policy exception clause under the Arrangement? The answer should be “yes,” because 
the policy of “One Country, Two Systems” allows each region to maintain its 
independent political, social, and economic systems, in Mainland China it is a deep-
rooted tradition that casinos are against public policy366 and recognizing and enforcing 
judgments involved gambling debts would violate the fundamental principle of justice 
and prevalent conception of good morals.367 However, generally, both regions should 
exercise the public policy exception with strict restraint. Otherwise, this ground will 
become a catch-all escape clause and hinder interregional JRE. Arguably, only when 
the effect of JRE will manifestly harm the public policy of the requested region, JRE 
can be denied.368  
Fraud is not an independent heading for refusing JRE in the Arrangement. The 
Arrangement does not state which grounds of refusal that a requested court should 
                                                        
366 Sun, supra note_296_ at 81-1. Editorials in Mainland state press, such as Beijing Youth Daily, described casino 
in Macao brought an “epidemic” in Mainland China because reckless gambling by Mainland government officials 
and entrepreneurs in Macao threat the (Mainland) national treasury and have “leaded to countless losses of family 
savings” and bankruptcy of many enterprises in Mainland China. Marina Osmond, China: Wave of Scandals 
Deflating Macau’s Gambling Boom, available at 
http://ins.onlinedemocracy.ca/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12421 (accessed on August 6, 2009). For 
Mainland’s measures to control the extension of gambling-related problems from Macao, see BBC News, Vaudine 
England, Bets are off for Macao Gambling Boom, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7807899.stm 
accessed on August 6, 2009, see also TIME, Michael Schuman, Fortunes Fade for Macau’s Casino Kings, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900109,00.html (accessed on August 6, 2009). 
367 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (New York 1918). If a fact pattern 
similar to the one in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 28 S.Ct. 641, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908), takes 
place between Mainland China and Macao, the judgment should not be recognised and enforced in Mainland 
China under the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.  
368 Yu, supra note_303_ at 158. 
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invoke to refuse recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by fraudulent 
jurisdiction. Both Mainland China and Macao may invoke the public policy exception 
to deny JRE when the judgment-rendering court’s jurisdiction is tainted by fraud. The 
law of the judgment-rendering region should be applied to determine whether fraud 
exists. If fraud has been extensively litigated and decided by the judgment-rendering 
court, it should not be a ground to deny JRE in the requested court. The proper 
remedy for the losing party is to appeal against or seek review of the judgment in the 
judgment-rendering region.    
The two circumstances where review on the merits is allowed under the Macao 
Civil Procedure Code do not exist in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. This is 
significant because allowing substantive review of a sister-region judgment would 
seriously hinder JRE. Although the Arrangement does not explicitly forbid review on 
the merits, it limits grounds for denying JRE to the above four scenarios. The only 
scenario that might involve review on the merits is the public policy exception. 
Macao should not review the merits of a sister-region judgment by invoking the 
public policy exception merely to protect its residents, because this would be a 
violation of the Arrangement. When critical new evidence appears, only when the 
judgment debtor cannot challenge the judgment in the judgment-rendering region, the 
Macao requested court may consider deny JRE by the public policy exception.   
 
4. Assessment and Conclusion 
 
Scopes are the major difference between the Mainland-Macao Arrangement and 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. The former is much broader than the latter in 
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terms of scope.369 This is because both Mainland China370 and Macao preferred to 
conclude a broad-scope JRE arrangement, but Hong Kong was reluctant.371 In the 
view of Mainland China, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement should cover all 
civil and commercial judgments.372 However, Hong Kong insisted on restricting the 
Arrangement to contractual disputes with choice of court agreements.373 Ultimately, 
Mainland China yielded to Hong Kong.374 The broad scope is an achievement of the 
Mainland-Macao Arrangement. However, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement is not 
perfect. For example, it does not clarify how a requested court should deal with 
judgments rendered by a court without jurisdiction and how to address procedure 
deficiencies uncovered by the unfair procedure clause.  
 
iii. JRE under the 1992 Protocol of the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao are parties to the 1992 Protocol of the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.375 This 
Convention applies to pollution damage caused on the territory of a member region 
and to preventive measures against such damage.376 It is not a specific arrangement so 
will be only briefly discussed here. Under this Convention, actions for compensations 
for pollution damage should be brought in the region where the damage occurred or 
                                                        
369 Zhang, supra note_20_ at 69. 
370 Id. at 56. 
371 For details, see Chapter II. See Yu, supra note_303_ at 156. See also Yu, supra note_304_ at 11. Zhang, supra 
note_265_ at 56. 
372 Yu, supra note_303_ at 157. Yu, supra note_304_ at 7. 
373 Yu, supra note 304 at 11. 
374 See art 1 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.   
375 The 1992 Protocol of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969), supra 
note_208_. For status of convention by countries, see 
http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248.  
376 Id, art. 1. 
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the preventive measure has been taken.377 Any consequent judgments shall be 
recognized in any contracting region except three circumstances.378 First, the 
judgment is not enforceable or subject to ordinary forms of review in the judgment-
rendering region.379 Second, the judgment was obtained by fraud. Third, the defendant 
was not given reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to present his or her case.380 No 
review on the merits is permitted.381 Therefore, interregional judgments covered by 
this Convention can be recognized and enforced in the three regions accordingly.  
 
C. The Next Stage: a Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
 
The two Arrangements are laudable because they remove many local-
protectionist regional JRE laws. For example, the grounds for refusing JRE decrease, 
the finality dispute is solved, and requested courts are required to apply the law of the 
judgment-rendering region to determine issues such as fair procedure. However, the 
two Arrangements fail to solve Chinese interregional JRE difficulties mainly for three 
reasons: differences between the two Arrangements, the JRE impasse between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong, and no JRE Arrangement between Hong Kong and 
Macao. First, the differences between Arrangements increase the complexity of 
interregional JRE. For example, requirements for JRE and grounds for refusing JRE 
are different under the two Arrangements. Therefore, a Mainland judgment creditor 
needs to follow different Arrangements to collect debts in Hong Kong and Macao. 
Second, because of the narrow scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, 
majority of judgments rendered in these two regions are practically unrecognisable 
                                                        
377 Id., at art. 9.1. 
378 Id., at art. 10.1 
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381 Id., at art. 10.2 
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and unenforceable in the other region. Third, no JRE Arrangement exists between 
Hong Kong and Macao, so JRE between them is completely governed by regional 
laws. The above comparison has shown that Hong Kong common law and Macao 
Civil Procedure Code are substantially distinct. Divergences between regional laws 
will make interregional JRE inefficient.   
Therefore, the two Arrangements are the only first steps beyond the 
unsatisfactory stage of pure regional laws, but more is needed: the next stage should 
be a Multilateral JRE Arrangement. It will harmonize the differences between the two 
existing Arrangements. For example, it will unify requirements for JRE and grounds 
for denying JRE. It will also clarify ambiguities in the two Arrangements. For 
instance, it will clarify how to define civil and commercial matters, fraud, and finality, 
as well as how to address procedure deficiencies unlisted in the heading of unfair 
procedure. Moreover, it will harmonize existing JRE rules. For example, the two 
existing Arrangements have different res judicata and unfair procedure rules. The 
above discussions have shown that both rules are problematic. The proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement will improve these rules. Furthermore, it will expand 
the two existing Arrangements. For example, it will break through the JRE impasse 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong and will fill the gap that currently no JRE 
arrangement exists between Hong Kong and Macao. It will also provide indirect 
jurisdiction rules to increase the certainty of JRE. As a conclusion, a Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement will be the future of Chinese interregional JRE law. 
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Chapter IV  
Three Serious Macro Challenges and Their Solutions 
 
Despite their shortcomings, the two bilateral Arrangements establish a foundation 
on which a Multilateral JRE Arrangement can be developed. This Multilateral 
Arrangement will ultimately realize free circulation of judgments among Mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and Macao, and may be extended to Taiwan. Before proposing selected rules 
for this Arrangement, issues on the macro level should be addressed first. 
Professors Depei Han and Jin Huang point out four distinctive challenges 
confronting Chinese interregional legal conflicts: the conflicts between socialist law and 
capitalist law, conflicts between civil law and common law, the conflicts among 
international treaties that regions ratified, and no court of final review that can hear cases 
from all the three regions.1 They believe these challenges make Chinese interregional 
legal conflicts much more difficult to solve than those in foreign countries, like the US.2 
Structurally, these challenges are on different levels. The first two are macro-level 
challenges for drafting a Multilateral JRE Arrangement; however, the latter two are 
difficulties arising from the implementation of the Arrangement. This Chapter attempts to 
address the first two challenges proposed by Han and Huang, as well as the challenge of 
weak mutual trust. The latter has been observed by many scholars3 but has never been 
                                                        
1 Depei Han & Jin Huang, Zhong Guo Qu Ji Fa Lv Chong Tu Wen Ti Yan Jiu [Analysis of Chinese Interregional 
Conflict of Laws], 1 ZHONG GUO SHE HUI KE XUE [CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCE] 117, 6-7 (1989). For details, see Chapter II. 
For other literatures, see He Qiong, Zhongguo Quji Lihun Falv Chongtu Xietiao Yinyou de Shijiao [A Necessary 
Perspective to Harmonize Legal Conflicts in Chinese Interregional Divorce], 6 YUNNAN XINZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO 
[YUNNAN ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTE JOURNAL] 148, 148 (2007). 
2 Han and Huang, supra note 1.  
3 Xianchu Zhang, A New Stage of Regional Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters: Implementation of 
the Mainland Judgments Ordinance and Certain Issues Beyond, 39 HONG KONG L. J. 3, 22 (2009). 
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satisfactorily addressed.4 The conflicts among international treaties that regions ratified 
and the issue of no court of final review will be analyzed in Chapter IV. 
This Chapter is divided into four sections. The First Section addresses the conflicts 
between socialist law and capitalist law. It argues that, in theory and in practice, conflicts 
between socialist law and capitalist law in civil and commercial cases have greatly 
decreased between Mainland China and its sister regions after they entered the WTO in 
late 2001. The Second Section points out that the dispute of finality illustrates the 
conflicts between civil law and common law in the field of JRE. It argues that 
autonomous terminologies are an effective solution for such conflicts. The Third Section 
analyzes the issue of weak mutual trust among Chinese regions and proposes two 
methods to improve interregional trust. The last section is a conclusion.  
 
A. Conflicts between Socialist Law and Capitalist Law  
 
In Chinese interregional legal conflicts, the first distinctive challenge identified by 
Professors Depei Han and Jin Huang is the conflicts between socialist law and capitalist 
law.5 The reason is that Mainland China is built upon socialism while Hong Kong and 
Macao are capitalist.6 They argue that these conflicts make Chinese interregional legal 
conflicts much more complex than those in foreign countries.7 However, notably, this 
argument was proposed in 1989. After more than twenty years, it has been widely 
recognized that Mainland China has made significant achievements in reforming its legal 
                                                        
4 For details, see infra the section of Enhancing Interregional Legal Education and Communication of Chapter IV.  
5 Han & Huang, supra note 1.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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system since it adopted the policy of reform and opening.8 Particularly, after Mainland 
China entered the WTO in 2001, in trade related areas the differences between Mainland 
socialist law and laws in capitalist WTO members, including Hong Kong and Macao, 
have sharply decreased. Therefore, the conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law 
in civil and commercial cases, if exist, have decreased significantly and should not 
hamper the establishment of a Multilateral JRE Arrangement. Socialist courts in 
Mainland China should recognize and enforce civil and commercial judgments from 
capitalist courts in Hong Kong and Macao, and vice versa. Mainland China can also learn 
from JRE laws in the capitalist US and EU to establish a Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
for civil and commercial judgments.  
Moreover, although in terms of contents, civil and commercial laws9 in Mainland 
China, Hong Kong, and Macao have converged significantly, their procedural laws and 
regulations for judges and lawyers are different. The court system also plays a role in the 
outcome of a commercial case. All these factors may negatively affect the quality of 
Mainland judgments. Therefore, public policy exception should be permitted in 
interregional JRE in China. This helps protect interests of Hong Kong and Macao so as to 
encourage them to participate in the Multilateral JRE Arrangement. 
This section is divided into two parts. The First Part discusses how Mainland China 
                                                        
8 Eg., Trade Policy Review: China 2010, Restructuring and Further Trade Liberalization are Keys to Sustaining Growth, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp330_e.htm, accessed on June 11, 2010 (acknowledging "that 
China has continued the gradual liberalization of its trade and investment regimes" since its accession); Zonglai Wang 
& Bin Hu, China's Reform and Opening-up and International Law, 9 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 
193 (2010).; Karen Halverson Cross, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B. C. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 347-48 (2004). DEBORAH Z. CASS, BRETT GERARD WILLIAMS & GEORGE ROBERT BARKER, 
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 83-174 (2003).; NICHOLAS R. LARDY, 
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 32-62 (2002). 
9 Civil and commercial law refers to laws that regulate relationship between private parties on equal status, such as 
between natural persons, between legal persons, and between natural and legal persons. Chapter Two of Min Fa Tong 
Ze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (hereinafter “Mainland Civil Law”) (Adopted at the Fourth Session of the 
Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 
April 12, 1986, and effective January 1, 1987), translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com accessed on November 3, 
2009 (P.R.C.). For detailed discussion of the meaning of "civil and commercial", see Section A of Chapter V.  
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modernizes its civil and commercial law in terms of legislation and adjudication. The 
Second Part explores issues brought by judgments against Mainland government in 
interregional JRE. 
 
i. Mainland China's Modernization of its Civil and Commercial Law 
1. Legislation 
 
Mainland China distinguishes its legal system from capitalist legal systems. For 
example, Banguo Wu, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Congress Standing 
Committee, predicts that by the end of 2010, Mainland China will establish a socialist 
legal system with Chinese characteristics.10 This system has four socialist features.11 
First, it should be constructed under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought, Den Xiaoping's Theory, "Three Representatives" Principles and Scientific 
Concept on Development.12 Second, it should reflect the collective interests of the 
country and the fundamental interests of the people.13 Third, it should detail, legalize, and 
systemize Chinese Communist Party's basic plans and policies at the primary stage of 
                                                        
10 This system was proposed by the Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter "CCP") at its 15th National Congress in 
1999. It is constituted by seven bodies of law, namely, the Constitution and relevant laws, civil and commercial law, 
administrative law, economic law, social law, criminal law, litigation and non-litigation procedural law. Jiang Zemin, 
Gaoju Deng Xiaoping Lilun Weida Qizhi, Ba Jianzhe You Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Shiye Quanmian Tuixiang 
Ershiyi Shiji—Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiwu Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de Baogao [Hold High the 
Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics into the 21s t Century—Report Delivered at the 15t h National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China] (September 12, 1997), Part VI. Banguo Wu, Que Bao Xin Cheng Zhong Guo Te Se She Hui Zhu Yi Fa 
Lv Ti Xi Mu Biao Ru Qi Shi Xian [Making Sure to Establish a Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characters], March 
9, 2010, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2010-03/09/content_1558122.htm (last accessed on April 10, 
2010). For comments, see JiangYu Wang, The Rule of Law in China: A Realistic View of the Jurisprudence, the Impact 
of the WTO, and the Prospects for Future Development,  SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 347, 347-48 (2004).  
11 Weicheng Wang, Guang Yu You Zhong Guo Te She She Hui Zu Yi Fa Lv Ti Xi De Ji Ge Wen Ti [Several Questions 
regarding the Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics], available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/15097/2369562.html (last visited April 10, 2010). Shaoming Zhang, Zhong Guo 
Te She She Hui Zhu Yi Fa Lv Ti Xi Yu Di Fang Li Fa [the Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics and 
Local Legislation], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/rdlt/fzjs/2010-04/02/content_1565997.htm (last 
visited April 10, 2010). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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socialism.14 Fourth, it should be featured with the opening policy and the modernization 
drive.15 However, this highly politicized language cannot hide the fact that Mainland civil 
and commercial law is in an on-going process of reform by embracing market-economy 
principles, such as party autonomy in contract, the equality between all the market 
players, the protection of private ownerships, and WTO standards.  
Between 1949 and 1978, Mainland China's commercial law was strongly 
influenced by the highly centralized planned economic system.16 But since Mainland 
China adopted the policy of reform and opening in 1978, its economic system has 
gradually departed from the centralized planned economic system17 and ultimately 
changed to socialist market economy.18 Meanwhile, it began modernizing its civil and 
commercial law "through engaging in market economy and globalization."19 This process 
has been regarded largely as "a process of westernizing legal regimes subject to China's 
own 'national circumstances.'"20 Since China's entry to the WTO in late 2001,21 this 
process has accelerated22 and transformed to modernizing Mainland civil and commercial 
                                                        
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Chen Su, The Establishment and Development of the Chinese Economic Legal System in the Past Sixty Years, 23 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 109, 110-15 (2009). Razeen Sappideen & Ling Ling He, Reflections on China's WTO Accession 
Commitments and Their Observance, 43 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 847, 849 (2009). Lardy, supra note_8_ at 29. 
17 For each economic reforming stage, see Su, supra note_16_ at 110-15. 
18 Jiakuai Gaige Kaifang he Xiandaihua Jianshe Bufa, Duoqu You Zhongguo Teshe Shehuizhuyi Shiye de Gengda 
Shengli [Jiang Zemin, Speech at the Fourteenth National People's Congress: Accelerate Opening Up Reform and the 
Pace of Modernization, Strive for the Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics] (1992), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697148.htm (last visited April. 18, 2010). Art. 7 of the 
Amendment to the Mainland Constitution 1993. For comments, see Chen Id. at 116.; Mo Zhang, From Public to 
Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 317, 321. B. Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
19 Wang, supra note_10 at 359. For the policy of reform and opening, see Resolution of the Third Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (1978).  
20 Id. at 359. 
21 Mainland China entered the WTO on December 11, 2001. Hong Kong and Macao entered the WTO on January 1, 
1995. http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited April 10, 2010). 
22 Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 97 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW 97, 97-98 (2005). 
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law according to the WTO standards.23 In order to fulfil its WTO obligations,24 Mainland 
China has undertaken "sweeping measures" to reform its commercial laws and judicial 
interpretations relating to commercial cases.25 Mainland China's fulfillment of its WTO 
commitments has received wide acknowledgement.26 In several aspects, Mainland China 
even has gone beyond its WTO promises.27 Up to today, Mainland commercial law, by 
and large, has embodied market economy-based principles such as non-discrimination, 
market access, fair competition, transparency, and national treatment.28 Mainland China 
has no reason to refuse recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments 
rendered in a capitalist region, if its civil and commercial law complies with the same 
market-economy principles as this capitalist region. This argument can find support from 
Mainland scholars' positive views towards the Hague Choice of Court Convention.29 
They surveyed Mainland law that involves key issues covered by the Convention and 
found no irresolvable conflicts between Mainland law and the Convention.30 They 
correctly argue that, although Mainland China may make some reservations, it should 
                                                        
23 Wang, supra note_10_ at 348. DEEPAK BHATTASALI, SHANTONG LI & WILL MARTIN, CHINA AND THE WTO: ACCESSION, 
POLICY REFORM, AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 19-99 (2004). 
24 For a summary of China's WTO obligations, see Cross, supra note_8_ at 327-31.Sappideen and He, supra note_16_ 
at 852. 
25 Wang, supra note 10 at 378. Su, supra note_19_ at 125. 
26 Cross, supra note_8_ at 357-58. Nicholas Calcina Howson, China and WTO Liberalization of the Securities Industry: 
Le Choc Des Mondes or L'Empire Immobile?, 3 ASIA POLICY 151, 151-185 (2007). Sappideen and He, supra note_19_ 
at 854-71. Clarke, supra note_25_ at 116. 
27 Nicholas Howson, supra note_29_ at 151-185. Clarke, supra note_25_ at 105. 
28 Wang, supra note_10_ at 374. Cao Jianming, WTO and the Rule of Law in China, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 379 
(2002). Cross, supra note_8_ at 345-46. Sappideen and He, supra note_19_ at 864. For harmonization between 
Mainland law and the WTO law, see Graham Mayeda, A Normative Perspective on Legal Harmonization: China's 
Accession to the WTO, 38 U.B.C. LAW REVIEW 83, 122 (2005). 
29 Eg., Guangjian Tu, Hague Choice of Court Convention - A Chinese Perspective,55 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 348 (2007). 
Guangqing Qu, Shuming Wang & Qia Sunling, Haiya "Xieyi Xuanzhe Fayuan Gongyue" Dui Zhongguo Guoji Shifa 
Lifa de Qishi [The Implications of Hague Choice of Court Convention to the Legislation of Chinese Private 
International Law], 95 HENAN SHENG ZHENGFA GUANLI GANBU XUYUAN XUEBAO [HENAN POLITICS AND LAW 
MANAGEMENT CADRE INSTITUTE JOURNAL], 28 (2006). Jiwen Wang, Woguo Pizhun Haiya "Xuanzhe Fayuan Xieyi 
Gongyue" de Biyaoxing Fenxi [The Necessity that China Ratifies the Hague Choice of Court Convention], 16 ANHUI 
DAXUE FALV PINGLUN [ANHUI UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 153, 164 (2009). 
30 Tu, supra note_29_ at 348. 
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ratify the Convention.31 Therefore, Mainland self-description of its legal system as 
socialist should not create insurmountable difficulties to establish a Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement with its capitalist sister regions.  
Among many examples of Mainland's capitalization of its civil and commercial 
law,32 this section concentrates on how Mainland reform important fields such as contract 
law, company law, and property law. The survey confirms that conflicts between 
socialism and capitalism have been minimized in the civil and commercial field.  
 
Contract Law: Endorsing Party Autonomy  
 
When the centralized planned economic system dominated Mainland China, 
contracts were "tools and mechanism for the implementation of state plans."33 In those 
years, no party autonomy existed34 and breaching a contract was regarded as "prejudicing 
the socialist planned economy."35 However, in 1999, Mainland China enacted the 
Uniform Contract Law.36 One of the guiding references for its drafters is "beneficial 
experience of foreign countries" and international legal documents.37 Its Article 4 
indicates the parties have the right to lawfully enter into a contract of their own free will, 
and no unit or individual may illegally interfere therewith.38 This law is praised to 
"comprehensively and accurately reflects the essential requirements of the market 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 Sappideen and He, supra note_16_ at 853-71. 
33 Su, supra note_16_ at 113. For the planned pricing system for foreign trade in China before 1978, see Lardy, supra 
note_8_ at 30. 
34 Su, supra note 16 at 113. 
35 Id. 
36 Mainland Contract Law (adopted at the 2nd Session of the Ninth NPC on March 15, 1999, effective on October 1, 
1999). This contract law combined and amended the previous three contract laws, namely the Economic Contract Law, 
the Foreign-Related Economic Contract Law, and the Technology Contract Law. For monograph of this contract law, 
see BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA (2002). 
37 Id. at 37-38. 
38 Id, at art. 4. 
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economy."39 Moreover, under the WTO, Mainland China has the obligation to ensure that 
the market, instead of the state, determines prices for goods and service:40 
 
China shall...allow prices for traded goods and services in every sector to be 
determined by market forces, and multi-tier pricing practices for such goods and 
services shall be eliminated. 
 
According to the 2010 WTO Trade Policy Review, in Mainland China only 3% of all 
prices in the economy are determined by governments at all level.41 Therefore, beyond 
law on the books, the Chinese government has been shifting its role in the economy. 
Endorsing party autonomy and ensuring the key function of markets in the economy, 
such as determining prices, make Mainland judgments in civil and commercial cases 
reflect private, instead of state, interests. Therefore, the conflicts between socialism and 
capitalism should not hamper their enforcement in other regions.  
 
Company Law: Equalizing Private and Public Market Players 
 
In socialism, state-owned parties prevail against private parties. The State can 
legitimately intervene in the production and management plans of an enterprise. The three 
old foreign-funded enterprise laws illustrate this. For example, the old Sino-Foreign 
Equity Joint Venture Law, Contractual Joint Venture Law, and Wholy Foreign Owned 
Enterprise Law require foreign-funded enterprises to give first priority to purchase raw 
                                                        
39 Su, supra note_16_ at 130. 
40 Art. 9.1 of the China's WTO Access Protocol. 
41 Trade Policy Review: China 2010, Restructuring and Further Trade Liberalization are Keys to Sustaining Growth, 
Trade Policies and Practices by Measure,  53, WT/TPR/S/230, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp330_e.htm. 
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materials in Mainland China.42 If they would like to purchase materials in the 
international market, they need to raise foreign exchange themselves.43 In other words, if 
they do not have deposits of foreign currencies, they cannot purchase foreign currencies 
from banks in China. These enterprises are also required to file their production and 
operating plans to the government agency in charge.44 Additionally, if a joint venture 
would like to buy insurance, the old laws required it to buy from Chinese insurance 
companies.45 These provisions result from the planned economy and authorize state to 
interfere in the management of an enterprise. In 2000 and 2001 Mainland China 
abolished all these provisions. Since then, foreign-funded enterprises enjoy treatments no 
less favorable than that accorded to Mainland individuals and enterprises in respect of the 
procurement of materials for production, foreign exchange control, and the conditions to 
sell their goods in the domestic market and for export.46 These enterprises also can freely 
decide their production and operating plans without reporting to the governments.  
Mainland China has also reduced significantly the measures to protect state-owned 
enterprises from market competition.47 For example, it bears the obligation under the 
WTO to "ensure that import purchasing procedures of state trading enterprises are fully 
                                                        
42 Art. 9.2 of the old Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, art. 19 of the old Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint 
Venture Law, art. 15 of the old Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law. 
43 Id. 
44 Art. 9.1 of the old Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, art. 56 of the old Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture 
Regulation, art. 11.1 of the old Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law, and art. 43 of the old Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprise Law Regulation.  
45 Art. 8.4 of the old Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law. 
46 Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (Adopted by the 2nd Session of the 5th National People's Congress on 
July 1, 1979 and revised on the Third Session of the 7th NPC on April 4, 1990, revised for the second time at the 4th 
Session of the 9th NPC and effective on March 15, 2001) 
Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law (Adopted at the 1st Session of the Seventh National People's Congress, 
and revised according to the Decision adopted at the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth NPC on 
October 31, 2000, and effective on October 31, 2000). Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law (Adopted at the 4th 
Meeting of the 6th NPC on April 12, 1986, amended at 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9th NPC and 
effective on October 31, 2000). For Mainland's obligation under China's WTO Accession Protocol, see art. 3 (non-
discrimination), art. 5 (right to trade) 
47 See Su, supra note_16_ at 127 (indicating "traditional state-owned enterprise development policy of simply 
increasing the number and scale of enterprises was replaced by policies aimed at improving the quality of corporate 
governance and management"). Clarke, supra note_22_ at 97. 
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transparent, and in compliance with the WTO Agreement, and shall refrain from taking 
any measure to influence or direct state trading enterprises as to the quantity, value, or 
country of origin of goods purchased or sold, except in accordance with the WTO 
Agreement."48 Governmental subsidies to the state-owned enterprises are subject to 
review in the WTO.49 The Mainland Enterprise Bankruptcy Law provides that all 
enterprises, including state-owned enterprises, should be treated equally in a market 
economy, and state-owned enterprises are subject to the same bankruptcy procedure as 
other enterprises.50 As a result, non-state owned enterprises are prospering. By the end of 
March 2009, there were 97,177,000 enterprises in Mainland China, of which 541,600 
were state-owned enterprises; approximately 6,642,700 were private enterprises and 
29,480,000 individual businesses.51  
In a highly centralized planned economy, the state is "an almighty regulator as well 
as a property owner."52 However, nowadays, the role of the Mainland government in 
economy has transformed "to a public goods provider and a regulator whose authority is 
both established and constrained by law."53 The enactment of the Administrative 
Licensing Law54 illustrates this. This law significantly reduced Mainland government's 
                                                        
48 Art. 6.1 of the China's WTO Accession Protocol. 
49 Id, art. 10.2. 
50 See the Mainland Enterprise Bankruptcy Code (Adopted at the 23rd meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on Aug. 27, 2006) translated in 
http://www.lawinfochina.com accessed on May 3, 2009 (P.R.C.). For comments, see Charles D Booth, The 2006 PRC 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally Over, 20 SINGAPORE ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 275, 280 (2008) 
(indicating the enactment of this law is "one part of the Chinese Government’s arsenal of  
reforms and remedies to address the historical overhang of problems from the centrally-planned market economy".) 
51 Xuelan Xu & Liping He, Tongji Fenxi Fabu: 2009 Nian Yijidu Quanguo Shichang Zhuti Fazhang Baogao [Statistical 
Analysis: Report on the Main Development of National Economic Organizations in the First Quarter of 2009] (May 11, 
2009), available at http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/tjzl/zhtj/bgt/200905/t20090511_47153.html (last visited April 12, 
2010). 
52 Wang, supra note_10_ at 339. 
53 Id. at 339. 
54 The Administrative Licensing Law (adopted at the 4th session of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC on August 
27, 2003, and effective on July 1, 2004). 
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excessive interference with economic matters.55 Moreover, the Law of State-Owned 
Assets of Enterprises56 published in 2008 prevent states from intervening the business 
activities of state-owned enterprises.57 This law significantly helps deepen China's 
economic reform and develop its market economy.58  
The most significant example of restricting state powers in economy is the 
Mainland Anti-Monopoly Law.59 It is illegal if administrative agents or organizations use 
their administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition.60 Although the law 
permits the state to protect state-owned enterprises concerning the lifeline of national 
economy and national security or those lawfully enjoying exclusive production and sales, 
those enterprises are forbidden to take advantage of their dominant position to harm the 
consumer interests.61 A commentator praises that62 
 
The enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law had far-reaching importance in 
preventing and restraining monopolistic behavior, protecting fair competition in 
the market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of 
consumers and the general public, and promoting the healthy development of the 
socialist market economy. 
 
The Anti-Monopoly Law further removes the state monopoly in Mainland economy and 
decreases the conflicts between socialism and capitalism in civil and commercial cases. 
                                                        
55 Wang, supra note_10_ at 339. 
56 The Law of the PRC on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises (adopted at the 5th session of the Standing Committee 
of the 11th NPC on October 28, 2008, and effective on May 1, 2009.) 
57 Id, at arts. 6, 14.2, 16 
58 Su, supra note_16_ at 127. Trade Policy Review: China 2010, Restructuring and Further Trade Liberalization are 
Keys to Sustaining Growth, Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, supra note_8_ at 25. (indicating "[w]ith the entry 
into force of its Anti-Monopoly Law on August 1, 2008, China has taken a major step to promote competition") 
59 Mainland Anti-Monopoly Law (adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth NPC on August 
30, 2007, effective on August 1, 2008). 
60 Id, at art. 8.  
61 Id, at art. 7.  
62 Su, supra note_16_ at 134. 
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Treating all market players equally63 in Mainland China encourage Mainland courts to 
refrain from invoking the public policy exception to deny the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments against Mainland governments. It helps pave the way for free 
circulation of civil and commercial judgments between Mainland China and its sister 
regions.  
 
Property Law: Protecting Private Ownership 
 
The concept of property is central to the conflicts between capitalism and 
socialism.64 In Chairman Mao's era, socialist ideology required the diminishment of 
private ownership,65 because it is synonymous with capitalism.66 But this is not the case 
in Mainland China any longer. On March 14, 2004, "citizen's lawful private property is 
inviolable" was added to the PRC Constitution.67 This amendment implies that a socialist 
market economy, all market players should operate on equal footing, enjoy the same 
rights, observe the same rules, and bear the same responsibilities.68 As its key 
implementing legislation, the Chinese Property Law was enacted and implemented in 
2007.69 It explicitly indicates that “[t]he state adopts a socialist market economy, and 
guarantees equal legal status and the right to develop to all market players,” and that 
“[s]tate, collective and private property rights, as well as the property rights of other 
                                                        
63 Id. at 129. 
64 Qinglan Long, Reinterpreting Chinese Property Law, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 55 (2009). 
65 Sappideen and He, supra note_16_ at 849. 
66 Zhang, supra note_18_ at 320. See Long, supra note_67_ at 55. 
67 PRC Constitution, Amendment Four, Amendment to Art. 13. National People's Congress on March 14, 2004.  
68 Su, supra note_16_ at 130. See Wang, supra note_10_ at 378.  
69 Property Law of the PRC (adopted at the 5th session of the Tenth NPC on Mar. 16, 2007, effective on Oct. 1, 2007). 
For comments of its contents, see Gebhard Marc Rehm & Hinrich Julius, The New Chinese Property Rights Law: An 
Evaluation from a Continental European Perspective, 22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 177, 234 (2009). 
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rights holders, are protected by law, which no unit or individual shall violate.”70 This 
"br[o]k[e] up the orthodox ideology in favor of public ownership against private 
ownership and individual liberty."71 And it symbolizes that Mainland China is moving 
from a communist economy to a fully free-market one.72 Moreover, its Article 67 states 
the rights of all (private, collective or state-owned) shareholders or investors in 
enterprises are equally determined based on investment contracts or the proportion of 
investment.73 This provision is significant because it "effectively puts private property on 
equal footing with state property in China, a socialist state which once regarded private 
property as harmful to the society."74 Judgments in civil and commercial cases concern 
only private rights.75 By protecting private ownership openly in its legislation, there is no 
reason for Mainland courts to reject the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
rendered in Hong Kong and Macao merely because they are capitalist, and vice versa.  
 
2. Adjudication 
 
Mainland dependent court system is alleged to be part of conflicts between 
socialism and capitalism. Many people worry about the quality of Mainland adjudication 
and allege it as a reason to reject the recognition and enforcement of Mainland 
                                                        
70 Arts. 3, 4, 64, and 66 of the Property Law. 
71 Zhang, supra note_18_ at 317. 
72 For comments from all over the world, eg., Peter Hartcher, Private property law puts China one step closer to free 
market, Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), March 21, 2007, First Edition, News and Features, pg. 2 (stating that 
"[t]he head of the World Bank's operations in China, David Dollar, has challenged a popular US political depiction of 
China as a centrally planned economy with poor property rights."); China's Capitalist Leap Forward, China Post, March 
25, 2007 (Indicating "Property Law is the last nail in the coffin of communism, which has been dying a slow death 
since Deng Xiaoping spearheaded his reform and opening-up program in the late 1970s."); Wang Tai Peng, Cover Story: 
Private Property's Long March, The Edge Singapore, April 23, 2007; and Andrew Busch, With its New Real Estate Law, 
China Shaking Off Shackles of Communism, the Globe and Mail (Canada), March 27, 2007, Report on Business 
Column, Economics, pg. B15. 
73 Art. 67 of the Mainland Property Law.  
74 Wang, supra note_10_ at 379. See Zhang, supra note_18_ at 362-63. 
75 For definition of "civil and commercial," see Part i of Section A of Chapter V.  
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judgments.76 However, these people wrongly invoke the socialism and capitalism 
difference because the facts show that Mainland courts generally adjudicate impartially in 
civil and commercial cases.  
In terms of civil and commercial law, fair administration of law is China's 
obligation under its WTO Accession Protocol: 77  
 
China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all 
its laws, regulations and other measures of the central government as well as local 
regulations, rules and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level...  
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights ("TRIPS") or the control of foreign exchange. (Emphasis added)  
 
In order to fulfil its WTO obligations, the Supreme People's Court has issued a 
"landmark" regulation to promote judicial independence in cases affecting international 
trade.78 This regulation grants Mainland courts to review administrative decisions relating 
to international trade and intellectual property.79 In reality, local governments, to a very 
large extent, also refrain from making policies inconsistent with China's WTO 
obligations.80 Importantly, empirical studies also demonstrate that local protectionism has 
significantly decreased in JRE in areas with diversified economy.81 
Moreover, courts in Hong Kong,82 Macao,83 and the US84 have upheld that 
                                                        
76 See Chapter II. 
77 World Trade Organization, Accession of the People Republic of China (hereinafter " China's WTO Accession 
Protocol"), WT/L/432, Document No. 01-5996 23 November 2001, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic 
of China, Part I:2(A):2. For explanation of "a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner", see Wang, supra note_10_ at 
383-84. For other comments, see Cross, supra note_8_ at 352. 
78 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Questions Concerning the Hearing and Handling of 
International Trade Administrative Cases (Judicial Interpretation [2002] No. 27, effective Oct. 1, 2002) For comments, 
see Cross Id. at 360. 
79 Art.1 of the Provisions. 
80 Clarke, supra note_22_ at 106-08. 
81 Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China, 57 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 419, 419-55 (2009). 
82 New Link Consultants Ltd v. Air China, [2004] H.K.C. 169 (C.F.I.), para 98. available at 
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/judgment.jsp. For detailed analysis of this case, see the section of Unfair 
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adjudication in Chinese courts are impartial and just. For example, in TSMC North 
America v. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation85 the appellate court 
held that significant evidence showing that the Beijing municipal court would provide 
due process to TSMC:86  
 
More generally, to the extent [TSMC] continue to dispute it; substantial evidence 
supports the trial court's finding that TSMC will receive due process in the PRC 
action. SMIC [Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation] 
submitted declarations from several experts in PRC law, who opined that the PRC 
Constitution and civil procedure laws provide for judicial independence, respect 
for the rule of law, equal treatment to litigants of all nationalities, the collection 
and presentation of evidence, direct and cross-examination of witnesses, and a 
right of appeal. Moreover, disproving the notion that foreign corporations like 
TSMC are treated unfairly in the PRC, SMIC submitted evidence demonstrating, 
based on PRC court records, that foreign corporations have won the majority of 
intellectual property cases filed in the Beijing court in recent years, particularly 
since the PRC gained membership into the World Trade Organization. Finding no 
compelling evidence to the contrary, the trial court stated it would “presume that 
the Beijing Municipal Court is capable of performing the traditional judicial 
function and that its results are not driven by political or economic interests.” In 
deference to the principles of judicial restraint and comity, and based upon the 
evidence and findings below, we too must presume the Beijing court will provide 
fair procedures to TSMC. 
 
Studies also show that Chinese courts are more and more willing to apply 
international commercial treaties and customs as well as foreign commercial law in 
adjudication.87 Courts show more respect to party autonomy in choice of law.88 They are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Procedure of Hong Kong Regional JRE Law in Chapter III. 
83 MIN YUAN, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN THE 
PRC, HONG KONG, MACAO AND TAIWAN 85 (2006) (indicating that Macao court has recognized that the civil procedure 
of Mainland China complies with the fair procedure requirement in the Macao JRE law). For detailed discussion, see 
Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
84 Zhang Guimei v. General Electric Co., 172 Cal. App. 4th 689, 696-701 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2009) (sending case to 
Mainland China under the doctrine of forum non conveniens). For other cases that find Mainland China as a convenient 
forum, ie Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp, 549 U.S. 422, 435 (2007), 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed 2d 15.; 
China Tire Holdings v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber (N.D.Ohio 2000) 91 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1110-1111; In re Compania 
Naviera Joanna S.A. (D.S.C. 2007) 531 F.Supp. 2d 680, 687. 
85 Corp., 161 Cal. App. 4th 581 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2008). 
86 Id, at 589, 594-95. 
87 Wang and Hu, supra note_8_ at 194. Jie Huang, Direct Application of International Commercial Law in Chinese 
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willing to apply international treaties not only in civil cases but also in administrative 
cases, and in cases without foreign factors.89 If Chinese law has more than one 
interpretation, courts will choose one that complies with international treaties that 
Mainland China ratified.90 Courts may also apply international law, when Chinese law 
does not stipulate how to deal with a certain issue but treaties ratified by Mainland China 
provide a provision for that.91 The reasons are that judges are more familiar with 
international commercial treaties and customs after Mainland China adopted the policies 
of reform and opening.92 Parties are more aware of their rights under international law so 
they more frequently bring their cases base on international commercial treaties and 
customs.93 Importantly, the Supreme People's Court is a strong supporter of the 
application of international commercial treaties and customs.94 In its 2008 Work Report, 
the Court explicitly indicated that Chinese courts should base decisions on treaties that 
China ratified or should refer to international customs to adjudicate commercial cases 
involving foreign factors in order to equally protect Chinese and foreign parties’ rights 
and interests.95 It is undeniable that Mainland courts still prefer to apply lex fori.96 But the 
phenomenon that courts prefer lex fori is not unique to China, and instead it also widely 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Courts: Intellectual Property, Trade, and International Transportation, 5 MANCHESTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 105, 105-42 (2008). 
88 Id. at 116. 
89 Id. at 121. For cases, see Chongqing Zhengtong Pharmaceutical Co. and the Trademark Review and Adjudication 
Board of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce v. Sichuan Huashu Veterinary Pharmaceutical Co. 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Jan. 6, 2008) (P.R.C.) (Sup. People’s Ct., Aug 31, 2007). 
90 Id.  
91 Huang, supra note_87_at 113. For cases, see Abdul Waheed v. China Eastern Airlines, the first-instance court is the 
People’s Court of Pudong New Area of Shanghai Municipality, and the judgment was rendered on Dec. 21, 2005. The 
second-instance court is Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate Court, and the judgment was rendered on Feb. 24, 2006. 
92 Id. at 141. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 141-42. 
95 See 2008 Nian Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [2008 Supreme People's Court Working Report], available 
at http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_926191.htm (last accessed April 15, 2010). 
96 Huang Jin & Du Huanfang, Private International Law in the Chinese Judicial Practice in 2001, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L 
L. 387, 410 (2003). 
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exists in the US.97 Judges' preference may come from their unfamiliarity with foreign or 
international law or parties fail to plead them.98 In other words, the conflicts between 
socialist and capitalist commercial law, if exist, are not the sole or manifest reason to 
discourage Mainland judges from applying international and foreign commercial law. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The line between civil and commercial laws adopted by socialist Mainland China 
and capitalist regions has become blurry.99 Their conflicts are rapidly decreasing.100 
Undeniably, China's judicial institutional reform101 and political democracy102 still lag 
behind.103 However, these factors mostly affect politically sensitive cases as opposed to 
civil and commercial cases. Rule of law104 in Mainland China is still being criticized,105 
but typically in non-commercial cases, such as arbitrary arrests, torture and mistreatment 
while in official custody, and the denial of basic procedural protections.106 Although they 
                                                        
97 Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law Consideration in the Validity & Enforcement of International Forum Selection 
Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 43, 47 (2004). 
98 Yackee, supra note 97  at 77-84. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 292 
(1990).  
99 Xiao Yongpin, The Conflict of Laws Between Mainland China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
the Choice of Coordination Models, 4  in YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 163, 189 (2003). (predicting that 
Mainland China and Hong Kong will probably become more similar in the fields of commercial laws after they revise 
their laws according to the requirements of WTO) 
100 Id. 
101 Wang, supra note_10_ at 385. Cross, supra note_8_ at 358-59. 
102 See Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law 
in China, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 474-75 (2002). 
103 Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for Law and 
Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 551, 552 (2009). Clarke, supra note_22_ at 111. 
104 For the definition of rule of law, see Wang, supra note_10 at 349.; John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANNU. 
REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 99, 105-07 (2007). For history of rule of law in China, see Jonathan K. Ocko & David Gilmartin, 
State, Sovereignty, and the People: A Comparison of the ?Rule of Law? in China and India, 68 THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN 
STUDIES 55-100 (2009). 
105 Eg., Randall P. Peerenboom, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China,  in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF 
LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 113, 116 
(Randall Peerenboom ed. 2004).(criticizing law-making process is lack of transparency and judges are of poor quality) 
106 William P. Alford, STATEMENT WILLIAM P. ALFORD HENRY L. STIMSON PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF EAST ASIAN 
LEGAL STUDIES HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (2002), http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/020702/alford.php. (Last visited 
April 10, 2010). 
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might, indirectly, negatively influence the full function of Mainland civil and commercial 
law,107 they should not constitute a convincing argument that socialist Mainland China 
should not recognize and enforce judgments from capitalist Hong Kong and Macao (or 
other capitalist jurisdictions), and vice versa. These factors are also not an excuse to deny 
the merits that Mainland China can learn from the US and EU JRE law in civil and 
commercial cases. It is unconvincing that, the US and the EU cannot provide any 
valuable lessons for China to improve its JRE system, simply because their laws are 
capitalist.108 JRE rules, such as finality and validity of a judgment, res judicata, and 
incompetent jurisdictions of judgment-rendering courts, have no socialist or capitalist 
color. Fraud and unfair procedures at the judgment-rendering proceedings may result 
from the incompetent Mainland court system. However, they are not necessarily the 
features of socialist law.  
 
ii. Judgments Relating to Mainland Governments  
 
In terms of the conflicts between socialism and capitalism, when a party to a 
judgment is a Mainland government agency, two questions are especially critical. First, 
should the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement cover such judgments; and would 
Mainland courts use the public policy exception to deny JRE?  
 
1. Mainland Public Institutions 
 
                                                        
107 Matthew S. Erie, China's (Post-)Socialist Property Rights Regime: Assessing the Impact of the Property Law on 
Illegal Land Takings, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 919, 920 (2007).  
108 For Chinese literature on learning from capitalist countries, such as the US and the EU, see Section C of Chapter II. 
Qiong, supra note_1_ at 149 (referring to US law for solving Chinese interregional divorce disputes). 
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The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement does not cover judgments in 
administrative cases.109 In other words, it only covers civil and commercial judgments.110 
If a judgment involves a government agency and the dispute arises from the public power 
exercised by this agency, this judgment is administrative.111 However, public institutions 
[Shiye Danwei] may cause confusion in the JRE scenario. Public institutions are legal 
persons, owned by Mainland governments, to promote education, science and technology, 
culture and hygiene.112 They are different from state-owned enterprises because of their 
non-profit nature. Typical examples include China Securities Regulatory Commission,113 
schools,114 and hospitals.115 Regarding JRE, whether a judgment is civil and commercial 
in cases of a medical malpractice judgment involving a Mainland public hospital or a 
judgment related to a Mainland public school because one of its teachers’ negligence 
causes injury to a student. These cases should be civil and commercial because, when a 
doctor treats a patient or a professor teaches a student, the doctor and the professor do not 
                                                        
109 For distinctions between "administrative" and "civil and commercial," see Autonomous Terminology of "Civil and 
Commercial" of Section A of Chapter V. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Arts. 2 and 3 of Shi Ye Dan Wei Deng Ji Guang Li Zan Xing Tiao Li [Interim Regulation on the Registration of 
Public Institutions] (Order No. 252 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued on October 25, 1998, 
amended according to the Decision of the State Council about Amending the Interim Regulation on the Registration of 
Public Institutions on June 27, 2004) translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com accessed on July 5, 2008 (P.R.C.). Art. 
4 of Shi Ye Dan Wei Deng Ji Guang Li Zan Xing Tiao Li Si Shi Xi Ze [Detailed Implementation Guidelines of the 
Interim Regulation on the Registration of Public Institutions] (published on April 15, 2005 by the National Registration 
and Management Bureau for the Public Institutions, and effective on January 1, 2006) available at 
http://sy.china.cn/cgi-
bin/noticeboards/get_notice.cgi?NOTICE_ID=21248&TEMPLATE=BAB_Content&TEMPLATE_UID=368632 
accessed on April 25, 2009. 
113 Guo Wu Yuan Ban Gong Ting Guan Yu Yin Fa Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Jian Du Guan Li Wei Yuan Hui Zhi Neng 
Pei Zhi, Nei She Ji Gou He Ren Yuan Bian Zhi Gui Ding De Tong Zhi [Notice of the State Council about the Function, 
Organization, and Staff of China Securities Regulatory Commission] (published on September 30, 1998 by the State 
Council) a Chinese version is available at http://www.fc110.gov.cn/zcfg/bwfg/200909/30414.html accessed on April 1, 
2010. 
114 Wei Hu, Guangyu Minban Jiaoyu Fazhan yu Guifang Shikao [Analysis of the Development and Regulation of Non-
state Owned Schools], 3 JIAOYU FAZHANG YANJIU [STUDY OF EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT] 8, 8-15 (2000); Yongjiu Kan, 
Gongli Xuexiao de Gonggongxing Wenti [The Publicity Problem of the Public School], 26 JIAOYU LILUN YU SHIJIAN 
[THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION] 17, 17-20 (2006). 
115 In Mainland China, 90% hospitals are public hospitals and only 10% are privately-owned. Licai Lin & Mao Licun, 
Goujian Hexia Yihuan Guanxi Zi Wo Jian [Establish a Harmonized Relationship between Patients and Hospitals], 23 
CAIZHI [INTELLIGENCE] 296, 296 (2009). 
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represent the governments to exercise a public power.116 Although public hospitals and 
schools receive funding from the governments, and eventually the funding may be used 
to pay for the judgments against them,117 this factor alone cannot make the judgments 
administrative. Therefore, these judgments should be covered by the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement. 
The ECJ faced a similar situation in Sonntag v. Waidmann. In this case, a German 
pupil was injured in Italy because of a teacher’s negligence during a school trip.118 The 
pupil’s family applied to a German court for the enforcement of an Italian judgment 
against the teacher.119 The ECJ ruled that this case was civil and commercial because 
although a teacher working in a public school has the status of civil servant, he does not 
exercise public power because the teacher’s “conduct does not entail the exercise of any 
powers going beyond those existing under the rules applicable to relations between 
private individuals” and a teacher in a public school or a private school assumes the same 
function to students.120 The ECJ also held that the fact that the teacher’s liability was 
covered by a social insurance scheme governed by public law was irrelevant “since the 
basis of the civil claim, that is to say liability in tort or delict, is not affected by the 
existence of that public insurance.”121  
This ECJ case can provide two useful insights for China. First, the key factor to 
determine whether a judgment should be covered by the proposed Arrangement is 
                                                        
116 Tian Fu, Woguo Gonglin Zhongxiaoxue Falv Diwei de Fali Fenxi [A Jurisprudential Analysis of Public Schools' 
Legal Status], 156 THE MODERN EDUCATION JOURNAL 26, 29-30 (2009). 
117 See Xiaodong Qing, Gaoxiao Zaiwu yu Zhengfu Zheren [Debts of Higher Education Institutes and Governmental 
Liabilities], 8 JINKA GONGCHENG JINJI YU FA [GOLDEN CARD PROJECT: ECONOMY AND LAW] 162, 162 (2009) (arguing 
that governments should pay for the debts of higher education institutes). 
118 Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v. Hans Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963, para. 3.  
119 In Germany, the pupil’s family tried to enforce the civil-law provisions of a judgment given by an Italian criminal 
court. Id, para. 2 and 4.  
120 Id, paras. 21, 22, 24, and 25. 
121 Id, paras. 27 and 28. 
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whether a party to the judgment was exercising public power when disputes occurred. 
The relationship between doctors and patients, or between professors and students, in 
public hospitals or schools is the same as that in private hospitals or schools. Therefore, 
there is no reason to characterize a medical malpractice judgment involving a public 
hospital as administrative and a judgment involving a private hospital as civil and 
commercial. Second, the question whether it is ultimately the government that pays for 
the judgment should be irrelevant to the JRE decision. Additionally, in Mainland China, 
doctors working in public hospitals or professors in public schools are not civil servants; 
this reinforces the conclusion that a medical malpractice judgment involving a Mainland 
public hospital or a judgment relating to a Mainland public school because one of its 
teachers’ negligence causes injury to a student is not civil and commercial.  
 
2. Interregional Public Policy Exception 
 
Importantly, a requested court in Mainland China should not deny JRE merely 
because the judgment is against a Mainland government agency or a public institution. 
The reason is that the conflicts between socialism and capitalism in civil and commercial 
law have been substantially eliminated. In a market economy, a government agency 
engaging in commerce should be treated equally as a private party.122 Although some 
Mainland lower courts still abuse the public policy exception to protect government 
agencies in commercial transactions, the Supreme People's Court would overturn lower 
courts' decisions and support a restrictive interpretation of public policy exception. Two 
cases illustrate this. 
                                                        
122 See Autonomous Terminology of "Civil and Commercial" of Section A of Chapter V.  
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In 1988, two Mainland companies and a Hong Kong company contracted to jointly 
form a joint venture in Mainland China.123 The joint venture would manufacture clothes 
for exportation.124 Under the contract, one of the Mainland companies should supply the 
joint venture with export quotas.125 After two years, this Mainland company suddenly 
refused to carry out its contractual obligation because a new government regulation 
forbad joint ventures to obtain export quotas.126 Parties went for arbitration to settle 
disputes.127 The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(hereinafter "CIETAC") rendered an award requiring the Mainland company to 
compensate other parties for breach of contract.128 Because the Mainland company failed 
to execute the award, other parties applied to the Zhengzhou Intermediate People's Court 
for enforcement.129 The Court invoked the public policy exception to refuse enforcement, 
because "if the arbitration award were enforced, the economic and social public interest 
of the State would be manifestly violated and the foreign trade order of the state would be 
undermined."130 This reasoning reflected the socialist view that private contracts did not 
exist in planned economy and all business transactions should be regulated by the state 
economic plan. The Supreme People's Court set aside the Intermediate Court's decision 
and stated that “the disallowing of the arbitral tribunal by the Zhengzhou Intermediate 
People's Court, on the ground that the economic and social public interest of the state 
would be manifestly violated and the foreign trade order of the state would be 
                                                        
123 Yongping Xiao & Zhengxin Huo, Order Public in China's Private International Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 668 
(2005). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 669. 
130 Id. Cheng Dejun, WANG SHENGCHANG & KANG MING, GUOJI GUANLI HE SHEWAI ZHONGCAI SHIWU [INTERNATIONAL 
PRACTICE AND ARBITRATION INVOLVING FOREIGN ELEMENTS] 258-259 (1993). 
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undermined, was incorrect."131 The Supreme People's Court's holding unambiguously 
demonstrates the view that the state should not intervene into private business 
transactions.  
The second case is between a Hong Kong company and a Mainland government 
agency.132 The government agency invested 105 million RMB to buy equipment from the 
Hong Kong company, but this equipment did not work as designed. The China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Center ruled that the malfunction of the 
equipment was not the fault of the Hong Kong company. So it rendered an award against 
the government agency. The High Court of Anhui Province refused to enforce this award 
on the grounds of violating social and public interests,133 because the government agency 
had invested millions in this equipment but gained no profit. This reasoning smacks very 
much of the socialist idea that the interests of government should prevail against private 
parties even in commercial transactions. 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Anhui High Court's decision. It ruled that 
it was improper to refuse the enforcement of this award on the grounds of a social and 
public interest violation, because social and public interests refer to the fundamental 
national legal order. In this case, the parties concluded and performed a contract, which 
did not violate social and public interests. In addition, the fact that the expensive 
equipment was left unused did not result from the enforcement of the arbitration award. 
Moreover, the Court ruled that the failure of a governmental project has nothing to do 
                                                        
131 Id. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan zhi He'an Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan de Pifu [Supreme People's Court Answer to 
He'nan Higher People's Court] dated Nov. 6, 1992. 
132 The Supreme People’s Court Reply to Whether to Enforce an Arbitration award Made by China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). (Effective January 23, 2006) ([2005] Min Si Ta Zi Di 45 
Hao.). A Chinese version can be found at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/zcfg/zh/sfjs/P020061008639050623050.pdf 
accessed on April 2, 2010. 
133 Social and public interests violation is included into public policy exception in Mainland China. See Part i of Section 
A of Chapter III. 
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with violations of social and public interests. Thus, this award should be enforced. The 
Supreme People's Court's decision demonstrates that in commercial transactions, 
governmental agencies are regarded as equal to private parties. In other words, the 
conflicts between socialism and capitalism do not play out in commercial settings. This is 
why a JRE is possible. Although the Supreme People's Court's decision does not 
announce that Mainland China will in the future be generally open to recognize 
judgments against its government agencies. But in this decision the Supreme People’s 
Court does not restrict its interpretation of social and public interests only to recognition 
and enforcement of arbitration awards. Mainland lower courts should follow this decision 
in interregional JRE. This will help soothe the concern that Mainland courts may abuse 
the public policy exception in order to protect government agencies in civil and 
commercial cases.  
 
B. Conflicts between Civil Law and Common Law 
 
Mainland China and Macao are influenced by the civil-law tradition,134 whereas 
Hong Kong is governed by the common-law tradition.135 Many scholars argue that the 
differences between the civil-law and common-law traditions complicate interregional 
legal conflicts in China but they do not specify what problems may be created by such 
                                                        
134 Zhenmin Wang, The Roman Law Tradition and Its Future Development in China, 1 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA 
72, 72-78 (2006) 
135 Hong Kong retains the common law tradition even after it was reunited with Mainland China. Art. 8 of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law provides that "the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, common law, rules of equity, 
ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and 
subject to any amendment by the legislature of Hong Kong." Its art. 84 further states that Hong Kong courts may refer 
to precedents of other common-law jurisdictions when adjudicating cases. But those precedents will only have 
reference value and no binding force over Hong Kong courts. For comments, see Albert H Y Chen, The question of 
conflict of laws between mainland China and Hong Kong, in H Y Chen & M M Chan, 48 fn 43 HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
RULE OF LAW [RENQUAN YU FAZHI] (Hong Kong, Wide Angle Press, 1987). See also Philip Smart, Enforcing 
Foreign Judgments after 1997, 4 HONG KONG LAWYER 144 (2002).   
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conflicts.136 Conflicts between civil law and common law bring thorny problems in 
jurisdiction.137 For example, under the Brussels Convention or Brussels I Regulation, 
most case law that has brought concern between civil law and common law is about 
jurisdiction.138 Similarly, when a world-wide jurisdiction and JRE convention was 
negotiated at The Hague in 1990s, jurisdiction raised most serious controversies at the 
Hague Conference.139 Conflicts between civil law and common law also create disputes 
in cases addressing forum shopping, such as anti-suit injunctions and lis alibi pendens.140 
Moreover, many literatures also discuss conflicts between civil law and common law in 
procedures, such as inquisitorial and adversarial systems141 as well as the way of 
executing judgments.142 Although harmonizing regional procedural laws is a laudable 
goal; however, considering the current stage of Chinese interregional integration, it would 
be far too early to discuss this issue. Therefore, in the interregional JRE proceedings in 
China, lex fori should be applied to the procedural issues. Notably, very few literature 
                                                        
136 Eg., Han and Huang, supra note_1_at 122. 
137 Jonathan Harris, Understanding the English Response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law, 4 
JOURNAL OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 347, 352 (2008); Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Civil Law, 
Common Law and Market Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611, 620-23 
(2003). 
138 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, Case C-116/02, [2003] ECR I-14693, Owusu v Jackson and. Others Case C-
128/01 [2005] ECR 1-1383, Turner v. Grovit, Case C-159/02 [2005] ECR I-3565. For comments of these cases, see 
Harris, supra note_137_ at 368-69. A Dickinson, A Charter for Tactical Litigation in Europe, Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 273 (2004); A Briggs, Anti-suit Injunctions and Utopian Ideals, 120 LAW QUARTERLY 
REVIEW 529 (2004). 
139 See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague 
Conference, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 271, 274-76 (1994); Ronald Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and A 
Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT. L. REV 661, 661-706 (1999); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdiction Salvation and 
the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 89, 85-133 (1999); Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1003-69 (2006); and Ralf Michaels, Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied 
in Judgment Conventions,  in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: A TRIBUTE TO ARTHUR VON 
MEHREN 29, 29-62 (Ralf Michaels, et al. ed. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=927484 (last 
visited Apr 15, 2010). 
140 Gardella and Brozolo, supra note_137_ at 623-28. ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW A COMPARATIVE STUDY 261-348 (2007). Allianz SpA and Generali 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers Inc. Case C-185/07. 
141 Eg., Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, Decision Making in the Absence of Successful Fact Finding: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence on Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Systems of Adjudication, 24 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 89, 89-105 (2004); Amalia D Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due 
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1181-1276 (2004); Francesco 
Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared, 22 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 193, 193-216 (2002). 
142 WENDY A. KENNETT, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE 62-63 (2000). 
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concerns conflicts between civil law and common law in requirements for JRE and 
grounds for refusing JRE. This Section intends to fill this gap by using legal conflicts 
between Mainland China, Macao, and Hong Kong as examples. 
In interregional JRE in China, conflicts between civil law and common law cause 
two problems: the same term may connote different meanings in regional laws and 
certain terms may exist in one regional law but be absent from the other. The typical 
example is finality. Its meaning is significantly different between Mainland law and Hong 
Kong law, as well as Macao law and the two existing JRE Arrangements. Different 
meanings or different concepts seem to concern only treaty interpretations and 
terminology choices. However, substantially they reflect conflicts between civil-law and 
common-law traditions. 
Part One of this section proposes the guiding solutions to resolve conflicts between 
civil-law and common-law traditions in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement. Part 
Two uses the dispute of finality to illustrate how to use these solutions to solve conflicts 
between civil-law and common-law traditions.  
 
i. Guiding Solutions 
 
Considering the conflicts between civil-law and common-law traditions in the three 
regions,143 it is not easy to achieve free circulation of judgments in one step.144 Chinese 
interregional legal conflicts are complex.145 Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE 
                                                        
143 For comparison of JRE laws among the three regions and between the two existing arrangements, see Chapter II. 
144 Guobin Zhu, Inter-regional Conflict of Laws under “One Country, Two Systems”: Revisiting Chinese Legal 
Theories and Chinese and Hong Kong Law, with Special Reference to Judicial Assistance, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 615, 
643 (2002). 
145 For literatures, see Chapter II.   
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Arrangement should adopt the approach of “start small” like the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement and the the Hague Choice of Court Convention.146 Therefore, the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement will be a basic framework where further development and 
expansion are possible and necessary in the future. 
As for the conceptual method, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should 
be established by focusing on and solving easy problems first and then gradually 
expanding to difficult issues. Additionally, the guideline for drafting is to adopt 
autonomous terminologies for terms that may have different meanings in regional laws. 
Legislatures should consider avoiding terms that have a meaning under any of the 
regional systems, unless that meaning is intended. In implementation, regional courts 
should decide the meaning of ambiguous terms by autonomous or comparative 
interpretations.147 An interregional mechanism should be established to coordinate 
regional courts to achieve uniformity of interpretation.148  
 
ii. Finality Disputes 
 
Finality is a requirement for JRE in common-law jurisdictions such as Hong 
Kong149 and the US.150 However, finality is not a requirement for JRE in the Brussels I 
                                                        
146 For the Hague Choice of Court Convention, see Report: Recent International Agreement—Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, Concluded June 30, 2005 119 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 935 (2006) (indicating the approval of the 
Hague Choice of Court Convention demonstrates that “start small” is a good approach to complicated conflict-of-law 
issues). For the approach adopted for drafting the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, see Hong Kong LC Paper No. 
CB(2)722/01-02(04), para 18 (indicating the approach is to “follow[ ] in order from easy to difficult matters and 
advance step by step" and this was inspired by the Hague Choice of Court Convention.) For details of the approach of 
“start small,” see Scope of the Arrangement Part i of Section B of Chapter III. 
147 Regarding methods of interpretations, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter VI. 
148 For details of this mechanism, see Section B of Chapter VI. 
149 For the finality criteria in Hong Kong law, see part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
150 For the finality criteria in the US law, see infra fn 197. 
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Regulation.151 Nevertheless, a requested court may stay the JRE proceedings if the 
judgment is challenged in rendering region.152 Under Mainland law, "a legally effective 
judgment [you fa lv xiao li de pan jue]"153 refers to "a final judgment."154 Under Macao 
law, "a definite judgment" has been used to describe the finality of a judgment.155 Besides 
differences in using terminologies, the meanings of finality deviate significantly between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong. In brief, a final judgment should not be subject to any 
appeal but can be subject to retrial in Mainland China. However, Hong Kong courts hold 
that a judgment is final even if an appeal against it is pending, but a judgment is not final 
if it may be retried under the Mainland procedure for trial supervision. Therefore, a final 
Mainland judgment is never final under Hong Kong law, and vice versa. 
This section concentrates on the finality dispute between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong, which has hindered JRE between these two regions when a judgment is beyond the 
scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. Solving this dispute is extremely 
important for the success of the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement. This Section 
will discuss when a Mainland judgment becomes final under Mainland law, why Hong 
Kong courts hold that Mainland judgment will never become final under Hong Kong 
standards, and how the finality dispute can be solved. 
 
                                                        
151 Carlos Esplugues Mota & Guillermo Palao Moreno, Chapter II Jurisdiction Section 5 Jurisdiction over Individual 
Contracts of Employment, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION , 340 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 
2007). 
152 Arts. 37 and 46 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
153  Art. 12.3 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts. 
154 Id. Art. 12.4 reads that “Zhongshen panjue he caiding, ye jiushi fasheng falv xiaoli de panjue he caiding” [a legally 
effective judgment is final]. It is suggested to refer to the Chinese version of this law, which makes its meaning clearer 
than the English version. Others disagree with my position; see Nanping Liu, A Vulnerable Justice: Finality of Civil 
Judgments in China, 13 THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW (1999), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/asiaweb/v13n1Liu.htm. 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/asiaweb/v13n1Liu.htm#top (accessed Dec 27, 2009). In the context of discussing 
Mainland law, "final" refers to "legally effective." But the "final" in Mainland law is significantly different from that in 
Hong Kong law. 
155 For the details of Macao law, see part iii of Section A of Chapter III. 
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1. Comparison of the Criteria of "Finality" under Mainland Law and Hong 
Kong Law 
 
Regarding the trial procedure, in Mainland China, a judgment becomes final when 
all appeals are exhausted156 or parties do not appeal under the statute of limitation.157 
Judgments of the Supreme People’s Court are final.158 In other words, unlike Hong Kong, 
Mainland courts hold that a judgment is not final if it has in fact been appealed or may 
potentially be subject to appeal. Therefore, in the trial procedure, the finality standard 
under the Mainland law is stricter than that of the Hong Kong law. 
However, unlike Hong Kong, Mainland China has established the procedure for 
trial supervision to retry final judgments rendered in the trial procedure.159 The retrial can 
be conducted by the court rendering the original judgment or a court at the next higher 
level, as well as a court designated by the latter.160 If the court rendering the original 
judgment conducts the retrial, it should form a new collegial panel for the retrial.161 
Notably, this procedure does not influence the finality and enforceability of a judgment 
unless a court with competent jurisdiction orders to stay the enforcement proceedings.162 
This means that enforcement can go on even while a court or a prosecutor is reviewing 
the judgment but has not decided to commence the procedure for trial supervision. 
However, Hong Kong courts hold that all Mainland judgments are not final because of 
this procedure.163 In order to understand Hong Kong courts’ holding, discussing three 
                                                        
156 Art. 12 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts. See also Art. 10 of the Mainland CPL. 
157 See arts. 147 and 158 of the Mainland CPL. 
158 Art. 12.1 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts. 
159 Chapter XVI of the Mainland CPL and Art. 14 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts are about this procedure. 
160 Art. 179 of the Mainland CPL. 
161 Id., art. 184. 
162 Art. 184 of the Mainland CPL. 
163 Eg., Chiyu Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Chan Tin Kwun, [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 395 (H.C.).  
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important features of this procedure is necessary.  
First, this procedure can be commenced by a party to a judgment and a prosecutor 
in instances provided by law.164 A prosecutor can lodge a protest on behalf of a party to a 
judgment, after it reviews and accepts this party’s application.165 If a prosecutor lodges a 
protest against the judgment, a relevant people’s court shall retry the case,166 but retrial 
does not necessarily lead to reversing the original judgment. 
The second feature of the procedure for trial supervision is that, a court can sua 
sponte initiate a retrial without party’s motion, when the judicial committee of a court 
discovers some definite error in a final judgment rendered by this court and deems it 
necessary to have the case retried.167 If the Supreme People’s Court or a people’s court at 
a higher level discovers some definite error in a final judgment of a people’s court at a 
lower level, it can retry the case itself or direct a competent people’s court to conduct a 
retrial.168  
The third feature is, if a party to a judgment would like to initiate a retrial, he or she 
must submit his or her application (1) within two years after the original judgment 
                                                        
164 Arts. 179 and 185 of the Mainland CPL. There are three circumstances that a party to a judgment and a prosecutor 
can request a court to commence retrial. 
(1) Evidence problems: there is sufficient new evidence to set aside the prior judgment or that the main 
evidence used in the original judgment to find the facts was insufficient, forged, or not cross-examined; or in the 
original proceedings a party, who was unable to collect the evidence necessary for the trial by herself for objective 
reasons, applied to a people’s court in writing and requested the court to investigate and collect the evidence, but the 
court refused her application.  
(2) Procedural problems: the composition of the judicial panel was illegal or a judge who should withdraw from 
the case but had not; any person with no legal capacity to engage in litigation did not have a guardian(s) as a legal 
representative(s) to act for her in a lawsuit, or a party who should participate in a lawsuit did not participate for reasons 
beyond this party’s or her legal representative’s control; a party’s right to argue for herself was illegally deprived; a 
default judgment was made without summons; and other undue process. This instance also includes that the judge who 
made the original judgment committed embezzlement, accepted bribes, performed malpractices for personal benefits or 
perverted the law in the adjudication of the case. 
(3) Other problems: there was definite error in the application of the law in the prior judgment; the judgment-
rendering court lacked jurisdiction; the judgment omitted or went beyond parties’ claims; or the legal document that the 
judgment was based on has been cancelled or modified.  
165 Art. 185 of the Mainland CPL. 
166 Id., art. 186. 
167 Id., art. 177.  
168 Id. 
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becomes final, or (2) within three months after he or she has known or should know that 
the legal document on which the original judgment was made is cancelled or revised, or 
that the judge was involved in any conduct of embezzlement, bribery, practicing 
favoritism for herself or relatives, or twisting the law in rendering judgment.169 There is 
no time limitation for prosecutors to lodge a protest or a court to sua sponte initiate a 
retrial against a judgment.  
A key policy underlining the procedure for trial supervision is to ensure that the 
parties have access to justice even if all appellate procedures have been exhausted and the 
judgment has become final. Balancing justice and finality of a judgment, Article 179 of 
the 2007 CPL limits retrials to circumstances designated by law.170 This Article is based 
on Article 179 of the 1992 version. Both versions provide that a people's court shall retry 
the case when a retrial application made by a party or a prosecutor finds any of the listed 
circumstances. For the convenient of comparison, the new Article 179 is divided into 
three categories. 
 The first category refers to the circumstances that are literally the same in both the 
new and old Article 179: (1) there is sufficient new evidence171 to set aside the prior 
judgment; (2) there was definite error in the application of the law in the prior judgment; 
and (3) the judge(s) who rendered the prior judgment committed embezzlement, accepted 
bribes, performed malpractices for personal benefits or perverted the law in the 
adjudication of the case. Thus far, there is no judicial interpretation requiring that these 
circumstances, although identical with those in the old law, shall be interpreted differently. 
                                                        
169 Art. 184 of the Mainland CPL. 
170 Art. 179 of the Mainland CPL. 
171 The definition of the "new evidence" can be found in article 44 of the Zuigao Remin Fayuan Guanyu Minshi Susong 
Zhengju de Ruogan Guiding [Supreme People's Court's Evidence Rule in Civil Litigation], Fashi [2001] No. 33 (passed 
at the 1201st meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on December 6, 2001, and effecitve on 
April 1, 2002.) 
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In other words, most likely the scope of the new law will be substantially the same as the 
old law in this category.  
 The second category is that the new law elaborates on the old law. So compared 
with the old law, the new law actually limit the courts' discretion in accepting retrial. This 
category includes defective major evidence and undue process. 
 The old law only indicated that the major evidence by which the facts were 
established in the original judgment was insufficient.  The new law lists three 
circumstances for defective evidence. They are: (1) the major evidence by which the facts 
were established in the prior judgment was forged; and (2) the major evidence by which 
the facts were established in the prior judgment has not been cross-examined. Therefore, 
the new law elaborates the old law by defining insufficient major evidence as forged and 
non-cross-examined evidence.  This clarification limits courts' discretion in making 
retrial decisions.  
The old law only stated that a final judgment should be set aside, if the judgment-
rendering proceeding was unfair, which may have affected the correctness of the 
judgment in the case. On the contrary, the new law lists five circumstances in detail, 
namely (1) the composition of the judicial panel was illegal or a judge(s) who should 
withdraw from the case but have not; (2) any person with no legal capacity to engage in 
litigation did not have a guardian(s) as a legal representative(s) to act for him in a lawsuit, 
or a party who should participate in a lawsuit did not participate because of reasons 
beyond his or his legal representative's control; (3) a party's right to argue for himself or 
herself was deprived; (4) a default judgment was made without summons; and (5) other 
unfair procedures. Therefore, compared with the old law, the new law is clearer. It 
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elaborates on the old law by narrowing its scope in this category.  Such development 
demonstrates that the value of finality should outweigh a minor defect in process. 
The third category focuses on the newly created circumstances to retrial under the 
new law. These circumstances can be further divided into two sub-categories. 
The instances in the first sub-category are reasonable grounds for retrial. They 
include: (1) the original trial court lacked jurisdiction; (2) an original judgment omitted or 
went beyond parties' claims; and (3) the legal document that original judgment or written 
order was based on has been cancelled or modified.  The first and the third circumstances 
are certainly reasonable.  However, there are doubts about the proportionality of the 
second circumstance. Retrial is costly and time-consuming not only for parties but also 
for courts. If a prior judgment omits parties' claims, maybe trying the omitted claim in 
new proceedings, rather than trying the whole case again, is a remedy proper enough for 
the parties.  Similarly invalidating the part of judgment that goes beyond parties' claims 
may be sufficient to relieve parties. My presumption is that a retrial court may just decide 
the omitted claim or simply invalidate the part of judgment that goes beyond a party's 
claim.  
 Second are unclear new categories. Only this category may potentially cause the 
new CPL expands the retrial grounds in the old CPL. It includes insufficient basic 
evidence and the failure of a court in assisting parties to collect evidence. A retrial can be 
commenced if the basic evidence by which the facts were established in the prior 
judgment was insufficient. The new law divides evidence into “basic evidence” and 
“major evidence.” The difference between these two concepts is unclear currently. 
However, literally, parties or prosecutors may prefer to argue a retrial based on 
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insufficient basic evidence, because they may have a larger leeway to define insufficiency. 
By contrast, if their argument is based on defective major evidence, they have to prove 
either forgery or non cross-examination. 
 More important, the new law also provides that a final judgment should be retried 
if in the prior proceedings, for objective reasons, a party is unable to collect the evidence 
necessary for the trial of the case by itself, and if that party had applied to a people's court 
in writing, asking the people's court to investigate and collect the evidence and the court 
did not comply. These evidence should be limited to those kept by state and not 
accessable to parties or those related to commercial secrets or personal privacy according 
to Article 17 of the Supreme People's Court's Evidence Rule in Civil Litigation.172 
"Objective reasons" should be narrowly defined in order to avoid retrial.  
Overall, it is unfair to charge the new CPL adds more circumstances for retrial 
simply because the number of grounds for retrial increases in the new law.173 The new 
law actually limits the courts discretion in the second category, and some newly added 
grounds are reasonable. The only potentially problematic new grounds are insufficient 
basic evidence and the failure of a court in assisting parties to collect evidence. Advisably, 
Mainland courts should restrictively interpret them and avoid loosening the requirements 
for retrial.  
 
                                                        
172 Art. 17 of the Supreme People's Court's Evidence Rule in Civil Litigation indicates: In any of the following 
circumstances, the parties concerned and the agent ad litum thereof may plead the people’s court to investigate upon 
and collect evidences:  
1. The evidences applied for investigation and collection are the archive files kept by relevant organs of the 
state and must be accessed by the people’s court upon authority; 
2. The materials that concern state secrets, commercial secrets or personal privacy; 
3. Other materials that cannot be collected by the parties concerned or the agents ad litum thereof due to 
objective reasons. 
173 For arguments that retrials will happen more frequently in Mainland China because the number of grounds for retrial 
increases in the new CPL, See Zhang, supra note_3_ at 16. 
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2. Hong Kong JRE Case Law: Chiyu and its progeny 
 
Questioning the finality of a Mainland judgment first arises in Chiyu Banking 
Corporation Limited v. Chan Tin Kwun.174 In this case the plaintiff applied to a Hong 
Kong court for enforcing a Mainland judgment. This judgment was final under Mainland 
law, because all appellate procedures had been exhausted. The defendant applied to stay 
the Hong Kong proceedings on the grounds that he had requested a Mainland prosecutor 
to issue a protest against the judgment under the procedure for trial supervision. The 
defendant argued that if a protest would be lodged in due course, the judgment-rendering 
court would have to order a retrial and possibly the court would reverse the original 
judgment. The Hong Kong court concluded that Mainland judgment was not final and 
conclusive for enforcement in Hong Kong in light of the procedure for trial supervision. 
The court first cited The Conflict of Laws by Dicey & Morris, indicating that “a 
foreign judgment may be final and conclusive though it is subject to an appeal and 
though an appeal against it is actually pending in the foreign country where it was 
given.”175 Then it based its reasoning on Gustave Nouvion v. Freeman, holding that, 
“One must apply Hong Kong law to determine whether a judgment is final and 
conclusive.”176 More importantly, it ruled that “no decision has been cited to the effect 
that an English Court is bound to give effect to a foreign decree which is liable to be 
abrogated or varied by the same court which issued it” (emphasis added).177  Therefore, 
the court concluded that the Mainland judgment was final in the sense that it was not 
appealable and it was enforceable in Mainland China, but it was not final for the purpose 
                                                        
174 Chiyu Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Chan Tin Kwun, [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 395 (H.C.). 
175 Id. 
176 Gustave Nouvion v. Freeman & Another (1889) 15 App Cas 1. 
177 Chiyu, [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 395 (H.C.). 
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of recognition and enforcement by Hong Kong courts because it “is not final and 
unalterable in the [Mainland] court which pronounced it.”178 Thus, the Hong Kong court 
decided to stay the enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of the decision of the 
Mainland prosecutor.  
As a conclusion, the Chiyu case establishes that Hong Kong courts will not 
recognize or enforce a judgment rendered by a Mainland court that retains power to alter 
the judgment. It also implies that Hong Kong courts will recognize or enforce a judgment 
rendered by a Mainland court, even if a court higher than the judgment-rendering court 
maintains power to alter this judgment. However, this case fails to answer an important 
question: would Hong Kong courts recognize and enforce the judgment if the people’s 
prosecutor does not lodge a protest after reviewing the defendant’s application? Or in 
other words, if the prosecutor does not lodge a protest, will the Mainland judgment 
become final? Professor Nanping Liu answers “no,” because under Mainland procedure 
for trial supervision, there is no time limit for a party to apply to a prosecutor to lodge a 
protest and the prosecutor has discretion in making its protest against a judgment at 
anytime.179 Therefore, he argues that Mainland judgments will never become final so 
never become recognizable and enforceable in Hong Kong. This view has been adopted 
by Hong Kong courts in subsequent cases after Chiyu.180   
One example is Wuhan Zhong Shuo Hong Real Estate Company Limited v. the 
Kwong Sang Hong International Limited.181 In this case, the plaintiff sought to enforce 
the outstanding balance of a Mainland judgment in Hong Kong. The judgment was final 
                                                        
178 Id. 
179 Liu, supra note 154 at 40 and 80. 
180 Eg., Wuhan Zhong Shuo Hong Real Estate Co. Ltd. v. the Kwong Sang Hong Int’l. Ltd. [2000] H.K.C. 711 (C.F.I.); 
Tan Tay Cuan v. Ng Chi Hung, [2001] H.K.C. 164 (C.F.I.) 
181 Wuhan Zhong Shuo Hong Real Estate, [2000] H.K.C. 711 (C.F.I.). 
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under Mainland law because it was rendered by the Supreme People’s Court. The 
defendant argued that the judgment was not final and conclusive. His contention was 
based on a letter dated of November 25, 1999, addressed to him from the Supreme 
People’s Prosecutor, saying that “the Supreme People’s Prosecutor had decided to review 
the judgment of the Supreme People’s Court on the basis that there was no sufficient 
evidence to establish the material facts and/or the wrong law had applied and/or that the 
lawful procedure had not been followed.”182 The court agreed with the defendant that the 
Mainland judgment was not final and conclusive, and granted a six-month stay based on 
expert evidence that the decision of the Supreme People’s Court or the Supreme People’s 
Prosecutor might be known about 6 months. 
Again, in 2001, the Hong Kong High Court refused to enforce a Mainland 
judgment because of the possibility that the Mainland Supreme People’s Court could 
retry the case under the procedure for trial supervision. The case is Tan Tay Cuan v Ng 
Chi Hung.183 In this case, the judgment was obtained after exhausting all appellate 
procedures in Mainland China. But the Hong Kong court held that this judgment was not 
final, because the defendant applied to the Supreme People’s Court asking to retry this 
case under the procedure for trial supervision. The court also noted that the application to 
retry this case in Mainland China had not been accepted or dismissed by the Mainland 
Supreme People’s Court. However, the court held that the situation seemed to suggest 
that there were possibly good grounds for a retrial. The court concluded that the 
Mainland judgment was “not a final and conclusive judgment because it [was] a 
judgment which by their procedure [was] capable of being corrected on review and on 
                                                        
182 Id. 
183 Tan Tay Cuan v. Ng Chi Hung, [2001] H.K.C. 164 (C.F.I.), available at 
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/judgment.jsp.3 
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retrial.”184 Accordingly, the enforcement was denied.   
Because of Chiyu, all the Mainland judgments become unrecognizable and 
unenforceable in Hong Kong. The Chiyu and its progeny demonstrate that three elements 
exist in Chiyu doctrine. First, Hong Kong law should be applied to determine whether a 
Mainland judgment is final and conclusive. Second, under Mainland law, a judgment will 
become final after being tried by two instances or after the period for appeal expires and 
no appeal is filed. However, importantly, under the Mainland procedure for trial 
supervision, a competent court—including the judgment-rendering court—can retry the 
case in limited circumstances provided by law. Therefore, however rare the circumstances 
may be, the judgment-rendering court may reverse its judgment in the retrial proceedings. 
The Chiyu court holds that if a court retains the power to reverse its own judgment, this 
judgment is not final. Third, a mere likelihood of a retrial is sufficient to make a 
Mainland judgment unrecognizable and unenforceable in Hong Kong. For example, in 
Chiyu and Wuhan, the retrial proceedings obviously have not been triggered: the 
prosecutors have not decided to lodge a protest against the judgments and the judgments 
are still final and enforceable in Mainland China. Another example is Tan Tay Cuan, 
where the Supreme People’s Court had not confirmed that it would retry the case, but the 
Tan Tay Cuan court held that “it does not necessarily mean that it [retrial] will take place 
but certainly it may take place. (Emphasis added)”  
 
3. Problems of Chiyu 
 
The Chiyu doctrine is problematic. First, it relies on the English precedent Gustave 
                                                        
184 Id. 
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Nouvion, which held that a final judgment should not be revisited by the court that 
pronounced it and, in cases that the judgment is erroneous; it should be a higher court 
with jurisdiction to reopen the case.185 However, the Chiyu doctrine interprets this 
precedent without looking into the specific facts of Gustave Nouvion.  
Gustave Nouvion involves a Spanish “remate” judgment obtained in “executive” 
proceedings.186 Under Spanish law, there are two proceedings. One is executive 
proceedings and the other is ordinary, plenary, or declarative proceedings.187 Both 
proceedings can be brought against the same subject-matter and between the same 
parties.188 But the judgment obtained in executive proceedings, which is the so-called 
“remate” judgment, has no res judicata effect.189 In other words, “the rights of the parties 
with reference to the original cause of action are in no way affected by any judgment 
obtained in the executive proceedings”190 and the “remate” judgment “merely [] give[s] a 
right to the plaintiff in the action to get execution on the assumption that he has got a 
good cause of action by the document on which he sues.”191 Furthermore, the “remate” 
judgment is not a decision that exhausts the merits of the controversy between the parties, 
because in “executive” proceedings, the defendant can only makes certain pleas of a 
certain prescribed and definite character.192 The same court that rendered the “remate” 
judgment also can hear an “ordinary” or “plenary” action to decide every plea that the 
defendant may raise including those had been decided in the previous executive 
                                                        
185 See Nouvion, (1889) 15 App Cas 1, per Lord Herschell and Lord Watson.  
186 See id.  
187 Nouvion, (1887) 37 CH D 244, per Lopes, L. J. Affirmed by (1889) 15 App Cas 1. 
188 Id, per Cotton, L. J. 
189 Id, per Cotton, L. J. and Lindley, L.J.  
190 Id, per Cotton, L. J. 
191 Id. 
192 Nouvion, (1889) 15 App Cas 1, per Lord Watson and Lord Ashbourne. 
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proceedings.193  
For two reasons the Spanish “remate” judgment is fundamentally distinct from a 
final Mainland judgment obtained in the trial procedure. First, the Mainland judgment 
conclusively decides the rights of the parties and has res judicata effect between them. 
Second, a defendant can raise all the pleas against a plaintiff’s claims in the Mainland 
trial procedure. Moreover, if a judgment is obtained through trial procedure, a party can 
apply to retry only in very limited grounds, such as discovering important new evidence 
or corrupt judges.194 Therefore, the Gustave Nouvion holding should not be applied to 
Mainland judgments.  
Moreover, Gustave Nouvion does not establish a general rule. English case laws in 
the nineteenth century when Gustave Nouvion was rendered also “established that a 
foreign judgment could be enforced in England despite the fact that there was a 
possibility that the foreign court might have to revisit its original decision.”195  
The second problem of Chiyu is that it improperly applies the law of the requested 
court to determine the finality of a judgment in the JRE proceedings. It ignores that a 
Mainland judgment is enforceable in Mainland China even if an application for retrial has 
been submitted to a court or a prosecutor.196 A mere likelihood of retrial cannot make the 
judgment unenforceable in Mainland China. Therefore, the Mainland judgment should be 
recognizable and enforceable in other regions.  
Applying the law of the region where the judgment was rendered to determine its 
finality is the general practice in the US. Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause does 
                                                        
193 Id, per Lord Watson. 
194 See art. 179 of the 2007 Mainland CPL. 
195 Philip Smart, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in ENFORCING JUDGMENTS IN HONG KONG 255, 267 (Christine N 
Booth ed. 2004). Vanquelin v. Bouard, (1863) 15 CB (NS) 341. 
196 Arts. 179 and 185 of the Mainland CPL.  
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not explicitly require finality as a precondition for JRE,197 in practice, except in child 
support and similar cases,198 only final judgments can be recognized and enforced in 
sister states.199 The leading practice is that a requested court should determine finality 
according to the law of the judgment-rendering region.200 The Judiciary Act of 1790 
explained the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution as: “Such Acts, records and 
judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same Full Faith 
and Credit in every court…as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State… 
from which they are taken.”201 (Emphasis added) This statement clearly indicates that the 
issues of finality and conclusiveness should be determined by “the law and usage” of the 
judgment-rendering state.202 The Second Conflicts Restatement also provides the same 
rule.203 For example, Paine v. Schenectady Insurance Co. involves conflicting judgments 
from Rhode Island and New York with appeals pending against both.204 An enforcement 
proceeding was brought in a Rhode Island court. The court consequently enforced the 
New York judgment, because under the New York law an appeal did not vacate a 
judgment but under the Rhode Island law it did. It is well received that the law of the 
judgment-rendering region should decide the effect of appeal, retrial and the like on the 
finality of a judgment.205 Moreover, in 2008 a US court recognized and enforced a 
                                                        
197 See Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 294 F. 3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Pure Distributors, Inc. v. 
Baker, 285 F.3d 150, 157 (1st. Cir. 2002); and Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87. 
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199 Pure Distributors, Inc. v. Baker, 285 F.3d 150, 157 (1st. Cir. 2002). Notes: The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict 
of Laws, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 878, 878 (1941). 
200 Clermont, supra note_139_ at 98. 
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203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, §95, comnt. (g) (1971).  
204 Paine v. Schenectady Insurance Co., 11 R.I. 411 (1876). 
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Mainland judgment.206 Although this judgment is subject to the procedure of trial 
supervision, the US court held that it “was final, conclusive, and enforceable under the 
laws of the PRC…”,207 because “the UFMJRA, adopted in California and codified.., 
applied to any foreign judgment that is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the laws 
where rendered.”(Emphasis added)208  
Under the Brussels I Regulation, finality is not a requirement for JRE.209 However, 
the requested court may stay recognition proceedings upon the application of the 
judgment debtor who lodges an appeal against the judgment in the judgment-rendering 
region.210 Nevertheless, "[t]he mere lodging of a complaint with the authorities,"211 like 
the judgment debtor did in Chiyu and its progeny, "against parties who are involved in the 
proceedings in the country of origin, does not as such constitute an ordinary appeal."212 
Article 46 of the Regulation empowers requested courts to stay enforcement proceedings 
when the time for appeal has not yet expired, even if the judgment debtor has not lodged 
an appeal.213 This approach looks like that adopted by the progeny of Chiyu, which held 
that Mainland judgments were never final because the prosecutors' rights to protest had 
no time limit. Namely, because the prosecutors' right to request courts to commence 
retrials will never expire, Mainland judgments are never final.214 But, notably, Article 46 
of the Brussels I Regulation particularly aims to counterbalance the unilateral nature of 
                                                        
206 Former Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1713.2”. Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., No. 2:06-
cv-01798-FMC-SS-x 2009 WL 2190187, (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009). 
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208 Id, at *5. 
209 Art. 37 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
210 Id. 
211 Patrick Wautelet, Chapter III Recognition and Enforcement Section 1 Recognition, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 
633 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007). 
212 Id. 
213 Art. 46 of the Brussels I Regulation. For differences between arts. 37 and 46, see Wautelet, supra note_211_ at 629. 
214 Liu, supra note 154 at 40. 
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the enforcement proceedings laid down by Article 38 et seq.215 Those Articles extend 
enforceability of a judgment from the judgment-rendering state to the requested state 
immediately on completion of the formalities requirement and without reviewing grounds 
to defense the enforcement.216 Clearly, the needs of such counterbalance do not exist in 
the contexts of Chinese interregional JRE. Therefore, Chiyu and its progeny improperly 
applies the law of requested court to determine the finality of the judgment and ignore its 
enforceability in Mainland China.  
Third, Chiyu causes Hong Kong courts to recognize and enforce Mainland 
judgments in a way distinct from how it treats judgments from other jurisdictions, such as 
the US. For example, Hong Kong courts refuse to recognize and enforce Mainland 
judgments because the judgment-rendering court has the power to retry the case. In the 
US, under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "FRCP") 59 and 60, the 
district court that renders a judgment also retains the power to revise the judgment on its 
own motion.217 However, Hong Kong courts have never held that US judgments rendered 
by district courts are unrecognizable and unenforceable because the judgment-rendering 
courts maintain the power to retry the case. 
For example, a default judgment rendered by a US district court may be set aside 
by the court that pronounced it.218 Nonetheless, such a judgment is recognizable and 
enforceable in Hong Kong. In Nintendo of America Inc v. Bung Enterprises Ltd, the 
plaintiff applied to enforce a default judgment rendered by the Western Division of the 
                                                        
215 Lennart Palsson, Chapter III Recognition and Enforcement Section 2 Enforcement Article 46, in BRUSSELS I 
REGULATION , 670 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed.). 
216 Arts 38 and 41 of the Brussels I Regulation. For comments, see Konstantinos Kerameus, Chapter III Recognition 
and Enforcement Section 2 Enforcement Article 41, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 645 and 654 (ULRICH 
MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed.). 
217 FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 59 and 60. 
218 FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b).  
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US District Court Central District of California.219 The defendant made a meritorious 
defense at the beginning of the US proceedings but defaulted later.220 In the Hong Kong 
JRE proceedings, the defendant argued that the US judgment was not final and 
conclusive because it may be set aside by the judgment-rendering court upon a 
reconsideration motion.221 Similar to the defendant in Chiyu, the defendant in this case 
also relied on Gustave Nouvion and argued that the American judgment was like the 
Spanish judgment that “might be at any time recalled or modified” by the judgment-
rendering court.222 The Hong Kong Court of First Instance distinguished the Spanish 
judgment in Gustave Nouvion from the American judgment because the former “was 
known as a ‘remate’ judgment which was a judgment after consideration of limited issues 
and which was liable to be reconsidered in ‘plenary’ proceedings where the whole merits 
of the matters might be gone into.”223 The court held that the US judgment should be 
enforced regardless the judgment-rendering court may retain the power to set it aside.224 
It first relied on Dicey & Morris:225 
 
 [I]t is well established that for the purpose of enforcement by an action in Hong 
Kong, a foreign judgment may be final and conclusive even though it is a default 
judgment liable to be set aside in the very Court which rendered it. (Emphasis 
added) 
 
Then, the Hong Kong court analogized the present case to Vanquelin v. Bouard and 
                                                        
219 Nintendo, HCA 1189/2000, para 1. 
220 Id, para 1. 
221 Id, para 7. 
222 Id, para 8. 
223 Id, para 8. The court held that the Spanish court judgment “was known as a ‘remate’ judgment which was a 
judgment after consideration of limited issues and which was liable to be reconsidered in ‘plenary’ proceedings where 
the whole merits of the matters might be gone into.” 
224 Nintendo, HCA 1189/2000, para 10, 11, and 12. 
225 Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 13th edition, para 14-021. 
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accepted the Vanquelin holding.226 In Vanquelin, a judgment creditor attempted to enforce 
a French default judgment in the UK, and the judgment debtor argued that the 
enforcement should be refused because if it appeared in the French court the French 
judgment-rendering court may revise the judgment.227 Erle C J in Vanquelin rejected this 
argument because a mere possibility of retrial in the judgment-rendering court is 
insufficient to deny JRE in Hong Kong:228 
I apprehend that every judgment of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction is 
valid and may be the foundation of an action in our courts, though subject to the 
contingency, that, by adopting a certain course, the party against whom the 
judgment is obtained might cause it to be vacated or set aside. But until that course 
has been pursued, the judgment remains in full force and capable of being sued 
upon. (Emphasis added) 
 
The defendant also argued that he had instructed his US attorney to seek the US 
judgment-rendering court’s reconsideration of the default judgment and planned to appeal 
if the reconsideration motion failed.229 This argument is essentially identical to the 
defendant’s argument in Chiyu that he had requested a Mainland prosecutor to issue a 
protest against the judgment under the procedure for trial supervision. However, different 
from Chiyu, the Nintendo of America Inc. court rejected this argument and held that 
although the defendant had given instructions to his attorney, the US court had not begin 
to take any step in reversing the judgment, so the judgment should be deemed as final in 
Hong Kong.230  
A lot of important similarities exist between Chiyu and Nintendo of America Inc. 
First, both judgment-rendering courts retain the power to revise the judgment under their 
                                                        
226 Vanquelin v Bouard (1863) 15 CB (N S) 341. 
227 Id. 
228 Id, at 367-68. 
229 Under Rule 60 of the US FRCP, parties to a final judgment can obtain relief from this judgment by filing a motion 
for relief within a reasonable time. 
230 Nintendo, HCA 1189/2000, see para 12-13. 
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retrial procedure. Second, both defendants invoked Gustave Nouvion. Third, both 
defendants took some steps to initiate the retrial procedure. In Chiyu, the defendant 
applied to a people’s prosecutor; and in Nintendo of America Inc. the defendant instructed 
its attorney to submit a reconsideration motion to the American court. In both cases, 
neither of the judgment-rendering courts has decided to retry the case. However, 
regardless of these significant similarities, Hong Kong courts refused the recognition and 
enforcement of the Mainland judgment in Chiyu but recognized and enforced the 
American judgment in Nintendo of America Inc. Hong Kong courts have never justified 
the different treatments between Mainland judgments and those from other jurisdictions.  
 
4. Reasons for Chiyu 
 
Unfamiliarity with and distrust of the Mainland procedure for trial supervision may 
explain why although the facts of Chiyu and Nintendo of America Inc. are similar, Hong 
Kong courts decided them differently. Arguably, the requested Hong Kong courts 
improperly ignore the following four aspects.  
First, not every application submitted by parties can convince a Mainland 
prosecutor to lodge a protest against a judgment. A party can resubmit his or her retrial 
application to a prosecutor after his or her previous application has been rejected. 
Therefore, it makes no sense to leave a judgment, rendered after a fair trial, in the hand of 
a losing party who tries to delay the enforcement by applying for retrials again and again. 
Therefore, Hong Kong Professor Philip Smart correctly pointed out that Chiyu overly 
favors a defendant who has no claims such as fraud, undue process, and public policy 
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exception, and can defeat the enforcement of a judgment in Hong Kong by merely 
submitting a retrial application to a Mainland prosecutor.231  
Second, under Mainland law, even if a prosecutor lodges a protest against a 
judgment, this judgment is still final and enforceable in Mainland China until a court with 
competent jurisdiction orders to stay the enforcement.232 Although Hong Kong courts 
apply Hong Kong law in its enforcement proceeding, the law of the judgment-rendering 
court regarding finality should be taken into account. Therefore, it is unreasonable to 
deny recognition and enforcement of a Mainland judgment for lack of finality, when this 
judgment is final and enforceable in the region where it is rendered.233   
Third, retrial in Mainland China is functionally quite similar to appeal. Both of 
them aim to ensure the losing party's access to justice. Retrial follows the appellate 
procedure, except when the retried judgment was rendered by a first-instance court (in 
this case, the first-instance procedure applies).234 Both retrial and appellate proceedings 
reviews facts and laws decided by the original judgment.235 Moreover, the 
commencement of retrial or appeal does not automatically lead to reversal of the original 
judgment.236 Hong Kong FJREO states that "a judgment shall be deemed to be final and 
conclusive notwithstanding that an appeal is pending against it, or that it may still be 
subject to appeal, in the courts of the country of the original court."237 Therefore, if 
judgments are enforced although an appeal is possible or even pending, it is justifiable to 
do the same with a judgment subject to retrial. 
                                                        
231 Smart, supra note_195_ at 268. 
232 Art. 185 of the Mainland CPL. 
233 See supra Problems of Chiyu.  
234 Art. 186 of the Mainland CPL. 
235 Art. 151 of the Mainland CPL. Art. 180 of the Opinions of the Application of the CPL. 
236 Art. 153 of the Mainland CPL. 
237 FJREO Section 3(3). 
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Fourth, in reality only very few cases are retried in Mainland China. In 2002, the 
Supreme People's Court issued a judicial interpretation to restrict the number of retrial 
brought by parties or courts in every case to once.238  The 2007 Mainland CPL, compared 
with its 1991 version which the Chiyu court considered, effectively clarifies the grounds 
for retrial.239 Thus courts have less discretion in reopening a final judgment. Moreover, 
only an extremely small percentage of cases have been retried according to statistics, 
since the Mainland Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procurator adopted 
the policy of restricting retrials and of respecting the finality of judgments in 2001.240 
The statistics by 2004 show that generally in one thousand final civil judgments 
rendered in the trial and appellate procedures: (1) about ten judgments (10/1000) were 
reopened in the procedure for trial supervision; (2) about four judgments (4/1000) were 
found erroneous in the procedure for trial supervision. 
 
Chart I 
 
Year 
Number of 
Civil Cases 
Accepted for 
Trial[??
????
??  
Number of 
Civil Cases 
Accepted for 
Retrial 
[????] 
The Percentage 
of Retried Case 
among the Total 
Civil Cases (%) 
1999  5 480 178 83 915 1.53 
                                                        
238 Arts. 2 and 3 of the Regulation of Remanding a Case to Retrial and Designating a Court to Retry a Case made by the 
Supreme People’s Court [decided by the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court No. 1221 Meeting on Apr. 
15, 2002, and effective Aug. 15, 2002]. 
239 See supra Comparison of the Criteria of "Finality" under Mainland Law and Hong Kong Law of Chapter IV.  
240 Eg., the Opinion to Regulate Protests by the People’s Procurator at the Provincial Level and the People’s Procurator 
Rule of Making Protests in Civil and Administrative Cases, issued by the Supreme People’s Procurator in August and 
September 2001, respectively; the Notice of Several Questions concerning the Procedure for Trial Supervision made by 
the Supreme People’s Court in November 2001; the Regulation of Remanding a Case to Retrial and Designating a 
Court to Retry a Case made by the Supreme People’s Court in July 2002. Li You Rong v. Li Rui Qiong, CACV 
159/2004, para 16. available at http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/legal_ref/judgments.htm accessed on January 7, 2009. 
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2000 5 153 374 83 201 1.61 
2001 5 074 080 82 652 1.63 
2002 4 830 000 48 180 0.997 
2003 4 827 710 46 151 0.956 
2004 4 756 563 45 250 0.951 
 
Source: JINGWEN ZHU, ZHONG GUO FA LV FA ZHAN BAO GAO: SHU JU KU HE ZHI BIAO TI XI 
[REPORT ON CHINESE LAW DEVELOPMENT: DATABASE AND INDICATORS] 205 and 240 (2007). 
 
Findings of Chart I:  
a. About 1% of final judgments were reopened each year under the procedure for 
trial supervision.  
b. After 2002, the percentage of retried cases decreased faster than the cases 
accepted for trial because people’s courts adopted the policy of restricting 
retrials and of respecting the finality of judgments.241 
 
Chart II 
 
Year 
Number 
of Civil 
Cases 
Accepted 
for 
Retrial 
[???
?] 
Number of 
Civil Cases 
Finished 
Retrial 
[???
?] 
Affirm the 
Original 
Judgments 
[????] 
Reverse the 
Original 
Judgments 
[??] 
Remand the 
Cases 
[????] 
The 
Percentage of 
Reversed and 
Remanded 
Cases among 
the Retried 
Civil Cases 
(%) * 
                                                        
241 See JINGWEN ZHU, ZHONG GUO FA LV FA ZHAN BAO GAO: SHU JU KU HE ZHI BIAO TI XI [REPORT 
ON CHINESE LAW DEVELOPMENT: DATABASE AND INDICATORS] 205 and 240 (2007). 
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1999 83 915 81 949 17 591 18 898 4 830 28.95 
2000 83 201 85 155 20 294 21 276 5 081 30.95 
2001 82 652 82 550 21 721 21 050 4 683 31.17 
2002 48 180 48 916 16 514 15 290 2 575 36.52 
2003 46 151 47 412 15 742 15 167 2 644 37.57 
2004 45 250 44 211 13 709 15 161 3 014 41.11 
 
Source: Zhu, supra note_241_ at 205 and 240. 
*The erroneous percentage of final judgments rendered in the trial and appellate 
procedures [????????] 
Chart II demonstrates that, after 2002, the number of cases accepted for retrial 
decreased. Meanwhile, the percentage of cases remanded and reversed under the retrial 
procedure increased. This contrast implies that the decline of the former resulted from the 
policy of restricting retrials and of respecting the finality of judgments.242 In other words, 
the fact that fewer cases are accepted for retrial does not represent an improvement of the 
quality of civil judgments in the trial and appellate procedures.  
Moreover, if the retrial court holds an originally final judgment is erroneous, it will 
directly reverse the judgment, or remand the case to the court that rendered the original 
judgment or other lower courts for a new trial. Remanding to lower courts often happens 
when more facts findings are necessary for making a new judgment. Bear this 
background in mind: 
  
                                                        
242 Id, this Report also shows that: (1) from 1978-1987, the number of cases accepted for retrial and the number of 
remanded and reversed cases both increased, which means that the quality of civil judgments declined; (2) from 1992-
2001, the number of cases accepted for retrial greatly increased and maintained in a high level. Meanwhile, the 
percentage of cases remanded or reversed in the retrial procedure also greatly increased. This means the quality of civil 
judgments declined again.  
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a. Chart II shows that about four out of one thousand final judgments rendered in 
the trial and appellate procedures are reversed as erroneous. The finding 
(0.004) is from this formula: 1% (Chart I) X 40% (Chart II). Two factors may 
affect this finding. First, remanding a case does not mean the previous 
judgment was erroneous and would be reversed in retrial. Therefore, the actual 
erroneous rate should be lower than 0.004. Second, it is unknown what 
happened to cases in the category of "others."243 So, it is hard to assess how 
the "others" will affect the erroneous rate. 
b. The 41.11% is the highest since from 1978 to 2004.244 Even taking this 
highest number, it is still unconvincing to argue that Mainland judgments 
could be easily reversed in retrial.   
 In Chart II, the numbers for affirmed, reversed, and remanded don't add up to the 
number of cases where retrial was completed. The rest of cases fall into one of the 
following categories:   
a. The original final judgment is affirmed. Chart II shows that the number of 
final judgments that were affirmed in the retrial was close to the number of 
final judgments that was reversed in the retrial.  
b. The retrial is dismissed. This happens when the circumstances for retrial are 
not satisfied under the Chapter 16 of the Mainland CPL.  
c. The party asking for retrial withdraws the request. 
d. Parties reach a settlement.  
                                                        
243  See infra fn 245. 
244 Zhu, supra note 241 at 241. 
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e. Others. A fairly large number of retried cases are in this category, but the 
statistics does not clarify the meaning of “others.” 245 More research needs to 
be done.  
Notably, dismissing and withdrawing retrials won't affect the previous judgments. 
Settlements are parties' voluntary actions. Although the previous judgments are changed, 
essentially settlements are different from new judgments resulting from courts' reversal of 
previous judgments in terms of "finality." For example, parties often reach settlements in 
executing judgments, which is equal to change previous judgments. But generally nobody 
will blame that previous judgments lack of finality.  
The statistics after 2004 are as follows: 
a. In 2005, the number of erroneous judgments (including civil, criminal, and 
administrative cases) found in retrial is 16 967, taking 0.34% of final 
judgments rendered in that year.246  
b. In 2006, the erroneous judgments (including civil, criminal, and 
administrative cases) found in retrial is 15 867, taking 0.31% of final 
judgments rendered in that year.247  
c. In 2007, the erroneous judgments (including civil, criminal, and 
administrative cases) found in retrial is 15 568, taking 0.27% of final 
judgments rendered in that year.248 
d. In 2008, 0.71% of final judgments (including civil, criminal, and 
                                                        
245 The number of cases in this category each year is: 20609 in the year of 1999, 20360 in 2000, 18973 in 2001, 10113 
in 2002, 9508 in 2003, and 7916 in 2004. Zhu, supra note 241 at 240. 
246 Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of The PRC, 8 (2005.4).  
247 Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of The PRC, 10 (2006.4). The total number cases finished retries is 46 468, 
and the total number of tried cases is 5 903 832. 
248 Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of The PRC, 11, 18 (2007.4). The total number of retried cases is 47 270, 
and the total number of tried cases is 5 755 591. 
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administrative cases) rendered in that year were retried judgments.249 
e. In 2009, 0.19% of final judgments (including civil, criminal, and 
administrative cases) rendered in that year were retried judgments.250  
This statistics reaffirm the argument that it is unreasonable to reject the JRE of one 
thousand judgments simply because ten of them will be reopened and averagely only four 
or less will be ultimately revered in the procedure for trial supervision.  
 As a conclusion, the Chiyu doctrine is doubtful both on the doctrinal and 
statistical levels. First, on the doctrinal level, the abstract reviewability of the Mainland 
judgment under the procedure for trial supervision in Chiyu is not different from the 
American judgment in Nintendo. Retrials are also not different form appalletes 
proceedings in terms of functions, procedures, and requirements. Second, the goal of 
refusing JRE--to make sure enforcement is not rendered invalid because the judgment on 
which it was based is reversed--is only rarely important because of the statistical 
infrequency of reversal. Therefore, it is unjustifiable to deny the recognition and 
enforcement of Mainland judgments merely because they are subject to retrial. 
 
 5. Malicious Re-litigations and Forum Shopping Caused by the Chiyu 
Doctrine 
 
Because of the Chiyu doctrine, all the judgments excluded by the narrow 2006 
                                                        
249 2008 Zuigao Renming Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [2008 Supreme People's Working Report], available at 
http://www.gov.cn/2008lh/content_926191.htm (last visited April 10, 2010). 
250 2009 Zuigao Renming Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [2009 Supreme People's Working Report], available at 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-03/17/content_1261386.htm (last visited April 10, 2010). According to another source, the  
number is 0.18%. See the 2009 Annuel Report of  People's Court, page 34, available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/fyxw/zgrmfyxw/201007/t20100714_7665.htm (last visited July 14, 2010).?
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Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement are unrecognizable and unenforceable in Hong Kong 
under common law. This triggers malicious re-litigations (or parallel litigations) and 
forum shopping between Mainland China and Hong Kong. The two Lam Chit Man cases 
well illustrate this.251  
Yat Cheong Electric Co. (hereinafter “Yat Cheong”) is a Hong Kong company and 
owned by Lam Chit Man. Lam Chit Man I was between Lam Chit Man and Zhitao Lin. 
The latter is the legal representative of Dongguan Rong Feng Clocks & Watches 
(hereinafter “Rong Feng”), a Mainland company.252 Rong Feng and Yat Cheong 
concluded an oral lease agreement and agreed to rent him one floor of the building 
located in Mainland China. However, disputes occurred during the performance of the 
agreement.253 Consequently, Rong Feng sued Yat Cheong in the Dongguan People’s 
Court,254 and Yat Cheong sued Rong Feng in a Hong Kong court.255 The two actions 
proceeded almost in the same period of time in Hong Kong and Dongguan, but the 
Dongguan court rendered a judgment earlier than Hong Kong court.256 So the winning 
                                                        
251 Eg., Lam Chit Man t/a Yat Cheong Electric Co. v. Lam Chi To, CACV 354/2001 (hereinafter Lam Chit Man I); Lam 
Chit Man t/a Yat Cheong Electric Co. v. Cheung Shun Lin, CACV 1046/2001 (hereinafter Lam Chit Man II).  
252 Lam Chit Man I. Dongguan is a city in Guangdong province Mainland China and it is very close to Hong Kong.  
253 Rong Feng claimed that Yat Cheong failed to pay the rents on time. Yat Cheong claimed that Rong Feng breached 
the agreement: because Rong Feng did not provide the fire extinction certificate of the building and other government 
approval documents; moreover, it stopped water and electricity supply to the building without informing Yat Cheong in 
advance; further, it unilaterally terminated the lease, and its staff beat Lam Chit Man when he moved out of the 
building. 
254 Dongguan Rong Feng Biao Ye You Xian Gong Si v Heng Chang Dian Zi (Shengzhen) You Xian Gong Si 
(Dongguan People’s Ct., Nov. 13, 2000). 
255 Lam Chit Man I. 
256 Here is a summary of the Dongguan action. On July 12, 1999, Rong Feng brought an action against Yat Cheong in 
Dongguan District People’s Court claiming the outstanding rents in Mainland China. Yat Cheong defended the 
substance of the case in Dongguan Court and brought a counter-action against Rong Feng claiming damages arising 
from Rongye’s breach of contract. Rong Feng defaulted in the last two hearings before the court issued the judgment. 
The Dongguan court ruled that based on the check issued by Yat Cheong, Yat Cheong had implicitly accepted the rents 
that Rong Feng asked for. The court found that the rents were reasonable and legal because it was a below average 
price in the local lease market. Although Yat Cheong disputed with Rong Feng about the calculation of the rents, Yat 
Cheong failed to provide evidence for its argument. The court also held that although Yat Cheong argued that Rong 
Feng should compensate it for stopping water and electricity without notice in advance, Yat Cheong failed to provide 
relevant evidence too. Regarding the compensation resulting from one staff of Rong Feng beating Lam Chit Man, the 
court found that Lam Chit Man did not provide evidence for this claim. Moreover, the cause of action of this claim was 
tort, but the current case was based on breach of the lease agreement. Therefore, the court suggested Lam Chit Man to 
bring a tort action separately for the beating. The court also ruled that Rong Feng improperly terminated the lease 
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party of the Dongguan judgment, Rong Feng, applied to the Hong Kong court for 
dismissing the Hong Kong proceeding and recognizing the Dongguan judgment.257 
The key issue in Lam Chit Man I was whether the Dongguan judgment was final 
and should be recognized in Hong Kong. The First Instance Court of Hong Kong ruled 
that the Dongguan judgment was final and binding on both parties, which constituted an 
estoppel, therefore both parties should not litigate the same cause of action in the Hong 
Kong court. The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong disagreed. It first stated that under the 
precedent of Chiyu, if a Mainland prosecutor lodged a protest against a civil judgment, a 
relevant people’s court had to retry the case and might reverse the judgment, so the 
Mainland judgment lacked finality and consequently could not be recognized or enforced 
in Hong Kong. The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong noticed two differences between Lam 
Chit Man I and Chiyu. First, the Chiyu judgment was based on expert evidence about the 
procedure for trial supervision in Mainland law, but in Lam Chit Man I, no party provided 
evidence regarding Mainland law. Therefore, the Court did not know whether the current 
Mainland law regarding the procedure for trial supervision remained the same as when 
Chiyu was decided. Second, the Court noticed that Lam Chit Man and Yat Cheong did not 
prove that they had taken any step to persuade a people’s prosecutor to lodge a protest 
against the Mainland judgment. Nevertheless, the Court still ruled for Lam Chit Man and 
Yat Cheong because Rong Feng failed to prove that the Dongguan judgment was final.  
Lam Chit Man I demonstrates that if no party provides evidence of current 
Mainland law regarding the procedure for trial supervision, a Hong Kong court may not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
contract unilaterally, but Yat Cheong accepted this termination voluntarily by moving his equipment out of the building 
after receiving the termination notice from Rong Feng. Consequently, on November 13, 2000, the Dongguan court 
rendered a judgment favourable to RongYe. At the end of the judgment, the court indicated that if a party was not 
satisfied with this judgment, it should appeal to the Dongguan Intermediate People’s Court within 15 days after 
receiving this judgment.  
257 Lam Chit Man II. 
 219 
be able to apply the Chiyu doctrine. The reason is that the court does not know whether 
the current Mainland law regarding this procedure remains the same as when Chiyu was 
decided. This, to some extent, restricts the application of the Chiyu doctrine. Half a year 
later, in Lam Chit Man II the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong removed this restriction and 
held that in civil proceedings a previous decision on a question of foreign law can be 
deemed as a precedent and applied directly to later cases.258  
The facts of Lam Chit Man II are similar to those in Lam Chit Man I. Yat Cheong 
and a Mainland company signed a lease contract over factory premises located in 
Mainland China. Disputes took place in the performance of the contract. The Mainland 
company sued Yat Cheong in the People’s Court of Long Gang District.259 Different from 
Lam Chit Man I, Yat Cheong did not defend itself in the Long Gang Court. On December 
15, 2000, the Court made a judgment favourable to the Mainland company. Yat Cheong 
did not appeal to an intermediate people’s court in due course, so the Long Gang 
judgment became final under Mainland law.  
On November 6, 2000, Yat Cheong brought an action against the Mainland 
company in front of a Master in Hong Kong for the same cause of action that had been 
decided in Long Gang Court. On January 16, 2001, the Master decided that unless Yat 
Cheong would successfully set aside the Long Gang judgment within 28 days, its claims 
should be dismissed because they had been decided by the Long Gang judgment. In other 
words, the Master recognized the Long Gang judgment; therefore, he held that Hong 
Kong court should not re-consider the claims that had been decided by the Mainland 
judgment. Yat Cheong appealed to the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong against the 
                                                        
258 Lam Chit Man II. 
259 Long Gang District is in Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, Mainland China. 
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Master’s order. The Court of First Instance held that it was improper for Hong Kong 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over this case for two reasons: first, all the disputes took 
place in Shenzhen City Mainland China and the real estate in question was also located 
there; second, a court in Mainland China had made a judgment over the same cause of 
action.  
Yat Cheong appealed to the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong. The Court of Appeal 
reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and the Master’s order. The Court 
held that according to Chiyu under the Mainland procedure for trial supervision the 
people’s court that renders a “final” judgment retains the power to reverse this judgment 
under some circumstances in the future, so the so-called “final” judgment is not final 
under Hong Kong law. The Court also held that foreign law should be deemed as facts in 
Hong Kong courts, and the decision or finding of a foreign law by a Hong Kong court 
could be used as an evidence of this foreign law in later cases, unless the contrary is 
proved.260 Therefore, the finding of the Mainland procedure for trial supervision in Chiyu 
should be applied to this case. In other words, because no opposite evidence regarding 
Mainland law had been submitted, the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong assumed that the 
Mainland procedure for trial supervision has undergone no changes since Chiyu was 
decided in 1996. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Rong Gang judgment is not 
final and Hong Kong court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the case.  
Notably, in both Lam Chit Man I and II, Yat Cheong has never tried to bring a 
retrial himself or request a prosecutor to lodge a protest on his behalf in Mainland China, 
but the Hong Kong Court of Appeal holds that this is insufficient to make the Chiyu 
doctrine inapplicable to this case, because Mainland law imposes no time limit for a 
                                                        
260 Lam Chit Man II, para 16-26. 
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prosecutor to lodge a retrial protest against a judgment. A later case further illustrates 
Hong Kong courts’ strong opinion about the universal applicability of the Chiyu doctrine: 
the Chiyu doctrine should be applied so a Mainland judgment is not final, “unless and 
until it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the [Hong Kong] court that no such 
protest would be made by the relevant authority [in any time.]”261 Therefore, debtors can 
succeed in Hong Kong enforcement proceedings by merely invoking the Chiyu doctrine 
even without making any efforts to initiate the Mainland procedure for trial supervision.  
Moreover, Lam Chit Man I and II also demonstrate that the Chiyu doctrine 
encourages forum shopping. A Hong Kong party can sue its Mainland counterpart in 
Mainland China first. If it wins, it enforces the judgment in the Mainland; if it loses, it 
can bring an action against the same party in Hong Kong. For example, in Lam Chit Man 
I, Yat Cheong defended the merits of the case in a Mainland court but lost. Then it 
brought a case on the same cause of action against the winning party of the Mainland 
judgment in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong action was allowed to proceed. Therefore, 
obviously, Yat Cheong is allowed to bite the same apple twice. In Lam Chit Man II, Yat 
Cheong ignored the Mainland proceedings completely and concentrated on the Hong 
Kong proceedings, because as a Hong Kong company, suing in Hong Kong certainly 
gave it advantages. Overall, Yat Cheong conducted an obvious forum shopping and 
succeeded!  
Lam Chit Man I and II also vividly illustrate how the Chiyu doctrine encourages re-
litigations (or parallel litigations) in Hong Kong. Being permissive to re-litigation might 
facilitate parties to safeguard their rights and interests when the opposing party has assets 
for enforcement only in the place where the litigation is conducted. However, costs of re-
                                                        
261 Chan Chow Yuen v Nangyang Commercial Bank Trustee Limited, and et al. HCAP 4/2002, para 10. 
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litigation, the risks of inconsistent judgments, and the uncertainty of enforcement, will 
only worsen, instead of alleviate, disputes between parties. Neither Mainland China nor 
Hong Kong would recognize or enforce a sister-region judgment if it has rendered a 
judgment on the same cause of action. Therefore, in both Lam Chit Man I and II, neither 
Mainland judgments nor Hong Kong judgments would be recognized or enforced by the 
other side. Except that Yat Cheong can find enough properties of the two Mainland 
companies in Hong Kong, it will not be able to satisfy its Hong Kong judgments. So are 
the two Mainland companies. The disputes between them remain unsolved although 
tremendous amount of time and money has been spent on the litigations. This situation 
will discourage business between the two regions.  
 
6. The Preferable Minority Approach in Hong Kong Courts 
 
Chiyu has not been unanimously accepted by all the judges in Hong Kong courts. 
Minority opinions are more convincing. For example, in a forum non conveniens case, the 
plaintiff alleged that Mainland judgments were never final so Mainland courts were less 
convenient than Hong Kong courts.262 The Hong Kong court rejected this argument 
because this allegation was “blinkered and partial.”263 The court further ruled that the 
plaintiff’s “criticisms against the Supervision Procedure in Mainland China amount to no 
more than a comparison between the Hong Kong system with the Mainland system and 
an invitation to the court to find that the local system is better than, or superior to, the 
Mainland system. This is precisely the sort of exercise which the court should not embark 
                                                        
262 New Link Consultants Ltd v. Air China, [2004] H.K.C. 169 (C.F.I.), para 93. This allegation was made by the 
plaintiff’s legal aspect Professor Nanping Liu. 
263 New Link Consultants, [2004] H.K.C. 169 (C.F.I.), para 96. 
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upon.”264 This decision should be praised because imposing the Hong Kong criterion of 
finality to Mainland judgments results from an unjustifiable comparison of the two 
systems. Therefore, a judgment that is final and enforceable in Mainland China should be 
regarded as final in Hong Kong JRE proceedings. 
Li You Rong v. Li Rui Qiong was a 2004 case.265 It concerned the question whether 
a Mainland judgment was final if it was made by an appellate People’s Court and 
affirmed in retrial. The dissenting judge in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held that the 
Mainland judgment was final and should be recognized.266 In his view, Hong Kong 
courts should not deny JRE because of a theoretical likelihood that a retrial may be 
brought in Mainland China.267 He held that after Mainland China adopted the policy of 
restricting retrials and of respecting the finality of judgments,268 it was practically 
impossible for the judgment debtor in this case to bring the retrial again.269 However, the 
majority remanded the case partly on the procedural ground that the legal effects of the 
new Mainland policy were unclear.270 This dissenting opinion should be applauded 
because it is correctly based on the practical possibility of retrial in Mainland China, 
instead of the theoretical possibility that adopted by the Chiyu doctrine. 
 
7. Proposed Solutions to the Finality Dispute 
 
There are three solutions to the finality dispute. The first two solutions require 
                                                        
264 Id. 
265 Li You Rong v. Li Rui Qiong, CACV 159/2004, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/legal_ref/judgments.htm 
accessed on January 7, 2010. 
266 Id, para 81.  
267 Id, para 75.  
268 For how this policy decreased retrials in Mainland China, see supra fn 240. 
269 Li You Rong, para 66, 68, 69, and 75.  
270 Id, paras 27 and 36.  
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amending relevant regional laws in Hong Kong and Mainland China. The third solution 
involves two interregional law approaches. They attempt to use the proposed Multilateral 
JRE Arrangement to fundamentally solve the finality dispute between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China.   
 
a. Amend Hong Kong Law 
 
The first solution would be for Hong Kong courts to abandon the Chiyu doctrine. 
The Mainland judgment in Chiyu should be treated final until a court with competent 
jurisdiction orders to retry the case and to suspend the enforcement of the original 
judgment.271 Accordingly, the Chiyu court should recognize and enforce the Mainland 
judgment and should stay the enforcement proceedings only when a Mainland court 
orders to retry the case.272 Suppose that the retrial is conducted by the original first-
instance court, the retrial judgment will be treated as a first-instance judgment; therefore, 
it will become final if no appeal is filed within fifteen days after the issuance of the 
judgment.273 If no appeal is filed, this judgment should be treated final so recognizable 
and enforceable in Hong Kong. Moreover, suppose that the retrial is conducted by the 
original second-instance court or any other higher courts, the retrial judgment should be 
treated final when it is issued. Therefore, it is recognizable and enforceable in Hong 
Kong. This suggestion can solve the finality dispute and help to enforce Mainland 
                                                        
271 See art. 10 of the 2006 Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. Professor Philip Smart prefers using the date that a 
prosecutor lodges a protest as the time point when a judgment loses its finality. See Smart, supra note_195_ at 267. 
However, there are maximum thirty days between a prosecutor lodges a protest and a court orders to retry the case 
according to art. 188 of the Mainland CPL. Therefore, the time point that a judgment loses its finality should be when a 
court orders to retry the case.  
272 See Smart, supra note_195_ at 267-68. 
273 Art. 186 of the Mainland CPL. 
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judgments in Hong Kong.  
Alternatively, Professor Philip Smart recommended a way to change the judicial 
practice in Hong Kong regarding the recognition and enforcement of Mainland 
judgments:274 
 
 The better approach, and one which it is submitted is fully justified by the common 
law authorities, would be to grant Order 14 judgment [summary judgment275] in 
favour of the plaintiff (except where, of course, the defendant raises genuine and 
substantial objections to enforcement, such as on the grounds of fraud or a denial of 
natural justice), but to stay or limit execution against the defendant’s assets in Hong 
Kong. So that, in an appropriate case, moneys would be held in court and would not 
be paid out to the plaintiff until after the determination of any application for a retrial 
or attempt to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the prosecutor. The possibility of 
repeated but groundless applications to the prosecutor by a defendant could easily be 
provided for by appropriate undertakings on the part of the defendant or plaintiff. 
 
 
 b. Amend the Mainland CPL 
 
The second solution would be for Mainland China to revise its procedure for trial 
supervision and to forbid a judgment-rendering court from reopening its own judgments. 
This is because essentially the key conflicts between the Mainland procedure for trial 
supervision and the finality criteria under Hong Kong law is that the former permits the 
court that rendered a judgment to reopen the case either sua sponte or based on a 
prosecutor's or a party's requirement. For example, the Chiyu court emphasizes the 
Mainland judgment is not final for the purpose of recognition and enforcement by Hong 
Kong courts because it “is not final and unalterable in the [Mainland] court which 
                                                        
274 Smart, supra note_195_ at 269. 
275 For Order 14 judgment, see CAMILLE CAMERON & ELSA KELLY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
HONG KONG 131-134, 331-32, 426 (2 ed. 2008). 
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pronounced it. (Emphasis added).”276 The English precedent Gustave Nouvion also held 
that a final judgment should not be revisited by the court that pronounced it, and, in cases 
that the judgment is erroneous, it should be a higher court with jurisdiction to reopen the 
case.277  
 The 2007 Mainland CPL largely narrows the circumstances that a judgment-
rendering court may reopen its own judgment from three aspects. First,  generally retrials 
should be conducted by a court higher than the judgment-rendering court.278 This aims to 
make retrial more convincing for the parties.279 Only when it more proper for the 
judgment-rendering court than a higher court to retry the case, the latter may authorize 
the latter to conduct retry.280 This refers to circumstances such as undue process that may 
affect correct adjudication of a case or when a higher court holds the judgment-rendering 
court should retry the case.281 The newly added Article 181 of the Mainland CPL requires 
that when a retrial is commenced by parties’ motion, the retrial should be conducted by 
an intermediate people’s court or a people’s court at a higher level.282 This provision 
forbids a district people's court from retrying its own judgments as long as the retrial is 
brought by a party. Second, the new Article 188 sets a default rule that if the retrial 
motion is submitted by a prosecutor, the court rendered the original judgment shall not 
conduct retrials except in limited circumstances according to the law. Those 
                                                        
276 Chiyu, [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 395 (H.C.). 
277 Nouvion, (1889) 15 App Cas 1, per Lord Herschell and Lord Watson. 
278 Art. 27 of Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Souli Minshi Zaishen Anjian de Ruogan Yijian de Tongzhi 
[Supreme People's Court's Notice on Accepting Civil Retrial Cases], Fafa [2009] No. 26. April 27, 2009. Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Shixin Minshi Zaisheng Anjian Xingui Fuzheren Da Dizhe Wen [Supreme People's Courts' Answers to 
the Press Regarding the New Rules on Retrial in Civil Cases], http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2009-
06/01/content_17863050.htm (last visited July 15, 2010).?
279 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Shixin Minshi Zaisheng Anjian Xingui Fuzheren Da Dizhe Wen [Supreme People's Courts' 
Answers to the Press Regarding the New Rules on Retrial in Civil Cases]. 
280 Id.  
281  Art. 28 of Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Souli Minshi Zaishen Anjian de Ruogan Yijian de Tongzhi 
[Supreme People's Court's Notice on Accepting Civil Retrial Cases]. 
282 Art. 181 para 2 of the Mainland CPL. 
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circumstances are: new evidence is found; the facts, which the original judgment is based 
on, have no evidence to support; or the original judgment is based on forged evidence or 
uncross-examined evidence.283 Third, under the 2007 Mainland CPL a judgment-
rendering court cannot sua sponte reopen its own judgments unless it finds a definite 
error in the judgment itself.284 If a judge finds a definite error in a judgment that he or she 
made, this judge should refer this case to the president of the court and the president 
needs to ask the permission of the adjudication committee to reopen the case.285 As a 
conclusion, only in rare circumstances, a judgment-rendering court can reopen its own 
judgment under the procedure for trial supervision. That is no Hong Kong case law yet 
demonstrating the 2007 CPL has soothed Hong Kong's concern regarding the finality of 
Mainland judgments. Therefore, Mainland China should consider explicitly and 
completely banning a judgment-rendering court from reopening its own judgments in any 
event. Retrials should be conducted by a court at the next higher level or a court at the 
same level but in another district.  
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement has made the first effort in this direction. 
Article 2.2 of the Arrangement indicates that, “where a case is to be retried by a Mainland 
court in accordance with the law after an application for recognition and enforcement of 
the judgment in the same case has been filed with a Hong Kong court, the case shall be 
brought up for retrial by a people’s court one level higher than the court which made the 
legally effective judgment” (emphasis added).286 Therefore, if a people's court reopens its 
own judgment, the retrial judgment cannot be recognized and enforced under the 
                                                        
283 Arts. 179 and 188 of the Mainland CPL.  
284 Id, art. 177. 
285 Id. 
286 Art. 2.2 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
 228 
Arrangement. This provision also limits the retrials under Article 10 paragraph 2.287 
Discouraging a judgment-rendering Mainland court from reopening its own judgments 
may also have other benefits. For example it may guarantee a retrial judgment free from 
defects that may taint the original trial.  
As a conclusion, Mainland China should amend the CPL to restrict a judgment-
rendering Mainland court from reopening its own judgments. 
 
c. Interregional Law Approaches:  
Provide an Autonomous Terminology for Finality 
 
In order to avoid the finality dispute, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
avoids words used by regional laws, namely, "legally effective" in the Mainland CPL and 
the "final and conclusive" in the Hong Kong JRE law. Instead, it uses a new term, 
“enforceable final judgments”, as a requirement for JRE.288 Three types of judgments are 
“enforceable final judgments” for the case of Mainland China: (1) any judgment rendered 
by the Supreme People’s Court289 and an appellate court,290 (2) judgments where the time 
limit to appeal has expired and no appeal has been filed,291 (3) judgments rendered after 
the case is reviewed by the people’s court at the next higher level in accordance with the 
procedure for trial supervision.292 In the case of Hong Kong, “enforceable final 
                                                        
287 Id, at para 2 art. 10. This provision indicates "Where a local people's court in Mainland China makes a decision of 
retrying a case for which a decision has been made, or where the Supreme People's Court makes such a decision, upon 
verification, a Hong Kong court may suspend the recognition and enforcement procedure, and resume the procedure if 
all or part of the decision is sustained after retrial, or terminate the procedure if the decision is completely overruled 
after retrial." 
288 Art. 2 of the Mainland-Hong Kong  Arrangement. 
289 Art.2(1)(i) of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
290 Id, art.2(1)(ii)  
291 Id, art.2(1)(ii)  
292 Id, art.2(1)(ii)  
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judgments” refers to any legally effective judgment rendered by the Court of Final 
Appeal, the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance of the High Court and the 
District Court.293 The Mainland implementing legislation uses the term "enforceable final 
judgments".294 But the Hong Kong implementing legislation, the Mainland Judgments 
Ordinance, requires that "the judgment is final and conclusive as between the parties to 
the judgment; and the judgment is enforceable in the Mainland."295 A Hong Kong scholar 
asks whether the test of "enforceable and final" is the same as that of "final, conclusive, 
and enforceable."296 Although different opinions exist,297 this scholar believes these two 
tests are different.298 Therefore, the different wordings between the Arrangement and the 
Hong Kong implementing legislation have created confusions.  
What brings more confusion is that no uniformity exists between the Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement and Mainland-Macao Arrangement. Although the latter does 
not adopt the term "final judgment" because this term is not used by the regional laws in 
Mainland China and Macao,299 it uses "effective judgment" instead. Namely, only if a 
judgment is effective, it can be recognized and enforced under the Arrangement.300 
However, this Arrangement does not define "effective." Article 3 of the Arrangement 
indicates 
In respect to an effective judgment rendered by the court of one region and with 
the content of performance, the party involved can file an application for 
recognition and enforcement with the competent court of the other region. 
                                                        
293 Id, art.2(2). 
294 The Mainland implementing legislation is identical to the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, except the statute of 
limitation. 
295 Cap 597, s 5 (2) (c) and (d). 
296 Zhang, supra note_3_ at 14-15. 
297 Id. (indicating that "Madam Tsang of the Department of Justice took the view that under the Ordinance a mainland 
judgment is final and conclusive if falls into the enumerated list where no appeal is allowed or the time limit for appeal 
has expired or it is the decision of the second instance. This view seems to equate 'finality' with 'final judgment with 
enforceability'.) 
298 Id. at 15. 
299 See Section B of Chapter III. 
300 Art. 3 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
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The wording of this article seems to require the requested court to apply the law of the 
judgment-rendering region to determine whether the judgment is effective. However, the 
absence of an explicit definition of "effective" will possibly cause controversies in 
practice.  
Considering that the criteria of finality adopted by Mainland China and Hong Kong 
are in a sharp contrast, and that the two Arrangements use different wordings, the 
proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should provide uniformity. Arguably, the 
proposed Arrangement should avoid using any of following terms that have been used in 
either regional or interregional laws: "enforceable final judgments", "legally enforceable 
judgments", "effective judgments", "final and conclusive judgments" or "definite 
judgments." It should create a new term and all implementing regional legislations should 
adopt this term.301 The following term may be considered: "qualified judgments under 
this Arrangement." Importantly, the term chosen should be an autonomous terminology.  
Adopting autonomous terminology is a good solution to reconcile the differences 
between legal traditions. An autonomous terminology refers to a terminology whose 
meaning is disengaged from the special understandings that might be associated with it 
under a regional law or an international legal instrument that a region ratified.302 In other 
words, the interpretation of a certain word or phrase in an interregional legal instrument 
                                                        
301 For confusions arising from different terms used in the interregional arrangement and regional implementing 
legislations, see Zhang, supra note_3_ at 13-15 (arguing that the test of "final judgment with enforceability" in the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement should be different from the test of "final, conclusive and enforceable judgment" in 
the Mainland Judgment Ordinance).  
302 GEORGE A. BERMANN & ROGER J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 1390 (2nd ed. ed. 
2002). See also Ulrich Magnus, Introduction, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 31-32 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter 
Mankowski ed. 2007) (indicating that interpreting the Brussels Convention and Regulation by autonomous meanings 
have two aspects: “First, questions of doubt were principally to be answered without redress to a specific national law 
but from an insofar autonomous, to some extent supra-national viewpoint...[s]econdly, the construction of terms and 
the gap-filling of the Convention was  to be inferred from the Convention itself generally also without any redress to 
other international legislative instruments…”) (internal citation omitted). 
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should not depend on the law of one or more of the regions concerned, but, first and 
foremost, on the legal instrument itself.303 Using autonomous terminologies to define 
terms or phrases in a legal instrument has valuable benefits. It can prevent the instrument 
from being subject to various regional laws, can increase certainty and predictability, can 
simplify the interpretation process, and also can ensure that the instrument will be applied 
in the way that it is intended to be applied.304  
The benefits of using autonomous terminologies to ensure legal certainty and 
transparency in interregional JRE can be observed in the case law of the ECJ, which has 
interpreted many terms and phrases in the Brussels Convention and Regulation in this 
way.305 For example, the Convention and Regulation does not define the phrase “civil and 
commercial matters.” In a German JRE proceeding involving a Belgian monetary 
judgment, a German appeal court asked the ECJ whether, for purposes of interpreting the 
term “civil and commercial matters,” reference should be made to the law of the state 
where the judgment was rendered or to the law of the state where enforcement is sought. 
The Court held that an autonomous definition should be given to this phrase: 306 
 
The concept in question must…be regarded as independent and must be interpreted 
by reference, first to the objectives and scheme of the convention and, secondly, to 
the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems. 
 
Similarly, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should adopt an autonomous 
                                                        
303 See Bermann, supra 297 at 1386.  
304 Case C-29/76 Ltu Lufttransportunternehmen GMBH & CO. KG V. Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541, 1556. 
305 Magnus, supra note 297 at 31-33. Examples of autonomous interpretation can be found in Case C-125/92 Mulox 
IBC Ltd. V. Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, I-4102 para. 10; Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde et al. v. Master 
of the Vessel “Suhadiwarno Panjan” [1999] ECR I-6307, I-6347 et seq. para. 11; Case C-271/00 Gemeente 
Steenbergen v. Luc Baten [2002] ECR I-10489, I-10519 para. 28. Only a few exceptions to the autonomous 
interpretation exist. One is the place of performance, which can be interpreted according to the applicable national law, 
Case 12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dumlop AG [1976] ECR 1473. 
306 Eurocontrol, [1976] ECR 1541, 1550. 
 232 
terminology for "finality" in the arrangement-making process. In implementation, 
regional courts should strictly adapt to the autonomous terminology and avoid the 
influences from regional laws. They should consult or seek coordination from the 
interregional mechanism that is established to facilitate interregional judicial 
assistance.307  
Supposed that the term "qualified judgments under this arrangement" is chosen, it 
may be defined as follows:  
 
 a. in Mainland China:  
1. a judgment rendered by the Supreme People’s Court;  
2. a judgment rendered by a higher people’s court, an intermediate people’s 
court or a district people’s court308, when appeal is not allowed for the first 
instance judgment or no appeal is made within the prescribed time limit, or an 
effective second-instance judgment; or  
3. a retrial judgment rendered after the case is reviewed by the people’s court 
other than the one rendered the previous judgment in accordance with the 
procedure for trial supervision. 
 
b. In Hong Kong: a judgment rendered by the Court of Final Appeal, the Court 
of Appeal of the High Court, the Court of First Instance, or the District Court. 
 
c. In Macao: a judgment rendered by the Court of Final Appeal, the 
                                                        
307 For details of this mechanism, see Section B of Chapter VI. 
308 Regarding whether the district people's courts should be restricted to those has been delegated jurisdiction over the 
first instance of a civil or commercial case involving foreign, Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan affairs, see Part iii of 
Section A of Chapter V. 
 233 
Intermediate Court, or the Court of First Instance.  
 
 If a retrial occurs in Mainland China against a judgment that is under Hong Kong or 
Macao JRE proceedings, the Hong Kong or Macao court may suspend the proceedings, 
and resume it if all or part of the Mainland judgment is sustained after retrial, or 
terminate it if the Mainland judgment is completely overruled after retrial. If an appeal 
occurs in Hong Kong against a judgment that is under Mainland or Macao JRE 
proceedings, the Mainland or Macao court may suspend the proceedings, and resume it if 
all or part of the Hong Kong judgment is sustained after appeal, or terminate it if the 
Hong Kong judgment is completely reversed after appeal. 
 
Apply the Law of the Judgment-Rendering Region 
 
As an alternative to an autonomous terminology for finality, the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement may require a requested court to apply the law of the 
judgment-rendering region to determine the finality of a judgment. This lesson is drawn 
from US law.309 Chinese regions may consider requiring a requested court to determine 
finality according to the law of the judgment-rendering region. If a retrial happens in 
Mainland China, requested courts in sister regions may suspend the recognition and 
enforcement proceedings upon the result of the Mainland retrial. If an appeal against a 
Hong Kong judgment has been filed, requested courts in sister regions may stay the 
recognition and enforcement proceedings upon the Hong Kong appeal. Applying the law 
of the judgment-rendering region also can solve the finality dispute. However, an 
                                                        
309 See supra Problems of Chiyu.  
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autonomous terminology of finality brings more clarity and less need to look into sister-
region laws. Therefore, the latter is preferable than the former.  
 
C. Weak Mutual Trust 
 
Free circulation of judgments is based on the mutual trust of each other’s legal 
system. The two existing Arrangements have shown the growth of mutual trust between 
Mainland China, and Hong Kong and Macao, respectively.310 For example, The 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement requires that a requested court should invoke the law 
of the judgment-rendering court to determine whether a sister-region judgment is 
achieved by fair procedures. Compared with Hong Kong regional JRE law that requires 
the application of Hong Kong law to determine the fairness of the judgment-rendering 
proceedings, the Arrangement shows more respect to sister regions. However, even 
though Chinese regions were reunited ten years ago, mutual trust between the three 
regions remains fragile. For example, after the conclusion of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement, the Hong Kong business community expressed deep worries about 
exposing Hong Kong businessmen to judgments obtained through fraudulent means in 
Mainland courts.311  
Absent mutual trust, an effective broad scope Multilateral JRE Arrangement will 
never be developed among Chinese regions. We should acknowledge the lack of trust 
among Chinese regions, particularly between Mainland China and Hong Kong, and 
should discuss what can be done to improve trust. Otherwise, a far-reaching interregional 
                                                        
310 For details, see Chapter III. 
311 Xianchu Zhang & Philip Smart, Development of Regional Conflict of Laws: On the Arrangement of Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters between Mainland China and Hong Kong 
SAR,  36 HONG KONG L. J. 553, 578 (2006). See GRAEME JOHNSTON, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN HONG KONG 122 (2005).  
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arrangement will only deter the incentives of smaller regions, namely Hong Kong and 
Macao. The English dissatisfaction towards the Brussels I Regulation and the failed 
Hague Judgment Convention illustrate the importance of creating mutual trust.312 This 
section proposes two solutions to increase mutual trust among Chinese regions: 
improving Mainland judicial system and enhancing interregional legal education and 
communication. 
 
i. Improving the Mainland Judicial System 
 
Weak mutual trust between Mainland China and its sister regions comes from a 
presumption that the Mainland judicial system is incompetent due to factors such as the 
lack of judicial independence,313 local protectionism,314 and other issues.315 However, a 
recent study proves that in Guangdong Province, which has the closest economic tie with 
Hong Kong and Macao, this presumption is incorrect in enforcing civil and commercial 
                                                        
312 For the reasons why English scholars appear unenthusiastic about the harmonization of private international law in 
the EU, such as Brussels I Regulation, see Harris, supra note_137_ at 370. For the failed Hague Judgment Convention, 
see Peter Trooboff, Ten (and probably more) difficulties in Negotiating a Worldwide Convention on International 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: 
LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 263, 268-69 (John J. Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont ed. 2002).  
313 Q J Kong, Enforcement of Hong Kong SAR Court Judgments in the People’s Republic of China, 49 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 867, 870 (2000) (discussing that in China administrative 
power dominates political and social affairs, so judgment enforcement more reflect the interests of political and senior 
leaders’ interests instead of legislators’. Therefore, judgment enforcement is often interfered by politically influential 
parties.) 
314 See Wang, supra note_10_ at 384-85. See Kong, supra n 308 at 870. See J A Cohen, Reforming China’s Civil 
Procedure: Judging the Courts, 45 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 793, 779-800 (1997). See also D M 
Rosenberg, Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitration awards in the People’s Republic of China, in SELECTED TOPICS 
IN CHINESE BUSINESS LAW 57-8 (Howard Chao ed., 1996) (observing “strong local protectionism makes out-of-locality 
enforcement quite difficult for creditors).  
315 Other problems include incompetent judges, the phenomenon of relationship [guanxi] in China and corruption of 
local courts. See Cohen, supra note 309 at 794-97, 801-02. See also Rosenberg, supra note 309 at 58-9 (indicating the 
difficulty in freezing a debtor’s bank account and observing small market exists for the seized items, therefore a 
creditor may find it difficult to realize its rights). See A A Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China 
from a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 757, 759 
(describing collecting monetary judgments in Mainland China is like a frustrating cat-and-mouse game). 
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judgments.316 Nevertheless, undeniably Mainland China still needs to make tremendous 
efforts in reforming its judicial system before gaining mutual trust from its sister regions. 
Improving Mainland judicial system is a broad topic and has been much debated in 
scholarship. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide solutions in details. The 
point is this: on the one hand, Mainland China needs to make serious efforts in reforming 
its judicial system by enhancing judicial independence, reducing local protectionism, and 
training judges, etc; on the other hand, Hong Kong and Macao need to acknowledge the 
achievements that Mainland China has made in improving its judicial system and 
modernizing its laws.317 If Hong Kong and Macao rigidly adhere to the stereotypical 
negative presumption towards Mainland China and disregard Mainland achievements, no 
mutual trust can be built. 
Regarding interregional JRE, in Mainland China, not every court has jurisdiction 
over cases involving interregional elements. As for district courts, only those located in 
economic and technological development zones enjoy first-instance jurisdiction over 
such cases,  and they generally enjoy a better reputation for fair trial than courts in rural 
China.318 The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement restricts judgments to those rendered 
by these Mainland district courts and higher courts.319 This approach should be adopted 
by the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement in order to help soothe sister-regions’ 
                                                        
316 He, supra note_84_ at 421-55 (proving “with a diversified local economy, local governments have less incentive to 
help specific enterprises and thus local protectionism decreases; general judicial reforms aimed at building institutions 
and increasing the professionalism of the judiciary have been implemented; and specific measures to strengthen 
enforcement have been put into place.”) 
317 For detailed discussion regarding how Mainland China modernizing its laws after entry the WTO, see supra Part i of 
Section A of Chapter IV. 
318 Arts. 1 and 5 of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil 
and Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements, adopted at the 1203rd meeting of the Judicial Committee of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Dec. 25, 2001, and effective on Mar. 1, 2002. 
319 See the second attachments to the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
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concerns on the quality of Mainland judgments.320 Moreover, in order to incentivize 
Hong Kong to participate in a broad scope Multilateral JRE Arrangement, Mainland 
China need reform its procedure for trial supervision and solve the finality dispute, as 
well as accept common-law concepts such as fraud as a heading for denying JRE in the 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement.321 
 
ii. Enhancing Interregional Legal Education and Communication 
 
Conceptual and doctrinal differences between national legal systems complicated 
the negotiation of a broad scope judgment convention at The Hague.322 Delegates were 
sceptical about each other's legal systems.323 In Arthur von Mehren's word, "Nor is it easy 
to persuade jurists...that change is desirable. Better the devil we know--and have learned 
to live with--than the devil we know not."324 The divergences between the English 
common-law system and the European continental civil-law system make the UK doubt 
the European harmonization of private international law and harm the mutual trust 
between the UK and other EU members.325 Similarly, the divergences between the legal 
systems in three Chinese regions also cause weak interregional mutual trust. Put in simple 
terms, the three regions do not trust each other partly because they are unfamiliar with 
each other’s legal systems. So, enhancing interregional legal communication is extremely 
important. The Mainland-Macao Arrangement has made a valuable effort. It authorizes a 
                                                        
320 See infra Part iii of Section A of Chapter V. 
321 For detailed discussion of fraud, see infra Part iv of Section C of Chapter V. 
322 Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments 
Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW191, 201 (Spring 2001). 
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325 See Harris, supra note 137 at 352-53, 359-363, 364-367. 
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requested court to directly contact a judgment-rendering court in the other region to 
verify the genuineness of the judgment.326 Moreover, it also requires the Supreme 
People’s Court and the Court of Final Appeal of Macao to provide each other with legal 
materials related to the implementation of the Arrangement and to inform each other of 
the results in implementation every year.327 Such communication channels will 
tremendously enhance interregional understandings. However, they are, regretfully, 
absent in the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. Like the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement, the Multilateral JRE Arrangement should also establish similar 
communication channels among regional courts.328 Nevertheless, the two existing 
Arrangements do not provide detailed information regarding how the communication 
channel operates.329  
In China, interregional legal education and communication has attracted wide 
attentions. Early in 1999, Mainland Professor Juan Shen made a proposal to enhance 
interregional legal education.330 She proposed that each region should send judges or civil 
servants in the judicial department to work in other regions.331 She proposed two possible 
channels. One is to establish regular visiting programs, so judges or civil servants can 
visit their counterparts in other regions.332 As an alternative, Region A may establish a 
contact office for judicial assistance in Region B.333 Judges and civil servants from 
Region A will work in this contact office and learn the laws of region B.334 If courts in 
Region B need judicial assistance from Region A, they can directly contact this contact 
                                                        
326 See art. 7 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
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328 For details, see Section B of Chapter VI. 
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330 JUAN SHEN, ZHONGGUO QUJI FALV CHONGTU [CHINA INTERREGINOAL CONFLICT OF LAWS] (1999). 
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office.335 Advisably, it is a good idea to regularly arrange judges at the different levels to 
visit and work with their counterparts in other regions. This can help them become better 
acquainted with each other and understand each other's legal culture. Joint education of 
legal professionals has also raised the attention of the Supreme People's Court. In its 2004 
annual report, the Court stated that it had made efforts to arrange Mainland judges to 
study, visit, or communicate with their counterparts in Hong Kong and Macao.336 
Shen also observed that many challenges in the interregional conflicts come from 
the bad communication between the four regions. For example, it is difficult for people in 
one region to learn the law of another region.337 Or because of political disputes, regions 
have been isolated from one another; therefore, people in one region feel people in 
another region are strangers.338 Besides the exchange program discussed above, Shen 
proposed two other ways to solve these challenges. The first was to increase the exchange 
of scholars or students.339 This can help people in one region learn the law of the other.340 
Second, each region should allow residents in other regions to sit for the bar exam and to 
practice law after passing the bar there.341 Shen’s contribution lies in her detailed and 
feasible advice to improve communication and education among regions. Much of her 
advice has become realities today. For example, nowadays residents in Hong Kong and 
Macao are allowed to sit for the Mainland bar exam and practice law in Mainland China 
after passing the Mainland bar.342 The CEPA also enlarges exchange opportunities 
                                                        
335 Id., at 139-40. 
336 GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PRC 10 (April 2005). 
337 Shen, supra note 325, at 140. 
338 Id. 
339 Id. at 137. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. at 137-38. 
342 Residents in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan can take the Mainland bar exam, see 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1300/23229/2009/1/ji39014650171511900212320-0.htm (last visited April 15, 
2010). Mainland residents also can sit for Hong Kong and Macao bar exams. For Hong Kong bar exam information, 
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between legal professionals in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, respectively. For 
instance, Hong Kong law firms that have set up representative offices in the Mainland are 
allowed to operate in association with Mainland law firms, except in the form of 
partnership.343 Increasing education exchanges is another example. Up to 2010, the PRC 
Education Ministry has permitted eighteen universities in Hong Kong and Macao to 
recruit college students from Mainland China.344 More and more law students from 
Mainland China are enrolled in degree or visiting programs in universities in Hong Kong 
and Macao, and vice versa.345  
Moreover, Mainland professor Yongpin Xiao also proposes two methods to 
enhance legal cultural communication and education. The first method is bilingualism of 
Hong Kong's legislation and judicature.346 Xiao argues that Hong Kong statutes and case 
law were in English during its colonial period.347 The Basic Law designates both Chinese 
and English as the official languages.348 Therefore, translating Hong Kong law from 
English to Chinese is necessary.349 Bilingualism of Hong Kong's legislation and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
see http://www.hkba.org/admission-pupillage/general/index.html and for Macao bar exam information, see 
http://www.unesco.org.mo/eng/law/18legalProfession.html (last visited April 15, 2010). 
343 Liberalization Measures under CEPA, at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/tradeservices/leg_liberalization.html 
(last visited April 15, 2010). For comments, see Fan Wang, Hong Kong yu Neidi Kuajing Pochang de Falv Kuangjia 
Yanjiu [The Legal Framework for Trans-border Insolvency Cases between Mainland China and Hong Kong], 27 
ZHENGFA LUNTAN [TRIBUNE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW] 75, 78 (2009). Similar measures are applicable between 
Mainland China and Macao, see Mainland and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/edicoes/en/dse/cepa/ (last visited April 15, 2010). 
344 Neidi Xiangan Furen Xuewei, 18 Suo Gangao Gaoxiao Ke Neidi Zhaosheng [Mainland China and Hong Kong 
Mutual Recognition of Education Degree, 18 Hong Kong and Macao Universities are Permitted to Recruit Students in 
Mainland China],  (2010), http://edu.zjol.com.cn/05edu/system/2010/03/16/016423425.shtml (last visited Jun 1, 2010).  
345 In 2010, Macao universities will recruit 1594 students from Mainland China. See 
http://learning.sohu.com/20100412/n271456789.shtml (last visited April 15, 2010). In 2010, Hong Kong universities 
will recruite at least 1120 Mainland students. http://www.china.com.cn/info/zhuanti/09gaokao/2010-
03/05/content_19532665.htm (accessed on June 1, 2010). Guangyu Putong Gaodeng Xuexiao Zhaoshou he Peiyang 
Hong Kong, Macao, Yiji Taiwan Xueshen de Zanxin Guiding [Provisional Regulation on Mainland Universities Recurit 
and Train Students from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan] (Effective on March 1, 2006), 
http://www.gatzs.com.cn/gatzs/pz/zcfg/200603/20060301/395655.html (last visited April 15, 2010). For policies for 
Mainland students to study in Hong Kong, see http://www.studyinhk.net/guide/ug-ncee/faqs/year2010.aspx (last visited 
April 15, 2010).  
346 Yongpin, supra note_102_ at 193. 
347 Id. 
348 Art 9 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
349 Yongpin, supra note_102_ at 193-96. 
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judicature can also facilitate legal professionals from other regions to understand Hong 
Kong law.350 Second, Xiao argues that divergent legal cultures make translating Hong 
Kong law from English to Chinese difficult because351  
 
Hong Kong laws contain numerous legal terms denoting concepts that do not exist in 
the laws of Mainland China, it follows that there are no Chinese equivalents for such 
terms. On the other hand, some terms may be the same but have different meanings 
in the two jurisdictions, such as individual rights, the rule of law, judicial 
independence... 
 
Therefore, Xiao believes that improving comparative studies of the legal terminologies in 
Mainland China and Hong Kong is "the essential presupposition" of interregional legal 
cultural communication.352 Xiao's proposals are insightful and should be applicable to 
Macao as well. Considering the cost and time of translating all regional laws into three 
languages, regional laws in English or Portuguese should be first translated into Chinese. 
This is because Chinese is the official language in the three regions and spoken by 
majority of people there. Mainland China should support Hong Kong and Macao in 
financial or other ways for this endeavor. Additionally, legal academia in three regions 
should conduct more comparative studies to enhance mutual understanding. 
Hong Kong scholars also agree that interregional communication should be 
improved. Hong Kong Professor Xianchu Zhang expressed deep concern regarding the 
judicial fraud in Mainland China.353 He advocates that two regions should establish "a 
cross-border consultation and information exchange scheme" to "enable the Hong Kong 
court to access to needed information and verification, reflect issues and concerns for the 
                                                        
350 Id. at 193-96. 
351 Id. at 196. 
352 Yongpin, supra note_102_ at 196. 
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attention of the relevant authorities of the mainland, and obtain necessary assistance so 
that justice and public trust on the judiciary in Hong Kong can be ensured."354 Zhang's 
observation is correct. Court-to-court information exchange is crucially necessary to 
promote mutual trust in JRE.355 However, Zhang does not provide any solution to 
improve interregional legal communication and education.  
EU law provides good examples of enhancing interregional legal communication 
and education. They can serve as valuable guidance for China. As for communication, 
European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters can serve as a valuable 
reference for China.356 The Network is a non-bureaucratic structure and attempts to 
provide unofficial support to the courts and people involving in interregional 
litigations.357 It is composed by bodies in the member states, such as designated contact 
points, central authorities in charge of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial 
matters, liaison magistrates, and other judicial or administrative authority for judicial 
cooperation.358 The member states shall notify the European Commission full contacts 
information359 and the working languages360 of those bodies.361 The Network has two 
highlights. The first is contact points designated by member states for judicial assistance. 
They shall supply each other with information of and process requests for judicial 
                                                        
354 Id. at 22-23. 
355 For how to establish a court-to-court information exchange system in interregional JRE, see Part i of Section B of 
Chapter VI. 
356 COUNCIL DECISION OF MAY 28, 2001 ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
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cooperation.362 In case that a contact point is unable to respond to a request for 
information from another member of the Network, it shall forward it to the contact point 
that is best able to reply.363 They shall also meet regularly each half year to exchange 
information, identify best practices in judicial cooperation, and ensure the accessibility of 
information on judicial cooperation within the Network.364 The second highlight is that 
the European Commission shall construct and maintain365 an online public information 
system, including the European Judicial Network website,366 to facilitate people 
involving in interregional litigations.367 This system shall provide international, EU, and 
national legal instruments and case laws relating to judicial cooperation.368 This system 
also comprises practical and concise information sheets provided by member states, 
which provide most recent information on the national judicial systems, procedures for 
bringing cases to court, conditions for obtaining legal aid, national rules on service and 
JRE, alternative dispute-settlement possibilities, and organisations and operation of the 
legal professions in member states.369 All these information shall be translated into 
official languages of other member states.370 By September 30, 2009, the Network was 
composed of approximately 83 contact points and 335 central authorities, liaison 
magistrates, and other judicial or administrative authorities.371 The Network website 
provides 20 themes for 27 member states in 22 languages.372 From 2008 to 2009, the 
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average number of visitors (unique visitors) per month is 108,000 for a total of 274,000 
monthly page views.373 The Network facilitates international litigation and judicial 
cooperation between EU member states.374 From January 1, 2011, qualified professional 
associations in the member states will be able to become members of the Network and 
the contact points shall have appropriate contacts with them.375 Having lawyers working 
together with the Network will make judicial cooperation in the EU more effective.376?
The European Judicial Network offers valuable lessons for China. Based on its own 
situations, China may adopt the following three methods to enhance interregional legal 
communication.  
First, each region should formally designate a central authority in charge of 
interregional judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. Establishing central 
authorities for interregional judicial assistance does not mean that parties should send 
requests for judicial assistance to an authority and then the authority would forward the 
request to its counterpart in a sister region.377 A judgment creditor should be allowed to 
directly request a sister-region court where a judgment debtor's assets are located for 
enforcement.378 The major responsibility of a central authority is to solve problems 
arising from implementing arrangements and to coordinate with its sister-region 
counterparts for uniform interpretation of arrangements. Under the Convention of 18 
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,379 the 
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central authority for international judicial assistance in each of the three regions is: the 
Bureau of International Judicial Assistance of the PRC Ministry of Justice, 380 the Chief 
Secretary for Administration of Hong Kong,381 and the Procurator of the Procuratorate of 
Macau.382 On the contrary, currently, it is unclear what the central authority is for 
interregional judicial assistance in each region. The existing six arrangements on judicial 
assistance were negotiated between Mainland Supreme Court, Hong Kong or Macao 
judicial department, respectively. However, for solving problems arising from the 
implementation of the arrangements, the arrangements indicate different communication 
organs. Namely, Mainland Supreme People's Court and Hong Kong High Court,383 
Mainland Supreme People's Court and Macao Court of Final Appeal,384 Mainland 
Supreme People's Court and the representatives of Macau Special Administrative 
Region,385 or Mainland Supreme People's Court and the Hong Kong government.386 In 
practice, the Supreme People's Court takes charge of interregional judicial assistance in 
Mainland China.387 But it is unclear whether the central authorities in Hong Kong and 
Macao should be their Court of Final Appeal or the judicial or administrative department. 
Moreover, it appears that Hong Kong or Macao does not intend to appoint the same 
central authority of international judicial assistance for interregional affairs, because these 
                                                                                                                                                                     
April 15, 2010). 
380 Bureau of International Judicial Assistance, Ministry of Justice of the People's Republic of China 10 Chaoyangmen 
Nandajie, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100020, China. 
381 Chief Secretary for Administration of Hong Kong SAR, Central Government Offices, Lower Albert Road, Hong 
Kong, tel: (011) (852) 8102954. 
382 Procurator of the Procuratorate of Macau SAR, Alameda Dr. Carlos D''Assumpcao, NAPE, Edificio Comercial Tai 
Fung, 13, Regiao Administrativa Especial de Macau; tel: 853-797-8271, fax: 853-727-621. 
383 Eg., art.10 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement.  
384 Eg., art. 23 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.  
385 Eg., art. 24 of the Mainland-Macao Service and Evidence Arrangement and art. 15 of the Mainland-Macao 
Arbitration award Arrangement. 
386 Eg., art. 11 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arbitration award Arrangement. 
387 See Baoguo Jiang, Neidi yu Gang Ao Minshangshi Panjue Renke he Zhixin Anpai Bijiao Yanjiu [A Comparative 
Study on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments Arrangements between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong and Macao---with Special Reference to the Practices of Hong Kong], 113 FAXUE LUNTAN 
[LEGAL FORUM] 69, 70 (2007). 
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authorities have not been much involved in negotiating and implementing the existing 
arrangements. Therefore, it is necessary for Hong Kong and Macao to explicitly 
designate their highest court or the judicial or administrative department as their regional 
central authority for interregional judicial assistance.  
The second lesson that China can draw from the European Judicial Network is to 
establish contact points to facilitate interregional JRE. Each region may establish an 
interregional JRE office under the central authority or designate judges or civil servants 
in the central authority as contact points responsible for interregional JRE. These contact 
points can serve as the communication channels in the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement. They should respond to questions from other regions in a rapid and 
practical way and also should meet periodically for information exchange. Importantly, 
the contact points should coordinate to design a uniform information form for verification 
of sister-region judgments. In case that a requested court doubts the genuineness of a 
sister-region judgment, it can fill this form and submit it directly to the judgment-
rendering court for verification of the judgment.388 
The third lesson is to make interregional and regional laws easily accessible for the 
public. Central authorities should submit a report to each other annually, which comprises 
updated information regarding regional judicial systems, civil procedure, legal aid, rules 
on service and JRE, alternative dispute resolution procedures, organisations of legal 
professions, case law, and etc. This report should be available to the public from a 
website designated for interregional judicial assistance. The online information should be 
available at least in Chinese. Ideally, the website should provide information also in 
English and Portuguese; however, if it would be expensive to translate all information 
                                                        
388 See Section B of Chapter VI. 
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into three languages, the choice should be one language (Chinese) but more 
information.389 Currently, an urgent issue is that someone wanting to research JRE laws 
or conduct interregional litigation in China is overwhelmed by the divergences of legal 
systems involved and the difficulty of finding official versions of the texts. So this 
website aims to make the laws in one region more understandable and usable for the 
public, judges, and lawyers in the other region. Ultimately, persons in interregional 
litigation will have better access to justice. This website may be constructed and 
maintained jointly by central authorities, or by the proposed Interregional Coordination 
Organization.390 
Regarding interregional legal education, the EU experience also provides good 
examples for China. For instance, the European Judicial Training Network, founded in 
2000, constitutes the "principal platform and promoter for the development, training, and 
exchange of knowledge and competence of the EU judiciary."391 This Network aims to 
develop mutual trust between judges in member regions primarily by two types of 
judicial exchange programs.392 The first type is the exchange program for judges.393 It 
can be conducted by a two-week basis, where one or more visiting judges work with their 
counterparts in the courts' offices of other member states.394 Or in a three-month to one-
year program, visiting judges from member states work together at the ECJ, the European 
                                                        
389 See Joachim Bornkamm, The German Supreme Court: An Actor in the Global Conversation of High Courts, 39 TEX. 
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Court of Human Rights and Eurojust.395 The second type of program is the exchanges of 
trainers, where judicial trainers are hosted for one or two weeks by a judicial training 
institution of another member state to exchange experiences and best practices.396 
Arguably, Chinese regions may consider establishing a Judicial Training Network as well, 
because "legal uniformity is not merely a matter of existing norms. It is also a matter of 
whether the legal profession thinks and operates on a system-wide level."397 By working 
and studying together, judges will be able to get to know each other and comprehend 
each other's legal culture more effectively. In the long run, it will contribute legal 
harmonization among Chinese regions. 
 
D. Conclusion 
  
The ultimate goal of interregional JRE studies in China is to develop a Multilateral 
JRE Arrangement on the basis of the two current bilateral Arrangements. This Chapter 
aims to help solve the three most crucial macro challenges for interregional JRE in China. 
They are conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law, conflicts between civil law 
and common law, and weak mutual trust. This Chapter proposes detailed solutions for 
these challenges. Its major arguments can be summarized as follows:  
First, the argument that a crash between socialist law and capitalist law exists 
between Mainland China and its sister regions in the civil and commercial laws was made 
in 1989.398  Mainland China accessed to the WTO in 2001. Since then, in terms of civil 
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398 See supra Section A.  
 249 
and commercial law, Mainland China is in an ongoing process of reforming its laws to 
comply with the WTO standards. The survey of Mainland legislation and adjudication 
demonstrate that the conflicts between socialist law and capitalist law have significantly 
decreased in civil and commercial cases.399 Therefore, Mainland China should not deny 
JRE merely because judgments are rendered in capitalist Hong Kong and Macao, and 
vice versa.  
Second, the success of the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement will come from 
its ability in coordinating between the civil-law and common-law traditions. A good 
approach is to formulate autonomous terminologies for controversial terms such as 
finality. It should adopt the "start small" approach and avoid regulating direct jurisdiction.  
Last but not least, legal communication and education is important for enhancing 
mutual trusts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
399 See Yongpin, supra note_102_ at 198. See also Henry S. Gao, Taming the Dragon: China's Experience in the WTO 
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Chapter V  Selected Rules of the  
Proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
 
Chapter IV has demonstrated valuable lessons that China can draw from US and 
EU JRE laws for solving the three serious macro challenges for interregional JRE. These 
lessons can help design a Multilateral JRE Arrangement in terms of methodology.  
First, the approach of "start small" requires that the arrangement should be 
established by focusing on easier problems first and then gradually expanding to difficult 
issues. Therefore, this Chapter will propose a single enforcement arrangement and focus 
on the scope, the requirements for JRE, and the defenses for JRE in this proposed 
Arrangement. Direct jurisdiction, as an important subject for future study, will not be 
covered by this Arrangement at the current stage. Second, the following approaches can 
help make the proposed Arrangement acceptable to all regions: allowing the public policy 
exception, adopting autonomous terminologies for contentious concepts, and 
acknowledging some regional legal peculiarities, namely fraud and Mainland procedure 
for trial supervision.1 Third, the possibility of being accepted by each region and the 
feasibility of implementation in practice should be the touchstones for designing rules in 
this proposed Arrangement. Only by striking a balance between the big region (Mainland 
China) and smaller regions (Hong Kong and Macao), the proposed Arrangement can gain 
supports in practice. This Chapter attempts to serve as guidance for the three regions 
when they decide to combine the two existing arrangements and develop a new one.  
                                                
1 The Mainland procedure for trial supervision is related to the finality dispute. For details, See Part ii of Section B of 
Chapter IV. 
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This Chapter is divided into four sections. The First Section discusses the scope of 
the Proposed Multilateral Arrangement. The Second Chapter analyzes the requirements 
for JRE in this Arrangement. The Third Section explores the grounds for refusing JRE. 
The last Section is a summary. 
 
A. Scope 
 
The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should be broader than the current 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement in order to facilitate interregional commerce. Hong 
Kong can accept a broad-scope JRE arrangement, because the factors that cause Hong 
Kong to restrict the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement2 cannot be sustained 
any longer. These factors are: (1) The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is only the 
preliminary stage of interregional judicial assistance on JRE issues.3 Hong Kong would 
like to learn how this Arrangement would work in practice then to consider expanding its 
scope.4 (2) Hong Kong questions the judicial integrity of Mainland judges and 
practitioners.5 (3) Mainland China and Hong Kong have different criteria for finality.6 (4) 
It is difficult to execute judgments in Mainland China.7 Therefore, Hong Kong cannot 
benefit from a broad scope arrangement since Hong Kong judgments cannot be executed 
in Mainland China. However, these four reasons should not make a broad scope JRE 
arrangement unacceptable for Hong Kong.  
                                                
2 Hong Kong Legislative Council, LIFAHUI SIFA JI FALV SHIWU WEIYUANHUI HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGION YU NEIDI XIANFU ZHIXIN SHANGSHI PANJUE [LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, JUDICIAL AS WELL AS LEGAL AFFAIR 
COMMITTEE MUTUAL ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS BETWEEN HONG KONG SAR AND MAINLAND CHINA] 
(2006), CB (2) 1202/05-06 (02). 
3 Id. at para 3. 
4 Id. 
5 Id, at paras 5 and 25. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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The first reason, actually, emphasizes that the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
should be expanded. The Arrangement came into force in August 2008. Thus far, no 
judgment has been recognized and enforced under this Arrangement. This is due to the 
short period of time since its implementation and also because of its narrow scope.8 Lack 
of cases shows that the Arrangement is insufficient. It is also for Hong Kong's interests to 
establish a broad scope JRE arrangement because more Hong Kong judgments will be 
recognized and enforced in Mainland China, and also because Hong Kong will be able to 
become an interregional dispute resolution center.9  
Second, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement will provide grounds for 
refusing JRE such as fraud, unfair procedure, and the public policy exception. These 
grounds can protect Hong Kong debtors from Mainland judgments tainted by 
corruption.10 Mainland China should also make efforts to improve its judicial system.11 
Moreover, the two regions should enhance legal education and communication channels 
to increase mutual trust.12 All these measures can help sooth Hong Kong's concern 
regarding the qualities of Mainland judgments.  
                                                
8 Xianchu Zhang, Dui "Neidi Hong Kong Xianfu Renke he Zhixing Danshiren Xieyi Guanxia de Minshanshi Anjian 
Panjue de Anpai" de Chubu Pinjia [Preliminary Comments on the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutural Recognition and 
Enforcement Judgment Arrangement], 8 FAZHI LUNTAN [LEGAL SYSTEM FORUM] 51, 67-69 (2006). Xiangqian Zhu, 
Shipin "Guanyu Neidi yu Hong Kong SAR Xianfu Renke he Zhixin Danshiren Xieyi Guanxia de Minshangshi Anjian 
Panjue de Anpai" [Comments on the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement], FAZHI YU SHEHUI [LAW AND SOCIETY] 479, 
478 (2007). Yiling Lin, Neidi Hong Kong Minshanshi Anjian Xianfu Chengren yu Zhixing Wenti Chutan [Preliminary 
Analysis of Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments between Mainland China and 
Hong Kong],  CONSUME GUIDE 137, 138 (2007) (indicating the narrow scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
will restrict its use in practice). 
9 The Hong Kong Legislative Council acknowledged that:  
It is difficult to estimate the number of Mainland judgments that parties would seek to enforce in Hong Kong 
under the Arrangement, and to what extent the [Mainland-Hong Kong] Arrangement may encourage parties to 
choose HKSAR courts as the designated courts to determine their business disputes. Nevertheless, we do not 
envisage that the enforcement number will be large, at least at the initial stage of implementation, given the 
restricted scope and application of the Arrangement, the availability of other modes of disputes resolution, and 
the fact that not all judgment debtors have assets in Hong Kong worthy of execution.  
Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), Bills Committee on Mainland Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Bill Background Brief, appendix I para 10. 
10 See Hong Kong Legislative Council, supra note_2_ at para 25. 
11 For details, see Part i of Section C of Chapter IV. 
12 Id. 
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Third, different criteria for finality cannot block the establishment of a broad scope 
JRE arrangement. On the contrary, the proposed Arrangement can provide an 
autonomous terminology of finality, which is acceptable to Mainland China and Hong 
Kong.13 So it will ultimately solve the finality dispute between them.14  
Fourth, an authoritative empirical study has demonstrated that judgments are not 
difficult to execute in economically advanced areas in Mainland China.15 In 2007, 
Mainland China amended its CPL and issued a new judicial interpretation, aiming to 
improving judgment execution.16 Advisably, Supreme People's Court may require lower 
courts to prioritize executing sister-region judgments so as to soothe Hong Kong's 
concern. But in any event, the difficulty in executing judgments, alone, should not 
dissuade Hong Kong from concluding a broad scope JRE arrangement with Mainland 
China and Macao.  
Furthermore, lack of judicial integrity and difficulty of judgment execution in 
Mainland China cannot justify the rejection of a broad scope JRE arrangement, because 
these two factors are not even sustained in Hong Kong courts. For example, in a 2005 
forum non conveniens case, the plaintiff alleged that it could not get a fair trial in 
Mainland China because the defendant was a state-owned enterprise and Mainland courts 
would protect it.17 The Hong Kong court rejected this argument because of "absence of 
compelling evidence underpinning the general and pejorative conclusions presently 
                                                
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China, 57 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 419 (2009). 
16 Preamble of Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues concerning the Enforcement Procedures 
in the Application of the CPL (No. 13 [2008] of the Supreme People’s Court, adopted at the 1452nd meeting of the 
Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on September 8, 2008). 
17 Xingjiang Xingmei Oil-Pipeline Co. Ltd v. China Petroleum & Chemical Corp, [2005] 2 HKC 292, para 41. 
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asserted on behalf of the plaintiff."18 The plaintiff also argued that enforcing judgments 
against state-owned enterprises were difficult in Mainland China.19 The court rejected 
this argument too because this was only a speculative assertion and no evidence showed 
that the defendant was able to influence enforcement officials.20 This case demonstrates 
that Hong Kong courts would not uphold a general allegation that Mainland judicial 
system was incompetent. So the concern of Mainland judicial system should not withhold 
Hong Kong from joining a Multilateral JRE Arrangement. A correct approach for Hong 
Kong is to embrace this Arrangement, and in implementation, to adopt a case-by-case 
analysis approach and deny JRE on the grounds provided by the Arrangement and on 
solid and particularized evidence.21  
As a conclusion, a broad-scope arrangement should be acceptable for Hong Kong. 
Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should be broader than just 
covering judgments based on choice of court agreements. However, the "start small" 
approach makes it possible to leave out some judgments in order to encourage the 
participation of regions. Thus, on the one hand, the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement will cover both contractual and non-contractual civil and commercial 
judgments. On the other hand, this Arrangement should not cover judgments in family-
law cases and allow regions to reserve JRE in certain cases such as employment disputes 
and insolvency. This section aims to formulate an autonomous terminology of "civil and 
commercial" under the proposed Arrangement.  
                                                
18 Id, para 45. 
19 Id, para 47. 
20 Id, para 49. 
21 See Zhang, supra note_8_ at 65. 
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The first Part of this Section will define "civil and commercial." Second, Mainland 
China and Hong Kong have disputes regarding whether judgments rendered by all levels 
of Mainland courts should be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong.22 As for Mainland 
judgments, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement only covers judgments rendered by 
district courts with jurisdiction over interregional cases, and judgments rendered by 
intermediate courts or courts at higher level.23 Therefore, the Second Part will answer 
whether this restriction should be maintained in the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement. The Third Part will explore what types of judgments should be covered by 
the proposed Arrangement. 
 
i. Autonomous Terminology of "Civil and Commercial"  
 
Laws in the three Chinese regions have different definitions for "civil and 
commercial." For example, in Mainland China and Macao where the civil-law tradition 
has been adopted, the distinction between private and public laws generally helps to 
differentiate administrative cases from civil and commercial cases.24 However, Hong 
Kong, which follows the English common-law tradition, does not clearly distinguish 
private and public laws.25 Moreover, all of the existing arrangements on judicial 
                                                
22 Zhihong Yu, Di Er Ji Nei Di, Hong Kong, Macao Qu Ji Fa Lv Wen Ti Yan Tao Hui Zong Su [Report of The Second 
Conference Regarding Interregional Conflict of Laws among Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao], 147 FA XU 
PIN LUN [LAW REVIEW] 156, 157 (2008). Zhihong Yu, Nei Di Yu Macao, Hong Kong Xian Fu Ren Ke he Zhi Xing Min 
Shang Shi Pan Jue An Pai de Bi Jiao ji Ping Xi [Comparison and Analysis of Mainland China, Macao, and Hong Kong 
Mutural Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments], 5 TAI PING YAN XUE BAO [PACIFIC 
JOURNAL] 6, 6 (2009). 
23 Id. 
24 See Report Schlosser para. 23; Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Market 
Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611, 616-17 (2003).  
25 GRAEME JOHNSTON, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN HONG KONG 129-44 (2005).(proposing a category of "public laws" 
including penal and revenue laws, but the existence and delineation of the notion of "public laws" remain debatable.) 
For discussion of "civil and commercial" in English law, see Report Schlosser para 24; Gardella and Brozolo, supra 
note_24_ at 617. For English case law, see O’Reilly v. Mackman [1982] 3 WLR 1096 (H.L.). 
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assistance do not define the meaning of “civil and commercial.” The Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement attempts to clarify the meaning of “civil and commercial” by distinguishing 
it from administrative matters.26 However, the Arrangement does not provide any criteria 
for distinction. When a party to a judgment is a government agency or an institution 
established by a government, the distinction between “civil and commercial” and 
“administrative” becomes blurred. A judgment-rendering region might regard a case as 
being civil and commercial while a requested region might consider it administrative. 
This issue has been ignored by the Chinese literature. Moreover, the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement excludes contracts for employment and personal consumption from 
the scope of "civil and commercial." Many scholars opposed this exclusion.27 Therefore, 
whether these contracts should be covered by the proposed Arrangement deserves 
discussion. This Part tries to define the scope of the proposed Arrangement by 
formulating "civil and commercial" as an autonomous terminology.  
 
1. "Civil and Commercial" v. Administrative 
 
The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should cover civil and commercial 
rather than administrative judgments. "Civil and commercial" cases traditionally concern 
disputes28  
rest[ing] on the law of obligations (both contractual and non-contractual), the 
law of property (including succession law), and the law of persons (including 
family law). It includes those areas of commercial law that extend the law of 
contracts (e.g., the law of unfair competition), the law of property (e.g., intellectual 
                                                
26 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.  
27 See Scope of the Arrangement of Part i of Section B of Chapter III. 
28 Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law beyond the State - Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 843, 847 (2006). 
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property) and the law of persons (e.g., corporate law). It excludes those areas that 
are not based on such extensions and are therefore seen as (merely) regulatory 
public law (e.g., antitrust law). 
 
The watershed between a “civil and commercial” judgment and an administrative 
one should be whether a party to the judgment is exercising a public power. This party 
should be a public authority, which generally includes a government agency, an 
institution established by a government agency, or an agent entrusted by a government 
agency. It may be a natural person or an entity. Whether it exercises its public power 
lawfully is irrelevant to the nature of the judgment.29 This distinction can find support in 
the laws of all three regions. In Mainland China, “civil and commercial" matters mean 
matters between private parties such as between natural persons,30 between legal persons, 
and between natural and legal persons.31 In contrast, “administrative matters” refer to 
matters between a private party and a government agency exercising its public 
authoritative powers.32 The key to their differences is that: the former is between parties 
of an equal status; but the latter is between parties of an unequal status because one party 
is exercising a public power.33 Similarly, the Macao Administrative Procedure Law states 
that administrative cases are related to public powers34 and public orders.35 Moreover, 
                                                
29 see art. 2(1) of Regulation (EC) N. 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims, OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15. See also art. 2(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No. 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 Creating a European Order 
for Payment Procedure, OJ 2006 L 399, P.1). 
30 Natural persons include citizens and organizations, such as partnership, which are not legal persons. See Chapter Two 
of Min Fa Tong Ze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (hereinafter “Mainland Civil Law”) (Adopted at the Fourth 
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China on April 12, 1986, and effective January 1, 1987), translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com 
accessed on November 3, 2009 (P.R.C.) 
31 See art. 2 of the Mainland Civil Law. 
32 See art. 12, Xing Zheng Su Song Cheng Xu Fa [Administrative Procedure Law] (Adopted at the Second Session of 
the Seventh National People's Cong., April 4, 1989, effective October. 1,1990) translated in 
http://www.lawinfochina.com accessed on July 5, 2009 (P.R.C.). 
33 Michaels and Jansen, supra note_28_ at 849. 
34 Art. 2 of the Macao Administrative Procedure Law. Available at 
http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/99/50/codpaccn/codpac001.asp#c1a1, (accessed on April 24, 2010). 
35 Id, at art. 3. 
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commercial activities defined by the Macao Commercial Code have nothing to do with 
public powers.36 Additionally, Hong Kong courts deny the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign penal and revenue judgments, because Hong Kong civil courts are not "an 
enforcement arm of foreign governments."37 In other words, such judgments represent the 
public power of the judgment-rendering region. 
Undeniably, a public authority exercises public power when it renders sanctions, 
such as warning, confiscating, seizing, or freezing illegal gains or property, imposing 
fines, suspending or rescinding licenses or permits, or restricting personal freedom.38 The 
public power also includes issuing non-sanction decisions such as issuing, altering, 
suspending, or discharging certificates and permits, levying taxes, and providing social 
insurance or minimum maintenance fee for living according to law.39  
However, it becomes controversial when a public authority charges fees for the 
service it provides. For example, toll roads are very common in Mainland China.40 70% 
toll roads are state-owned.41 Governments can unilaterally decide the amount of fee for 
using state-owned toll roads.42 Vehicles using toll roads shall pay the fee in a way 
                                                
36 Arts. 2 and 3 of the Macao Commercial Code state that: commercial activities refer to the activities designed to gain 
profits and conducted by a commercial entity, including (1) industrial activities such as manufacturing products or 
providing service, (2) product circulations and intermediary service, (3) transportation, (4) banking and securities, and 
(5) all subsidiary activities to the above. 
37 Johnston, supra note_25_ at 129. 
38 See art. 6 of The Mainland Administrative Reconsideration Law (adopted at the Ninth Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on April 29, 1999, and effective on October 1, 1999). See also 
arts.8, 9 and 10 of The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Penalty (adopted at the Fourth Session 
of the Eighth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 17, 1996, and effective on 
October 1, 1996). 
39 See art. 6 of The Mainland Administrative Reconsideration Law. See also arts.8, 9 and 10 of The Law of the PRC on 
Administrative Penalty. 
40 See Gao Bo, Shoufei Gaosu Gonglu de Dingjia yu Zhengfu Guangzhi Sikao [Toll Highway and Government 
Management], 354 JIAGE YUKAN [PRICE MONTHLY] 3, 3 (2006) (indicating 90% highways in Mainland China are toll 
highway, 80% first-level roads are toll roads, and more than 40% second-level roads are toll roads. Overall 7% of roads 
in Mainland China are toll roads). 
41 Ye Fan, Woguo Shoufei Gonglu Fazhang Zhong De Wenti Ji Zhengche Jianyi [Problems Arising from Toll Roads in 
China and Policy Suggestions], 5 ZONGHE YUNSHU [COMPREHENSIVE TRANSPORTATION] 40, 42 (2004). 
42 Art. 15.1 of the Regulation of Toll Road, enacted by the State Council on Aug 18, 2004 and effective on Nov. 1, 2004. 
A Chinese version is available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/law/668550.htm, last visited Apr. 24, 2010. 
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unilaterally determined by the governments.43 If a judgment for collecting or returning 
tolls involves a Hong Kong or Macao driver, is it civil and commercial? Another example 
is the airport construction fee in Mainland China. In 2004, a consumer brought a civil 
action against an airline company that had charged him the airport construction fee.44 In 
2007, a consumer brought an administrative action against the Mainland Civil Aviation 
Bureau for the airport construction fee charged by an airline company.45 Both consumers 
requested return of the fees and challenged their legitimacy.46 The airport construction 
fee is for the construction and maintenance of airport fire control, safety inspection, 
guardrail, and other safety equipments.47 It was approved by the State Council in 1992 
and has been imposed to airline passengers since then.48 After 2004, the Mainland Civil 
Aviation Bureau authorized airline companies to directly collect this fee from 
passengers.49 All passengers who fly or transfer from a Mainland airport to a domestic or 
international destination shall pay this fee.50 The amount of the fee and the procedure of 
payment are determined unilaterally by the Mainland Financial Ministry and the Civil 
                                                
43 Id, at art. 7.  Governments usually entrust an agent to manage state-owned toll roads. 
44 Hao Xu, Lvshi Zhuanggao: Jichang Jianshefei Bu Hefa, Zhuangjia Fuyu: Jinkuai Chutai Xinzheng Shoufei Fa 
[Lawyer Argues: Airport Construction Fees are Illegal, Expert Urge: Enact Administrative Charge Law Quickly],  
XIAOFEI [CONSUMPTION] 36, 37 (2008). Juan Chen, Dui Jichang Jianshefei de Hefaxing Sikao [Analysis of the 
Legitimacy of Airport Construction Fees], 2 JINKA GONGCHENG JINJI YU FA [GOLDEN CARD PROJECT: ECONOMY AND 
LAW] 73, 73 (2009). 
45 Xu, supra note_44_ at 36. Chen, supra note 44 at 73. Yanjun Dai, Xuzheng Jichang Jianshefei Hefa Ma? [Is It Legal 
to Continue Charging Airport Construction Fee?],  CHINA TRIAL 92, 92-93 (2008). 
46 These two cases were dismissed by courts. Xu, supra note_44_ at 36. Chen, supra note 44 at 73.  
47 Xu, supra note 44, at 37. For comments, see Chen, supra note_44_ at 73-74. 
48 Xu, supra note_44_ at 36. Guowuyuan Bangongting Zhuanfa Minhan Zongju, Guojia Jiwei, Caizhengbu Guangyu 
Zhengdun Minhan Jichang Daishou Gezhong Jianshe Jijing Yijian de Tongzhi [State Council, Civil Avation Bureau, 
State Planning Commission, Financial Ministry Notice Regarding Regulation of Construction Funds Charged by Civil 
Airports], Issue in November 11, 1995 (Guofaban [1995] No. 57). For the history of airport construction fee, see 
Caoyan, Jichang Jianshe Fei Buru Zhongjie Guidao [The Ending of Airport Construction Fee], 
http://news.carnoc.com/list/41/41790.html (last visited April 24, 2010).  
49 Art. 1 of Chaizhen Bu, Minhan Zongju Guangyu Gaige Minhan Jichang Guanli Jianshefei Zhengshou Guanli Fanshi 
Deng Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [Financial Ministry and Civil Aviation Bureau Notice to Reform the Method of 
Charging and Management of Civil Airport Construction Fee], Caizongzhi [2004] No. 51. 
http://www.ljzfsf.gov.cn/zxl/zcfg_show.asp?lbbm=0604&wjbm=0004 (accessed on Apr. 24, 2010).  
50 Id, art. 2(1). 
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Aviation Bureau.51 Should a Mainland monetary judgment be considered civil and 
commercial in nature, when it requires a Hong Kong passenger who flew from a 
Mainland airport to pay this fee or it asks the Air Macao who operates in a Mainland 
airport to return an overcharged fee to a passenger?  
The EU JRE law sheds light on answering these questions. The ECJ, in 
Eurocontrol,52 decided that route charges imposed by a European Organization53 on 
aircraft owners were not a civil and commercial matter, because this organization was a 
legal person established jointly by states; it unilaterally decided the rate of charges, the 
methods of calculation, and the procedures for collection; and the use of its service was 
obligatory and exclusive.54 So the European Organization, when charging the fee, 
exercised public powers. In another case,55 the ECJ held that a fee to remove wrecks in a 
public waterway was not civil and commercial.56 The reason was that the agent that 
removed the wrecks was authorized by the Netherlands who assumed a treaty obligation 
of removing wrecks, so the agent actually exercised the public power.  
There are many similarities between the two ECJ cases and Chinese cases of toll 
roads and airport construction fees. All of them are related to a fee charged by one party 
authorized by a government (or an inter-governmental organization in Eurocontrol) to 
                                                
51 Id, art. 2(2). For comments, see Qintong Lin & Lingwei Li, Zhengshou Jichang Jianshefei Shi Xingzhen Qingquan 
Xingwei [Charging Airport Construction Fee Is Administrative Tort], 10 JOURNAL OF LIAONING ADMINISTRATION 
COLLEGE 34, 34-35 (2008). 
52 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol (Case 29/76), [1976] ECR 1541. 
53 This organization is the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation. It is an international organization 
established by several now-EU states in 1960. It imposed route charges on owners of aircraft for the use of its air safety 
services. These charges were authorized by the international agreement to establish Eurocontrol and by other 
agreements between states. Based on these agreements, it charged a German airline company LTU, who is the 
defendant in this case. 
54 Eurocontrol at 1550. 
55 Netherlands State v Reinhold Ruffer, [1980] ECR 3807, Case 814/79. 
56 The background of this case is that the Netherlands and Germany both claim sovereign rights of a waterway. A 1960 
treaty between them states that, without prejudice to sovereignty, the Netherlands takes charge of the administration of 
the waterways, including the removal of wrecks. In 1971, a German resident’s vessel sank in this waterway. The 
Netherlands authorized an agent to remove the wreck and later the agent claimed the cost of removing against the 
German resident. 
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provide service. Meanwhile, the other party is required by law to use this service at a 
price, a place, or a procedure unilaterally decided by the former. Therefore, the fee for 
state-owned toll roads and airport construction fees are administrative in nature. 
Accordingly, judgments involving these fees cannot benefit from the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement. In addition, although in the toll road case drivers who do 
not want to pay the fee may choose a freeway if available, this factor alone cannot change 
the administrative nature of this case.  
In a broader sense, under the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, a judgment 
is not civil and commercial if it relates to an obligation between two parties where one is 
required by the law to use the other’s service or equipment at a price, a place, or a 
procedure unilaterally decided by the latter, when the latter is a government agency or is 
entrusted by this agency to exercise public power.  
Moreover, the scope of the proposed Arrangement should be determined 
autonomously. Whether a judgment is civil and commercial is irrelevant to the nature of 
the judgment-rendering proceeding. For example, an action on airport construction fee 
can be brought according to Mainland civil law,57 so the judgment is civil in Mainland 
China. But the nature of judgment under Mainland law should not affect how courts in 
Hong Kong and Macao determine the nature of this judgment according to the proposed 
Arrangement. Requested courts should base on the Arrangement to decide whether a 
judgment is civil and commercial. The ECJ adopts the same approach. For example, the 
fact that the agent sought to recover the costs of removing the wreck by a civil action 
instead of an administrative proceeding was insufficient to bring the matter in dispute 
                                                
57 Xu, supra note_44_ at 37. Chen, supra note_44_ at 73. 
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within the ambit of the Brussels Convention.58 The other example is Irini Lechouritou v. 
Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias.59 In this case, Greek nationals 
residing in Greece brought a compensation claim against Germany for financial losses 
and mental damages during the Second World War. Under Greek law, this case is civil in 
nature. However, the ECJ ruled that this case was not civil or commercial because acts 
conducted by armed forces were linked to state sovereignty, in particular a state’s foreign 
and defense policy.60 Namely these acts came from the exercise of public powers and fell 
outside of the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private 
individuals.61 Therefore, the compensation disputes resulting from these acts were not 
civil and commercial. The court explicitly indicated that for determining whether the case 
was civil and commercial under the Brussels Convention “[t]he fact that the proceedings 
brought before the referring court are presented as being of a civil nature… [wa]s… 
entirely irrelevant.”62    
 
2. Judgments for Personal Consumption Disputes 
 
Different from the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement is limited to business-to-business commercial disputes and excludes 
contracts for personal consumption.63 This is inspired by the Hague Choice of Court 
                                                
58 Ruffer, [1980] ECR 3807, Case 814/79. 
59 Irini Lechouritou v. Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias, Case C-292/05. 
60 Id, para 37. 
61 Id, para 34. 
62 Id, para 41. 
63 Art. 3 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. For details, see the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement of Section 
B of Chapter III. 
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Convention.64 However, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should include 
consumer contracts. This is because consumer contracts concern an important area of 
cases. Thousands of Mainland consumers visit Hong Kong and Macao every year.65 More 
than 50% tourists in these two regions are from Mainland China.66 Mainland consumers 
have played an important role in boosting tourism, hotel, retail, and transportation 
industries in these two regions.67 Many Hong Kong and Macao residents also visit or live 
in Mainland China.68 Therefore, a lot of cases involving sister-region consumers probably 
occur in Hong Kong and Macao. In order to facilitate interregional economic integration 
and people's lives in the three regions, the proposed Arrangement should cover judgments 
involving personal consumptions.  
?
3. Civil Compensation Collateral to Criminal Proceedings 
  
The proposed Arrangement should also cover civil compensation collateral to 
criminal proceedings.69 This is because both the Mainland-Macao Arrangement70 and the 
                                                
64 See art. 2.1.a of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. For details, see the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement of 
Section B of Chapter III. 
65 Wen Zhang & Fei Tan, Dui Zhongguo Dalu Lvyouzhe Zai Xianggan Xiaofei Jiegou de Fenxi [Analysis of the 
Consumption Structure of Mainland Tourists In Hong Kong], 113 BEIJING DIER WAIGUOYU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [BEIJING 
NO.2 FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE JOURNAL] 24, 24-8 (2003). Duo Chen, Huigui Shinian Aomen Yu Neidi Jinmao 
Guanxi Fazhang Huigu [A Review of the Economic and Trade Relationship between Macao and Mainland China after 
10-year Reunion], 6 GUANGDONG SHEHUI KEXUE [GUANGDONG SOCIAL SCIENCE] 16, 18 (2009) (indicating 658 million 
Mainland tourists visited Macao in 2008.) 
66 Yong Hu & Lei Huang, Zhongguo Dalu Pu Xianggan Lvyou Yuche Moxing [Forecasting Model for Hong Kong's 
Tourism from Mainland China], 24 GUOJI JINGMAO TANSUO [INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE RESEARCH] 41, 44 
(2008). 
67 Neidi Gouwuyou Chen Xiangan Xiaofei Xin Zhuli [Mainland Tourists Constitute the New Major Consumer Group in 
Hong Kong], Beijing Shangbao [Beijing Business Newspaper] March 1, 2010, available at 
http://finance.ifeng.com/news/20100301/1868550.shtml (accessed on June 1, 2010). 
68 Yu Hou & Hong Yinli, Qiantan Shengang Yitihua [A Brief Analysis of Economic Integration of Shenzhen and Hong 
Kong], 139 ZHONGGUO GAOXIN JISHU QIYE [CHINA HI-TECH ENTERPRISES] 51, 52 (2010) (indicating many Hong Kong 
residents prefer to live in Shenzhen and work in Hong Kong, because living costs in Shenzhen is much lower than that 
in Hong Kong). 
69 Guanghui Li & Han Wang, Woguo Quji Fayuan Panjue Chengren Yu Zhixing Zhidu Zhi Bijiao [Comparison of 
Chinese Interregional Judgment Recognition and Enforcement Systems], 2 FALV KEXUE (LEGAL SCIENCE-JOURNAL OF 
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Hong Kong Regional JRE law consider it civil and commercial.71 Similarly, according to 
the EU JRE law, even though joined to criminal proceedings, a civil action for 
compensation for injury to an individual resulting from a criminal offence is civil in 
nature.72 Advisably the proposed Arrangement should include civil compensation 
collateral to criminal proceedings. Because currently no interregional arrangement exists 
to recognize and enforce criminal judgments in Chinese regions,73 using the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement to recognize and enforce civil compensation collateral to 
criminal proceedings can help victims in criminal cases to safeguard their rights. 
 
4. Judgments for Employment Disputes?
 
Unlike the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
excludes judgments for employment contracts.74 This also follows the Hague Choice of 
Court Convention.75 At the beginning stage, because of two reasons the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement may not need to cover judgments for employment disputes.  
First, the types of courts under the Arrangement do not cover courts that address 
labor disputes in Hong Kong.76 In Hong Kong, the jurisdiction of monetary employment 
                                                                                                                                            
WEST AND EAST POLITICS AND LAW UNIVERSITY) 118, 123 (2009). Yixian Song, Zhongguo Neidi yu Hong Kong Quji 
Minshangshi Sifa Xiezhu Ruogan Wenti Tantao [Discussion of Several Questions Relating to Interregional Judicial 
Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs between Mainland China and Hong Kong], 57 HUADONG ZHENGFA 
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF EAST CHINA POLITICAL AND LAW INSTITUTE] 59, 63-64 (2008). 
70 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
71 See Hong Kong FJREO, supra Hong Kong regional JRE Law of Section A of Chapter III. 
72 Sonntag v. Waidmann, Case C-172/91, para 19. 
73 The only existing bilateral arrangement for criminal issues is Arrangement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons between 
the Government of Macao and the Government of Hong Kong concluded on May 20, 2005, available at 
http://en.io.gov.mo/Legis/International/record/7.aspx (accessed on June 1, 2010).  
74 Art. 3 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. For details, see the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement of Section 
B of Chapter III. 
75 See art. 2.1.b of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. For details, see the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement of 
Section B of Chapter III. 
76 For types of courts covered by the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, see infra Level of Courts of Section A of 
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disputes belongs to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board and the Labor 
Tribunal.77 A party can appeal to the Court of First Instance only on the grounds of the 
award of the Board or the Tribunal is erroneous in point of law or outside their 
jurisdiction.78 If the Court upholds the appeal, it should remand the case to the Board or 
the Tribunal for a new hearing.79 The Court of First Instance can hear claims for mon-
monetary remedies, such as tort claims or injunctions to prevent breach of a post-
employment restraint.80 However, obviously, it does not have the first-instance 
jurisdiction to hear majority of employment disputes. Like the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement, at the beginning stage the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should 
not cover judgments rendered by the Board and the Tribunal. This is because the 
judgment-rendering process in the Board or the Tribunal is very informal and flexible.81 
For example, no practicing attorney is allowed.82 It is still undetermined whether other 
regions may accept the judgment-rendering proceedings in the Board or the Tribunal 
meet the requirement of fair procedure for JRE.  
                                                                                                                                            
Chapter V. 
77 PATTIE WALSH, HONG KONG EMPLOYMENT LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 359 and 360 (2008). The Board can exercise 
jurisdiction over employment claims involving less than 10 claimants for a sum of money not exceeding HK$8,000 per 
claimant. All other employment claims are heard by the Tribunal. Only in exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal can 
refer cases to the Court of First Instance. For details, see Walsh, at 366. 
78 Art. 31 of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance, Cap 453, at 
http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/453/; and art. 32 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance, Cap 25 at 
http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/25/ (accessed on June 1, 2010). 
79 Wang Guoshe, Neidi Yu Xiangan Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Zhidu Bijiao Yanjiu [Comparative Studies of Labor 
Arbitration Dispute in Mainland China and Hong Kong], 26 XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW SCIENCE] 68, 71 (2004). In 
practice, few parties appeal to the Court of First Instance and the awards are generally enforced in Hong Kong. See 
Zheng Gui, Xianggan Laodong Zhengyi Chuli Gaikuan [Overview of Labor Dispute Resolution in Hong Kong],  
ZHONGGUO LAODONG [CHINA LABOR] 40, 41 (2003). 
80 Walsh, supra note_78_ at 360. Glock (Hong Kong) Limited v Brauner Wilhelm (HCA2865/2004) confirms  
that the Labour Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in hearing a broad range of employment-related claims, but does not 
have jurisdiction over claims in tort. 
81 Id. at 360. 
82 For reasons, see Guoshe, supra note_80_ at 70 (indicating the reasons are to speed up the procedure and lower the 
costs). For criticism, see Walsh, supra note 78 at 360. 
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Second, in Mainland China, employment disputes are subject to compulsory 
arbitration.83 The arbitration award can be recognized and enforced according to the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arbitration Award Arrangement.84 Employers and employees 
cannot use a choice of court agreement to opt out the jurisdiction of the labor dispute 
arbitration commission.85 If an employee disagrees with the arbitration award, he or she 
can litigate the case in a court.86 But an employer can only request a court to set aside the 
arbitration award on procedural grounds instead of litigating the merits of the case.87  
Macao law neither imposes compulsory arbitration for employment disputes nor 
establishes a special labor tribunal. Employers and employees can solve their disputes by 
litigation according to Macao Labor Litigation Code or Civil Procedure Code.88 
Nevertheless, due to the peculiarities of solving employment disputes in Hong Kong and 
Mainland China, although employment disputes concerns an important area of cases, at 
the beginning stage the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should exclude them 
from its scope.  
 
                                                
83 Art 2 of The Law of Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration (adopted at the 31st meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on December 29, 2007, 
effective on May 1, 2008) states that 
This following labor disputes arising between an employer and an employee in Mainland China shall be 
submitted to labor arbitration: (1) A dispute arising from the confirmation of a labor relationship; (2) A 
dispute arising from the conclusion, performance, modification, rescission or termination of a labor contract; 
(3) A dispute arising from the removal or layoff of an employee or the resignation or retirement of an 
employee; (4) A dispute arising from the work hours, breaks, vacations, social insurance, benefits, training, or 
labor safety; (5) A dispute arising from the labor remunerations, medical expenses for a work-related injury, 
economic indemnity, compensation, etc.; or (6) Any other labor dispute as provided for by a law or 
administrative regulation. 
84 For details of this Arrangement, see Part ii of Section D of Chapter I. 
85 Jurisdiction lies in the arbitration commission at the place of performance of a labor contract or at the place of 
residence of an employer. Art. 21 of the Law of Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration. 
86 Id, at art. 48. But see art. 47, an arbitration award is final in case of (1) a dispute over the recovery of labor 
remunerations, medical expenses for a work-related injury, economic indemnity, or compensation, in an amount not 
exceeding the 12-month local monthly minimum wage level; or a dispute over the working hours, breaks and vacations, 
social insurance, etc., arising from the execution of state labor standards. 
87 Id, at art. 49. 
88 Arts.1 and 2 of the Macao Labor Litigation Code, at 
http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2003/26/codprotracn/codprotra001.asp#t1a1, (accessed on June 3, 2010). 
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5. Judgments on Insolvency and Related Issues 
 
The recognition and enforcement of sister-region insolvency proceedings and 
judgments is an urgent issue in China.89 Many debtors take advantage of the absence of 
an interregional JRE mechanism to escape debts.90 Between Chinese regions, whether 
insolvency proceedings in sister-region courts should be recognized is decided on a case-
by-case basis. Therefore, inconsistent practice exists. For example, early in 1983, in the 
LMK Nam Sang Dyeing Case, a Hong Kong accounting firm, as a representative 
appointed by a Hong Kong court, obtained permission from a Mainland municipal 
government to take over the debtor's assets in Mainland China back to Hong Kong where 
the primary insolvency proceedings was being held.91 The effects of Hong Kong 
insolvency proceedings were implicitly recognized in Mainland China.92 However, in 
Liwan District Construction Company v. Euro-American China Property Limited, the 
plaintiff sued the Hong Kong defendant for breach of contract in Mainland China.93 
Meanwhile the defendant was in an insolvency proceeding in Hong Kong.94 However, the 
Mainland court refused to recognize the extraterritorial effects of the Hong Kong 
proceeding and the liquidator appointed by the Hong Kong court.95 Nevertheless, in 
recent years, Hong Kong liquidators have reported that especially courts in Guangdong 
                                                
89 Teng Ma & Jian Hu, Lun Neidi yu Hong Kong Kuajing Pochang Zhong de Falv Chongtu ji Xietiao Jizhi [Legal 
Conflicts and Coordinating System between Mainland China and Hong Kong in Transborder Insolvency Cases], 16 
ANHUI DAXUE FALV PINGLUN [ANHUI UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 31, 31-32 (2009). 
90 Id. 
91 Fan Wang, Hong Kong yu Neidi Kuajing Pochang de Falv Kuangjia Yanjiu [The Legal Framework for Trans-border 
Insolvency Cases between Mainland China and Hong Kong], 27 ZHENGFA LUNTAN [TRIBUNE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
AND LAW] 75, 79 (2009). 
92 For comments of this case, see Jingxia Shi, Chinese cross-border insolvencies: current issues and future 
developments, 10 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW 33, 38 (2001). 
93 Wang, supra note_91_ at 79. 
94 Id. at 79. 
95 Id. at 79. Ma and Hu, supra note_89_ at 41. Donald J Lewis & Charles D Booth, Case Comment, Liwan District 
Construction Company v. Euro - America China Property Limited, 6 China L. Prac. 27 (1990). 
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province Mainland China are increasingly willing to offer co-operation to them.96 As for 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong court recognized the extraterritorial effects of Mainland 
insolvency proceeding in the famous GITIC case.97 The Hong Kong court stayed its 
proceeding and deferred to the Mainland court as the principal winding up jurisdiction.98 
The Court indicated that comity requires it to refrain from interrupting the Mainland 
proceeding when the court could equally treat local and overseas creditors.99 But in Re 
Zhu Kuan, three parallel insolvency proceedings against the same debtor took place in 
Hong Kong and Macao.100 The debtor was a Hong Kong subsidiary owned by a Macao 
company. However, because both the Macao court and the Hong Kong court refused to 
recognize the liquidator appointed by each other, the two courts had to restrict the 
proceedings to the debtor's assets within their jurisdictions. Creditors have to litigate the 
case in three regions, which is time- and money-consuming. 
Both Mainland and Hong Kong regional laws have adopted the "universality 
approach."101 In other words, they would recognize the extraterritorial application of 
sister-region jurisdiction's laws and allow the representative appointed by sister-region 
courts to claim the debtor's assets located in their jurisdiction.102 The 2006 new Mainland 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law states that Mainland insolvency proceedings have effects on 
                                                
96 Charles D Booth, The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally Over, 20 SINGAPORE ACADEMY OF 
LAW JOURNAL 275, 311 (2008). 
97 CCIC Finance Ltd v. Guangdong Int'l Trust & Inv Crop ("GITIC"), unrep HCA 15651/1999, July 31, 2001. For 
comments, see Jingxia Shi, Woguo Pochang Chengxu Yuwai Xiaoli de Shili Fenxi [A Study of An Real Case of The 
Extraterritorial Effects of Mainland Insolvency Proceedings], 20 ZHENGFA LUNTAN [TRIBUNE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
AND LAW] 41, 41-45 (2002). 
98 Id. 
99 Id, at 40.  
100  Re Zhu Kuan Group Co Ltd, unrep HCCW 875/2003. Wang, supra note_91_ at 80. 
101 For the "universality approach," see Booth, supra note_97_ at 311. For Mainland law, see Wang, supra note_91_ at 
76. For Hong Kong law, see generally Charles D Booth & Philip Smart, The New Avoidance Powers Under Hong Kong 
Insolvency Law: A Move From Territoriality to Extraterritoriality, 34 INT'L LAW. 225 (2000). 
102 See Booth, supra note_97_ at 311; see Wang, supra note_91_ at 76. 
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the debtor's properties located outside of Mainland China.103 Mainland Courts shall 
recognize and enforce foreign judgments on insolvency issues according to international 
treaties that Mainland China ratified or the principle of reciprocity.104 Under Hong Kong 
law, courts may recognize a sister-region court as the principal jurisdiction and offer 
administration help in an insolvency proceeding (1) when the debtor's domicile is located 
in the region where the insolvency proceeding commenced105 and whose law adopts the 
"universality approach", and (2) when the debtor requests Hong Kong courts to exercise 
jurisdiction.106  
The Mainland-Macao arrangements implicitly include insolvency and related issues 
in the scope of "civil and commercial."107 Therefore, in theory, insolvency judgments and 
proceedings can be recognized under the arrangements. However, the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement requires a choice of court agreement. Because insolvency cases 
generally involve many parties and are difficult to reach consensus on choice of court, the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is probably de facto inapplicable to insolvency 
cases.108 If the three regions prefer, proceedings and judgments on insolvency and related 
issues may be covered by the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement.  
Nevertheless, insolvency laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong are very 
different. For example, in Mainland China, no personal bankruptcy exists.109 Under Hong 
Kong law, insolvency applies to the bankruptcy both of nature person and partnership110 
                                                
103 Art. 5, para 1 of the Law of the PRC on Enterprise Bankruptcy (adopted at the 23rd meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress of the PRC on August 27, 2006, effective on June 1, 2007.) 
104 Id, art. 5 para 2.  
105 American Express Int'l Banking Corp v. Johnson [1984] HKLR 372. Felixstowe Dock and Rly Co v. US Lines Inc 
[1989] QB 360, [1988] 2 ALL ER 77, English High Court, Hirst J. 
106 Wang, supra note_91_ at 77-78. 
107 Art. 1 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement.  
108 Wang, supra note_91_ at 79. 
109 Booth, supra note_97_ at 291-92. 
110 Hong Kong Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6, 1999 
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as well as legal persons.111 The insolvency rules for these two types of entities are rather 
different in Hong Kong.112 Therefore, it is unclear whether Hong Kong judgments on the 
insolvency of a nature person and partnership can be recognized and enforced in 
Mainland China. The other example is that Mainland laws on insolvency issues prioritize 
the protection of employees113 and tax. However, Hong Kong laws tend to protect 
creditors' rights.114  
Besides the differences in regional insolvency laws, the concerns of recognition 
and enforcement of insolvency orders are different from those of other judgments. For 
example, finality is not an issue for the former but is crucial for the latter.115 Moreover, 
interregional insolvency involves not only recognition and enforcement of judgments and 
court orders but also cooperation in court proceedings. For example, in what 
circumstances that an ancillary jurisdiction should defer to the principal jurisdiction and 
how to exchange information between courts regarding issues such as the debtor's assets, 
fraudulent trading, disqualification of directors and etc.116 Considering the peculiarities 
and complexity of insolvency cases, regions should be allowed to make reservations on 
judgments of insolvency.  
                                                
111 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Cap 32, 1999. 
112 Id. 
113 Mainland laws require that if a company may be bankrupted by the enforcement of a People’s Court’s judgment, the 
enforcement proceedings should leave sufficient funds to support the basic life of workers. See arts. 6, 48, 82, 113, and 
132 of the Mainland Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (providing that in the hearing of a bankruptcy case the People’s Court 
shall guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of the employees in the insolvent enterprise. For example, before 
outstanding tax and the unsecured creditors’ claims, the insolvent assets should be used to pay off employees’ wages, 
compensation for their medical treatment, their basic retirement insurance premiums, their basic medical insurance 
premiums, and other compensation for employees as prescribed by the relevant laws and administrative regulations.) 
See also The Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Strict Prohibition of Freezing and Transferring Basic Living 
Fund of Laid-off Workers of State Owned Enterprises, dated Nov. 24, 1999 (Providing that the basic living support 
fund for laid-off workers of state-owned enterprises is immune from any detention or execution.). 
114 Wang, supra note_91_ at 35. 
115 Johnston, supra note_25_ at 509. 
116 Id. at 459-60. 
 271 
Alternatively, the three regions may conclude a separate arrangement on insolvency 
issues.117 Excluding insolvency issues from other civil and commercial cases is not 
unusual in both Chinese regional laws and international/foreign laws. For example, the 
Mainland CPL is inapplicable to insolvency issues, which shall be decided according to 
the Enterprise Bankruptcy law. The Hong Kong FJREO does not apply to insolvency 
judgments.118 The Hague Choice of Court Convention excludes judgments on insolvency 
and related issues from its scope.119 The reason is that choice of court agreements may 
conflict with the strong trend of centralizing insolvency and analogous proceedings in 
one forum.120 In the EU, the Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation do not apply 
to insolvency and related issues.121 Instead, EC Regulation No 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings addressed such issues.122 In the US, the Congress established bankruptcy 
courts for solving insolvency issues.123 Therefore, arguably, in China, a specialized 
arrangement on interregional insolvency issues should be established. 
 
                                                
117 Wang, supra note_91_ at 82. Ma and Hu, supra note_89_ at 45. Booth, supra note_97_ at 313-14. Johnston, supra 
note_25_ at 478. 
118 Section 2(2) of the Hong Kong FRJEO. 
119 Art. 2(e) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. RONALD BRAND & PAUL HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION 
ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 60-61 (2008). 
120 Id. at 60-61. 
121 Art. 1(2)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation. Pippa Rogerson, Chapter 1 Scope, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 59-62 
(ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007).  
122 EC Regulation No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, adopted on May 29 2000 and entered into force on May 
31 2000. Its contents is practically identical to that of the defunct EC Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 1995, 5 
Int. Insolv. Rev. 171-185 (1996). For a brief introduction to its contents, see MICHAEL BOGDAN, CONCISE 
INTRODUCTION TO EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (2006). For comments, see Comments: by Miguel Virgos and 
Etienne Schmit, Document 6500/96 of the Council; see also B. WESSELS, CURRENT TOPICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCY LAW (2004). Insolvency proceedings concerning insurance undertakings and credit institutions are 
governed by Directive No. 2001/17 of 19 March 2001 on the Reorganisation and Winding-up of Insurance 
Undertakings, and Directive No. 2001/24 of 4 April 2001 on the Reorganisation and Winding-up of Credit Institutions. 
123 Eg., Kalb et ux. v. Feuerstein et ux, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (In this case a state court in Wisconsin rendered a judgment 
of foreclosure of a farm while an identical suit was pending in a federal bankruptcy court. One of the issues is whether 
the state court’s judgment is subject to collateral attack. The Supreme Court of the US held that as a general rule a 
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack. However, because Congress 
has power over the subject of bankruptcy, it created an exception to this general rule: it legislated that the bankruptcy 
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over a petitioning farmer-debtor or his property. The Wisconsin case involved a 
farmer-debtor. So the federal bankruptcy court should have exclusive jurisdiction over this case. In other words, the 
Wisconsin court lacked jurisdiction, so its judgment was subject to collateral attack). 
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6. Judgments on Family-law Issues 
 
The proposed Arrangement should not be applied to judgments on rights or 
obligations arising out of a family relationship.124 The three regions may consider 
establishing a separate JRE regime on judgments in family-law cases. This is for three 
reasons.  
First, for Hong Kong's interests, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement will 
probably be limited to judgments issued by Mainland district courts with "centralized 
first-instance jurisdiction"125 and higher courts. The "centralized first-instance 
jurisdiction" rule does not apply to cases involving family-law issues. The majority of 
judgments on family-law issues are rendered by courts without "centralized first-instance 
jurisdiction."126 Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement is not useful for 
the recognition and enforcement of family-law judgments.  
Second, the recognition of sister-region divorce decrees without enforceable 
contents is possible under the current regional laws. The three regions do not require 
reciprocity in this regard.127  
                                                
124 Zhu, supra note_8_ at 478. (supporting the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement to exclude family-law issues, 
becasue the two regional laws on allocating assets in divorce are very different). For proposing using regional laws to 
solving interregional divorce dispute, see He Qiong, Zhongguo Quji Lihun Falv Chongtu Xietiao Yinyou de Shijiao [A 
Necessary Perspective to Harmonize Legal Conflicts in Chinese Interregional Divorce], 6 YUNNAN XINZHENG 
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [YUNNAN ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTE JOURNAL] 148, 151 (2007). 
125 See infra Levels of Courts of Section A of Chapter V. 
126 Family-law cases are typically in the jurisdiction of district courts located in the place where the defendant has 
domicile. In exceptional circumstances, the district courts located in the place where the plaintiff is domiciled has 
jurisdiction. The district court located in the place where the parties were married may also have jurisdiction. See arts. 
22 and 23 of the Mainland CPL and art. 13 of the Supreme People's Court's Opinions on the CPL. 
127 For Mainland law, see Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ 
Handling Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, 64 THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT 
GAZETTE 61 (2000). For details of this Mainland law, see Part i of Section A of Chapter III. For Hong Kong law, see 
Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap 179, Section 55. For Hong Kong cases, see Maples v Maples [1988] Fam 14, per 
Latey J. For Comments on Hong Kong law, see Johnston, supra note_25_ at 408. For Macao law, see Part iii of Section 
A of Chapter III.   
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Third, the best approach for three regions is to establish a Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement specializing on family-law judgments. This is because unilateral regimes 
cannot offer the efficiency and stability of a multilateral JRE regime.128 Scholars have 
already suggested that family-law judgments should be included into an interregional 
JRE mechanism.129 Establishing a specialized JRE law for family-law judgments is a 
widely-accepted approach in Hong Kong, the US, and the EU JRE laws. The Hong Kong 
FJREO does not apply to any proceedings in connection with either matrimonial matters, 
administration of estates of deceased persons, lunacy, or guardianship of infants.130 In the 
US, the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act applies to child support and 
similar cases.131 Moreover, in the EU, although the Brussels I Regulation address 
maintenance issues, it does not apply to status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights 
in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession. The Brussels 
II Regulation is established to address these issues.132 Council Regulation (EC) No. 
4/2009 abolishes the exequatur procedure and deals with matters relating to maintenance 
obligations in a more efficient way.133 Similarly, the Hague Choice of Court Convention 
also excludes maintenance obligations, other family-law matters, and wills and 
succession.134 This is mainly because the Hague Conference has provided special 
conventions on these issues.135 
                                                
128 See Chapter III. 
129 Li and Wang, supra note_70_ at 123. Song, supra note_70_ at 64. 
130 Section 2(2) of the Hong Kong FJREO. 
131 The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B. 
132 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of November 27 2003 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility, 
133 Council Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 of December 18 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, Official Journal L007, P.1, 
2009/01/10. 
134 Art. 2 (b)(c)(d) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. 
135 Eg., Convention of October 24, 1956 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Children, 
Convention of November 15, 1965 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions, 
Convention of June 1, 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, and Convention of March 14, 1978 
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7. Summary 
 
The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should include civil and commercial 
judgments, which covers both contractual and non-contractual disputes, including 
personal consumption disputes as well as civil compensation collateral to criminal 
proceedings. At the beginning stage, the proposed Arrangement may not need to cover 
judgments for labor disputes. This is because Hong Kong courts that resolve labor 
disputes are not covered by the Arrangement, and also because Mainland labor arbitration 
awards can be recognized and enforced according to the arbitration award arrangements. 
Arguably, separate arrangements should be concluded for recognizing and enforcing 
judgments in family-law cases as well as in insolvency and related cases.  
The proposed Arrangement defines "civil and commercial" as an autonomous 
terminology: a case is not civil and commercial if one party is a government agency or is 
entrusted by a government to exercise public power, which includes a debt between two 
parties where one is required by the law to use the other’s service or equipment at a price, 
a place, or a procedure unilaterally decided by the latter.  
 
ii. Levels of Courts 
 
                                                                                                                                            
on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages. For comments, see Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 
58-59. 
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The two existing Arrangements are different regarding the levels of courts whose 
judgments are entitled to JRE.136 The Mainland-Macao Arrangement covers judgments 
rendered by all the courts in Mainland China and Macao. By contrast, the Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement does not cover judgments issued by some district people’s 
courts.137 Namely, judgments rendered by district people’s courts that are not designated 
to exercise jurisdiction over foreign-related civil and commercial cases cannot benefit 
from the Arrangement.  
As discussed above, the concerns of Mainland judicial integrity and difficulty in 
executing judgments should not be an obstacle for Hong Kong to conclude a broad-scope 
JRE arrangement with Mainland China. Hong Kong courts have not been overloaded by 
requested Mainland judgments since the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement was 
implemented in August 2008.138 On the contrary, this Arrangement has not been invoked 
even in one case partly because of its limited scope.139 Therefore, ideally the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement should not impose any limitation regarding the types of 
Mainland courts in order to expand its scope and to benefit more judgments. However, if 
Hong Kong insists, Mainland China should compromise and accept the limitation. 
Restricting the types of Mainland courts make senses for three reasons.  
First, this limitation is not directed against Mainland law. In Mainland China, as for 
district courts, the first-instance jurisdiction over cases involving foreign (including 
interregional factors) is limited to those located in an economic and technological 
                                                
136 See supra in Section III.  
137 The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement covers Hong Kong judgments rendered by the Court of Final Appeal, the 
Court of Appeal of the High Court, the Court of First Instance, or the District Court, and Mainland judgments issued by 
intermediate or higher people’s court, as well as district people’s courts with jurisdiction over cases related to Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan factors. Art. 2.a and Annex 2 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
138 See Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), Bills Committee on Mainland Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Bill Background Brief, appendix I para 10 (envisaging that the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement will not be frequently invoked.) 
139 See Id.  
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development zone. Such a zone shall be established under the approval of the State 
Council).140 This is the so-called “centralized first-instance jurisdiction.” Compared to 
other areas, more foreign and interregional businesses exist in economic and 
technological development zones. District courts in these zones are more experienced 
than other district courts in deciding cases involving foreign and interregional factors. 
Centralizing first-instance jurisdiction to these courts optimizes the use of judicial 
resources, eliminates local protectionism, and improves the quality of judgments. 
Therefore, restricting the type of district courts under the Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
to those with centralized first-instance jurisdiction is acceptable for Mainland China.  
Second, such limitation would only minimally impede interregional economy 
because all interregional economic disputes adjudicated by district courts fall into those 
courts with centralized first-instance jurisdiction. As for district courts taking charge of 
cases entirely relating to Mainland China, their judgments generally do not require 
interregional JRE. The exceptions are cases where a judgment debtor has insufficient 
property for enforcement in Mainland China but meanwhile has property in a sister 
region. The creditor may require to have this judgment recognized in the sister region. 
However, overall, such circumstances do not frequently occur. Therefore, if Hong Kong 
strongly insists on limiting Mainland district courts to those with jurisdiction over 
foreign-related cases in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, Mainland China 
should consider accepting this limitation.  
                                                
140 Arts. 1 and 5 of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil 
and Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements, adopted at the 1203rd meeting of the Judicial Committee of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Dec. 25, 2001, and effective on Mar. 1, 2002. 
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Third, restricting the scope of the proposed Arrangement to district courts with 
jurisdiction over foreign-related cases as well as higher courts can sooth Hong Kong's 
concerns. Hong Kong Legislative Council confirms the value of this restriction:141 
  
[A]bout 1% out of the 3 100 odd Basic Level People's Courts in the Mainland 
had been designated to exercise jurisdiction over foreign-related civil and 
commercial cases, some of which might be allowed to adjudicate claims of up to 
RMB 1 million, generally on par with the District Court of the HKSAR. In many 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government, a good proportion of foreign-related cases were dealt with by the Basic 
Level People's Court, which could amount to 50% of the total number of foreign-
related civil and commercial matters dealt with in the relevant region. Many of the 
designated Basic Level Peoples' Courts were situated in provinces or municipalities 
where Hong Kong businesses had set up operations. In view of this development, the 
Administration accepted the Mainland side's counter-proposal that judgments made 
by designated Basic Level People's Courts should also be covered under the revised 
Arrangement.  
  
As a conclusion, the types of courts covered by the MJA should be: all courts in 
Macao; the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal of the 
High Court, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance, and the Hong Kong District Court; 
Mainland District, Intermediate, Higher, and the Supreme People’s courts. Whether the 
type of Mainland district courts should be limited to those with centralized first-instance 
jurisdiction will depend on negotiations between Mainland China and Hong Kong.  
 
iii. Types of Judicial Awards 
 
The types of judicial awards in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should 
include (1) judgments, rulings, mediation agreements and orders for payment from 
                                                
141 Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), supra note 137, at para 16. 
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Mainland China, (2) judgments, orders, and allocaturs from Hong Kong, and (3) decrees, 
judgments, mediation rulings, and judges’ instructions on substantive issues from Macao. 
This is based on the types of judicial awards covered by the two existing JRE 
Arrangements.142 Therefore, regarding the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, 
Mainland China is likely to accept decrees, judgments, mediation rulings, decisions, and 
instructions of judges from Macao, as well as judgments, orders, and allocaturs from 
Hong Kong. Considering the broad coverage of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, it is 
unlikely that Macao would refuse to accept judgments, orders, and allocaturs from Hong 
Kong under the Multilateral JRE Arrangement.  
Because unlike the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement excludes Mainland decisions,143 the issue for the proposed Arrangement is 
whether Hong Kong would accept Mainland decisions and Macao decisions and 
instructions of judges.  
Both Mainland decisions and Macao decisions only address procedural issues.144 
Macao judges' instructions are for either procedure or substantive issues.145 Macao 
judges' instructions on the substantive issues should be covered by the proposed 
Arrangement because they have the same effects as Macao judgments. However, 
Mainland and Macao decisions as well as Macao judges' instructions on procedural issues 
need not to be included in the proposed Arrangement for two reasons.  
                                                
142 Art. 2 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. The Arrangement covers judgments, decisions, and mediation 
agreements from Mainland China and Macao; rulings and orders for payment from Mainland China; decrees and 
instructions of judges from Macao. For detailed discussion of each of these judicial awards, see Chapter III. Art. 2 of 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement includes judgments, rulings, 
mediation agreements and orders for payment from Mainland China, and judgments, orders and allocaturs from Hong 
Kong. For detailed discussion of each of these judicial awards, see Chapter III. 
143 Id.  
144 For details, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter III. 
145 Id.  
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First, the majority of Mainland and Macao decisions as well as Macao judges' 
instructions on procedural issues aim to facilitate judgment-rendering proceedings and 
have no enforceable content in a sister region. For example, a decision of a party’s 
recusal application against a judge or a court clerk cannot be enforced in a sister region. 
Neither can a decision of granting or declining extension of a time limit upon a party’s 
application, nor a Macao court instruction dismissing a party’s motion for suspending a 
trial. These judicial awards are interlocutory in nature and aim to facilitate the 
proceedings in the judgment-rendering court. It is pointless to include them in the 
proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement. The same approach is adopted by the US and 
EU laws. In the US, these judgments are not on the merits, so they cannot benefit from 
the full-faith-and-credit JRE.146 In the EU, the Schlosser Report provides that 
“interlocutory decisions which are not intended to govern the legal relationships of the 
parties, but to arrange the further conduct of the proceedings,” should be excluded from 
the Brussels I Regulation.147 The reason is that these decisions concern procedural issues 
in the region of origin and is minimally related to the legal order of the requested 
region.148 For similar reasons, Mainland and Macao decisions as well as Macao judges' 
instructions on procedural issues need not to be covered by the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement.  
Second, Mainland and Macao courts also can use decisions to impose fines or 
money guarantees as compulsory measures against obstruction of civil actions.149 
Notably, the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement excludes penalties, such as fines, from 
                                                
146 See Part ii of Section C of Chapter I. 
147 Report Schlosser para. 187. 
148 See Patrick Wautelet, Chapter III Recognition and Enforcement Section 1 Recognition, in BRUSSELS I 
REGULATION, 543 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007).  
149 For details, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter III. 
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its scope.150 If Hong Kong is not willing to recognize and enforce judicial awards on fines 
from other regions, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should exclude judicial 
decisions on fines and money guarantees.  
In conclusion, the types of judicial awards in the proposed Arrangement should 
include (1) judgments, rulings, mediation agreements and orders for payment from 
Mainland China, (2) judgments, orders, and allocaturs from Hong Kong, and (3) decrees, 
judgments, mediation rulings, and judges’ instructions on substantive issues from Macao. 
Mainland and Macao decisions as well as Macao judges' instructions on procedural issues 
are not necessarily to be covered by the proposed Arrangement.   
 
B. Requirement for JRE 
 
In the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, the requirement for JRE is that a 
judgment should be final.151 The criterion of finality is determined either by an 
autonomous terminology provided by the Arrangement or according to the law of the 
judgment-rendering region.152 The former should be preferable to the latter because it can 
bring more clarity and less need to look into sister-region laws.153 On the merits is not 
required, because the types of judicial awards covered by the proposed Arrangement 
includes judicial awards on procedural issues, such as Mainland rulings and Hong Kong 
court orders.154  
                                                
150 Art. 16 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. 
151 For detailed discussion of solving the finality dispute and the autonomous terminology of "finality," see Part ii of 
Section B of Chapter IV. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Neither Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement nor the Mainland-Macao Arrangement has the requirement of "on the 
merits." For details, see Section B of Chapter III.  
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 C.  Grounds for Refusing JRE 
 
There are five grounds for refusing JRE under the Arrangement: lack of jurisdiction, 
unfair procedure, fraud, res judicata, and public policy exception. This list is exhaustive. 
Neither the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement nor the Mainland-Macao Arrangement 
states that the grounds for refusing JRE in the Arrangements are exhaustive.155 In other 
words, it is unclear whether a judgment debtor can invoke a ground for refusing JRE that 
is available in the regional laws but not in the existing Arrangements. This issue is 
important because the existing Arrangements do not cover grounds such as natural justice 
in Hong Kong law or substantive review under Macao law.156 Some scholars argue that 
regional JRE laws should be applied to interregional JRE issues that the existing 
Arrangements have not covered.157 For example, in Mainland China, a senior judge of the 
Supreme People's Court opined that regional JRE laws can be applied to the issues that 
the Mainland-Macao Arrangement does not stipulate:158  
 
For instance, the grounds under the Macao Arrangement to deny recognition 
and enforcement do not include violation of the parties' equality and judicial 
corruption, which are separately provided in the Code of Civil Procedures of 
Macao.... [] (at least) on theory these rules shall not be excluded for application (in 
reciprocal recognition and enforcement proceedings). [] 
 
Similarly, a Hong Kong scholar also argues that the grounds for refusing JRE in 
Hong Kong common law should be applied to interregional JRE even under the 
                                                
155 See Section B of Chapter III. 
156 For grounds for refusing JRE under the two existing Arrangements, see Chapter III. 
157 Xianchu Zhang, A New Stage of Regional Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters: Implementation of 
the Mainland Judgments Ordinance and Certain Issues Beyond,  39 HONG KONG L. J. 3, 19 (2009). 
158 Id. 
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Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.159 Therefore, the defense of "natural justice", 
although not provided in either the Arrangement or the Mainland Judgments Ordinance, 
may be applied to interregional JRE.160 
It is true that sometimes regional JRE laws should be applied to interregional JRE 
issues that the arrangements have not covered. For example, generally the lex fori still 
governs the procedural issues of the interregional JRE proceedings and decides how to 
execute a sister-region judgment in the requested region. However, very importantly, the 
list of grounds for refusing JRE shall be considered exhaustive. In other words, grounds 
available in the regional laws but not in the existing interregional Arrangements shall not 
be allowed in cases where Arrangements are applicable.  
This approach is adopted by the Brussels I Regulation. The grounds for refusing 
JRE under Article 34 and 35 of the Regulation are the sole grounds for refusing JRE.161 
Unremunerated grounds, such as those under national laws, are inapplicable.162 Similarly, 
in the Hague Choice of Court Convention, grounds not explicitly specified in the 
Convention cannot be invoked to deny JRE.163 The proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement should adopt this approach. Because if grounds unspecified in the 
Arrangement are permitted, predictable and effective interregional JRE will be hard to 
achieve. This will also potentially subject the proposed Arrangement to the manipulation 
of regional courts and devastate mutual trust.  
 
                                                
159 Id. at 20. 
160 Id. at 21. 
161 Art. 45 of the Brussels I Regulation. Stephanie Francq, Chapter III Recognition and Enforcement Section 1 
Recognition, 557-59 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed.). 
162 Id. at 559. Grounds for refusing JRE under public international law, although unremunerated in Articles 34 and 35, 
can serve as defense against JRE.  
163 Arts. 8.1 and 9 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. For comments, see Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 
101. 
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i. Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction  
1. Direct and Indirect Jurisdiction  
a. JRE Difficulties Brought by Different Regional Direct and Indirect 
Jurisdiction Laws 
 
If a requested court deems that a judgment-rendering court lacked in jurisdiction, it 
will not recognize and enforce the latter's judgment.164 However, a court, which has 
jurisdiction over a case according to its own law, may not have jurisdiction according to 
the law of the requested region. A typical case in practice would be: a Hong Kong 
company that has no domicile in the Mainland signs a contract in the Mainland with a 
Mainland company. Later, the Mainland company brought an action against the Hong 
Kong company for breach of the contract. Because the contract was signed in the 
Mainland, the Mainland court has jurisdiction over this case under the Mainland CPL.165 
Suppose that the Mainland court effected service by way of public announcement166 and 
made a default judgment ordering the Hong Kong defendant to pay a sum of money to 
the Mainland plaintiff, then the judgment creditor applied to a Hong Kong court for 
enforcement of this judgment. According to Hong Kong law, because this hypothetical 
case is an action in personam, and the defendant did not appear in the Mainland court, the 
Mainland court did not have jurisdiction over the case.167 Therefore, the Hong Kong 
                                                
164 Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and A Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1601, 1610 (1965). 
165 According to art. 243 of the Mainland CPL, an action concerning a contract dispute brought against a defendant who 
has no domicile in the Mainland, where the contract is signed or performed in the Mainland, then the people's court of 
the place where the contract is signed has jurisdiction over this case. 
166 Art. 307 of the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL. 
167 The Hong Kong FJREO, Cap 319, § 6(2)(a)(i) provides that: “For the purposes of this section, the courts of the 
country of the original court shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), be deemed to have had jurisdiction…in 
the case of a judgment given in an action in personam…if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, 
submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings…” 
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court refused to enforce this Mainland judgment. This case reflects the conflicts of direct 
and indirect jurisdictions between Mainland China and Hong Kong.168   
Direct jurisdiction is determined by the laws where the judgment-rendering court is 
located, and indirect jurisdiction is decided according to the law where the judgment 
seeks to be recognized or enforced.169 These two types of jurisdiction could be 
different:170  
 
[D]irect jurisdiction is a privilege –the courts of state A are free to exert direct 
jurisdiction, and state B has no right (the opposite of a privilege) that state A refrain 
from that jurisdiction. Indirect jurisdiction, by contrast, is a power – if the courts of 
state A have indirect jurisdiction, they bind the courts of state B with the ensuing 
judgment []  Powers and privileges can be connected in a legal system, but – this is 
important – there is no logical connection between them. The courts of state A may 
have direct but not indirect jurisdiction, and vice versa.   
 
In our hypothetical case, the Hong Kong court refused to recognize and enforce the 
Mainland judgment, because the Mainland court did not have indirect jurisdiction over 
this case under the Hong Kong JRE law, notwithstanding the Mainland court had 
competent direct jurisdiction under the Mainland CPL. A close look at Mainland direct-
jurisdiction law and Hong Kong indirect-jurisdiction law is necessary.  
A Mainland court regards a defendant’s domicile as the basis of exercising direct 
jurisdiction over a civil or commercial case involving foreign elements.171 If an action 
                                                
168 See Ralf Michaels, Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions,  in 
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: A TRIBUTE TO ARTHUR VON MEHREN 29, 35-36 (Ralf 
Michaels, et al. ed. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=927484 (last visited Apr 15, 2010). 
169 Id. at 35-36. 
170 Id. at 36-37. See also von Mehren, supra note_164_ at 1610-36. Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments--General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, 167 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 9 (1980); Arthur Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 221 (1941).  
171 This is called the general jurisdiction. Art. 22 of the Mainland CPL indicates: “A civil lawsuit brought against a 
citizen shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court of the place where the defendant has his domicile; if the 
place of the defendant's domicile is different from that of his habitual residence, the lawsuit shall be under the 
jurisdiction of the people's court of the place of his habitual residence.” See also Jin Huang and Huanfang DH, Private 
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concerns a dispute over property rights and interests against a defendant who has no 
domicile in the Mainland, a Mainland court may exercise jurisdiction over the following 
cases: those where the contract is signed or performed within the Mainland, those where 
the object of the action is located within the Mainland, those where the defendant has 
distrainable property within the Mainland, or those where the defendant has its 
representative office within the Mainland.172 A Mainland court can also hear a case 
according to a choice of court agreement concluded by the parties173 or a case in which a 
defendant raises no objection to the jurisdiction.174 Therefore, in our hypothetical case, 
Mainland court's direct jurisdiction is based on the fact that Mainland China is the place 
where the contract was concluded. 
Hong Kong common law requires a nexus existing between the defendant and the 
judgment-rendering court for indirect jurisdiction.175 However, such nexus does not exist 
in our hypothetical case. Therefore, Hong Kong courts hold that the Mainland judgment 
is unrecognizable. Even if we supposed that the Hong Kong FJREO176 would apply to 
Mainland judgments, the conclusion were the same. The reasons is none of the indirect 
jurisdiction grounds provided by the FJREO exists in our hypothetical case. Hong Kong 
courts would consider the Mainland court without jurisdiction even if the "sweeping up" 
                                                                                                                                            
International Law in Chinese Courts, FRONT LAW CHINA 1, 14-33 (2006). A case involving foreign factors refers to a 
case that one of the parties is a foreigner, stateless person, foreign enterprise or organization; that the legal facts 
creating, changing, or terminating the civil legal relations between parties occur in a foreign country; or that the subject 
matter of the dispute is located in a foreign country. See art. 304 of the Opinions on Application of the Mainland CPL. 
172 Correspondingly, the people's court of the place where the contract is signed or performed, or where the object of 
the action is, or where the defendant's distrainable property is located, or where the torts are done, or where the 
defendant's representative office is located, shall have jurisdiction. See art. 241 of the Mainland CPL. 
173 Id, art 242.  
174 This is called the presumptive jurisdiction. See id., art. 245 indicates: “If in a civil action in respect of a case 
involving foreign element, the defendant raises no objection to the jurisdiction of a people's court and responds to the 
action by making his defense, he shall be deemed to have accepted that this people's court has jurisdiction over the 
case.” 
175 GARY HEILBRONN, CHRISTINE BOOTH, AND HELEN MCCOOK, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN HONG KONG 311 
(Butterworths 1998). For details, see Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
176 S 6(2)(a) of FJREO, Cap 36. For details of the indirect jurisdiction grounds under the FJREO, see Part ii of Section 
A of Chapter III. 
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provision of the FJREO is applied.177 This provision requires that, if according to Hong 
Kong direct jurisdiction law (not FJREO), Hong Kong courts can exercise jurisdiction 
over the same case; the judgment-rendering court should be considered to have 
jurisdiction.178 But Hong Kong courts probably will decline jurisdiction over a 
contractual dispute merely because parties conclude a contract in Hong Kong and no 
other contact to Hong Kong exists. As a conclusion, under the FJREO, the Mainland 
court still lacks indirect jurisdiction therefore its judgment is unrecognizable in Hong 
Kong.  
This case describes a typical situation that likely happens to people who are 
involved in interregional litigations. Due to the differences of direct and indirect 
jurisdictions between the judgment-rendering region and the requested region, judgments 
rendered by one region may not be recognized and enforced in the other. Consequently, 
disputes between parties continue and their rights and obligations remain uncertain.  
The existing Arrangements fail to harmonize the differences between direct- and 
indirect- jurisdiction laws in Chinese regions. The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement 
uses a choice of court agreement to align regional direct and indirect jurisdiction laws.179 
However, this Arrangement has very narrow scope;180 therefore, it cannot sufficiently 
solve the conflicts of direct and indirect jurisdiction rules between regions. The 
Mainland-Macao Arrangement only states that a requested court can refuse JRE if its 
exclusive jurisdiction is infringed by the judgment-rendering court. But it is silent 
regarding whether a requested court can deny JRE when it holds that the judgment-
                                                
177 For details of this provision, see Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
178 Heilbronn, supra note 175 at 315. 
179 See Supra Part i of Section B of Chapter III. 
180 Id. 
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rendering court has no indirect jurisdiction according to the law of the requested region. 
Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should coordinate regional 
jurisdiction laws to facilitate JRE. 
 
b. Single Enforcement Arrangement 
 
The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement does not regulate direct jurisdiction, 
because harmonizing regional direct jurisdiction law is a difficult,181 if not an impossible, 
task.182 The absence of a court of final review requires that the requested court should be 
allowed to review issues of indirect jurisdiction.183 Moreover, the "start small" approach 
also emphasizes that, at the beginning stage, the proposed Arrangement should focus on 
indirect jurisdiction rules. In other words, it leaves direct jurisdiction to regional laws, but 
it requires requested courts to review jurisdiction of judgment-rendering courts according 
to the unified indirect jurisdiction rules under the proposed Arrangement.  
Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement is a single enforcement 
arrangement184 that deals only with JRE (including indirect jurisdiction) but not direct 
                                                
181 Yoav Oestreicher, The Rise and Fall of the "Mixed" and "Double" Convention Models Regarding Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW 339, 341 and 
349 (2007). Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Hague Judgments Convention--And Perhaps Beyond, in 
Law and Justice in a Multistate World 121-22 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002). See Arthur 
T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable 
World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 191, 
195 (Spring 2001) (arguing "many American jurists consider the absence of a general activity-based jurisdiction a 
serious--even fatal--defect in the Special Commission's draft"). 
182 For the difficulties of harmonizing direct jurisdictions, see eg Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003 (2006). 
183 Arthur T. von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements: To What Extent Should the State of Origin's Interpretation of 
Convention Rules Control for Recognition and Enforcement Purposes?,  in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION 
AND JUDGMENTS A-29, A-43 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman ed. 2001). For discussion of no court of final 
review, see Section B of Chapter VI. 
184 The single enforcement convention only deals with JRE not direct jurisdiction. For definition of a single 
enforcement convention, see Michaels, supra note_168_ at 54-55. For single enforcement bilateral treaties that 
Mainland China ratified, eg. THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL AFFAIRS ON MAY 2, 1992 BETWEEN 
MAINLAND CHINA AND SPAIN, http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/10/10-4.htm (last visited Feb 2, 
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jurisdiction.185 It has three categories of indirect jurisdiction: required, excluded, and 
permitted.186 Compared with arrangements addressing direct jurisdiction,187 a single 
enforcement arrangement will be much easier to negotiate188 between Chinese regions, 
especially considering their legal systems are distinct,189 their regional laws are 
divergent,190 and they have not established strong mutual trust yet191 and do not have an 
overarching court of final review.192 The asymmetric design of direct and indirect 
jurisdictions leaves regions' direct jurisdiction laws untouched so each region still 
maintains its freedom in rendering judgments, therefore it will probably meet less 
resistance in regions.193 And meanwhile this design unifies regional indirect jurisdiction 
law, so will significantly increase the certainty of JRE.194 
Notably, when negotiating a broad scope judgment convention at the Hague 
Conference, one of the main criticisms against a single enforcement convention was that 
                                                                                                                                            
2010). Its Article 21 indicates the circumstances where a judgment-rendering court shall be regarded as having 
jurisdiction. Article 22 states that if a court does not exercise jurisdiction according to Article 21, its judgments cannot 
be recognized and enforced under the Treaty. Other examples are THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL, 
COMMERCIAL, AND CRIMINAL AFFAIRS BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND CYPRUS, THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 
IN CIVIL AFFAIRS BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND ITALY, THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL AFFAIRS BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND VIETNAM, AND THE TREATY FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL, 
COMMERCIAL, AND CRIMINAL AFFAIRS BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA AND EGYPT. Examples of single enforcement 
international conventions, see the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters and the draft UK-US Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil Matters. 
185 For designs of single conventions, see ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW A COMPARATIVE STUDY 355 (2007). See Oestreicher, supra note_181_ at 341.(arguing 
combining the issues of recognition and enforcement with the issue of jurisdiction is the key reason for the failure of a 
broad-scope international judgment convention.)  
186 Michaels, supra note_168_ at 54-55. 
187 Arrangements addressing direct jurisdiction include single jurisdiction conventions that regulate direct jurisdiction 
but not JRE, and double conventions that addresses both JRE (indirect jurisdiction) and direct jurisdiction. For 
explanation of these conventions, see Id. at 54-55. 
188 Oestreicher, supra note_181_ at 350-54 (arguing "[a] simple convention will make it easier for the parties to join the 
proposed international instrument, as it would eliminate the need to agree in advance on the bases for the assertion of 
jurisdiction"). 
189 See Chapter I. 
190 See Chapter III. 
191 See Section C of Chapter IV. See von Mehren, supra note 185 at 356.  
192 von Mehren, supra note_183_ at A-43 (indicating the single convention format is appropriate when there is no 
"neutral institutions that can control the interpretation and application of each state's international obligations".) 
193 Michaels, supra note_168_ at 38-39. 
194 Id. at 38-39. 
 289 
it leaves jurisdiction to uncertainty195 so it would not improve the current situation where 
each country recognizes and enforces foreign judgments according to its own law.196 This 
criticism is unconvincing, because:197 
 
[a single enforcement convention] will change and improve dramatically the 
current international regime as it will add a major international obligation and a moral 
commitment on the part of all of the participating countries to recognize and enforce 
foreign judgments, something that does not exist under the current regime and should 
not be underestimated. This is a major improvement on what we have today. 
 
In the context of Chinese interregional JRE, a multilateral single enforcement 
arrangement will significantly expand the scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement, because the latter is restricted to judgments on a choice of court agreement. 
So it will help solve the JRE impasse between Mainland China and Hong Kong. It will 
also enhance the certainty of JRE between Mainland China and Macao because the 
Mainland-Macao Arrangement does not clarify the indirect jurisdiction rules that 
requested courts should apply in the JRE proceedings. In addition, it will fill the gap 
between Hong Kong and Macao because currently no JRE arrangement exists between 
them.  
Another benefit of a single enforcement arrangement is its ability to adapt to the 
changing economic, legal, and political situations among Chinese region. If Chinese 
regions become more and more economically interrelated, legally converged, and 
                                                
195 Fausto Pocar & Peter Nygh, Report of the Special Commission drawn up by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar,  in THE 
HAGUE PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 209, 214 (2005). (indicating that "a 'single 
Convention' would not be useful.). This is accepted by the Hong Kong delegation to the Hague Conference. See para 11 
of CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE DRAFT HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS (hereinafter "Hong 
Kong Paper") (International Law Division, Department of Justice Hong Kong) (1999), available at 
http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/archive/doc/4499.doc (last visited April 16, 2010). 
196 Oestreicher, supra note_181_ at 355. 
197 Id. at 350-54. 
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politically allied in the future, the single enforcement arrangement has the potentiality to 
develop into a mixed or double arrangement and ultimately harmonize regional direct and 
indirect jurisdiction laws. A mixed arrangement regulates both JRE and jurisdiction,198 
and it also divides jurisdiction into three types: required, prohibited, and permitted.199 
The 1999 Hague Draft Convention is an example.200 This type of arrangement best suits 
participating regions that “have become to a significant extent economically and 
politically inter-dependent but do not aspire to political or economic union.”201 Therefore, 
after concluding a single enforcement arrangement, when regions are more integrated 
with each other, they may consider to develop it into a mixed arrangement.  
As a further step, regions may consider to reduce the permitted jurisdiction grounds 
in the mixed arrangement and change it into a double arrangement.202 A double 
arrangement addresses both indirect and direct jurisdiction.203 Under such an arrangement, 
certain types of jurisdictional bases are allowed and the rest are prohibited.204 The Due 
Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the US Constitution, and the 
Brussels I Regulation are examples of double arrangements.205 This type of arrangement 
generally requires member regions share similar legal traditions, strong political alliances, 
and an overarching court that can control the interpretation and application of the 
                                                
198 If a judgment is based on a required jurisdictional ground under such arrangement, it should be recognized and 
enforced in another participating region. Exorbitant jurisdictions are prohibited. If a court assumes jurisdiction on such 
grounds, the recognition and enforcement of its judgments should be denied. Permitted jurisdictional grounds are a grey 
area where participating regions cannot make an agreement; therefore it is left to their regional laws. von Mehren, 
supra note 185 at 356.  
199 Id.  
200 See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted 
by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999, available at  
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf, Article 17; see also Report of the Special Commission drawn up by 
Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, supra note 195 at 19, 28-29.  
201 von Mehren, supra note 185 at 356.  
202 von Mehren, supra note 185 at 355-56. von Mehren, supra note 181 at 198.  
203 von Mehren, supra note 185 at 355-36.  
204 Id.  
205 Michaels, supra note_168_ at 37-38. 
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arrangement.206 Although the Hague 2005 Choice of Court Convention is a double 
arrangement, it is concluded because its limited scope makes the alliances between its 
members less important. Therefore, only when Chinese regions are closely integrated in 
terms of politics and economy, they are ready to develop a double JRE arrangement.  
 
c. Three Categories of Indirect Jurisdiction 
 
The proposed Arrangement provides three categories of indirect jurisdictions: 
required jurisdiction, excluded jurisdiction, and permitted jurisdiction.207 Requested 
courts shall review the judgment-rendering court’s jurisdiction according to these rules. 
First, requested courts shall recognize and enforce judgments that comply with the 
required indirect jurisdictional grounds.208 Second, requested courts are barred from 
recognizing and enforcing judgments rendered on an excluded indirect jurisdictional 
ground.209 Third, if the judgment-rendering court exercises jurisdiction according to the 
rules for permitted indirect jurisdiction, requested courts are free to determine whether or 
not judgments on such basis should be recognized and enforced.210 The category of 
permitted jurisdiction is designed to encourage the participation of regions and facilitate 
their negotiations:211  
A quick look at policy impacts shows how helpful the gray [permitted 
                                                
206 For explanation of double convention, see von Mehren, supra note 185 at 356; von Mehren, supra note 181 at 198; 
Michaels, supra note 168 at at 39-41. 
207 The design of required, excluded, and permitted jurisdiction bases first appeared in Arthur T. von Mehren, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS 271, 283 (1994). Michaels, supra note_168_ at 32-35. See Andreas Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a 
Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 
(1994).  
208 For details, see infra Required Direct Jurisdiction of Section C of Chapter V. 
209 For details, see infra Excluded Direct Jurisdiction of Section C of Chapter V. 
210 For details, see infra Permitted Direct Jurisdiction of Section C of Chapter V. 
211 Michaels, supra note_168_ at 35. 
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jurisdiction] category would have been for negotiations. Generally, required bases 
favor plaintiffs, while excluded bases favor defendants. Without the gray category of 
permitted bases, this means that delegates must not only agree for every basis of 
jurisdiction whether it is good and should be required, or whether it is bad and should 
be excluded; they must also always have the overall balance between plaintiffs and 
defendants in view. This is almost impossibly complex. By contrast, once bases can 
be left in the gray area, it becomes possible to negotiate over individual bases of 
jurisdiction without having to agree on every single one of them. This makes 
negotiations much easier and the consequences of conventions on the balance 
between plaintiff and defendant interests easier to predict. 
 
As a conclusion, the category of permitted jurisdiction grounds can flexibly adapt 
to the current extent of convergence of Chinese regions.212  
 
2. Required Indirect Jurisdiction 
 
If a judgment-rendering court exercised jurisdiction based on a defendant’s 
domicile, a choice of court agreement, or a defendant’s voluntary submission, a requested 
court shall recognize and enforce the resulting judgment, if no other defense exists.  
 
a. The Defendant Has His or Her Domicile or Habitual Residence in the 
Region Where the Judgment-rendering Court is Located  
 
All the bilateral treaties containing indirect jurisdiction rules and ratified by 
Mainland China state that: the judgment-rendering court should have jurisdiction, when a 
defendant has his or her domicile or habitual residence in the region where the court is 
                                                
212 See von Mehren supra note 185 at 356.  
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located.213 If the defendant is a non-natural person, it has its principal place of business or 
is registered in the region where the court is located.214 This rule is not against the 
indirect jurisdiction rule under the Macao Civil Procedure Code.215 Hong Kong has 
accepted a similar rule. For example, under Hong Kong common law, a judgement-
rendering court has competent indirect jurisdiction if a defendant resides in its 
jurisdiction or carry on business at a reasonably permanent place within its jurisdiction.216 
The FJREO also adopt a similar rule.217 Therefore, using defendant's domicile or habitual 
residence as a ground for indirect jurisdiction will be likely accepted by all regions. 
Additionally, the Brussels I Regulation permits a court that is seized of a case to 
invoke its regional law to determine a natural person’s domicile,218 but it provides an 
autonomous terminology for the domicile of a non-natural person.219 At the starting point 
of the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, arguably a requested court should decide 
the domicile of a party (regardless that the party is a natural person or not) according to 
the law of the judgment-rendering court. Moreover, “domicile” may be replaced by 
“habitual residence.” For example, in Mainland China if the defendant’s domicile is 
different from his or her habitual residence, the people’s court located in the place of his 
or her habitual residence has jurisdiction.220 In the future, if regions agree upon 
autonomous definitions of “domicile” or “habitual residence,” the proposed Arrangement 
should adopt these definitions for the benefit of certainty and predictability.  
                                                
213 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part i, Section A of Chapter III.  
214 Id. 
215 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part iii, Section A of Chapter III. 
216 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part ii, Section A of Chapter III. 
217 Id. 
218 Art. 59.1 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
219 Art. 60 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
220 Art. 22 of the Mainland CPL. The “habitual residence” of a defendant refers to the place where he or she has 
continuously resided for more than one year from the time when he or she left her domicile to the time of the action, 
except the place where she is hospitalized. Art. 5 of the Opinions of the Application of the CPL. 
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b. The Defendant has a Representative Office in the Region Where the Court 
is Located and the Action is Related to the Activities of the Office 
 
This rule should be adopted by the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement because 
it complies with the indirect jurisdiction rules in the bilateral JRE treaties concluded by 
Mainland China,221 Hong Kong JRE law,222 and the Macao Civil Procedure Code.223  The 
requirement of a relation between the action and the activities of the representative office 
is consistent with the rule adopted by the 1971 Hague Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters224  and the 
Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Judgment Convention.225  
 
c. Jurisdiction Based on a Choice of Court Agreement 
 
A judgment must be recognized if a judgment-rendering court exercises jurisdiction 
based on a choice of court agreement. This rule has been accepted by the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement and regional laws in Mainland China, Macao, and Hong Kong.226 The 
Hague Choice of Court Convention will not be implemented among Chinese regions.227 
                                                
221 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part i, Section A of Chapter III. 
222 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part ii, Section A of Chapter III. 
223 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part iii, Section A of Chapter III. 
224 Art. 10 (2) of the 1971 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. 
225 Art. 2(d) of the Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, concluded on Feb 1, 1971.  
226 See Chapter III. 
227 See Hong Kong Legislative Council Paper No. CB(2) 722/01-02(04) para 18, December 20, 2001. For details, see 
Relations with Other Interregional and International JRE Instruments of Chapter VI. 
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The two existing Arrangements are designed to fill this gap.228 The three regional laws on 
choice of court agreements, although similar, contain some differences. Based on the 
rules for choice of court agreements under the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, the 
proposed Arrangement attempts to harmonize relevant regional laws by formulating an 
autonomous terminology for choice of court agreements. 
 
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreement 
 
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement is restricted to judgments with an explicit 
exclusive choice of court agreement. This is because Mainland China and Hong Kong 
have different direct jurisdiction laws.229 An exclusive choice of court agreement aims to 
minimize the risk of parallel proceedings.230 Hong Kong also hopes more parties may 
choose Hong Kong to litigate their cases so as to make Hong Kong an interregional 
dispute resolution centre.231 For the same reasons, the choice of court agreement should 
also be exclusive under the proposed Arrangement.  
This requirement also complies with regional and interregional laws. For example, 
only exclusive choice of court agreements are valid under Mainland laws.232 A case 
between a Hong Kong shipping company and a Mainland company demonstrates this. In 
this case, they concluded a charter party with an arbitration clause.233 Later they signed 
                                                
228 See id. 
229 Baoguo Jiang, Neidi yu Gang Ao Minshangshi Panjue Renke he Zhixin Anpai Bijiao Yanjiu [A Comparative Study 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments Arrangements between Mainland China and 
Hong Kong and Macao---with Special Reference to the Practices of Hong Kong], 113 FAXUE LUNTAN [LEGAL FORUM] 
69, 71-72 (2007). 
230 Id. at 72. Hong Kong Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2) 1365/06-07(02), supra note 137 at para 14. 
231 Id.  
232 Art. 24 of the Opinions of the Mainland CPL. Guangjian Tu, Hague Choice of Court Convention - A Chinese 
Perspective, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 356 (2007). 
233 Hong Kong Yin Sen Shipping Company v. The Overseas Chinese Bank, Xiamen Branch and Xiamen Shengli 
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an Agreement on Payment of Freight with an exclusive choice of court clause favoring 
the Hong Kong High Court. Accordingly, a Mainland bank provided a guarantee for the 
Mainland party favoring the Hong Kong company. Because the Mainland party did not 
pay the freight, the Hong Kong company brought an action against the Mainland bank in 
the Xiamen Maritime Court in Mainland China. The court exercised jurisdiction because 
the choice of court clause conflicted with the arbitration clause, therefore both of them 
were invalid. But the appellate court (the Higher People’s Court of Fujian Province) 
reversed this decision. It ruled that the charter party was separate from the Agreement on 
Payment of Freight. The choice of court agreement was valid because it was exclusive; 
therefore, the Hong Kong High Court should have jurisdiction. In Hong Kong, both 
exclusive and non-exclusive submission to Hong Kong courts is effective “but only the 
former practically precludes a defendant from arguing that the Hong Kong court should 
not exercise its jurisdiction.”234 Macao law is similar to Hong Kong law on choice of 
court agreements.235 Therefore, in order to gain supports from all regions, the proposed 
Arrangement should consider restricting to exclusive choice of court agreements and 
leaving non-exclusive choice of court agreements to regional laws.  
In addition, Mainland law also requires that the choice should not violate the laws 
regarding the jurisdiction by level in Mainland China.236 However, under Hong Kong and 
Macao law, submission to a court in a region is equal to submission to all courts in that 
                                                                                                                                            
Economic and Trade Development Company, Higher People’s Court of Fujian Province, 1994, in SUPREME PEOPLE’S 
COURT, SELECTED CASES OF PEOPLE’S COURTS 2015-19 (1996). 
234 Johnston, supra note 25 at 60. 
235 Zhu Jian, MACAO MIN SHI SU SONG GUANG XIA YU QUE REN WAI DI CAI PAN DE ZHI DU [MACAO SYSTEMS FOR 
JURISDICTION AND JRE IN CIVIL LITIGATION], http://www.court.gov.mo/pdf/ConfirmC.pdf (last visited Feb 2, 2010). 
(Indicating Macao courts recognize both exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements.). See Chapter III. 
236 Art. 242 of the Mainland CPL. 
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region.237 Hong Kong applies this rule to choice of court agreements favoring Mainland 
courts.238 This approach is better than that adopted in Mainland China. In the 
interregional context, advisably, a choice of court agreement should be valid even if it is 
against a regional law regarding the jurisdiction by level. The chosen court can transfer 
the case to the proper venue in the same region based on regional law.   
 
In Writing 
 
The choice of court agreement under the proposed Arrangement should be in 
writing. A written form means a form, in which the contents may be displayed visibly 
and are accessible for subsequent reference and use.239 Besides a written contract or a 
letter, an electronic data message, such as an e-mail, a telegram, a telex, or a facsimile, is 
also a written form in this Arrangement.240  
This requirement is modeled upon the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.241 It is 
also consistent with the corresponding concept in Article 11 of the Mainland Contract 
Law.242 In Hong Kong, a choice of court agreement or clause can be either in oral or 
writing.243 Therefore, the form requirement under the proposed Arrangement will be a 
compromise between regional laws. Since Hong Kong accepts the written requirement in 
                                                
237 For Hong Kong law, see Supra Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. For Macao law, see Supra Part iii of Section A of 
Chapter III Supra Part ii of Section A of Chapter III, see also Jian, supra note_235_. 
238 A348, art. 3(2) of the Mainland Judgment (Reciprocal) Ordinance. See Supra Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
239 Id. at A348, art. 3(3). 
240 Id. 
241 Art. 3 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
242 Art. 11 of the Mainland Contract Law. He Tong Fa [Contract Law] (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth 
National People’s Congress on March 15, 1999, effective October 1, 1999) translated in http://www.lawinfochina.com 
accessed on November 3, 2009 (P.R.C.). Tu, supra note_232_ at 356. 
243 Johnston, supra note 25 at 579-580. 
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the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement, it is likely to accept the same requirement in the 
proposed Arrangement.  
This requirement is also in line with recent international private law conventions, 
including the 2005 UNCITRAL Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts.244 Comparatively, the Hague Choice of Court Convention has a 
more flexible requirement regarding the format of choice of court agreements. It includes 
agreements in writing or “by any other means of communication which renders 
information accessible so as to be useable for subsequent reference.”245 Therefore the 
Hague Convention can include as many judgments in its scope as possible.246 Arguably, 
when expanding the proposed Arrangement in the future, regions may consider accepting 
choice of court agreements in means of communication other than writing. 
 
Connection between the Chosen Court and the Dispute 
 
Mainland law requires that the court chosen should be located in a place with actual 
connections to the dispute.247 Generally, a place would have "actual connections" with a 
court if it is located where one of the parties is domiciled, where the contract would be 
performed or signed, or where the subject of the contract is located.248 However, it is 
unclear what other factors can count as "actual connections." Neither Hong Kong law nor 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement imposes the requirement of "actual 
                                                
244 U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], U.N.Doc. A/60/515, annex I, chapter III, art. 9(2)(2005). 
245 Art. 3(c) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. For comments, see Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 45-46. 
246 Id. at 46. 
247 Art. 242 of the Mainland CPL. 
248 See id., art. 25. 
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connections."249 In the US, a chosen court does not necessarily need to have any actual 
connection with the dispute.250 For example, in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., a US 
company contracted with a German company to tow a drilling rig from the US to Italy.251 
The contract contained a choice of court clause favoring the London Court of Justice.252 
Because of a severe storm in the Gulf of Mexico, the rig was damaged and the tug 
Bremen had to berth at the Tampa, Florida, the nearest port of refuge. Parties disputed 
whether the court of Tampa or the London court should have jurisdiction regarding the 
damages to the rig. The Supreme Court of the US stated that253 
 
the courts of England meet the standards of neutrality and long experience in 
admiralty litigation. The choice of that forum was made in an arm's length negotiation 
by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and, absent some compelling and 
countervailing reason, it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts. 
 
Therefore, the Court held that unless a defendant can meet the heavy burden of showing 
that the enforcement of a choice of court agreement would be unreasonable, unfair, or 
unjust, the agreement should be binding on the parties.254  
Similarly, according to the Brussels I Regulation, no connection is required 
between the chosen court and the dispute.255 The 2005 Hague Choice of Court 
Convention does not require a connection exists between the chosen court and the 
                                                
249 Johnston, supra note 25 at 119-120. 
250 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Ved P. Nanda, The Landmark 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 773, 774-75 (2007) (indicating in Bremen, "the Court approved of what 
it called a recent trend in adopting 'a more hospitable attitude' toward choice of forum clauses.) 
251 Bremen, at 407 U.S. 1 at 1.  
252 The clause is "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice." Id, at 2. 
253 Id, at 12. 
254 Id, at 8-20. For comments, see Ronald Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and A Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. 
PITT. L. REV 661, 699-700 (1999).  
255 Art. 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. For comments, see Ulrich Magnus, Chapter II Jurisdiction Section 7 
Prorogation of Jurisdiction, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION, 389 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 
2007). For cases, see Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumpy SpA, (Case C-159/97) [1999], 
ECR I-1597, I-1656 para 50; Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, (Case C-
106/95) [1997] ECR I-911, I-944 para. 34. 
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dispute;256 however, it permits member states to declare that "its courts may refuse to 
determine disputes to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies if, except for 
the location of the chosen court, there is no connection between that state and the parties 
or the dispute."257 The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement might adopt this 
approach. However, arguably, Mainland China should not require an actual connection 
between the chosen court and the dispute in civil and commercial case,258 except that 
parties purposefully choose a court to maliciously evade Mainland mandatory laws. 
Considering that Mainland China accepts the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement that 
does not require the chosen court should have an actual connection to the dispute, 
Mainland China is likely to waive the same requirement in the proposed Arrangement.  
 
Miscellaneous 
 
The terms of a choice of court agreement exist independently, unless it is otherwise 
provided in the contract. No matter whether the contract is modified, rescinded, 
terminated or nullified, terms on jurisdiction remain effective. Further, a choice of court 
agreement shall not violate the exclusive jurisdiction under regional laws. 
Moreover, some scholars based in Hong Kong are concerned that Mainland courts 
may set aside choice of court clauses concluded by parties for reasons such as local 
protectionism.259 Especially, according to a judicial interpretation when invalidating 
foreign or sister-region related arbitration clauses, lower courts shall seek the approval of 
                                                
256 Art. 5 of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention. Forum non conveniens is forbidden.  
257 Art. 19 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 146-49. 
258 Jiwen Wang, Woguo Pizhun Haiya "Xuanzhe Fayuan Xieyi Gongyue" de Biyaoxing Fenxi [The Necessity that China 
Ratifies the Hague Choice of Court Convention], 16 ANHUI DAXUE FALV PINGLUN [ANHUI UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 
153, 157 (2009). 
259 Zhang, supra note 157 at 12-13. 
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the Supreme People’s Court.260 But such a requirement does not exist in the choice of 
court context. It is advisable to treat choice of court agreements and arbitration 
agreements equally so to soothe people outside of Mainland China. Therefore, the 
Supreme People’s Court should consider expanding its judicial interpretation regarding 
arbitration agreements to choice of court agreements.  
 
d. Jurisdiction Based on Submission  
 
A requested court shall recognize and enforce a judgment that is rendered on the 
ground that the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court. 
In other words, a defendant argues the substance of the case in a court without raising 
objection to its jurisdiction, should be deemed to have accepted its jurisdiction. What 
amounts to submission should be determined by the law of the judgment-rendering region. 
Jurisdiction based on submission has been widely acknowledged by regional JRE laws.261 
Therefore, this rule is likely to be accepted by all regions.  
 
3. Excluded Indirect Jurisdiction 
 
Besides required indirect jurisdiction grounds, the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement should also stipulate excluded indirect jurisdiction grounds. JRE shall be 
denied if the judgment is rendered on these grounds. Providing excluded indirect 
                                                
260 Point 1 of the Notice of the Supreme People's Court Concerning Handling of Certain Issues of Foreign Related 
Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration dated 28 August 1995. Printed in 2 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Sifa Jieshi Quanji [Collection of Judicial Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court] 548 (1993-1996) 
(Beijing: People's Court Publishing House, 1997). 
261 See Section A of Chapter III. 
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jurisdiction grounds seemingly makes little sense in a single enforcement arrangement, 
whose aim is to "make enforceability easier rather than harder."262 However, conflicts 
between direct jurisdiction rules among Chinese regions are an urgent issue and no 
interregional legal solution exists.263 At the current stage, concluding an arrangement on 
direct jurisdiction is probably an insurmountable task.264 Comparatively speaking, a 
single enforcement arrangement with excluded indirect jurisdiction grounds is easier for 
regions to agree upon. This is because it leaves direct jurisdiction to regional laws, and 
meanwhile more importantly, it can use denying JRE to discourage parties to sue on 
exorbitant direct jurisdiction grounds. This will pave the way for the regions to develop a 
mixed or double arrangement regulating both direct and indirect jurisdiction in the long 
run. Admittedly, there may be concerns that the excluded indirect jurisdiction grounds 
may make the proposed Arrangement less appealing for regions because it may regulate 
too much. However, the benefits of decreasing conflicting jurisdictions and parallel 
litigations should outweigh this concern. Excluded indirect jurisdiction grounds do not 
regulate too much. Instead, it fills the gap in the current Chinese interregional conflict of 
laws where JRE is difficult and jurisdiction conflicts are rampant. It makes the proposed 
Arrangement more effectively solving interregional legal conflicts so it is more 
appealing. Additionally, the excluded bases of indirect jurisdiction mainly concern 
Mainland exorbitant jurisdiction law.265 Therefore, it is for the interests of each region to 
accept excluded indirect jurisdiction grounds. 
 
                                                
262 This argument is noted in Michaels, supra note_168_ at 41. 
263 Zhang, supra note 157 at 24-34. 
264 Id, at 33 (indicating "[a]pparently, the considerable disparities [regarding direct jurisdictions] between the two 
regions [Mainland China and Hong Kong] would not allow any substantive compromise and comprehensive 
cooperation at this moment.)  
265 See Chapter II. 
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a. Exclusive Jurisdiction over Certain Disputes of Joint Ventures  
 
The JRE treaties containing indirect jurisdiction rules and the two existing JRE 
Arrangements concluded by Mainland China all states that Mainland China can refuse 
JRE if the judgment-rendering court infringes the exclusive jurisdiction of Mainland 
courts.266 Mainland courts have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from the 
performance of contracts for joint ventures established between a Mainland party and a 
party from a sister region.267 Mainland China should give up its claim to this ground of 
exclusive jurisdiction,268 at least vis-à-vis the other sister regions. The establishment of 
exclusive jurisdiction aims to protect Mainland sovereignty and national interests.269 
However, it is doubtful that imposing exclusive jurisdiction over joint ventures would 
promote this goal,270 especially when the ventures are established by capital from a sister 
region. It is even doubtful to distinguish joint ventures from other companies in 
jurisdictional rules when national treatment has been granted to joint ventures in other 
fields in Mainland law.271 Therefore, a requested court in Hong Kong and Macao should 
refuse recognizing and enforcing Mainland judgments rendered on this rule. 
 
b. Jurisdiction of the Place Where the Contract is Signed 
                                                
266 For discussion of required exclusive jurisdiction rule under the Proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, see supra 
Required Indirect Jurisdiction of Chapter V. 
267 Art. 244 of the Mainland CPL. 
268 For criticism of this jurisdiction ground and the problems it brings to JRE, see Patricia J. Blazey & Peter S. Gillies, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China,  SSRN ELIBRARY, 10 (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103364 (last visited Jun 10, 2010). 
269 JIN HUANG, GUO JI SI FA [PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 893-94 (Law Press, 1999). Depei Han, GUO JI SI FA XIN 
LUN [NEW ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 629 (Wu Han University, 1997).  
270 Ding Wei, On the Perfection of the Legal System of China’s Jurisdiction over Foreign Civil and Commercial 
Disputes, the Collection of Papers presented on 2007 Chinese Private International Association Annual Conference 
200-1 (on file with the author). 
271 Id, at 201. For detailed reasons why this jurisdictional ground is exorbitant, see Chapter III. 
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The JRE treaties ratified by Mainland China often state that a judgment-rendering 
court should have indirect jurisdiction when, in contractual disputes, the contract was 
signed in the region where the court is located.272 The Mainland CPL contains a same 
rule for direct jurisdiction, namely, when the defendant has no domicile in Mainland 
China, the court located in the place where the contract is signed, can exercise 
jurisdiction over the contractual dispute.273 Jurisdiction of the place where the contract is 
signed is unreasonable because this place may be fortuitous and hard to determine.274 
Notably, jurisdiction based on the place where the contract is signed is exorbitant in the 
Brussels I Regulation.275 In the US, although jurisdiction based on the place where the 
contract is signed appears in some state long-arm statutes,276 such ground possibly 
violates the Due Process Clause in the US Constitution.277 Therefore, if a Mainland 
judgment is rendered on this ground, Hong Kong and Macao requested courts should be 
barred from recognizing and enforcing these judgments under the proposed Arrangement. 
 
c. Jurisdiction by Service on a Defendant Who Temporarily Appears  
 
The Hong Kong FJREO has a "sweeping up" indirect jurisdiction rule, which 
provides that if the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court is recognized by Hong 
Kong laws, its judgments can be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong. Under Hong 
                                                
272 See Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part i of Section A of Chapter III. 
273 Art. 241 of the Mainland CPL. 
274 See Brand, supra note_254_ at 691-92. 
275 Art. 3(2) of the Brussels I Regulation and Annex I.  
276 Brand, supra note_254_ at 691. For cases, see Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 712 (4th Cir. 1966); 
Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225, 233 (1965). 
277 Brand, supra note 254 at 691-92. 
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Kong direct jurisdiction law, courts can exercise jurisdiction when the document 
initiating an action have been served on the defendant during his or her temporary 
presence in Hong Kong.278 In Hong Kong, service can be affected by personal service 
upon a defendant. It is sufficient to finish a service by informing the defendant the nature 
of the document and “leave it as nearly as could be done in his possession or control.”279 
The defendant’s refusal to accept the document is irrelevant. Service can also be affected 
by inserting the judicial document through the letterbox at or sending it by registered mail 
to “the defendant’s usual or last known address in Hong Kong.”280 Establishing 
jurisdiction by merely serving a document initiating an action to a defendant who 
temporarily appears is exorbitant and has been banned by the Supplementary Protocol to 
The Hague Judgment Convention281 and the Brussels I Regulation,282 as well as 
suggested by many American commentators during the negotiation of a broad scope 
Hague Judgment Convention.283 Therefore, a requested court in Mainland China or 
Macao should refuse to recognize and enforce Hong Kong judgments rendered on this 
jurisdiction ground.  
 
4. Permitted Indirect Jurisdiction 
 
                                                
278 Johnston, supra note_25_ at 67. 
279 Re David C Buxbaum ex p Samuel-Rozenbaum (HK) Ltd, HCB 7637/2004, para 14, per Kwan J. See also Hong 
Kong Civil Procedure 2004, Vol 1, para 65/2/3; Thomson v Pheney (1832) 1 Dowl. 441 at 443. 
280 Johnston, supra note 25 at 67. See Rules of the High Court, Order 10, r 1(2)(a)&(b).  
281 Art. 2(e) of the Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, concluded on Feb 1, 1971.  
282 Annex I of the Brussels I Regulation.  
283 LINDA J. SILBERMAN & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, The Hague Judgments Convention--And Perhaps Beyond, in 
LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD 128 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002) 
(arguing that tag jurisdiction can be eliminated except for war criminals, human rights violators, and Holocaust 
profiteers). von Mehren, supra note 181 at 195-96. 
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All the remaining regional indirect jurisdiction laws fall into this category. 
Requested courts can exercise discretion to recognize and enforce judgments rendered on 
these jurisdiction grounds. Because Mainland regional JRE law contains no indirect 
jurisdiction rules, the Mainland indirect jurisdiction laws analyzed in this dissertation are 
based on the bilateral JRE treaties ratified by Mainland China. Macao indirect 
jurisdiction law is very brief284 and Macao has not concluded any JRE treaty with an 
indirect jurisdiction rule.285 Based on these regional laws, at the beginning stage, the 
proposed Arrangement should contain four permitted indirect jurisdiction rules. Regions 
should be allowed to add indirect jurisdiction rules into this category, and they should 
inform each other if they do so. However, arguably, regions should work together to 
reduce the number of permitted grounds to enhance the certainty of interregional JRE. 
The three permitted indirect jurisdiction rules are as follows: 
First, in an action in rem of which the subject matter was movable property, if the 
property in question was at the time of the proceedings in the region where the judgment-
rendering court is situated.286 This is an indirect jurisdiction rule in the Hong Kong 
regional JRE law. It is a proper rule. Because current Mainland and Macao JRE law do 
not contain a similar law, it should be a permitted, instead of required, ground. 
Second, in contractual disputes, the contract has been or will be performed in the 
region where the court is located, or the subject matter is located in that region.287 Third, 
in cases of tort, the conducts or results of the tort took place in the region where the court 
is located.288 These two rules are found in bilateral JRE treaties concluded by Mainland 
                                                
284 Art. 1200 (c) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code. 
285 See supra Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part iii of Section A of Chapter III. 
286 Hong Kong FRJEO Section 6, art. 3(b). 
287 See supra Incompetent Indirect Jurisdiction of Part i of Section A of Chapter III. 
288 Id. 
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China. These two rules are proper. They are permitted, rather than required, grounds 
because there is no equivalence of these rules in Hong Kong and Macao JRE law.  
Four, requested courts are free to decide the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, if the judgment-rendering court infringes the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
requested court. This rule is endorsed by regional JRE laws in Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and Macao, as well as the two existing JRE Arrangements.289 Advisably, the 
proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should adopt it. It should also list the exclusive 
jurisdiction of each region. Regions should inform each other if they would like to revise 
their exclusive jurisdiction laws.  
Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao have a common exclusive jurisdiction 
law: a lawsuit brought on real estate shall be under the jurisdiction of the court located in 
the region where the real estate is situated.290 Therefore, in the proposed Arrangement, a 
requested court can deny recognition and enforcement of judgments that violates this 
exclusive jurisdiction rule.   
Besides this common jurisdiction law, each region has one more exclusive 
jurisdiction law that may be relevant to the proposed Arrangement. Under Hong Kong 
law, a lawsuit regarding the registration of an intellectual property right in Hong Kong 
shall be under its exclusive jurisdiction.291 Macao courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction 
when lawsuits related to the bankruptcy or insolvency of a Macao legal person.292 This 
jurisdiction law is relevant to the proposed Arrangement only when the regions decide to 
include insolvency and related issues into the Arrangement. According to Mainland law, 
                                                
289 See Section A and Section B of Chapter III. 
290 See Section B of Chapter III.  
291 For a detailed discussion of lex situs rule in Hong Kong, see Johnston, supra note 25 at 297-318. 
292 Art. 20 of the Macao Civil Procedure Code.  
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a lawsuit concerning port operations and Sino-foreign cooperative exploration and 
development of natural resources shall be under the jurisdiction of the court located in the 
region where the port and the resources are located.293 The court where a port is located is 
best suited to address disputes arising from the operation of the port. Regarding natural 
resources, Mainland China has a larger territory than Hong Kong and Macao. Exclusive 
jurisdiction over cooperative exploration and development of natural resources, although 
protectionist, are important for Mainland China. Recognizing Mainland courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over cooperative exploration and development of natural resources 
can motivate Mainland China to accept the proposed Arrangement. Meanwhile, Hong 
Kong and Macao have fewer ports and natural resources than Mainland China, so this 
rule matters less for them and is likely to be acceptable for them. 
 
ii. Unfair Procedure 
1. Three Instances 
 
The Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement states that JRE shall be denied when the 
judgment-rendering proceeding is unfair, which includes the case in which the default 
judgment debtor has not been summoned in the original trial or has been summoned but 
not been given a reasonable time to defend a case.294 Besides the requirement of lawful 
summons, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement lists another procedural deficiency: a party 
who doesn’t have litigation capacity was not assigned a guardian as specified by the law 
                                                
293 Besides exclusive jurisdiction over ports and natural resources, as well as joint ventures that will be discussed above, 
Mainland China has one more exclusive jurisdiction laws (see art. 34.3 of the Mainland CPL): a lawsuit concerning 
inheritance shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the people’s court located in the place where the decedent had 
his or her domicile upon his or her death, or where the principal portion of his or her estate is located. But this rule 
concerns family-law issues and should be excluded by the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement.  
294 Art. 9.4 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. For comments, see Part i of Section B of Chapter III. 
 309 
of the place where the original trial was conducted.295 Both Arrangements do not cover 
all possible procedure deficiencies in the original trial. But in general it is impossible to 
list all procedure deficiencies in a JRE arrangement. The proposed solution is to list some 
instances of procedure deficiencies under the heading of unfair procedure and to regard 
the rest as fraud or violating public policy.296  
In the proposed JRE Arrangement the heading of unfair procedure includes three 
instances: the losing party was not duly summoned or was summoned but not given a 
reasonable time to defend a case, or was not properly represented by a guardian if lacking 
litigation capacity. If a party lacking litigation capacity is not represented by a guardian 
in hearings, he or she essentially loses the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Therefore, 
all three instances emphasize due notice to a losing party and his or her reasonable 
opportunity to be heard. The grounds of unfair procedure in the US and EU JRE laws, as 
well as the Hague Choice of Court Convention all underscore the same policy. 
In the US, judgments rendered in a procedure violating the Due Process Clause 
cannot be recognized and enforced in sister regions.297 The opportunity to be heard is the 
fundamental requisite of due process of law.298 It means a defendant should be informed 
of the pendency of a suit so can choose to appear or default.299 The form of notice used 
must be reasonable in light of the practicalities and peculiarities of the specific case. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.300 is the leading case concerning the 
                                                
295 Art. 11.4 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. For comments, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter III. 
296 For how to delimit procedure deficiencies under the heading of unfair procedure, fraud, and public policy, see infra 
fn 453 and accompanying texts. 
297 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 105 (1971). 
298 Id, at § 92 (b). Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 234 U. S. 394. See Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int’l, 231 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 
2000) (F1’s mistake in not allowing amendment of pleadings does not violate due process, so its judgment is entitled to 
full faith and credit recognition in F2). 
299 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604; Roller v. 
Holly, 176 U. S. 398. 
300 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), 314-15.  
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constitutional sufficiency of notice to a defendant in the US law. In this case, according 
to New York law, a defendant planned to establish a common trust fund by pooling small 
trust estates into one fund for investment administration. Among those small trusts, some 
beneficiaries did not reside in New York. The defendant notified all beneficiaries by 
publication in a local newspaper, which complied with the minimum requirements of a 
New York banking law.301 The Supreme Court of the US ruled that for beneficiaries with 
unknown contact information, this notice is sufficient because they could not be notified 
in a way more practicable and more effective.302 But for known beneficiaries, this notice 
was insufficient under the Due Process Clause because “it is not reasonably calculated to 
reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand.”303 The Court held that 
the defendant shall notify known beneficiaries at least by ordinary mail.304 Therefore, 
Mullane demonstrates that, in the US JRE law, due notice must be afforded to a 
defendant and his or her reasonable opportunity to be heard must be guaranteed.  
Similarly, Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation aims to protect a defaulting 
defendant’s right for a due notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.305 It states 
that JRE can be denied if the document(s) that instituted the proceedings or its 
equivalent(s) was not served upon the defendant properly so he cannot arrange his 
defense.306 According to the ECJ case law, this condition refers to the situation that the 
defendant was not served with the document(s) duly both in method and timing so he or 
                                                
301 Id. at 310. The announcement listed the name and address of the trust company, the name and the date of 
establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates. 
302 Id. at 313-18. 
303 Id. at 319. 
304 Id. at 318-20. 
305 Art. 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. Maersk Olie & Gas A/S v. Firma M. de Haan en W. de Boer, (Case C-39/02) 
[2004] ECR I-9657. Arthur T. von Mehren & Kerameus Konstantinos, The Scope of Recognition of Judgments,  in THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 59, 65-66 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman ed. 
2001). 
306 For explanation, see Francq, supra note_161_ at 585-91. 
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she could not assert his or her rights before an enforceable judgment was rendered.307 
This condition is not met if the defendant “was notified of the elements of the claim and 
had the opportunity to arrange for this defense.”308 Weiss und Partner illustrates this.309 
In this case, the defendant complained that the service of document to him was defective 
because the annexes of the document instituting the proceeding had not been translated 
into English.310 The ECJ ruled that service could not be refused on the sole ground that 
the annexes had not been translated. The reason was that the annexes “ha[d] a purely 
evidential function and [wa]s not necessary for understanding the subject-matter of the 
claim and the cause of action.” In other words, if the document instituting the proceeding 
was translated and was sufficient to enable the defendant to assert his or her rights, the 
service was proper. Therefore, similar to Mullane, Weiss und Partner demonstrates that 
due service requires a defendant should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
his or her case and to be heard.  
Moreover, the Hague Choice of Court Convention311 and the 1999 Hague Draft312 
also emphasizes a defendant’s right for a due notice and an opportunity to prepare his or 
her defense. Its Article 9 (c) states two instances to refuse JRE: the defendant was not 
notified or the notification did not allow him or her proper time or manner to arrange for 
an effective defense.313 
                                                
307 Hengst Import BV v Anna Maria Campese, (Case C-474/93) [1995] ECR I-2113 para. 19.  
308 Volker Sonntag v. Hans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann and Stefan Waidmann, (Case C-172/91) [1993] ECR I-
1963 para. 39.  
309 Weiss und Partner, ECJ C-14/07, Judgment (OJ) OJ C 158 of 21.06.2008, p.5. 
310 See Art. 8.1 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 
on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of 
documents), and repealing (annul) Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OF L 324, 10.12.2007) . 
311 Art. 9(c) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. 
312 Art. 28.1(d) of the Hague 1999 Draft. Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 306-08. 
313 Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 114. 
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Therefore, the proposed Multilateral Arrangement underscores the same policy 
adopted by the US and the EU JRE laws as well as the Hague Choice of Court 
Arrangement.  
Additionally, in the proposed Arrangement, a requested court should invoke the 
law of the judgment-rendering region to determine whether unfair procedure tainted the 
original trial. This has been adopted by the two existing arrangements.314 Notably, some 
commentators imply that, under the Hague Choice of Court Convention, a requested 
court may invoke its own law to determine whether the judgment-rendering procedure is 
unfair.315 This may be correct for international JRE where mutual trust among countries 
is weak. However this is improper in the Chinese interregional scenario, especially 
considering the two existing Arrangements have abandoned this approach.316  
 
2. Losing Party or Defendant 
 
Following the existing two Arrangements,317 the unfair procedure defense in the 
proposed Arrangement should extend protections from "defendant" to "losing party." 
This is because in Mainland China, courts are responsible to ensure every party in the 
action (both plaintiffs and defendants) who lacks litigation capacity is represented by a 
guardian.318 The unfair procedure defense in many bilateral JRE treaties that Mainland 
                                                
314 Art. 9.4 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and art.11.4 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
315 Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 114. 
316 The existing two arrangements require the requested court to review the legitimacy of judgment-rendering process 
according to the law of the judgment-rendering region. Art. 9.4 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and art. 11.4 
of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
317 Art. 9.4 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and art.11.4 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
318 Art. 57 of the Mainland CPL and art. 67 of the Opinions to the Mainland CPL. 
 313 
China concluded is identical to the existing two JRE arrangements.319 They all use 
"losing party" rather than "defendant."320 This should be acceptable to Macao and Hong 
Kong, because they are not against their regional laws. Both plaintiff and defendant of the 
original trial can invoke the unfair procedure defense under the Macao JRE law, because 
the defense covers procedure issues, such as defendants were not duly summoned or 
parties were not duly represented.321 The unfair procedure defense under the Hong Kong 
JRE law only addresses undue notice, so only a defendant in the original trial can invoke 
it.322 However, a losing party without litigation capacity who was not represented by a 
guardian in the judgment-rendering proceedings can invoke the public policy exception 
to defend JRE.323 
As a conclusion, the proposed Arrangement may indicate that JRE should be 
denied if the losing party was not duly summoned or was summoned but not given a 
reasonable time to defend a case, or was not properly represented by a guardian if lacking 
litigation capacity. 
 
3. Obligation of Challenging a Judgment on the Ground of Unfair Procedure 
in the Judgment-Rendering Court 
 
                                                
319 Eg., art. 17.3 of THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TREATY IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES ON DECEMBER 25, 1999 BETWEEN 
THE PRC AND VIETNAM; the Treaty between the PRC and Spain, supra note 191, at art. 22.4 and 22.5. Both these 
treaties provide that JRE should be denied if the losing party was not duly summoned or was summoned but not given a 
reasonable time to defend a case, or was not properly represented by a guardian if lacking litigation capacity. 
320 Id. 
321 Art. 1200 (e) of the Macao Civil Procedure Code states that JRE shall be refused if the defendant had not been duly 
summoned, or the principles of adversarial procedure and the equality between parties were not been observed. For 
details, see Part iii of Section A of Chapter III.  
322 The Hong Kong FJREO Section 6(1)(a)(iii) provides that JRE shall be refused when "the judgment debtor, being the 
defendant in the proceedings in the original court, did not...receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient  
time to enable him to defend the proceedings and did not appear." 
323 See the Public Policy Exception of the Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
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In the Brussels I Regulation, one precondition for refusing JRE on unfair procedure 
is that the defendant commenced the proceedings to challenge the judgment on this 
ground when it was possible for him to do so. If the defendant fails to do so in the 
judgment-rendering region, he or she cannot invoke Article 34(2) in the JRE 
proceedings.324 This precondition aims to balance finality and justice, because a 
defendant should litigate the issue of unfair procedure in the judgment-rendering court. 
As the ECJ indicates, “the possibility of having recourse, at a later stage, to a legal 
remedy against a judgment given in default of appearance, which has already become 
enforceable, cannot constitute an equally effective alternative to defending the 
proceedings before judgment is delivered.”325 Moreover, the obligation that a defendant 
should challenge the issue of unfair procedure in the judgment-rendering court is only 
imposed on him “when it was possible for him to do so.”326 Therefore, if a defendant 
raises the issue of unfair procedure, the requested court should examine whether the 
defendant should have been in a position to appeal or seek review in the judgment-
rendering court.327 If the defendant was in this position but did not litigate the issue of 
unfair procedure, he or she waives the right to deny JRE on grounds of unfair procedure 
in the JRE proceedings. In other words, a defendant should challenge unfair procedure in 
the judgment-rendering region, and only when the defendant has no opportunity to do so, 
a requested court should be permitted to review the judgment-rendering procedure and 
deny JRE accordingly.   
US law adopts a different approach. It distinguishes erroneous but valid 
                                                
324 Francq, supra note_161_ at 591-92.  
325 Minalmet GmbH v. Brandeis Ltd, (Case C-123/91) [1992] ECR I-5661 para. 19. 
326 Francq, supra note_161_ at 592.  
327 Id. 
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judgments328 from void judgments.329 The former refer to judgments that contains an 
error of fact or of law but are valid in the judgment-rendering region.330 A judgment 
debtor, who alleges a judgment is erroneous, should utilize the review procedures 
available in the judgment-rendering state, not collateral attack in the requested court.331 
However, if a judgment is void in the region where it is rendered, collateral attack is 
permitted in a requested court.332 "A judgment is void unless a reasonable method of 
notification is employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard afforded to persons 
affected"333 according to the law of judgment-rendering region and subject to 
constitutional restraints.334 Therefore, a defendant who did not have a fair opportunity to 
be heard does not have the obligation to challenge the judgment in the judgment-
rendering court. Instead, the defendant can challenge this judgment in a requested court. 
Comparatively, the US approach suits China’s situation better for two reasons. 
Hong Kong concerns about the judicial competence of Mainland courts.335 No 
precondition should be required before a losing party brings a collateral attack against a 
judgment rendered from an unfair procedure. The fact that no court of final review exists 
to guarantee a defendant’s right for a fair hearing in China reinforces this argument. 
However, a requested court should apply the law of the judgment-rendering region to 
                                                
328 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 92 and 106 (1971). U.S. v. Bigford, 365 F.3d 859, 867. NationsBank 
of North Carolina v. Parsons, 324 S.C. 506, 477 S.E.2d 735, 736, 739. 
329 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 105 (1971). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11, comment c 
(1982).  
330 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 106 (1971). Craven v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 
11, 13–14. 
331 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 106 (1971), comment (a) 
(1971). EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1287-89 (4th ed. 2004). 
332 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § § 25 and 105 (1971). Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946). 
Miserandino v. Resort Properties, 345 Md. 43, 691 A.2d 208, 213, cert. denied 522 U.S. 953, 118 S.Ct. 376, 139 
L.Ed.2d 292 (1997). 
333 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982). 
334 Id., §§ 7 and 8 (1942) 
335 Xianchu Zhang & Philip Smart, Development of Regional Conflict of Laws: On the Arrangement of Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters between Mainland China and Hong Kong 
SAR, 36 HONG KONG L. J. 553, 574 (2006). 
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determine whether unfair procedure exists. Like the existing two Arrangement, the 
proposed Arrangement should also impose this choice of law requirement. It can help 
enhance interregional mutual trust.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the proposed JRE Arrangement, the concept of unfair procedure is an 
autonomous terminology. It includes three instances: according to the law of the 
judgment-rendering region, the losing party was not duly summoned or was summoned 
but not given a reasonable time to defend a case, or was not properly represented by a 
guardian if lacking litigation capacity. The losing party should be allowed to challenge 
the judgment tainted by unfair procedure in the requested court.  
 
iii. Res judicata 
 
The existing Arrangements divide the res judicata rules into two instances: a 
judgment for which JRE is requested conflicts with a judgment rendered in a third region 
or with a local judgment.  
 
1. Conflicts between a Requested Judgment and a Recognized Judgment 
 
The two existing Arrangements provide the same rule: JRE shall be refused if the 
requested court has already recognized or enforced a judgment on the same cause of 
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action rendered by a court in a third region.336 This rule is unanimously agreed among the 
three regions.337 Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should adopt this 
rule. The Brussels I Regulation also adopts a similar rule. Its Article 34(4) indicates that: 
JRE shall be refused, if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in 
another member region or in a third region, if the two judgments involve the same cause 
of action and between the same parties, and if the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions 
necessary for its recognition in the member region requested.338 Therefore, the proposed 
Arrangement can draw useful insights from case law under the Brussels I Regulation, 
such as how to define “the same cause of action” and whether the requirement of “the 
same parties” is necessary.339  
 
2. Conflicts between a Requested Judgment and a Local Judgment 
 
Compared with Hong Kong and Macao, the Mainland civil procedure is well-
known for its rapidity.340 Therefore, when free circulation of judgments is possible 
among the three regions, parties may maliciously take advantage of the rapid Mainland 
civil procedure, try to get a favorable judgment in Mainland China first, and then claim 
preclusive effects in other regions. In other words, parties may rush to "get one action 
decided ahead of the other in order to create a situation of res judiciata or issue estoppel 
                                                
336 Art. 11.3 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
337 For details discussion, see Section B of Chapter III. 
338 Art. 34(4) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
339 Under the American Res judicata rule, the judgment obtained last in time will prevail against all previous judgments. 
For reasons that the American rule will possibly not be well received in China, see Hong Kong Anti-suit Injunction of 
Section B of Chapter IV. 
340 Johnston supra note 25 at 123 (stating that “Mainland legal system, which is well known for its rapidity compared 
to that of Hong Kong and other common law systems.) For problems brought by Mainland rapid civil procedure in 
interregional JRE, see Part i and ii of Section B of Chapter III. 
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in the latter."341 ML v. YJ, illustrates this.342 In this case, the wife commenced a divorce 
action in Hong Kong first, but later the husband brought the second divorce action in 
Mainland China and obtained a favorable judgment earlier than his wife. Then, the 
husband applied to a Hong Kong court to recognize and enforce the Mainland judgment. 
In Chapter III, the comparison of res judicata rules in the three regional laws and 
the two Arrangements demonstrates that the benefit of the rule in the Mainland-Macao 
Arrangement is to prevent parties from taking advantage of the rapid Mainland civil 
procedure.343  
Unlike res judicata rules in China, the Brussels I Regulation states that the 
judgment rendered in the requested region always prevails against a sister-region 
judgment although the former may be late in time.344 This rule has a bias towards F2 
judgments.345 Comparatively, the res judicata rule in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement 
adopts a more balanced and objective approach to forum and F2 judgments.  
In the US, in case that two or more valid but inconsistent judgments are rendered in 
different forums between the same parties on the same cause of action, the one rendered 
last in time will prevail.346 The rationale is that court should not sua sponte raise the 
doctrine of res judicata.347 Therefore, if parties in the second action do not relied upon 
the judgment in the first action, the second judgment should become valid even though it 
                                                
341 The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, [1984] 1 All ER 470, House of Lords, per Lord Brandon. 
342 HCMC 13/2006. For detailed discussion of this case, see Chapter III. 
343 For detailed comparison of the five res judicata rules, see Chapter III.  
344 The precondition is that the judgment that is requested to recognize is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a 
dispute between the same parties in the requested region. Art. 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
345 See BURKHARD HESS, THOMAS PFEIFFER & PETER SCHLOSSER, THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION 44/2001 APPLICATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU.  
346 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 75-8 (1939). Andrysek v. Andrysek, 280 Or. 61, 569 P.2d 615 (1977). 
Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments In Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-In-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969). 
347 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 15 (1982). 
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is inconsistent with the first judgment.348 Therefore, the second judgment is generally 
held conclusive in a third action.349 However, in China, there is no strict rule preventing 
Mainland courts from sua sponte raising the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, 
Mainland China and Macao adopt the inquisitorial civil-law system, where judges 
generally play a more active role in actions compared with their counterparts in the 
American adversarial system. Moreover, Hong Kong courts follow the English precedent 
Vervaeke v. Smith and Others.350 So if a foreign judgment is inconsistent with a Hong 
Kong early-in-time decision between the same parties or their privies on the same cause 
of action, the judgment will not be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong.351 Obviously, 
Hong Kong law contradicts with the American res judicata rule. Therefore, the American 
res judicata rule will possibly not be well received by judges in Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and Macao. 
As a conclusion, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should states that if 
the requested court had been seized the action before the judgment-rendering court was 
seized the action, the former's judgment should prevail against the latter, even if the 
former is late in time.  
 
3. Same Cause of Action 
 
Like the existing Arrangements, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
should also require that the two conflicting judgments should be on the same cause of 
                                                
348 Id. 
349 Id. However the second judgment may not have res judicata effect if “the error consisted of a denial of Full Faith 
and Credit to the [first] judgment of a sister state and the losing party was denied review in the Supreme Court of the 
United States.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 114, Comment b (1971). 
350 Vervaeke v. Smith and Others, [1983] 1 AC 145. 
351 For details, see Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
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action. If two judgments share the same cause of action, they should have a common 
legal and factual basis, and a common legal objective.352 Such rule is administrable in 
practice as long as regional courts make determinations according to whether the ultimate 
goals of the actions are mutually exclusive.353 EU law provides rich resources in this 
regard.354 For example, an action aiming to enforce a contract and an action to annul a 
contract are of the same cause of action.355 The reason is that the ultimate goals of the 
two actions are mutually exclusive. Moreover, supposed that a matrimonial link is the 
precondition of maintenance, one judgment about divorce between parties and the other 
about maintenance between them are of the same cause of action.356 Because if the first 
judgment resolves the marriage, the second judgment cannot exist; therefore, they are 
mutually exclusive.  
 
4. Same Parties 
 
The res judicata rules in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should not 
have the “same parties” requirement, because this complies with existing laws in Chinese 
regions. The res judicata rules in the two existing Arrangements do not have the “same 
parties” requirement.357 Macao law states that judgments involving different parties or 
                                                
352 See Gantner Electronic GmbH v. Basch Expolitatie Maatschappij BV, (Case C-111/01) [2003] ECR I-4027, I-4235 
paras. 24-32. The Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship "Tatry" v. The owners of the ship "Maciej Rataj", 
(Case C-406/92) [1994] ECR I-5439. Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v. Giulio Palumbo, (Case 144/86) [1987] ECR 
4861. Richard Fentiman, Chapter II Jurisdiction Section 9 Lis Pendens-Related Actions,  in BRUSSELS I 
REGULATION, 502-04 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski ed. 2007). 
353 See Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 304 (explaining the meaning of "inconsistent judgments" of Art. 28 (b) of 
the Hague 1999 Draft as "mutually exclusive").  
354 See The Owners of the Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ship “Tatry” v. The Owners of the Ship “Maciej Rataj”, 
(Case C-409/92) [1994] ECR I-5439, I-5475 para. 41. See also Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg, 
(Case 145/86) [1998] ECR 645 para. 22. 
355 Fentiman, supra note_352_ at 502. 
356 The facts are based on Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg, (Case 145/86) [1998] ECR 645. 
357 For details, see Section B of Chapter III. 
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different cause of action may be regarded inconsistent as long as they are 
irreconcilable.358 The res judicata rule in Article 306 of the Opinions on Application of 
the Mainland CPL does not explicitly require that conflicting judgments should be 
between the same parties.359 Although the Hong Kong FJREO and common law have the 
"same parties" requirement, courts generally do not interpret the "same parties" as 
"identical parties."360 Moreover, the res judicata rule in the Mainland Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance does not explicitly impose a "same parties" 
requirement.361 Therefore, mutually exclusive judgments between different parties should 
be subject to the res judicata rules in the proposed Arrangement. 
Loosening the "same parties" requirement is also the solution adopted by the US 
law. Mutuality of parties is not required when collateral estoppel is used defensively in 
the US. The leading case is Bernhard v. Bank of America, where the court held that it was 
proper for a new party (the defendant in the second suit) to invoke the findings of a 
previous suit to bar action by a party of that suit, as long as that party had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first suit.362 Whether non-mutuality of parties can 
be permitted in offensive collateral estoppel is determined on a case-by-case basis.363 
This permission should not be given when a new party (the plaintiff in the second suit) 
could easily have joined in the first suit or when granting this permission would be unfair 
to a defendant.364 Relaxing the "same parties" requirement also can be found in the EU 
JRE law. Although the res judicata rules in Article 34.3 and 34.4 of the Brussels I 
                                                
358 Id.  
359 For discussion of this Article, see Part i of Section A, Part i and Part ii of Section B of Chapter III.   
360 Johnston, supra note_25_ at 556. For details, see Chapter III. 
361 Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, para 18 (1)(h) and (i) provide that “a judgment on the 
same cause of action between the parties to the judgment has been given by a court in Hong Kong...” (emphasis added) 
362 Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). 
363 Parklane Hosiery Co v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
364 Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), Blonder-Tongue  Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 
402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
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Regulation require the two conflicting judgments shall between the same parties,365 the 
"same parties" requirement includes all parties, although maybe different, and sharing 
common legal interests.366 Moreover, the 1999 Hague Draft does not have the 
requirement of same parties.367 A commentary explains that368  
 
[i]nconsistent judgments...can result from causes of action in respect of subject 
matters which are different and may even arise when the parties are different as 
when one judgment condemns a guarantor to pay for a debt that as between the 
creditor and principal debtor has been annulled in another judgment. 
 
In addition, Article 9.f of the Hague Choice of Court Convention requires that the two 
conflicting judgments shall between the same parties.369 But the Convention does not 
give a strict interpretation of the "same parties"; instead, it leaves the interpretation to the 
law of the requested region.370  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The res judicata rules in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should 
include two instances. First, JRE shall be refused if the requested court has already 
                                                
365 Fentiman, supra note_352_ at 501.  
366 Id. at 501. Drouot Assurances SA v. Consolidated Metallurgical Industries, (Case C-351-96) [1998] ECR I-3075, I-
3097 para. 19 (the ECJ ruled that if an insurer subrogates the insured and sued in the latter’s name, the “insurer and 
insured must be considered to be one and the same party). 
367 Art. 28.1(b) of the 1999 Hague Draft. 
368 Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 304. 
369 For the EU law, see Fentiman, supra note_352_ at 501. For US law, see RESTATEMENT SECOND OF 
CONFLICTS § 114 (1971), comment a. For the Hague Choice of Court Convention, see Brand and Herrup, supra 
note_119_ at 120. 
370 For the US law, see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdiction Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 89, 
98 (1999).; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 94 (1971) (stating that " What persons are bound by a 
valid judgment is determined, subject to Constitutional limitations, by the local law of the State where the judgment 
was rendered."); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); and Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941). For the 
EU law, see Fentiman, supra note_352_at 501. For the Hague Choice of Court Convention, see Brand and Herrup, 
supra note_119_ at 120. 
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recognized or enforced a judgment on the same cause of action rendered by a court in a 
third region. Second, JRE shall be refused, if a requested court, which has jurisdiction 
over the same cause of action, had been seized before the judgment-rendering court was 
seized. 
 
iv. Fraud 
1. Autonomous Terminology 
 
Fraud is a ground for refusing JRE in Hong Kong law371 and the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement.372 Macao courts also use fraud to refuse JRE if it is associated with 
jurisdiction or critical new evidence, and courts may regard recognition and enforcement 
of a judgment tainted by fraud violates Macao public policy.373 However, fraud is not a 
defence to JRE in the Mainland-Macao Arrangement, although it may be implicitly 
covered by the public policy exception.374 Moreover, before the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement was concluded, fraud had never existed as a ground in Mainland JRE law. 
But the Arrangement does not define fraud.375 Regretfully, the Mainland 2008 
implementing legislation of the Arrangement does not define the meaning of “fraud”, 
either.376 Therefore, potentially, the different meanings of fraud may create controversies 
in interregional JRE. Harmonization of these differences will be achieved if the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement provides an autonomous terminology of fraud. 
                                                
371 For details, see Grounds for Refusing JRE of Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
376 Id. 
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Similar to Hong Kong law, fraud is a defence against JRE in US law377 and the 
Hague Choice of Court Convention.378 However, like Mainland China and Macao, in EU 
JRE law, fraud is part of public policy exception.379 In the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement, fraud should have an independent heading. The first reason is to encourage 
Hong Kong to participate in the Arrangement because Hong Kong JRE law traditionally 
gives fraud an independent heading.380 The second reason is that it is improper to include 
fraud into the public policy exception. The reason is that in the JRE settings, fraud and 
the public policy exception are of different natures. Fraud focuses on the fraudulent acts 
of the parties or the judgment-rendering courts; in contrast, the public policy exception 
concentrates on the results of JRE in the requested region.381 A good example for their 
different natures is that, in some legal systems, a party who conducts fraudulently may be 
punished, but there is no punishment for violating public policies.382 
In the proposed Arrangement, fraud should be restricted to procedural issues, which 
includes jurisdiction. This aims to keep the requested court from reopening the merits of 
a sister-region judgment. Fraud involving procedural issues is so-called extrinsic fraud. 
The concept of extrinsic fraud, as opposed to intrinsic fraud, is drawn from the US JRE 
law. In the US, a judgment tainted by fraud is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit 
recognition and enforcement in a requested state,383 when the same defence is available 
                                                
377 Eg. Big Tex Trailer Mfg., Inc. v. Duff Motor Co., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2009). 
378 Art. 9 (d) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Fraud is also a ground to deny JRE in the UK law, see Gerhard 
Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, in CIVIL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE: RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT, 31 (Gerhard Walter 
& Samuel P. Baumgartner ed. 2000). 
379 Schlosser Report para. 192. Wautelet, supra note_149_ at 628. For the use of fraud to deny JRE outside of the 
Brussels regime in Europe, see Walter and Baumgartner, supra note_378_ at 31. 
380 For details of fraud in Hong Kong regional JRE law, see Grounds for Refusing JRE of Part ii of Section A of 
Chapter III. 
381 Jin Huang & Huacheng Guo, Macao Guo Ji Si Fa Zhong De Qi Zha [Fraud in Macao Private International  Law], 
109 FA XUE YAN JIU 125, 127. 
382 Id.  
383 Wheeler v. Winters, 134 S.W.3d 774 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2004). L & L Wholesale, Inc. v. Gibbens, 108 S.W.3d 74 
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against a domestic judgment in the judgment-rendering state.384 But the defence is limited 
to extrinsic fraud.385  
Extrinsic fraud is in connection with judgment-rendering court’s jurisdiction386 or a 
matter of procedure that deprived the losing party of adequate opportunity to present his 
or her case to the court.387 Examples of extrinsic fraud include cases in which the plaintiff 
lured the defendant into the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court by false 
representations,388 the plaintiff obtained a default judgment by “a false affidavit that the 
defendant had been duly served with the initiating process,”389 or the judgment creditor 
won the action by bribing judges or kidnapping of witnesses.390 In contrast, intrinsic 
fraud refers to circumstances where “a witness in the foreign proceedings gave false 
testimony or [] a forged document was introduced in the foreign proceeding.”391 
Generally, in the US, the intrinsic fraud is not a defence against JRE in a requested 
                                                                                                                                            
(Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2003). There are cases law that held sister-state judgments were not impeachable for fraud. Mills v 
Duryee (1913, US) 7 Cranch 481, 3 L ed 411; Hampton v M'Connel (1818, US) 3 Wheat 234, 4 L ed 378; Christmas v 
Russell (1866, US) 5 Wall 290, 18 L ed 475. Notably, these cases decide only that fraud in the procurement of a 
judgment is no defense at law in the sister-state enforcement proceedings; the holdings do not forbid a judgment debtor 
to defense the enforcement of a sister-state judgment by bringing an action in equity on the ground of fraud in its 
procurement.  
384 Baker v. Erbert, 199 Kan. 59, 427 P.2d 461 (1967) (citing annotation). Blume Law Firm PC v. Pierce, 741 N.W.2d 
921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
385 For leading cases regarding fraud in the US JRE law, see United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 and Allegheny 
Corporation v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
386 See Comment, Direct and Collateral Attack on Judgments, 66 YALE L.J. 526 (1957). 
387 See Section 4(B)(2) of the US Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. See also § 5(v) of the Foreign 
Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act, proposed by the American Law Institute in 2005. “Fraud is regarded as 
extrinsic or collateral where it prevents a party form having a trial or from presenting his cause of action or his defense, 
or induces him to withdraw a defense, or operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner 
in which it was procured.” Chisholm v. House, 160 F.2d 632, at P.643 (10th Cir. 1947). 
388 See Tootle v. McClellan, 7 Ind. T. 64, 103 S.W.766 (1907). False representation made by the wining party to the 
losing party includes false promises of compromise made by the former to the latter or promise that the latter is a 
nominal party against whom no relief is sought.  
389 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 62 (2006). 
390 See Vestal, A Study in Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J. 18 (1959). 
391 The American Law Institute, supra note_389_ at 62. The fraud is regarded as intrinsic where “the judgment was 
founded on a fraudulent instrument or perjured evidence, or the fraudulent acts pertained to an issue involved in the 
original action and litigated therein.” Chisholm v. House, 160 F.2d 632, at P.643 (10th Cir. 1947). Auerbach v. Samuels, 
10 Utah 2d 152, 155, 349 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1960).  
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court,392 because the judgment debtor is supposed to raise this defence in the judgment-
rendering court393 and because allowing the requested court to consider intrinsic fraud 
may potentially lead to reopen the merits of the case.394  
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud395 has been criticized as being 
fuzzy,396 particularly when the intrinsic fraud tainted a fair trial of the case.397 However, 
this distinction has been endorsed by international law, such as the 1999 Hague Draft398 
and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention.399 These two conventions state that the 
requested court may deny recognition and enforcement if the judgment was obtained by 
fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.400 This can be interpreted as extrinsic 
fraud.401 The benefit of this distinction is to prevent the requested court from reviewing 
the merits of the judgment, which is explicitly forbidden by Article 8(2) of the Hague 
                                                
392 Dixie Cash Register Co., Inc. v. S.D. Leasing, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 424, 323 S.E.2d 284 (1984) (holding that the trial 
court properly refused to allow the defendant to maintain collateral attack on a sister-state judgment on ground that it 
was procured by fraud, because the alleged fraud was of intrinsic nature involving contract rights underlying the 
judgment.)  
393 The American Law Institute, supra note_389_ at 62 and 73. See Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank & 
Trust Co. of Vidalia, 382 F. Supp. 956 (S.D. Ga. 1974), judgment aff'd, 510 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the 
claim of fraud regarding the underlying loan obligations on which a sister-state judgment was based was intrinsic fraud, 
so should be brought in the judgment-rendering court). 
394 See Allegheny Corporation v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (indicating that the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud aims to reconcile justice to the parties and a finality of litigation).  
395 See In re Estate of O'Keefe, 833 So. 2d 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2002). Fahrenbruch v. People ex rel. Taber, 
169 Colo. 70, 453 P.2d 601 (1969) (citing annotation).  
396 See Howard v. Scott, 225 Mo.685, 125 S.W.1258 (1910). In this case, a party obtained a partition judgment by a 
combination of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. His fraudulent acts included hiding transaction details from the other party, 
false swearing in a bankruptcy proceeding, and suing the other party without actual notice. The appeal court indicated 
that “[t]hat case illustrates the honorable sensitiveness of courts to frauds on their jurisdiction, and shows how shadowy, 
uncertain and somewhat arbitrary is the line between fraud in the procuring of the judgment as distinguished from fraud 
in the cause of action itself.” 225 Mo. 685, 714. The court held that because the party who committed fraudulent acts 
basically made courts an “instrument of injustice,” it was unnecessary to distinguish extrinsic and intrinsic fraud and 
the partition judgment should be reversed. 225 Mo. 685, 714-75. For Canadian cases, see Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 
S.C.R. 416 paras 43-51 (Can.). 
397 See Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM, L. REV. 783 (1950). 
398 Art. 28.1(e) of the 1999 Hague Draft. Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 308-09. 
399 Article 9 (d) of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention. Masato Dogauchi & Trevor C. Hartley, PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT CONVENTION ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS: EXPLANATORY REPORT, para 42 (2004), Prel. Doc. 
No. 26 of December 2004, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3512&dtid=35. 
400 Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 308. The Nygh/Pocar Report divided fraud into "extraneous fraud" and 
"intrinsic fraud." The former refers to "a fraud which the complaining party only discovered after the original trial." 
The latter implies "any credible allegation of a fraud committed by the other party even if the complaining party was 
aware of it and raised it at the original trial." Id, at 309. 
401 Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 116. However, it seems that the examples of fraud provided by the Draft 
Report may include intrinsic fraud: the plaintiff forged the defendant’s signature on a false choice of court agreement 
and either party conceals evidence. Dogauchi & Hartley, supra note 399 at paras 141 and 142. 
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Choice of Court Convention.402 Therefore, arguably, the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement should follow this trend and limit the defence of JRE to procedure issues. 
Moreover, the procedural issues should not include a general argument regarding 
the organic deficiency of the Mainland judicial system. The reason is that the general 
structure of Mainland courts has nothing to do with fraud, and that fraud needs to be 
proven to exist in the particular case.403 For example, Hong Kong law generally requires 
that a judgment debtor must “particularize the fraud with precision”404 by using plausible 
evidence to establish a prima facie, arguable, or credible case.405 This rule should be 
applied to Mainland judgments.  
As a conclusion, arguably, fraud in the proposed Arrangement should be an 
autonomous terminology: it should be restricted to procedural issues. Namely, JRE 
cannot be refused because the judgment is based on fraudulent evidence. The underlying 
policy is to avoid a requested court from opening the merits of a sister-region judgment 
and to protect its finality.  
 
2. Review of Fraud in F2 
 
Some authorities in Hong Kong suggest that the defence of fraud may be raised in 
Hong Kong even though this defence was pleaded and rejected by the judgment-
                                                
402 Id. at 116-17. 
403 Id. 
404 WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Malcolm Maydwell (unrep, C.A.C.V. 148 of 1995), Court of Appeal, per Ching JA ([1996] 
2 H.K.L.R. 236 Court of Appeal) (This case suggests that Hong Kong courts may not support a general argument that 
Mainland courts are corrupt so fraud cannot be properly established or litigated there). The same approach is adopted 
by the US court, eg., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin (S.D.Fla.1997) 978 F.Supp. 1078, the court dealt with the question 
whether corruption in Bolivian courts precluded application of forum non conveniens to allow trial of the matter in 
Bolivia. The court noted that generalized allegations of corruption “do[ ] not enjoy a particularly impressive track 
record.” (Id. at 1084.) 
405 Syal v Heyward [1948] 2 KB 443; Owens Bank Ltd v Etoile Commerciale SA [1995] 1 WLR 44, Privy Council; 
Ever Chance Development Ltd v Ching Kai Chiu (unrep, C.A.C.V. 8 of 1997). 
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rendering court.406 However, Wang Hsiao Yu v Wu Cho Ching demonstrates that 
litigation of fraud should be restricted by the doctrine of abuse of process.407 In this case, 
the court held that Hong Kong courts should not impeach a sister-region judgment on the 
ground of fraud when the allegation of fraud had been examined extensively and 
thoroughly in the judgment-rendering court in Taiwan. This holding should be applied to 
Mainland judgments when the allegation of fraud has been tried by the Mainland 
procedure for trial supervision.408 As a return, Mainland China should not deny JRE 
because of fraud if the allegation has been fully litigated in the judgment-rendering court 
in Hong Kong.  
The doctrine that, judgment-rendering court's determination of fraud should have 
preclusive effects in the requested court is also adopted by US and EU JRE laws. In the 
US, if fraud has been expressly litigated in the F1, F1’s determination of fraud becomes 
res judicata and is entitled to Full Faith and Credit recognition and enforcement.409 A 
requested court will be precluded from considering the same defence of fraud, either 
intrinsic or extrinsic, when this issue has been fully litigated in the judgment-rendering 
court,410 even if the judgment-rendering court made an erroneous decision.411 Similar to 
                                                
406 Philip Smart, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,  in ENFORCING JUDGMENTS IN HONG KONG 255, 270 (Christine N 
Booth ed. 2004). See WFM Motors Pty Ltd v. Maydwell [1996] 1 HKC 444 (HKCA), appeal dismissed, [1997] 
HKLRD 739 (PC), cf. Hong Pian Tee v. Les Placement Germain Gauthier Inc, [2000] 2 SLR 81 (Singapore, CA) and 
Beals v. Saldanha, (2003) 234 DLR (4th) 1. 
407 Wang Hsiao Yu v Wu Cho Ching, HCA 1690/1997 (holding that it was an abuse of process to allow a defendant to 
re-litigate the issue of fraud in Hong Kong after his allegations had been examined extensively and thoroughly and 
determined against him by a judgment-rendering court in Taiwan after 6 rounds of appeal. The Wang Hsiao Yu court 
reconciled its decision with WFM Motors Pty Ltd by indicating that the latter court did not consider the issue of abuse 
of process.) 
408 For information of Mainland procedure for trial supervision, see Part ii of Section B of Chapter IV. 
409 Ex parte Aufill, 268 Ala. 43, 104 So. 2d 897 (1958) (holding that in the enforcement proceedings in F2, fraud 
pleaded must present some issue that was not litigated and that parties did not have an opportunity to litigate in the 
judgment-rendering court). 
410 Superior Distributing Corp. v. White, 146 Colo. 595, 362 P.2d 196 (1961) (in this case, the jurisdictional facts 
alleged as fraud have been heard and decided by the judgment-rendering court, so the same defense was not available 
in the requested court.) 
411 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948). Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 
U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85 (193). 
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the US JRE law, in the EU law, if the allegation of fraud has been fully decided in the 
judgment-rendering court, generally the same allegation could not be accepted as a 
ground for refusing JRE in a requested court.412 The Chinese regions should adopt the 
same approach because the finality of a judgment should not be easily questioned. 
Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should state that, if fraud has been 
fully tried in F1, F2 should refrain from considering this issue in the JRE proceeding and 
should suggest the losing party to appeal in F1. However, when no reasonable 
opportunity (such as a wholesale of judicial corruption in the judgment-rendering region) 
exists for a judgment debtor to challenge the ground of fraud in the judgment-rendering 
region, he or she should be allowed to allege this defence in the JRE proceedings. 
The related issue is whether a requested court can review a sister-region judgment 
in substance when the judgment debtor has not alleged fraud in the judgment-rendering 
court. The answer should be negative. In the US, the party, who alleges a judgment is 
tainted by fraud, should utilize the review procedures available in the judgment-rendering 
state, not collateral attack in the requested court.413 Moreover, the Queen’s Bench in the 
UK faced a similar issue in a JRE proceeding where the judgment debtor alleged that the 
creditor achieved this judgment by fraudulent acts in the judgment-rendering court in 
France.414 The Court carefully distinguished judgments rendered in an EU member state 
from those outside of the EU.415 It held that if a judgment debtor alleges that a judgment 
rendered in an EU member state is tainted by fraud, the English Court should first 
consider whether a remedy lies in the judgment-rendering state, and if so the Court 
                                                
412 Francq, supra note_161_ at 573. For UK cases, see Interdesco S.A. v. Nullfire Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180.  
413 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS § 106, comment (a). 
Scoles et al., supra note_332_ at 1287-89. 
414 Interdesco S.A. v Nullifire Ltd, [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180.  
415 Id, 186-87. 
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should leave the debtor to pursue his or her remedy in that state.416 In any case, the Court 
should not review the judgment in substance.417 Both US and EU laws provide a valuable 
lesson for China: the requested courts should avoid reviewing the substance of a sister-
region judgment. If the debtor has not litigated the allegation of fraud in the judgment-
rendering region, the requested court should suggest the debtor to challenge the judgment 
under the appellate procedure or the retrial procedure in that region.  
As a conclusion, if a judgment debtor litigated fraud and lost in F1, the proper 
response for F2 is to suggest the debtor to appeal in F1. If the debtor failed to litigate 
fraud in F1, although he or she may be barred from making the argument on the appeal or 
review proceedings in F1, he or she should not be able to litigate fraud in the JRE 
proceedings in F2 either. 
 
v. Public Policy Exception 
1. Necessity of Preserving a Public Policy Exception 
 
Whether a public policy exception should be allowed in interregional JRE is a 
controversial issue in China. Some scholars, including Professor Jisheng Ren who is the 
former President of the Lawyer’s Association of China, argue that a public policy 
exception should not be allowed because this doctrine is related to the sovereignty of a 
state.418 According to Ren, since Hong Kong, Macao, and Mainland China are under one 
sovereign, a public policy exception should not be applied between them.419 However, 
                                                
416 Id, at 188.  
417 Id, a 187. 
418 Jisheng Ren, Guo Nei Bu Tong Fa Yu Zi Jian De Si Fa Xie Zhu [Judicial Assistance of Different Legal Regions], 4 
FA XUE JIA [JURISTS’ REVIEW] 63 (1995). 
419 Id. 
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other scholars disagree.420 Mainland Professor Depei Han421 and Jin Huang,422 as well as 
Hong Kong Professor Xianchu Zhang,423 all believe that a public policy exception should 
be allowed in interregional conflict of laws in China because great disparities exist 
between regional political and economic systems. Some other scholars argue that the 
public policy exception should be allowed in interregional JRE because the regions are 
equal in terms of conflict of laws; therefore, each region should be allowed to make 
necessary reservations to protect its own legal orders.424 
The same controversy exists between the US and the EU JRE laws: the former 
forbids public policy exception in interregional JRE, but the latter permits it.  
In the US, the public policy exception can never constitute a defense to 
interregional full-faith-and-credit JRE.425 For example, Fauntleroy v. Lum demonstrates 
that, the public policy exception cannot be used to deny the recognition and enforcement 
of a judgment rendered by a sister-region court of competent jurisdiction, 
                                                
420 Those scholars include law professors from Mainland China or Hong Kong, officials from the Judicial Assistance 
Department of the Ministry of Justice and judges from the Higher People’s Courts of Guangdong and Hainan. Chuxian 
Zhang, The Extraterritorial Service of Judicial Documents from Hong Kong, 28 HONG KONG L. J. 356, 371 (1998). 
See Xianchu Zhang, The Agreement between Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR on Mutual Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards: Problems and Prospects, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 463, 478 (1999) (pointing out the maintenance of 
public policy exception in recognizing and enforcing arbitral award between Mainland China and Hong Kong results 
from the difference between capitalist system in Hong Kong and the socialist ideology and institutions in Mainland 
China). See Huang Feng, Shi Lun Zhong Guo Wei Lai De Qu Ji Si Fa Xie Zhu [One Future Regional Judicial 
Assistance within China], 4 FA XUE JIA [JURISTS’ REVIEW] 76 (1995). See also Ling Qiman & Wang Xiaoming, 
Zhong Guo Da Lu Yu Xiang Gang Min Shang Shi Fa Lv Chong Tu Yan Jiu [A Study of Conflict of Laws between the 
Mainland and Hong Kong on Civil and Commercial Matters], 7-8 KAI FANG SHI DAI [OPEN TIMES] 92 (1997).  
421 HAN DEPEI (ED), ZHONG GUO CHONG TU FA YAN JIU [STUDIES OF CHINESE CONFLICT OF LAWS] 422 
(Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1993). 
422 Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, “One Country, Two Systems,” Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: 
The Emerging Inter-regional Conflicts of Law in China, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289, 319 (1994).  
423 Zhang, supra note 420 at 372-73.  
424 Renshan Liu & Meirong Zhang, Pi Xi Zhong Guo Qu Ji Min Shang Shi Pan Jue Xiang Fu Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xing 
Wen Ti de Li Fa Yu Si Fa Xian Zhuang [Analysis of Current Legislation and Judicial Practice of Chinese Inter-regional 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters], a paper presented in 2008 Annual 
Chinese Association of Private International Law in Beijing. 
425 See Baker v. GM, 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 
U.S. 430, 438, 88 L. Ed. 149, 64 S. Ct. 208 (1943) (the Supreme Court is "aware of [no] considerations of local policy 
or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Act 
of Congress require to be given to [a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.") Differently, a forum can 
determine the applicable law by the consideration of public policy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-424, 59 L. 
Ed. 2d 416, 99 S. Ct. 1182 (1979).  
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notwithstanding any errors of law in the judgment or the fact that the underlying cause of 
action is prohibited in the second region.426 The prohibition of a public policy exception 
in the US interregional JRE does not contradict with Section 103 of the Second 
Restatement, which provides that a judgment “is not required by the national policy of 
Full Faith and Credit because it would involve an improper interference with important 
interests of the sister state.”427 Section 103 implies that, although the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause may be limited when “the most unusual and extraordinary [] 
circumstances” occur, these circumstances are not considered as public policy 
exception.428 As a conclusion, the public policy exception is not allowed in the US 
interregional JRE laws.  
Unlike the US, the EU JRE law allows a member region to use public policy 
exception to refuse recognition and enforcement of judgments. Article 34(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation states that, JRE shall be refused, if the effects of JRE are manifestly 
contrary to the basic, essential norms and values of the requested region.429 The law of 
the requested region shall define the contents of its public policy.430 The ECJ, however, 
                                                
426 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 233 (1908). 
427 See A.A. EHRENZWEIG & D.W. LOUISELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 138 (3d ed. 1973). Reynolds, The Iron 
Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MARYLAND L. REV. 412, 436-49 (1994). 
428 Scoles, supra note 332 at 1292-93. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 220 and 227 (1933) (the dissenting 
Justice Stone held that South Carolina had a peculiar interest and concern in the maintenance and support of children 
domiciled there. According to him, the majority’s decision improperly extended the operation of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and “ma[d]e it an instrument for encroachment by Georgia upon the domestic concerns of South 
Carolina.”). Later cases echoed Justice Stone’s dissent and sought to limit the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
when F2 has a compelling interest that appears after F1 renders a judgment. For example, in Elkind v. Byck, the court 
held that the Yarborough decision would not control where the father had moved out of F1 and changed his domicile 
after F1 rendered its decree. See Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal.2d 453, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404, 439 P.2d 316 (1968). 
429 Peter Hay, The Development of the Public Policy Barrier to Judgment Recognition Within the European Community,  
THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FORUM 289, 291 (2007). Regarding public policy exception under the Brussels Convention, see 
Xandra E. Kramer, Enforcement under the Brussels Convention: Procedural Public Policy and the Influence of Article 
6 ECHR, , http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/10824/2003_Int-l_Lis_Annotation_Maronier-Kramer.pdf (last visited 
Apr 30, 2010) (indicating "The Brussels Convention did not contain the phrase ‘manifestly’, but it has always been 
clear from the explanatory Jenard-report, the case law of the Court of Justice and literature, that the public policy 
exception has to be applied restrictively.") 
430 Francq, supra note 161 at 565. Notably “European public policy” exists and is defined by the ECJ, which is a 
concept going beyond the traditional national meaning of public policy. Renault SA V. Maxicar SpA and Orazio 
Formento, (Case 38/98) [2000] ECR I-2973 para. 32.    
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can set limits to this definition431 and the EU public policy constitutes part of the public 
policy of its members.432 Similar to the interregional JRE in the US, the requested court 
in the EU cannot invoke the public policy exception to refuse recognition of a sister-
region judgment on the mere ground that the judgment-rendering court wrongly applied 
national or Community law.433  
The public policy exception should be maintained in interregional JRE in China. 
China’s situation is different from the US. The function of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause in the US Constitution is to unite independent states;434 however, the policy of 
“One country, Two Systems” in China aims to preserve the interests and autonomy of 
each region.435 Notably, in the EU, although the convergence of European values urges 
that the public policy exception should be abandoned in interregional JRE, a strong 
argument against this suggestion states436   
 
non-use or non-applicability [of the public policy exception] (as also in the 
United States) does not necessarily require abandonment... Infringements of 
sovereign functions of the recognizing state remain thinkable and a few borderline 
areas remain, in which there are still strongly held differences among member 
states... Moreover, the convergence of national values and the emergence of 
commonly held European values...must also be seen in the context of a larger and 
growing Community. To have the public policy defense on the books, assuming 
its continued narrow interpretation by national courts, thus continues to seem 
useful.  
 
Considering the divergence among the regional legal and political systems in China, 
                                                
431 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, (Case C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935. 
432 Renault, (Case 38/98). Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, (Case 126/97) ECR [1999] I-3055. 
433 Régie, 11 May 2000, Case C-38/98.  
434 Baker v. GM, 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998). 
435 See Huang and Qian, supra note_430_ at 319-20.  
436 Hay, supra note_430_ at 294. 
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arguably, the public policy exception should be maintained in interregional JRE.437 This 
can help assure Hong Kong and Macao that their fundamental interests are protected, so 
they would be willing to participate in a broad-scope JRE arrangement. Nevertheless, the 
use of public policy exception should be strictly restrained.438 Only when the effects of 
JRE, rather than the law on which the judgment is based, will manifestly infringe the 
fundamental interests of a region, a requested court can deny JRE.439 Manipulation of this 
defense will create uncertainties and instabilities regarding whether a right created in one 
region can be recognized in the others.440 In the long run, it will jeopardize the mutual 
trust between the regions and consequently harm the policy of “One country, Two 
Systems”.441 
 
2. Substantive and Procedural Public Policy Exception 
 
The proposed JRE Arrangement recognizes both substantive and procedural public 
policy exception. Both should be invoked only in exceptional situations. As for the 
former, a requested court should be allowed to refuse JRE when the result of JRE is 
manifestly against the public policies of the requested region. Only when JRE will 
                                                
437 Nansheng Sun, Lun Yiguo Lianzhi Xia Quji Shifa Zhong de Gonggong Zhixu Baoliu [An Analysis of Public Policy 
Exception in Interregional Conflict of Laws under the Policy of "One Country, Two Systems", 41 HUADONG ZHENGFA 
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF EAST CHINA POLITICAL AND LAW INSTITUTE] 73, 83 (2005). 
438 Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 309. 
439 Id. at 309. 
440 See Liu & Zhang, supra note 425. See also Weidong Chen, Qu Ji Fa Yuan Pan Jue Chen Ren Yu Zhi Xing Tiao Jian 
Zhi Bi Jiao [A Comparative study of the Conditions of Inter-regional Judgment Recognition and Enforcement], 
ZHONGGUO GUOJI SIFA YU BIJIAOFA NIANKAN [ANNUAL JOURNAL OF CHINA PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW] 353 (1999).  
441 See Huang & Qian, supra note 422 at 321. See also Xianyu Yu, Zheng Qu Jie Jue Taiwan Yu Nei Di Ji Gang Ao De 
Fa Lv Chong Tu Wen Ti [Correct Solve the Legal Conflicts Between Taiwan and Mainland China as well as Hong Kong 
and Macao], ZHONGGUO GUOJI SIFA YU BIJIAOFA NIANKAN [ANNUAL JOURNAL OF CHINA PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW] 263 (1999). 
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infringe the fundamental interests and values of the requested region, the requested court 
can invoke the public policy exception for refusal.442  
Regarding procedural deficiencies of judgment-rendering courts, the ground of 
unfair procedure in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement only lists three 
circumstances: according to the law the judgment-rendering region, the losing party was 
not duly summoned or was summoned but not given a reasonable time to defend a case, 
or was not properly represented by a guardian if lacking litigation capacity.443 The 
remaining procedural deficiencies, such as jurisdiction fraud and judicial corruption, fall 
under fraud. However, it is possible that even if the judgment-rendering proceedings 
comply with the law of the judgment-rendering region and no fraud is involved, the 
proceedings still do not meet the basic elements of a fair trial of the requested region. 
Therefore, the procedure contents of the public policy exception should be acknowledged 
in the proposed Arrangement.  
Application of the public policy exception to procedural deficiencies beyond the 
ambit of the unfair procedure ground is endorsed by the EU JRE law. In the Brussels I 
Regulation, Article 34(1) permits a requested court to deny JRE because of public policy 
exception. Article 34(2) is the guarantor of fair procedure but limited to default 
judgments where the defendant was not properly served. Nevertheless, the protection of 
fair procedure must be more far-reaching than proper service, because there should be 
fair trial "after its commencement, not just notice at its beginning."444 The EU JRE law 
                                                
442 This is generally agreed by regional laws, see Chapter III. For discussion that discourages Mainland China from 
denying JRE merely because the judgment is against a Mainland government agency, see Section A of Chapter IV. 
443 See supra Res Judicata of Section C of Chapter V.  
444 Hay, supra note_429_ at 292-93. 
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demonstrates the exceptional situation where Article 34(1) should be applied to 
procedure issues. Two examples illustrate this. 
The first is Krombach v. Bamberski.445 Krombach concerns the question whether 
the requested court can deny JRE by invoking the public policy exception, when the 
defendant did not have a fair hearing in the judgment-rendering court. In this case, Mr. 
Bamberski and Mr. Krombach were domiciled in France and Germany, respectively. Mr. 
Krombach was suspected of having murdered Mr. Bamberski’s daughter in Germany. 
The French court exercised jurisdiction based on the victim’s French nationality, 
although the Brussels Convention banned this jurisdiction ground. Mr. Krombach was 
served properly but he refused to attend the hearing. The French court held that he was in 
contempt of the court. Under French law, no defense counsel may appear on behalf of the 
person in contempt. Finally, the French court ruled for Mr. Bamberski without hearing 
the defense counsel instructed by Mr. Krombach. Mr. Bamberski sought JRE in Germany. 
Mr. Krombach invoked the public policy exception under the Brussels I Regulation on 
the ground that he had been unable to defend himself effectively in the French court. The 
ECJ ruled that the public policy exception in Article 34(1) includes all conditions 
considered by the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter "ECHR") as 
necessary for a fair trial.446 The ECJ held that, the French court refused to hear Mr. 
Krombach’s defense because he was not present at the hearing; although this complied 
                                                
445 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, (Case C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935. A parallel ECHR case is Krombach v. 
France, Application no. 29731/96 Judgment Strasbourg February 13, 2001, Final May 13, 2001 (the ECHR court held 
that the French judgment-rendering proceeding violated Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 
3 (c)). 
446 Krombach, (Case C-7/98) [2000] ECR I-1935, at paras 24-26, 38-39, and 42. 
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with the French law, it still manifestly breached Mr. Krombach’s fundamental rights for a 
fair trial.447 Therefore, JRE was denied. 
The second example is Maronier v. Larmer.448 In this case, the plaintiff brought an 
action against a dentist in the Netherlands and properly served him. However, this action 
was suspended due to the plaintiff’s health problem and bankruptcy. Meanwhile, the 
defendant moved to the UK and lost all contacts with the Holland law firm representing 
him. After 12 years of suspension, the plaintiff reactivated the action without affecting a 
fresh service on the defendant. Consequently, the defendant was not aware of the 
reactivated action until the plaintiff requested a British court to recognize and enforce the 
Dutch judgment. The requested court in the UK invoked the procedural aspect of the 
public policy exception of Article 34(1) and refused the JRE because the defendant did 
not have a fair trial in the Netherlands under the ECHR.449 
Therefore, in the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement, the requested court 
should be allowed to invoke the public policy exception to deny JRE for procedural 
deficiencies unlisted in the ground of unfair procedures.450 It helps soothe Hong Kong 
and Macao's concern about the Mainland judicial system, especially in extremely 
exceptional situations, that requested courts in Hong Kong and Macao may hold that a 
Mainland judgment is tainted by corruption but because of the wholesale judicial 
corruption, a judgment debtor cannot obtain evidence to prove the existence of corruption. 
                                                
447 Id. 
448 W. Maronier v. Bryan Larmer [2002] I.L.Pr. 685 (C.A., per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers M.R.). For comments, 
see Kramer, supra note_429_. 
449 Maronier, [2002] I.L.Pr. 685 (C.A., per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers M.R.). 
450 This approach is adopted by the Hong Kong FJREO. See Johnston, supra note_25_ at 563. 
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Therefore, this can satisfy the human right protections, including rights to a fair trial, 
required by the Hong Kong and Macao Basic Laws.451 
The grounds of unfair procedures, fraud, and public policy exception all involve 
procedure deficiencies. They also co-exist in the Hague Choice of Court Convention452 
and the 1999 Hague Draft.453 Commentaries and reports on the two Conventions provide 
valuable guidance in delimiting these three grounds.454 Accordingly, in the proposed 
Multilateral JRE Arrangement the ground of unfair procedures455 are lex specialis 
compared with fraud and public policy exception. Therefore, if a case involves any of the 
three instances under the heading of unfair procedures, this heading should prevail 
against fraud and public policy exceptions.456 Fraud should be applied to cases such as if 
the plaintiff seduced the defendant into the jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court 
or the judgment creditor won the action by bribing judges or kidnapping of witnesses. 
The procedural contents of the public policy exception should be applied to cases beyond 
the perimeters of the grounds of unfair procedures and fraud. Notably, a mere difference 
between the procedures of the judgment-rendering region and the requested region does 
not trigger the procedural public policy exception.457 Only when the judgment-rendering 
proceedings contradict with fundamental elements of fair procedure of the requested 
region, the court may invoke public policy exception to reject JRE.  
                                                
451 Some Mainland scholars concern that the exclusion of natural justice as a ground for refusing JRE in the Mainland-
Hong Kong Arrangement may fail to meet the requirement of human rights protections under the Hong Kong Basic 
Law, see Yu, supra note_22_ at 157. For details, see Chapter II.  
452 Art. 9(c)(d)(e) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention. 
453 Art. 28.1(c)(d)(e) of the 1999 Hague Draft. 
454 Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 119. Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 309. See Dogauchi and Hartley, 
supra note_399_ at 32-34.  
455 The three grounds refer to the losing party was not duly summoned or was summoned but not given a reasonable 
time to defend a case, or was not properly represented by a guardian if lacking litigation capacity. See supra Unfair 
Procedure of Section C of Chapter V. 
456 Brand and Herrup, supra note_119_ at 119. 
457 Pocar and Nygh, supra note_195_ at 309. 
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Notably, the lex specialist argument also can find support from treatises on the 
Brussels I Regulation.458 A prominent commentator argues that Article 34(2) is only one 
express application of procedural due process of rights but Article 34(1) must be the 
broader source of such rights."459 
Therefore, like the two existing arrangements, the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement should adopt the public policy exception as a ground to refuse JRE. 
However, different from the two existing Arrangements, the proposed Arrangement 
should state that only a manifest violation of the public policy can constitute a defense to 
JRE.460 The contents of the public policy exception should be determined according to 
the law of the requested region. A requested court can deny JRE only when the effects of 
JRE will manifestly infringe the fundamental interests of the requested region.461 The 
procedural contents of the public policy exception should cover procedure deficiencies 
beyond the scope of the unfair procedure defense and fraud. 
 
D. Summary 
 
This Chapter proposes selected rules of the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
by comparative studies between China, the US, and EU JRE laws, as well as Hague 
Conventions. It covers the scope, requirements for JRE, and defenses against JRE in the 
proposed Arrangement. In brief, it has three important contributions. First, at the starting 
point, the proposed Arrangement should be a single enforcement arrangement. It 
                                                
458 Eg. Hay, supra note_429_ at 293. 
459 Id. at 293. For fraud and public policy exception in JRE outside of the Brussels I Regulation, see also Walter and 
Baumgartner, supra note_378_ at 31. 
460 For details, see Chapter III. 
461 Id. 
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regulates JRE (including indirect jurisdiction) but not direct jurisdiction. It divides 
indirect jurisdiction into categories of required, excluded, and permitted. Second, in order 
to harmonize divergences between regional laws and between the two existing 
Arrangements, the proposed Arrangement provides autonomous terminologies for "civil 
and commercial," "finality," "choice of court agreements," "unfair procedures," "fraud," 
and "res judicata." More autonomous terminologies should be developed for terms used 
in the Arrangement in the future. Third, it also explains grounds for refusing JRE in 
details, namely lack of jurisdiction, unfair procedure, res judicata, fraud, and public 
policy exception. 
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Chapter VI  Implementation of  
the Proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
 
This chapter focuses on the most important issues regarding the implementation of 
the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement. It argues that the best legal form for the 
proposed Arrangement is an interregional instrument signed by the three regions and 
implemented by separate regional legislations. Then it proposes a coordination 
mechanism to solve the problems brought by the absence of a court of final review. 
Finally, it argues that lex specialis should determine the hierarchy between the proposed 
Arrangement and international JRE conventions ratified by Chinese regions.  
 
A. Legal Form 
 
Different proposals exist regarding which legal form is most suitable to solve 
interregional JRE.1 They fall into three categories: adding a guiding principle of 
interregional JRE in the PRC Constitution, enacting a national law applicable to all 
regions, and adopting a model law.2 However, all these proposals are less appropriate 
compared with the form of interregional arrangement plus separate regional 
implementing legislation. 
 
                                                        
1 For academic debates, see Chapter II. 
2 Guobin Zhu, Inter-regional Conflict of Laws under “One Country, Two Systems”: Revisiting Chinese Legal Theories 
and Chinese and Hong Kong Law, with Special Reference to Judicial Assistance, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 615, 674-75 
(2002). Charles Chau Chi-chung, Implementation of Article 95 of the Basic Law: Mutual Recognition and Enforcement 
of Civil and Commercial Judgments between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Mainland China and 
Taiwan, 3 HKSLR 170 (1997). 
 342 
i. Amending the PRC Constitution 
 
The first approach advocates that the Mainland National People’s Congress 
(hereinafter “NPC”) should amend the PRC Constitution by adding a guiding principle 
relating to interregional JRE and should make this clause directly binding on Hong Kong 
and Macao.3 This approach is feasible if Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao are in 
agreement. However, it requires amending the PRC Constitution, which is very complex.4 
Moreover, even without this amendment, interregional JRE is still legitimate because 
Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Article 93 of the Macao Basic Law have 
already provided a constitutional basis for interregional judicial assistance including 
JRE.5 Because these two Articles are essentially identical, here I use Article 95 of the 
Hong Kong Basic Law as an example. It reads: “The Hong Kong SAR, may, through 
consultations and in accordance with law, maintain juridical relations with the judicial 
organs of the country, and they may render assistance to each other.”6 Clearly, it 
authorizes Hong Kong to make efforts to enhance interregional judicial assistance.7 
However, one commentator criticizes this Article.8 He raised four questions:9 
 
[Article 95] fails to answer whether the H[ong]K[ong] SAR courts may 
                                                        
3 Zhu, supra note 2 at 647. Hu Jinnan, A Study on the Approaches of Inter-regional Judicial Assistance, in STUDIES ON 
INTER-REGIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE [QUJI SIFA XIEZHU YANJIU] (Huang Jin & Huang Fend, eds.) 33 (Beijing: Press of 
University of Politics and Law of China, 1993). 
4 Art 64 of the PRC 2004 Constitution states that: amendments to the Constitution are to be proposed by the Standing 
Committee of the NPC or by more than one-fifth of the deputies to the NPC and adopted by a vote of more than two-
thirds of all the deputies to the Congress. 
5 Zhu, supra note_2_ at 674. The two Basic Laws directly implement art 31 of the PRC Constitution and enjoy the 
highest status in the hierarchy of laws of Hong Kong and Macao.        
6 Art. 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
7 Zhu, supra note_2_ at 672. (Indicating that art. 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law encourages further institutional 
arrangements regarding judicial assistance between the HKSAR and other parts of Mainland China.) 
8 Qingjiang Kong, Enforcement of Hong Kong SAR Court Judgments in the People’s Republic of China, 49 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 867, 873 (2000). 
9 Id. 
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enforce their final judgments on the mainland; the provision fails to clarify whether 
the H[ong]K[ong] SAR courts shall request assistance from individual courts in 
mainland China on a case-by-case basis; the provision fails to elaborate whether the 
law of the H[ong]K[ong] SAR or the law of the PRC shall be paramount; the 
provision fails to address whether the people’s court on the mainland shall review 
the judgments of H[ong]K[ong] SAR before recognizing and enforcing them within 
its jurisdiction. 
 
This criticism is inappropriate for three reasons. First, these four questions concern 
specific JRE issues. As a constitutional clause, Article 95 does not need to provide 
answers for such detailed issues. It is more appropriate for JRE arrangements concluded 
under Article 95 to respond to these questions. For example, the Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement and its 2008 implementing legislations in the two regions have answered all 
these four questions.10 Second, Hong Kong law and Mainland law are two separate and 
equal systems11 so one system cannot be "paramount" to the other. Third, the Basic Law 
of Hong Kong does not apply in Mainland China, so it, of cause, cannot say anything 
about what a Mainland court should or should not do in a JRE proceeding. As a 
conclusion, Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Article 93 of the Macao Basic 
Law can justify the legitimacy of the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement.12  
 
ii. Enacting a National JRE Law 
 
The second approach refers to enacting a national JRE law applicable to all 
                                                        
10 See Chapter III. 
11 For the constitutional framework between Mainland China and Hong Kong and the equality principle between 
regions, see Chapter I and II. 
12 CAMILLE CAMERON & ELSA KELLY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN HONG KONG 430 (2 ed. 2008) 
(indicating that the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement forms "part of a range of initiatives to develop mutual legal 
assistance between the Mainland and the HKSAR, in accordance with Article 95 of the Basic Law") See Zhu, supra 
note_2_ at 674 (indicating adding a general principle for interregional judicial assistance in the PRC Constitution is not 
feasible because it ignores Article 95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law). 
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regions.13 This approach was proposed early in 1980s by Professor Depei Han.14 
According to Han’s three-step solution to Chinese interregional conflicts, the first step is 
regional conflict of laws, the second step is interregional conflict of laws, and the third 
step is national substantive law.15 Han argues that on the second step, a national 
interregional JRE law enacted by the NPC should replace regional laws under Articles 
17(3) and (4) of the Hong Kong Basic Law draft.16 Notably, these two provisions were 
removed in the final version of the Basic Law. Under Article 17 of the final version, 
Hong Kong SAR shall be vested with legislative power.17 Article 18 further clarifies that 
laws enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee are inapplicable in Hong Kong 
except the six laws listed in the Basic Law.18 The Standing Committee of the NPC may 
add or delete from the list of laws after consulting the Hong Kong SAR Basic Law 
Committee and the Hong Kong government.19 This list shall be confined to laws relating 
to defense and foreign affairs as well as other matters outside the autonomy of Hong 
Kong as specified by the Basic Law.20 However, the Basic Law clearly states that judicial 
                                                        
13 Qian Hua, Approaches and Methods for Conducting Inter-regional Judicial Assistance between the Mainland and 
Hong Kong, in STUDIES ON INTER-REGIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE [QUJI SIFA XIEZHU YANJIU] (Huang Jin & Huang Fend, 
eds) 80 (Beijing: Press of University of Politics and Law of China, 1993); Liu Zhengjiang, Exploration on the Issues 
regarding Inter-regional Judicial Assistance in China, in STUDIES ON INTER-REGIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE [QUJI SIFA 
XIEZHU YANJIU] (Huang Jin & Huang Fend, eds.) 51-52 (Beijing: Press of University of Politics and Law of China, 
1993). 
14 Depei Han, Lun Wo Guo De Qu Ji Fa Lv Chong Tu Wen Ti---Wo Guo Guo Ji Shi Fa Yan Jiu Zhong De Yi Ge Xin Ke 
Ti [An Analysis of Chinese Interregional Legal Conflicts: A New Subject in Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws], 6 
ZHONG GUO FA XUE [CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 3, 8-10 (1988). For details of this article and comments, see Chapter II. 
15 Id. 
16 Id, at 9-10. 
17 Art17 of the Basic Law indicates: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with legislative power. 
Laws enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR must be reported to the Standing Committee of 
the NPC for the record. The reporting for record shall not affect the entry into force of such laws. 
If the Standing Committee of the NPC, after consulting its Hong Kong SAR Basic Law Committee, 
considers that any law enacted by the legislature of the Region is not in conformity with the provisions of this 
Law regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central Authorities or regarding the relationship 
between the Central Authorities and the Region, the Standing Committee may return the law in question but 
shall not amend it. Any law returned by the Standing Committee of the NPC shall immediately be invalidated. 
This invalidation shall not have retroactive effect, unless otherwise provided for in the laws of the Region. 
18 See art. 18 and the Annex III of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
19 Art. 18(2) of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
20 Id, art. 18(3). 
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assistance falls into the autonomy of Hong Kong.21 Therefore, it is against the Basic Law 
if the NPC and its Standing Committee enact a national interregional JRE law and require 
Hong Kong and Macao to implement it.22 
 
iii. Proposing Model Laws  
 
The third approach is to enact a model law.23 Its supporters believe each region 
should amend its regional JRE law according to a model law.24 The benefit of the model 
law approach is to maintain the autonomy of each region while achieving harmonization.  
Advocating model laws for solving Chinese interregional conflicts can be traced 
back to 1990, when Professors Depei Han and Jin Huang drafted the Model Law for 
Choice of Laws between Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao in Civil 
Cases.25 In 1995, they proposed the Model Law for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
on the Application of Laws in Hong Kong and Macau-related Cases.26 As their name 
indicates, these two model laws only deal with the issue of choice of law and they have 
                                                        
21 Id, at art. 95.  
22 Zhu, supra note_2_ at 674-75. 
23 Id. at 675. 
24 See Renshan Liu & Meirong Zhang, Pi Xi Zhong Guo Qu Ji Min Shang Shi Pan Jue Xiang Fu Cheng Ren Yu Zhi 
Xing Wen Ti de Li Fa Yu Si Fa Xian Zhuang [Analysis of Current Legislation and Judicial Practice of Chinese Inter-
regional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters], a paper presented in 2008 
Annual Chinese Association of Private International Law in Beijing (arguing good unilateral legislation can better 
facilitate interregional JRE than bilateral arrangements). There are three Model Laws aiming to solve interregional 
conflicts proposed by Mainland scholars. Depei Han & Jin Huang, Model Regulations on the Application of Laws in 
Civil Matters between the Mainland and Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, published at the 1991 Annual Conference of 
the China Association of Private International Law held in Jinan, Shandong Province. Yuan Quan, Review and 
Prospects on the Research of Inter-regional Conflict of Laws in China before the End of the Century II Perspectives Do 
Directo (bilingual, Fayu zongheng) 148 (1997). Depei Han & Jin Huang, Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone on the Application of Laws in Hong Kong and Macau-related Cases, 6 LAW REVIEW [FAXUE PINGLUN] 47 (1995). 
These two Model Laws have no JRE chapter. For comments see Zhu, supra note_2_ at 639. The third model law is 
proposed by Xianyu Yu & et al., see Xianyu Yu & et al, The Model Law of Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws 
(2009), presented in the 2009 Annual Conference of Chinese Private International Law Association in Hanzhou, 
October 2009. (on file with the author). 
25 Model Regulations on the Application of Laws in Civil Matters between the Mainland and Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macau, see supra note 24. 
26 Model Law for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on the Application of Laws in Hong Kong and Macau-related 
Cases, see supra note 24. 
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not been supported strongly by legislatures in any region.27 However, they are the first 
model laws for Chinese interregional conflict of laws.  
An important effort to unify conflict-of-law rules in the four regions was made in 
2009, when Mainland professor Xianyu Yu and his research team presented The Model 
Law of Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws in the annual Conference of Mainland 
Private International Law Association.28 This Model Law contains 125 conflict-of-law 
rules concerning jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments and arbitration awards.29 It serves as a sample for legislators to adopt in 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.30 Its Article 119 stipulates general 
principles for JRE.31 
 
Judicial decisions (including judgments, decisions, orders, and court 
settlements) and arbitration awards, rendered in any of the four regions should be 
recognized and enforced in another region according to the bilateral arrangements or 
the principle of reciprocity. Refusing JRE shall comply with the explicit grounds 
provided by this law. 
 
Its Article 120 provides that judicial decisions rendered in one region should not be 
recognized and enforced in another region in which recognition or enforcement is sought 
in any of the following circumstance.32 
 
                                                        
27 Zhu, supra note_2_ at 639. 
28 The Model Law of Chinese Interregional Conflict of Laws (2009), supra note 28. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Art. 119 of the Model Law. The English translation is the author's. 
32 Art. 120 of the Model Law. The English translation is the author's. Yu's Model Law also indicates what documents 
that a party seeking recognition or enforcement should submit to the requested court. Art. 122 of the Model Law 
provides that lex fori or bilateral JRE arrangements shall determine the JRE procedures and the way of execution. Art. 
123 of the Model Law indicates that "an application with the name and address of the judgment debtor, a copy of 
judgment that can sufficiently establish its authenticity and enforceability in the judgment-rendering court, and a 
certificate proving that the losing defendant was lawfully summoned or that the losing defendant with no capacity to 
take part in litigation was represented with an agent. If the above documents are made in a language other than Chinese, 
a Chinese translation should be provided." The English translation is the author's.  
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1. According to the law of the region where the requested court is located, the 
requested court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case;  
2. According to the law of the region where the judgment-rendering court is 
located, the judgment is not legally effective, or its enforcement has been suspended; 
        3. An action based on the same claim is pending in the requested court, which 
was brought before the commencement of the JRE proceedings, and the requested 
court has jurisdiction over the action;   
4. The court of the place of enforcement, a foreign country or an overseas 
region has rendered a decision for the same claim, or an arbitral agency has rendered 
an arbitration award for the same claim, and such decision or arbitration award has 
been recognized or enforced by the court at the place of enforcement; 
5. In the proceedings at the judgment-rendering court, the losing defendant has 
not been lawfully summoned or the losing defendant with no capacity to take part in 
litigation is not represented with any agent; 
6. Judicial decisions are contrary to the basic legal principles or public policy of 
the region where the requested court is located. 
 
Huang's Model Laws attract Mainland legal academia to the emergence of Chinese 
interregional conflicts. Yu's Model Law is a concrete step towards harmonizing JRE rules 
in Chinese regions. However, no model law has ever been adopted by any regional 
legislature thus far.33 This fact reveals the shortcomings of the model-law approach: it 
attempts to unify regional laws by suggesting legislatures in each region to adopt it on a 
voluntary basis. Model laws have no binding force and do not impose an implementation 
obligation on regions. Nobody can guarantee its acceptance by the legislatures in the 
three regions.34 It may also take regions a long time to unanimously adopt the law.35 
Considering the urgent need for interregional JRE,36 this approach is not preferable. 
Moreover, even if regions would like to adopt a model law, there is no guarantee that they 
will adopt it in a similar time frame. In contrast, a multilateral interregional arrangement 
will impose an obligation on its member regions to reform their regional laws in a certain 
                                                        
33 Zhu, supra note_2_ at 639. 
34 Id, at 675. 
35 Id. Xu Hong, On the Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters between Hong Kong and the Mainland under One Country, 
Two Systems, 6 JURIST'S REVIEW [FAXUE JIA] 19 (1996). 
36 Zhu, supra note_2_ at 675. 
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time frame. Therefore, the arrangement can provide more effective coordination among 
regions. Additionally, the absence of an authoritative institution to draft model laws for 
the three regions is another serious obstacle to the model-law approach. 
Moreover, Yu's Model Law is imperfect. For example, the grounds for refusing JRE 
under the Model Law are very similar with those of the Mainland-Macao JRE 
Arrangement but largely deviate from the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. It does not 
address any common-law concerns, such as finality and fraud.37 Therefore, it may not be 
welcomed by Hong Kong.38 Moreover, compared with proposed grounds for refusing 
JRE in Chapter V, Yu's Model Law does not regulate indirect jurisdiction except 
excessive jurisdictional bases. It is also unclear how to address unfair procedures 
uncovered by Article 120.5.39 It has been shown from Chapter V that Article 120.3 (res 
judicata) in Yu's model law cannot address forum shopping brought by the rapidity of 
Mainland civil procedure. Moreover, Article 120.6 (public policy exception) is not 
restricted to cases of manifest violations, so it is not best formulated to suit Chinese 
interregional situations. 
 
iv. Interregional Arrangement plus Separate Regional Legislations 
 
The above discussion demonstrates that amending the PRC Constitution, enacting a 
national JRE law, and adopting model laws, do not fit Chinese situation. This dissertation 
argues that the best model is "interregional arrangement plus separate regional 
legislations." Namely, regions negotiate an interregional arrangement and then implement 
                                                        
37 For details of finality and fraud in Hong Kong common law, see Part ii of Section A of Chapter III. 
38 For how the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement addresses finality and fraud, see Chapter IV and V.  
39 Id. 
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it by separate regional legislations.40 As discussed in Chapter I, “arrangement” is an 
interregional instrument signed by member regions in China to address interregional 
issues.41 After signing an arrangement, regions will make separate implementing 
legislations in their own jurisdiction. This “[interregional] arrangement plus separate 
legislative approach” has been proved to be feasible and effective to solve questions 
relating to judicial assistance.42 Therefore, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement 
should adopt the same legal form: it should be an interregional instrument signed by the 
three regions and replace the existing two JRE arrangements; and it should be 
implemented by separate legislations in each region. This process attempts to ultimately 
harmonize the JRE laws in the member regions, just like adopting the Brussels 
Convention was aimed to use a multilateral JRE convention to replace existing bilateral 
JRE treaties and to achieve unification among its members.43 Moreover, like other 
arrangements, the constitutional foundation of the proposed JRE Arrangement is Article 
95 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Article 93 of the Macao Basic Law.  
 
As a conclusion, the proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should be an 
                                                        
40 Id. 
41 See Chapter I.  
42 Stephen Kai-yi Wong, Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the HKSAR, HONG 
KONG LAWYER 67 (Nov. 1999). Zhu, supra note_2_ at 615. JRE is a part of judicial assistance in a broad sense. For 
scholarship in Hong Kong, see Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese 
Sovereignty and the Basic Law 351 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2nd edn, 1999). For scholarship in 
Mainland China, see Li Shuanyuan, Several Issues Concerning the Theoretical Research and Practice on Private 
International Law in China, in STUDIES ON CHINESE CONFLICT OF LAWS [ZHONGGUO CHONGTUFA YANJIU] (Han Depei ed.) 
365 (Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1993); Xiao Yongpin, The Conflict of Laws Between Mainland China and the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: the Choice of Coordination Models, 4  in YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 163, 189 and 197 (2003). For examples, see art. 3 of the Treaty of Judicial Assistance in Civil and 
Criminal Affairs between People’s Republic of China and Republic Belarus (indicating judicial assistance includes the 
service of documents, investigation of evidence, recognition and enforcement of civil judgments, and etc.). Art. 6 of the 
Treaty of Judicial Assistance in Civil Affairs between People’s Republic of China and Bulgaria (indicating judicial 
assistance includes the service of documents, investigation of evidence, recognition and enforcement of judgments and 
arbitration awards). See also Art. 2 of the Treaty of Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Affairs between 
People’s Republic of China and France (indicating judicial assistance includes the service of documents, investigation 
of evidence, recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitration awards and etc.) 
43 Kurt H Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper FORA in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market 
Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997 (1967). 
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interregional instrument ratified by regions and implemented by separate legislations in 
each region. 
 
B. Coordination Mechanism for Implementing the Proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement 
 
The Supreme People’s Court in Mainland China, and the Court of Final Appeal in 
Hong Kong and Macao, respectively, are the highest court in each region and are equal in 
authority. No court of final review exists to hear cases from all three regions. As special 
administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao enjoy final adjudicative powers according 
to their Basic Laws.44 Therefore, establishing a supra-regional court of final review, 
without the agreement of Hong Kong and Macao, intrudes upon the Basic Laws. If the 
three regions agree to establish a supra-regional court, interregional judicial coordination 
will be significantly enhanced. However, currently, the three regions have not show 
consent to establish such a court. Nevertheless, the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement can be implemented consistently even without a court of final review in 
China. This is for three reasons.  
First, the proposed Arrangement adopts autonomous terminologies to avoid 
regional idiosyncratic interpretations. When interpreting terminologies in the proposed 
Arrangement, regional courts should adopt the solution of autonomous interpretation and 
comparative interpretation. The former requires regional courts to strictly comply with 
autonomous terminologies in the proposed Arrangement. The latter encourages regional 
courts, when interpreting a term that has not been defined in the proposed Arrangement, 
                                                        
44 Art. 2 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. Art. 2 of the Macao Basic Law. 
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to take into account how other regions have interpreted it and use that as a presumption to 
follow. The approach of comparative interpretation is demonstrated by the US Supreme 
Court's decision in Abbott v. Abbott.45 In this case, the Court held that “[t]he ‘opinions of 
our sister signatories' ... are ‘entitled to considerable weight" in interpreting “right of 
custody” under the Hague International Child Abduction Convention.46 Similarly, the 
Supreme People's Court also refers to the general practices of contracting countries when 
interpreting the meaning of "agent" according to the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property.47 Comparative interpretation can help regional courts to interpret 
the proposed Arrangement consistently. In addition, since the proposed Arrangement 
aims to realize rapid recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in member 
regions, when conflicting definitions exist, words and phrases in the Arrangement should 
be interpreted in a way favorable to interregional JRE. 
Second, notably, interregional JRE in the US involves fifty states and the EU 
twenty-seven Member States.48 It is difficult for so many members to cooperate and 
maintain consistent interregional JRE without the supervision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States or the ECJ. However, Chinese interregional JRE involves only three 
regions. The small number of regions makes the cooperation between them considerably 
easier. Moreover, the number of courts in Hong Kong and Macao is far more less than 
that in Mainland China. In other words, the majority of courts involving interregional 
JRE are in Mainland China and the Supreme People's Court can ensure them to interpret 
                                                        
45 Abbott v. Abbott, 2010 WL 1946730 (U.S.). 
46 Id, at page 10. 
47 Chongqing Zhengtong Pharmaceutical Co. and the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board of the  
State Administration for Industry and Commerce v. Sichuan Huashu Veterinary Pharmaceutical Co.  
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Jan. 6, 2010) (P.R.C.) (Sup. People’s Ct., Aug 31, 2007). For detailed discussion of this 
case, see Jie Huang, Direct Application of International Commercial Law in Chinese Courts: Intellectual Property, 
Trade, and International Transportation, 5 MANCHESTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 105, 122-25 
(2008). 
48 The number of EU Members has been 27 since 2007.  
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the Proposed Arrangement uniformly. Therefore, if the three regional central authorities 
cooperate well, consistent application of the proposed Arrangement is theoretically 
possible even if a court of final review is absent. 
Third, establishing a coordination mechanism is more feasible than establishing a 
supra-regional court of final review. The former only requires the consensus of regions 
and can be established in the current regional institutions. But the latter involves 
amending Basic Laws49 and the PRC Constitution,50 as well as establishing a new court. It 
also requires differentiating the authorities between the new court and the existing three 
supreme courts. Therefore, the former is considerably easier and feasible than the latter at 
the current stage.  
Notably, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement requires the two regions to establish a 
coordination mechanism.51 It authorizes a requested court to directly contact a judgment-
rendering court in the other region to verify the genuineness of the judgment.52 It also 
requires the Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Final Appeal of Macao to provide 
each other with legal materials related to the implementation of the Arrangement and to 
inform each other of the results in implementation every year.53 These channels are 
valuable for smooth implementation of the Arrangement in Mainland China and Macao. 
However, the Mainland-Macao Arrangement does not provide information regarding how 
these communication channels operate in practice. Moreover, these channels are, 
regretfully, absent in the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. The Mainland-Hong Kong 
Arrangement requires a JRE applicant to provide a certificate issued by the judgment-
                                                        
49 For the high requirements of amending the Basic Laws, see art. 159 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and art. 143 of the 
Macao Basic Law.   
50 For the high requirements of amending the PRC Constitution, see art. 62. 
51 Arts. 7 and 23 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. 
52 See id, art. 7. 
53 Id, art. 23. 
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rendering court, proving that the said judgment is a final judgment described in Article 2 
of this Arrangement.54 However, the contents of and the procedure for obtaining such 
certificates are unclear. Additionally, although the existing two JRE Arrangements 
contain a similar provision stating that any problem arising from their implementation 
and any amendment to be made to them should be resolved through consultation between 
the Supreme People's Court and the Government of Hong Kong and of Macao,55 it is 
unclear yet how this scheme will work out. These insufficiencies show an emerging 
problem that has not been widely addressed in the two regions, which is how to make 
swifter amendments when an arrangement reveals shortcomings. Therefore, the proposed 
coordination mechanism should fill these gaps.  
The proposed mechanism addresses two problems concerning the implementation 
of the proposed Arrangement: (1) information about the specific judgments that are to be 
enforced; (2) maintenance of interpretational uniformity. Additionally, this mechanism 
can also help regions to amend the proposed Arrangement by consensus. This mechanism 
has two levels. First is a court-to-court information exchange mechanism. It is designed 
to address the first problem. The second level is a central authority-to-central authority 
information exchange mechanism. It aims to solve the second problem. In the long run, 
regions may consider developing the central authority-to-central authority information 
exchange mechanism into a coordination organization specializing in enhancing 
interregional JRE and other judicial assistance issues.  
 
i. Exchanging Information about the Specific Judgments that Are to be 
                                                        
54 Art. 6.3 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement.  
55 Art. 22 of the Mainland-Macao Arrangement and art.18 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement. See eg., art. 10 of 
Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement and art. 11 of the Mainland-Hong Kong Arbitration Arrangement.  
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Enforced 
 
Judgments in the three regions are in different formats and maybe in different 
languages; therefore, facilitating the requested court to determine the authenticity and to 
find the essential information of a judgment is important. In this regard, China can draw 
useful insights from the US and the EU JRE laws. The Brussels I Regulation leaves the 
authenticity requirement to the law of judgment-rendering region.56 However, it requires 
a JRE applicant to produce a standardized certificate containing necessary information 
for recognition and enforcement.57 In practice, this certificate "does in fact make it easier 
for a creditor to have a judgment recognized or enforced."58 In the US, the authenticity 
criteria for a judgment are determined by 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 or the statutes of 
requested state. The former requires the judgment should be with the attestation of the 
clerk and seal of the judgment-rendering court, together with a certificate of a judge of 
the court that the said attestation is in proper form.59 The latter generally requires a JRE 
applicant to produce an affidavit that contains information of the judgment, such as the 
name of the parties and their attorney, contacts information of the judgment-rendering 
court and state, case number, amount of judgment and date of judgment.60 This affidavit 
should be submitted with a copy of the judgment. Considering the divergences of 
regional law in China, a standardized certificate can provide higher uniformity than an 
                                                        
56 Report Jenard p. 55. 
57 Arts. 53-55 of the Brussels I Regulation.  
58 Lajos Vekas, Chapter III Recognition and Enforcement Section 3 Common Provisions,  in BRUSSELS I 
REGULATION, 687-89 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007). 
59 28 U.S.C. Section 1738. 
60 Eg., MC 62  (3/08) Affidavit And Notice Of Entry Of Foreign Judgment of State of Michigan at 
http://forms.justia.com/michigan/statewide/civil/general/affidavit-and-notice-of-entry-of-foreign-judgment-12534.html 
(last visited June 1, 2010). Eg., The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act adopted in Alabama requires the 
affidavit must include the names and last known addresses of the judgment debtor and creditor, and a statement that the 
foreign judgment is valid, enforceable and unsatisfied. available at 
http://www.madisoncountycircuitclerk.org/CircuitCivilDivision.htm (last visited June 1, 2010). 
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affidavit under regional law. Therefore, arguably, the proposed Arrangement should 
require a JRE applicant to produce a standardized certificate. The certificate should 
contain information, such as (1) the contact information of the judgment-rendering court 
and judge, (2) the date, reference number, parties and their attorneys to the judgments, (3) 
whether there are appellate or retrial pending against the judgment, (4) date of service of 
the document instituting the proceedings if the judgment was given in default; and (5) the 
number of claims and corresponding decisions. This certificate should be attached to a 
copy of the judgment. It should be in the official language of the requested region and 
issued by the judgment-rendering court or the central authorities of the judgment-
rendering region. 
If a requested court has doubts regarding the authenticity of judgments, it can 
directly contact a judgment-rendering court for information under the proposed 
Arrangement. Notably, this court-to-court information exchange may overlap with the 
information exchange channel between regional contact points discussed in Chapter IV. 
The former is specially designed to enhance the efficiency of judicial co-operation 
between courts involved in a JRE case. Courts may also use the information exchange 
channel between regional contact points. But the latter is more indirect than the former, 
because a requested court needs to send its request to the regional contact point where the 
judgment-rendering court is located, and then the contact point forwards the request to 
the judgment-rendering court. 
Moreover, this court-to-court information exchange channel is especially valuable 
when a judgment is enforced in two or more regions. For instance, if the place of 
domicile or habitual residence of the judgment debtor or the place where his or her 
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property is situated falls within more than one region, the judgment creditor may file 
separate applications with the courts of both regions at the same time. However, the total 
amount recovered from enforcing the judgment in the courts of the two regions shall not 
exceed the sum specified in the judgment. In this case, courts should coordinate in order 
to assure that a judgment creditor can be fully compensated, but not overcompensated.61 
The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should provide a time frame in which a 
court should respond to the question proposed by another court.  
 
ii. Maintaining Interpretational Uniformity 
 
The central authorities in the three regions should meet at least annually to discuss 
how to solve problems arising from the implementation of the proposed Arrangement and 
how to amend it if necessary.62 Information exchange between central authorities is 
crucially important to ensure the uniform interpretation of the proposed Arrangement and 
its amendment. The value of information exchanges and meetings has been endorsed by 
Professor Arthur von Mehren when negotiating the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Judgments.63 He argues that64  
 
[i]t may be feasible to provide for exchanges of information and occasional 
                                                        
61 The other way to avoid over or under compensation is to require the creditor to designate a court to enforce his or her 
judgment first and the other court to seize, detrain, or freeze the judgment debtor’s property while the other court is 
enforcing the judgment. When the property located in one court’s jurisdiction cannot satisfy the whole judgment, the 
other court can use the property located in its jurisdiction to enforce the outstanding judgment. See art. 4 of the 
Mainland-Macao Arrangement.  
62 For discussion of central authorities, see Part ii of Section C of Chapter IV.  
63 Arthur T. von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements: To What Extent Should the State of Origin's Interpretation of 
Convention Rules Control for Recognition and Enforcement Purposes?,  in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION 
AND JUDGMENTS A-29 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman ed. 2001). 
64 Id. at A-34. Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign 
Judgments Acceptable Worldwide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?,  in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION 
AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE, 289 (John J. Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont ed. 2002). 
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meetings to discuss the State parties' decisional law. Such arrangements can at 
best encourage a greater measure of uniformity in the interpretation and 
application of the convention than would otherwise be the case.  
 
Therefore, Chinese regions should inform each other their implementing legislations and 
relevant cases. They also need to inform each other implementing results annually. 
Regular meetings should be scheduled among central authorities for JRE issues they are 
commonly interested in.  
 
iii. Proposed Coordination Organization 
 
Regular meetings and information exchange between central authorities may not 
assure litigants that regional courts will uniformly interpret and apply the arrangements.65 
Therefore, in the long term, establishing an organization for interregional coordination 
should be considered. This organization should aim to help enhance uniform 
implementation of the proposed Arrangement and may extend its authority to other issues 
regarding interregional judicial assistance. 
Establishing such an organization has been well received by Mainland scholars. 
They support the establishment of an interregional institution to provide consultation, 
coordination, and cooperation for solving interregional legal conflicts.66 However, 
scholars dispute whether this organization should be intergovernmental or non-
governmental. Professor Yongpin Xiao proposes to establish a coordination institution 
                                                        
65 von Mehren, supra note_63_ at A-34. von Mehren, supra note_64_ at 289. (Indicating that information exchange and 
meetings “can, at best, encourage a greater measure of uniformity in the interpretation and application of the [Hague] 
convention than would otherwise be the case. They would not, however, assure litigants that the convention's 
provisions will be fairly and uniformly interpreted and applied by national courts.) 
66 Jie Chen, Qu Ji Fa Lv Chong Tu Zhong Pan Jue De Cheng Ren Yu Zhi Xin Wen Ti Yan Jiu [Study on the recognition 
and Implementation of Judgments Concerning Interregional Conflict of Laws], 10 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL 
PROCURATORS COLLEGE 13, 17-18 (2002). 
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under the NPC:67 
 
[It] would be composed of an equal number of members from Mainland China 
and HKSAR. Its main functions would be to draft model laws, improve legal 
communication, mediate potential disputes, formulate and publish advisory opinions 
on the Basic Law approved by a majority of its members. 
 
Although Xiao made his proposal to solve interregional conflicts between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong, this proposal can also be applied to conflicts involving Macao. 
Xiao's proposal should be regarded as an intergovernmental model.  
 By contrast, Professor Jin Huang prefers a non-governmental organization. He 
indicates that regional unilateral legislations are insufficient for solving interregional 
legal conflicts.68 He argues that "it is absolutely necessary" to establish a comprehensive 
multilateral interregional mechanism of legal consultation, coordination and 
cooperation.69 He names this mechanism "National Commission of Legal Consultation 
and Coordination."70 He believes that it should be founded on the framework of the PRC 
Constitution and the two Basic Laws and should be constituted by legislature members, 
judges, lawyers, legal academics, and other legal experts appointed by the three regions.71 
Its responsibilities include "the initiation of research, consultation, and coordination in 
interregional legal affairs and issues, and the making of proposals that are agreeable to all 
parties in order to promote mutual assistance and cooperation in legal matters."72 
                                                        
67 Yongpin, supra note_42_ at 200.  
68 Jin Huang, Interaction and Integration Between the Legal Systems of Hong Kong, Macao and Mainland China 50 
Years After Their Return to China,  in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS -- PERSPECTIVES OF 
EVOLUTION ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 769, 772 (Jorge 
Oliveira, Paulo Cardinal ed. 1999).  
69 Id. at 770. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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Although this Commission should receive official supports from the three regions,73 
Huang believes it should be a non-governmental organization.74 So its legislative 
proposals are not mandatory:75 
 
Its legislative proposals would thus serve as recommendations, model laws, or 
instructions without having mandatory force. The final decision-making power 
would rest with the respective legislatures in accordance with the respective Basic 
Laws of the SARs. 
  
Huang concludes that the establishment of such commission should be the primary 
objective during and after the first 50-year that Hong Kong and Macao reunited with 
Mainland China.76 Additionally, some scholars suggest the Hague Conference as a good 
model.77 The legislative suggestion proposed by this organization is not binding and 
legislatures in each region are the final decision-makers.78 
The functions of the organizations proposed by Xiao and Huang are similar: draft 
model laws, enhance regional legal communications, and publish advisory opinions. 
They differ in the fact that Xiao's proposal is an intergovernmental organization while 
Huang advocates a non-governmental organization. In my view, both intergovernmental 
and non-governmental forms deserve to be attempted. The central authority in every 
region may jointly establish an organization for interregional JRE issues. Although not 
deciding particular cases, this organization should provide guidance for regions in 
implementing the proposed Arrangement and maintain its uniform interpretation. 
                                                        
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Chen, supra note_66_ at 18. 
78 Id, at 19. 
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Alternatively, the Chinese Society of Private International Law in Mainland China79 may 
cooperate with academic organizations in other regions80 to promote interregional legal 
exchange in a non-governmental fashion. Because currently no association contains 
members from all Chinese regions, another channel of non-governmental cooperation is 
to establish a Chinese Interregional Law Association. It should comprise of the elites of 
the academia, the judiciary, and the private bar from the four regions. It aims to help 
clarify and simplify interregional JRE laws as well as other interregional laws. It may 
draw useful insights from the development and function of the American Law Institute 
(hereinafter “ALI)81 and the proposed European Law Institute.82 The ALI is also a private, 
non-profit corporation,83 and has played a very important role in the harmonization of 
American state laws since its establishment in 1923.84 It is dedicated to address 
controversial issues involving difficult intersections of policy and social interests and its 
projects include restatements85 and model laws.86 Notably, the European Parliament also 
                                                        
79 Chinese Society of Private International Law is a non-governmental academic organization founded in October 1987. 
Its members include academics, judges, and lawyers in Mainland China. It arranges an annual meeting to discuss 
important theoretical and practical issues on private international law. It also invites people from Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Taiwan to participate in the annual meetings. Its major achievements include the Model Law of Private 
International Law of the People’s Republic of China (2000). Chinese Society of Private International Law, Model Law 
of Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law Press China 2-3 (August 2000). 
80 Eg., the Law Society of Hong Kong, more information is available at http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_e/default.asp, 
Hong Kong Academy of Law, more information is available at http://www.hklawacademy.org/about.php, and the Law 
Society of Macao, more information is available at http://en.io.gov.mo/Priv/record/1728.aspx (last visited on May 1, 
2010). 
81 The ALI was founded because the then best legal minds of the US were unsatisfied with the inconsistency, 
uncertainty, and complexity of the common law. For more information about the ALI, see also 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.creationinstitute (last visited on March 23, 2010).  
82 For details of European Law Institute, see http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/ (last visited on March 23, 2010) 
83 G C Hazard, Jr., The American Law Institute Is Alive and Well, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 661, 664 (1997-1998). The ALI is 
formed under the laws of the District of Columbia, the US. C W Wolfram, “Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s 
Restatements” 26 Hofstra Law Review 817, 819 (1997-1998).  
84 See Hazard, Jr., supra 83 at 665. H P. Wilkins, Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship, and 
the Restatements of Law, 26 Hofstra Law Review 567 (1997-1998). But the ALI is not perfect. For criticism of its 
restatement making process, see C W Wolfram, supra n 83. For the difficulties that the ALI faces when its project 
intends to change the status quo, particularly to upset important economic relationships, see generally C Silver, The 
Lost World: of Politics and Getting the Law Right, 26 Hofstra Law Review 773 (1997-1998).  
85 For the restatement making process, see W T Barker, Lobbying and The American Law Institute: the Example of 
Insurance Defense 26 Hofstra Law Review 573, 576-78 (1997-1998). For a plea for a new restatement in relation to 
private international law, see Simeon C. Symeonides, A New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not? 5 Journal of Private 
International Law 383 (2009). 
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advocates to establish an European Law Institute, where "legal policy-makers, the 
administrative authorities, the judiciary and those responsible for applying the law 
cooperate on a scientific basis" to prepare a European restatement of civil and 
commercial law.87 This Institute, following the ALI, is expected to lead the discussion of 
the harmonization of European private law, draft and update the text of the principles and 
an official commentary, and provide a website for information.88 It will certainly take 
years for the proposed comparative Chinese Interregional Law Association to become a 
major force, like the ALI or the proposed European Law Institute, in shaping 
interregional JRE laws in a plural legal system. The success of the proposed Association 
will come from its contribution to the advancement and unification of laws in China’s 
interregional conflicts.  
As a conclusion, because Chinese interregional JRE only involves three members, 
court-to-court and central authority-to-central authority information exchange can address 
the problems of exchanging information about the specific judgments that are to be 
enforced and maintaining interpretational uniformity. In the long term, a governmental or 
non-governmental organization may be established to enhance interregional judicial 
assistance.  
 
C. Relationship with Other Interregional or International JRE Instruments 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
86 Hazard, Jr., supra n 83 at 662. 
87 Para 15 of the European Parliament Resolution on the Approximation of the Civil and Commercial Law of the 
Member States (COM (2001) 398- C5-0471/2001-2001/2187(COS)), dated November 15, 2001, which responded to 
the European Commission's Communication on European Contract Law, COM (01) 398. 
88 Dominik Kallweit, Towards a European Contract Law: For a Prosperous Future of International Trade, 35 VICT. U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 269 (2004). Martijn W. Hesselink, The Common Frame of Reference as a Source of European 
Private Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 919, 928 (2009). Christian v. Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for 
European Private Law, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 379, 387 (2002). Joachim Bornkamm, The German Supreme Court: An 
Actor in the Global Conversation of High Courts, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415, 427 (2004). 
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The proposed Multilateral JRE Arrangement should supersede the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Arrangement and the Mainland-Macao Arrangement. If in the judgment-rendering 
proceedings, service is conducted or evidence is collected according to relevant 
interregional arrangements,89 the requested court should not deny JRE on the ground of 
unfair procedure regarding service and evidence collection, if no other defense exists.  
The Majority of conventions concluded at the Hague Conference,90 including the 
Hague Choice of Court Convention, will not be applied among Chinese regions.91 
Regarding the relationship between the proposed Arrangement and international JRE 
instruments ratified by Chinese regions and applicable among them, China may draw 
useful insights from the EU. The EU JRE law adopts the lex specialis rule to solve 
potential conflicts between the Brussels I Regulation and international conventions.92 The 
goal is to ensure regions comply with the particularities in ratified conventions regarding 
specific matters.93 Therefore, the proposed Arrangement should not prejudice to 
international conventions involving JRE on specific matters. In other words, specialized 
                                                        
89 Eg., the Mainland-Hong Kong Service Arrangement and the Mainland-Macao Service and Evidence Arrangement. 
For details of these arrangements, see Chapter I. 
90 The Hague Conventions that continue to be applicable to Hong Kong after it reunited with Mainland China are 
Convention of 5 October 1961 on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions, 
Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legislation for Foreign Public Documents, Convention 
of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition. The Hague Conventions that continue to be applicable to Macao after it reunited with Mainland China are 
Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil procedure, Convention of 24 October 1956 on the law applicable to maintenance 
obligations towards children, Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of authorities and the law 
applicable in respect of the protection of infants, Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of 
Legislation for Foreign Public Documents, and Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction. See http://cn.io.gov.mo/Legis/International/1/14.aspx (accessed on June 1, 2010).  
91 See Hong Kong Legislative Council Paper No. CB(2) 722/01-02(04) para 18, December 20, 2001. The conclusion of 
the Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement partly aims to fill the gap when Mainland China and Hong Kong ratify the 
Hague Choice of Court Convention but it does not apply between these two regions. Similarly, the Hague Evidence 
Convention and the 1958 New York Convention are inapplicable among Chinese regions. Therefore, interregional 
arrangements on evidence and arbitration awards were concluded among Chinese regions.  
92 Art. 71(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. Peter Mankowski, Chapter VII Relations with Other Instruments,  in 
BRUSSELS I REGULATION , 754-55 (ULRICH MAGNUS & PETER MANKOWSKI ed. 2007). 
93 Mankowski, supra note 92 at 755. The Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship “Tatry” v. The owners of 
the ship “Maciej Rataj” (Case 406/92), [1992] ECR I-5439, I-5471 para. 24; Nürnberger Allegmeine Versicherungs-AG 
v. Protbridge Transport International BV, (Case C-148/03) [1004] ECR I-10327, I-10335 para. 14. The “Po” [1991] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 206 (C.A.). 
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conventions should prevail against the proposed Arrangement in case of conflicts. For 
example, the 1992 Protocol of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage should prevail against the proposed Arrangement when requested 
judgments are relating to pollution damage or preventive measures against such 
damage.94 However, the proposed Arrangement should apply when conventions on 
specific matters do not govern. 
 
  
                                                        
94 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969), , 
http://www.imo.org/conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=660&topic_id=256 (last visited Feb 9, 2010). 
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Chapter VII Conclusion 
 
This dissertation is a comparative study and focuses on what lessons China can 
draw from the US and the EU to develop its interregional JRE law. It argues that the 
Mainland-Hong Kong Arrangement and the Mainland-Macao Arrangement are only first 
steps beyond the unsatisfactory stage of pure regional JRE laws, but more is needed: the 
next stage should be a Multilateral JRE Arrangement. It explores solutions for the three 
most crucial macro challenges for this Arrangement: conflicts between socialist law and 
capitalist law, conflicts between civil law and common law, and weak mutual trust among 
Chinese regions. It also proposes selected rules of the proposed Multilateral JRE 
Arrangement. This Arrangement should be a single enforcement arrangement, regulating 
JRE (including indirect jurisdiction) but not direct jurisdiction. It divides indirect 
jurisdiction into categories of required, excluded, and permitted. This dissertation also 
discusses the scope, requirements for JRE, and defenses against JRE in the proposed 
Arrangement. It argues that the proposed Arrangement should be adopted as an 
interregional instrument signed by the three regions and implemented by separate 
regional legislations. Moreover, it proposes a coordination mechanism to solve the 
problems brought by the absence of a court of final review. 
As a Chinese proverb says, “a journey of ten thousand miles must begin with a 
single step.” This dissertation is only a single step. There is still a substantial amount of 
work to develop Chinese interregional JRE rules, so as to deal with the new challenges 
brought by the more and more frequent interactions among the distinctive regions within 
one China. The future work at least includes how to develop this Arrangement into a 
 365 
mixed or double arrangement in order to enhance the certainty of JRE and to reduce the 
conflicts of jurisdiction, and how to extend this Arrangement to Taiwan. 
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